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In July 2016, the Toronto chapter of Black Lives Matter (BLM)—the 
antiracist movement emerged four years earlier in the United States—
staged a protest during the local LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, 
queer) Pride.1 BLM activists interrupted the march for about half an hour. 
They protested, among other things, the lack of institutional and economic 
support for the presence of black queer collectives at the Pride, the 
underrepresentation of trans women of color, queer people of color, and 
indigenous queers within its organizational structures, the disappearance 
of the South Asian stage from the march, and the presence of police forces 
in uniform.2 Months before, BLM had been invited to lead the Pride as a 
“honoured group.”3 Instead of declining the invitation, as the local chapter 
of the movement did in San Francisco,4 the Toronto chapter chose to seize 
that space. Upon consulting with groups that either had been boycotting 
the Pride for a long time or have been progressively marginalized within 
the organization of the event, such as Black Queer Youth, BLM decided to 
disrupt the march in order to publicly articulate a number of demands rooted 
in the struggles of trans and queer people of color. The protest ended when 
Mathieu Chantelois, executive director of Pride Toronto at the time, signed 
a document through which he committed to implementing such demands. 
Chantelois backpedaled the next day, stating that his only concern had been 
to interrupt the protest. Yet, at its annual general meeting in January 2017, 
Pride Toronto voted in favor of endorsing all of the demands originally put 
IRUZDUGE\%/0LQFOXGLQJWKHEDQQLQJRISROLFHÀRDWVIURPWKHPDUFK
It is not surprising that a critique of the Pride was articulated, in Toronto, by 
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this particular black antiracist formation. In its composition, BLM illustrates 
VRPHNH\WUDQVIRUPDWLRQVLQWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\¿HOGRIDQWLUDFLVWIHPLQLVW
and LGBTQ politics. Formed in the United States in 2012, after seventeen-
year-old African American Trayvon Martin was shot to death by police 
RI¿FHU*HRUJH=LPPHUPDQDQGWKHODWWHUZDVDFTXLWWHGIRUKLVFULPH%/0
is a movement primarily organized around the problem of anti-black racism. 
+RZHYHUWKHUDPL¿FDWLRQVRIUDFHDORQJD[HVRIJHQGHUDQGVH[XDOLW\DUH
not obscured, but rather emphasized. The movement was initiated by three 
black queer women—Alicia Garza, Opal Tometi, and Patrisse Cullors—
DQGGHSLFWVLWVHOIDVIROORZV³%ODFN/LYHV0DWWHUDI¿UPVWKHOLYHVRI%ODFN
queer and trans folks, disabled folks, black-undocumented folks, folks with 
records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers 
those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movements. It 
is a tactic to (re)build the Black liberation movement.”5 On the one hand, 
at a particular historical juncture when anti-black violence has resurfaced 
LQSODLQYLHZLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV%/0UHÀHFWVWKHQHHGWRUHFRQVWUXFWD
terrain of antagonism around the color line and to reactivate black antiracism 
as a form of radical mass organizing. On the one hand, its queer composition 
has also turned the movement into a platform from which to articulate an 
antiracist critique of contemporary LGBTQ politics. 
7KXV WKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRI WKHSURWHVW VWDJHGE\%/0DW WKH3ULGH LQ
Toronto goes beyond the concrete transformations that may actually 
take place in the future organization of the march. BLM’s intervention 
LVLOOXVWUDWLYHRIEURDGHUSURFHVVHVRIUHFRPSRVLWLRQDIIHFWLQJWKH¿HOGRI
contemporary identity political formations. Through the past twenty years, 
the problems of race and racism have been gaining increasing centrality 
in LGBTQ politics as well as queer theory. This process has been key in 
reorienting queer critique toward questions of material redistribution. For 
instance, central to BLM’s protest at the Pride in Toronto was a critique of 
the defunding of black queer collectives in favor of a marketization of the 
march.67REHVXUH WKHVH UHFRPSRVLWLRQVRI WKH¿HOGRI LGHQWLW\SROLWLFV
do not often reach the peak—as in the experience of BLM—of entirely 
shifting the terrain of radical queer critique from LGBTQ formations to 
antiracist formations. In this respect, BLM is to a certain extent exceptional. 
Nonetheless, recalling W. E. B. Du Bois (1903) with a difference, one could 
argue that the problem of the color line has become, for LGBTQ politics 
DQGTXHHUWKHRU\WKHSUREOHPRIWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\7 
The rise to prominence of race as a queer question has been not only, 
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but also a response to broader shifts rightward in contemporary sexual 
politics. By receding from the terrain of social and economic justice and 
embracing a politics of formal equality, pursuing almost unilaterally the 
achievement of same-sex marriage and other forms of state-sanctioned 
UHFRJQLWLRQVLJQL¿FDQWVHJPHQWVRI/*%74PRYHPHQWVDFURVVWKHJOREDO
North have been facilitating a convergence between progressive sexual 
politics and neoliberalism. Concrete alliances established with centrist 
parties on both sides of the Atlantic—for instance, with the New Democrats 
of Bill Clinton in the United States through the 1990s—have presided 
RYHUVXFKDFRQYHUJHQFH7KLVUHDOLJQPHQWKDV LQWHQVL¿HGFRQÀLFWVRYHU
class and race within LGBTQ formations. Contemporary queer critiques 
of the Pride marches are once again exemplary. Those who point out the 
increasing marketization of the marches, and the privileging of corporate 
sponsors’ interests over political content, usually do so by recalling the 
class and racial composition of the crowd who famously revolted against 
the police at the Stonewall Inn on June 28, 1969. BLM made this point 
during their protest in Toronto: “We threw bricks for you. We got locked 
up for you. . . . Don’t you ever forget your queer histories. Don’t you ever 
forget who made this possible!” 
This reclaiming of a trans and queer of color history is often 
mobilized, in the present, as a vantage point on the heterogeneous effects 
of neoliberalization on racially and economically segmented LGBTQ 
IRUPDWLRQV7R WKLVZHPXVW DGG WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV RI WKH UDFLDO ¿HOG
itself in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 
2001, commonly referred to as 9/11. Since the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks, sexual progress has been largely mobilized, both in Europe and the 
8QLWHG6WDWHVIRUWKHDUWLFXODWLRQRIVSHFL¿FIRUPVRIUDFLVPQDWLRQDOLVP
and imperialism. The populations targeted by the ongoing “war on terror”—
especially Muslim, Arab, and South Asian populations—are racialized as 
“sexually backward” and as a threat to Western progress. In this context, 
BLM’s demand that Pride Toronto reinstates the South Asian stage, which 
KDGGLVDSSHDUHGIURPWKHPDUFKJDLQVDGGLWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH,WLVLQOLJKW
of these transformations of progressive sexual politics—its convergences 
with neoliberalism, racism, nationalism, and imperialism—that one has 
to understand the contemporary recompositions of LGBTQ formations 
around the problem of the color line.
This dissertation explores these transformations and recompositions 
DV WKH\ KDYH EHHQ PDWHULDOL]LQJ ¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW LQ WKH WKHRUHWLFDO
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¿HOG,QSDUWLFXODULWWDNHVDVLWVVWDUWLQJSRLQWWKUHHDWWHPSWVWRname the 
contemporary shifts rightward in progressive sexual politics, for these 
attempts have been particularly successful in reorienting contemporary 
queer debates. In The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural 
Politics, and the Attack on Democracy (2003), Lisa Duggan conceptualizes 
the emergence of what she terms “homonormativity”: a sexual politics 
ideologically aligned with the politico-economic project of neoliberalism 
through the promotion of “a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, 
depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (50). 
'XJJDQDUJXHV WKDW WKHSROLWLFVRIKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\²¿UVWDUWLFXODWHG LQ
WKHODWHVE\VPDOOEXWLQÀXHQWLDO86JD\ULJKWZLQJIRUPDWLRQVVXFK
as the Log Cabin Republicans—must be understood as part and parcel of 
a broader shift in the ideological apparatus of neoliberalism: from the 
alliances with sexual conservatives and white supremacists typical of the 
Thatcher-Reagan era, toward a contemporary non-redistributive politics of 
HTXDOLW\DEVRUELQJVLJQL¿FDQWVHJPHQWVRI/*%74PRYHPHQWV
In Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007), 
Jasbir K. Puar draws in part on Duggan’s analysis in order to diagnose the 
formation of a national homonormativity, or “homonationalism,” in the 
VSHFL¿F FRQWH[W RI WKH ³ZDU RQ WHUURU´3XDU SRLQWV DW WKH LQFRUSRUDWLRQ
of elements of LGBTQ discourses into U.S. nationalism after 9/11. 
Through this incorporation, she argues, the United States could be 
ideologically produced as a safe space for queers by means of comparison 
with a “repressed” Arab world, even as an aggressively heteropatriarchal 
nationalism was reactivated both at home and during the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, in Desiring Arabs (2007), Joseph A. 
Massad focuses on the Arab world and develops an analysis of sexual 
imperialism. The main target of Massad’s critique is what he terms the 
“Gay International”: an ensemble of international LGBTQ organizations 
and intellectuals invested into the saving of Arab gays and lesbians. In his 
view, even as the Gay International advocates sexual liberation, it is in fact 
centrally responsible for the articulation of popular and state homophobia 
in contemporary Arab societies. For Massad, this sexual imperialism is 
RUJDQLFWRWKHEURDGHUHGL¿FHRI:HVWHUQLPSHULDOLVPLQWKH$UDEZRUOG
The concepts of “homonormativity,” “homonationalism,” and “sexual 
LPSHULDOLVP´ KDYH EHHQ FLUFXODWLQJ ZLGHO\ QRW RQO\ ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOG RI
queer theory, but also across the boundaries between the theoretical and 
WKH SROLWLFDO ¿HOGV )RUPVRI DQWDJRQLVP VXFK DV WKH RQH DUWLFXODWHG E\
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BLM at the Pride in Toronto are informed by—and continue to inform—
contemporary queer debates.8 Against the background of these exchanges 
across the theory/practice divide, this dissertation contributes to the 
debates on homonormativity, homonationalism, and sexual imperialism by 
ORFDWLQJWKHVHFRQFHSWVRQWKHVSHFL¿FWHUUDLQRItheoretical practice. My 
primary matter of concern is what they do—as conceptual abstractions and 
WKHRUHWLFDOPRPHQWV²WR TXHHU WKHRU\ DV D ¿HOG ,Q RWKHUZRUGV UDWKHU
WKDQDVVXPLQJDWUDQVSDUHQWUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHWKHRUHWLFDO¿HOGDQG
WKH ¿HOG RI VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO VWUXJJOHV , DSSURDFK WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI
theory itself as a practice and as a terrain of struggle. What transformations 
and processes of recomposition has queer theory undergone in the wake 
of the appearance of homonormativity, homonationalism, and sexual 
LPSHULDOLVP ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOG" ,Q RUGHU WR DGGUHVV WKLV TXHVWLRQ , UHDG
both the contemporary shifts rightward in progressive sexual politics and 
WKH UHFRPSRVLWLRQV RI WKH TXHHU WKHRUHWLFDO ¿HOG WKURXJK WKH WKHRU\ RI
hegemony developed by Stuart Hall. 




contemporary debates on homonormativity, homonationalism, and sexual 
imperialism has three implications. First, I suggest that these contemporary 
shifts rightward in progressive sexual politics maintain important relations 
of continuity with political and ideological processes inaugurated in 
WKH V 6HFRQG , UHFRYHU NH\ FRQFHSWV RI+DOO¶V DQDO\VLV²¿UVW DQG
foremost, the concept of hegemony—that were central to the early project 
of cultural studies but have faded into the background or even disappeared 
from contemporary queer debates. I argue that such concepts can help us 




of hegemony and counter-hegemony, not only the current transformations 
of sexual politics, but also the transformations and recompositions of 
WKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\,QIDFWDUHÀHFWLRQRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
theory and practice informs this dissertation as a whole. I address this 
theoretical problem in different ways throughout the three chapters and I 
further emphasize it at the end of each chapter, where I present and discuss 
Introduction6
a political vignette that speaks back to the theoretical debates.
7KH¿UVWFKDSWHU³7KLQNLQJZLWK6WXDUW+DOO+HJHPRQ\DQG,GHQWLW\
Politics,” is devoted to Hall’s reading of Gramsci. In his Prison Notebooks 
>@  *UDPVFL DUJXHG WKDW D VRFLDOLVW SROLWLFV LQ OLEHUDO
societies must confront the rule of the bourgeoisie not just through frontal 
attack, but seizing spaces in civil society. This is so because, in his view, a 
dominant class in liberal societies does not rule only through coercion, but 
through a combination of coercion and consent: hegemony. In other words, 
a dominant class can consolidate and exercise its power only if it is able 
to operate across the terrains of both state and civil society, articulating 
the interests of heterogeneous social segments into what Gramsci termed 
a “hegemonic bloc.” The politics of hegemony and counter-hegemony is, 
IRU*UDPVFL D ³ZDU RI SRVLWLRQ´ WDNLQJ SODFH¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW RQ WKH
terrain of civil society. In the 1980s, Hall elaborated on Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony to conceptualize a triangular relation between the rise of 
Thatcherism, a crisis of the British Left, and the emergence of new identity 
politics. In Hall’s view, the problem of identity—opened up in the 1970s 
by new social movements such as feminism, gay and lesbian liberation, 
and Black Power—came to constitute a key terrain of struggle in the war 
of position between the Left and the New Right of Margaret Thatcher. 
According to his analysis, while Thatcherism was quick to size that terrain 
and to articulate it rightward, along conservative lines, the Left was unable 
or even reluctant to occupy the same terrain on socialist terms (see Hall 
and Jacques 1983). For Hall, it is also because of its failure to understand 
identity as a relevant terrain of struggle that the Left lost ground and failed 
to confront the increasing ascendancy of Thatcherism.
Hall turned to Gramsci because the theory of hegemony that the latter 
HODERUDWHGLQWKHVDQGVUHSUHVHQWHGLQWKH¿UVWSODFHDFULWLTXH
of Marxist economic reductionism and a refusal to locate politics and 
ideology as superstructural by-products of the economic base. Questioning 
the classical Marxist base-superstructure metaphor, Gramsci argued 
that “the superstructures of civil society” are key sites to be seized in a 
struggle for hegemony (Hall 1986a). Drawing on Gramsci’s critique of 
economic reductionism, and in close dialogue with Louis Althusser and 
Ernesto Laclau, Hall developed a theory of the “relative autonomy” of the 
political and the ideological from the level of the economic. In his view, 
the convergences between the three levels are never given, but are rather 
the effects of practices of “articulation.” So the question in the 1980s, 
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for Hall, was not whether identity politics are inherently conservative or 
progressive, but how they were being contingently articulated in the course 
of the struggle for hegemony conducted by Thatcherism. In this way, he 
was able to project the problem of identity at the core of the struggle 
between Thatcherism and the Left, yet maintaining that identity politics 
possess their own relative autonomy.
2Q WKHRQHKDQG LQ WKH¿UVWFKDSWHU , UHFRYHUNH\DVSHFWVRI+DOO¶V
theoretical intervention: his reading of Gramsci and of the theory of 
hegemony, his analysis of Thatcherism, his critical dialogues with 
Louis Althusser and Ernesto Laclau, his theory of “articulation” and his 
conceptualization of the ideological and the political levels as “relatively 
autonomous” from the economic, and his Marxist approach to the problem 
RILGHQWLW\SROLWLFV2QWKHRWKHUKDQG,]RRPLQRQVSHFL¿FPRPHQWVWKDW
reveal the centrality of identity to the struggle for hegemony conducted by 
Thatcherism. I discuss in particular two “moral panics”: a moral panic about 
race and mugging that Hall and his colleagues analyze in depth in Policing 
the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (Hall et al. 1978), and 
the panic about homosexuality that led to the introduction of the infamous 
Section 28 in the Local Government Act (1988) of the third Thatcher 
government, which prohibited “the promotion of homosexuality” by local 
authorities. At the end of the chapter, I recall the experience of Lesbians 
and Gays Support the Miners (LGSM), a group of lesbians and gays that 
formed in London in order to support the miners on strike, in 1984-85, 
against the second Thatcher government. The story of LGSM illustrates 
the possible articulations and the tensions between identity politics and the 
politics of hegemony and counter-hegemony.
In the next two chapters, I turn to contemporary queer debates, 
which I approach through the lens of Hall’s conceptual apparatus. In the 
second chapter, “Homonormativity, Intersectionality, and the ‘Marxist 
Renaissance’ in Queer Theory,” I interrogate Lisa Duggan’s (2003) work on 
homonormativity and its impact on contemporary queer debates. Duggan 
YLUWXDOO\GULYHV+DOO¶VDQDO\VLV IRUZDUG LQ WKH WZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\ZKLOH
shifting the focus from the British context to the United States. While Hall 
argued, in the 1980s, that the failure of the British Left to engage with identity 
politics would concede space to Thatcherism, and that the latter would 
occupy that terrain on conservative terms, Duggan reconstructs the process 
through which the neoliberal bloc itself proceeded to shift its approach to 
the problem of identity through the 1990s. In her view, as the Left continued 
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WRGHEDWHZKHWKHUDSROLWLFVRIFODVVFRQÀLFWZDVFRPSDWLEOHRUQRWZLWKWKH
politics of gender, race, and sexuality, advocates of neoliberalism began 
to establish new alliances with segments of the LGBTQ movement in the 
United States, embracing a non-redistributive politics of equality. Unlike 
Hall, Duggan primarily focuses on the transformations of identity political 
formations themselves, rather than locating the latter as a key terrain to be 
seized in a war of position between Left and Right. Like Hall, however, she 
situates these transformations within broader struggles for hegemony—
PRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\DVSDUWRIDVKLIWLQWKHSROLWLFRLGHRORJLFDODSSDUDWXVRI
the neoliberal bloc. 
This chapter begins by rereading the well-known exchange on 
redistribution and recognition between Judith Butler (1997b) and Nancy 
Fraser (1997b), which in many ways prepared the ground for Duggan’s 
intervention and, more broadly, for contemporary queer debates about 
the relation between sexual politics and capitalism. While Butler argues, 
in that exchange, that LGBTQ politics intrinsically undermine the very 
structure of capitalism, Fraser replies that recognition and redistribution are 
politically and analytically distinct terrains of struggle. Rather than siding 
with either Butler or Fraser, I suggest that their exchange both anticipates 
TXHHUGHEDWHVWKDWEHJDQWRXQIROGDWWKHWXUQRIWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\
andIDLOVWRUHJLVWHUWKHVSHFL¿FLWLHVRIWKHHPHUJLQJFRQMXQFWXUHWKDWLVWKH
articulation of homonormativity. Hence, after discussing Duggan’s analysis 
of homonormativity as a sexual politics politically and ideologically aligned 
with neoliberalism, the rest of the chapter explores key transformations of 
WKHTXHHUWKHRUHWLFDO¿HOGLQWKHZDNHRIWKLVVKLIWRIWKHSROLWLFRLGHRORJLFDO
terrain, which neither Butler nor Fraser anticipated. On the one hand, I 
locate here what I term a “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory, suggesting 
that this contemporary reencounter between queer theory and Marxism is 
largely a response to the emergence of homonormativity. I identify the 
analysis offered by Kevin Floyd in 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH7RZDUGD
Queer Marxism (2009) as a central contribution to this reencounter. On 
the other hand, I discuss the formation of queer of color critique, mainly 
through a reading of Roderick A. Ferguson’s Aberrations in Black: Toward 
a Queer of Color Critique (2004). I propose that this theoretical formation 
mediates both the contemporary “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory and 
the critique of homonormativity. And I argue that it does so by struggling 
WRKHJHPRQL]HWKHFRORUOLQHZLWKLQWKH¿HOG
Central to this chapter is the problem of identity politics. In the face 
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of homonormativity, queer critiques of identity politics proliferate today. 
Both identity politics and identity as such are often regarded as instances 
RI WKH³UHL¿FDWLRQ´RI VRFLDO UHODWLRQVXQGHU FDSLWDOLVP HVSHFLDOO\ LQ LWV
neoliberal phase. Instead, I propose to conceptualize identity politics as an 
H[SDQVLYHDQGLQWHUVHFWLRQDO¿HOGRILGHQWL¿FDWLRQVDQGGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV
Emphasizing the struggle around the color line conducted by queer of color 
FULWLTXHZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\DQGEULQJLQJ+DOO¶VLQVLJKWVLQWR
these contemporary debates, I suggest that identity politics be understood 
as a possible (if not necessary) terrain of recomposition. I conclude the 
chapter by reconstructing the political life narrative of Afro-Dutch lesbian 
feminist Gloria Wekker, tracing her passages through antiracist, feminist, 
and LGBTQ formations as well as academic spaces in the Netherlands 
from the 1970s to the present. On the one hand, grounding my analysis in 
WKHVSHFL¿FLWLHVRIWKH'XWFKFRQWH[W,VXJJHVWWKDWDQWLUDFLVWRUJDQL]LQJ
rather than LGBTQ organizing, may function today as a privileged terrain 
for the articulation of queer critiques of homonormativity. In other words, 
I observe a tendency toward recomposition similar to the one illustrated 
by BLM in the United States. On the other hand, by bringing into focus 
Wekker’s struggles within the university, I point at the ways in which such 
a recomposition is crucially mediated by the seizing of institutional space. 
Wekker’s political life narrative illustrates the conditions of possibility 
for a continuous exchange across the theory/practice divide as well as the 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQVWDNLQJSODFHLQERWK¿HOGVWKURXJKWKHHPHUJHQFHRIUDFH
as a queer question.  
In the third chapter, “Queer Diasporic Critiques of Homonationalism 
and Sexual Imperialism,” I continue a discussion of the contemporary 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV RI WKH TXHHU WKHRUHWLFDO ¿HOG E\ IRFXVLQJ RQ -DVELU .
Puar’s (2007) critique of homonationalism and Joseph A. Massad’s (2007) 
critique of sexual imperialism in the Arab world. The chapter begins by 
SUR¿OLQJWKHFRQWRXUVRITXHHUGLDVSRULFFULWLTXHDWKHRUHWLFDOIRUPDWLRQ
WKDWVLJQL¿FDQWO\RYHUODSVZLWKTXHHURIFRORUFULWLTXHDQGMRLQVWKHODWWHU
in its struggle around the color line in queer theory. While the boundaries 
EHWZHHQ WKH WZR FDQ EH GH¿QHG RQO\ SUHFDULRXVO\ DQG SURYLVLRQDOO\ ,
emphasize the distinct transnational scope of queer diasporic critique. I 
do so through a reading of key interventions by Gayatri Gopinath (2005a), 
Chandan Reddy (2011), and Martin F. Manalansan IV (2003). Hence, I 
ORFDWH3XDU¶VDQG0DVVDG¶VUHVSHFWLYHDQDO\VHVZLWKLQWKLV¿HOGHYHQDV,
point out that neither of the two is exemplary, strictly speaking, of a queer 
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diasporic theoretical practice. On the contrary, even though their critiques 
of homonationalism and sexual imperialism have played a central role in 
RULHQWLQJWKHTXHHUGLDVSRULF¿HOGERWK3XDUDQGHVSHFLDOO\0DVVDGWDNH
distance, in different ways and to different extents, from queer diasporic 
theoretical and political formations.  
Nonetheless, I locate Puar’s and Massad’s interventions on the terrain 
RITXHHUGLDVSRULFFULWLTXHEHFDXVH WKLVDOORZVPH WRFRQGXFWD VSHFL¿F
discussion of their theoretical practice. Many critics of Puar and Massad 
have been signaling precisely their diasporic location in the United States 
in order to question the capacity of their analyses to account for LGBTQ 
struggles unfolding on the other side of the transnational divide (see Castro 
9DUHODDQG'KDZDQ5LWFKLH6LPLODUO\ ,SRVHDTXHVWLRQRI
diasporic theoretical practice: to what extent are queer diasporic analyses 
of homonationalism and sexual imperialism able, not only to join queer of 
color formations in their struggle around the color line in the global North, 
EXW DOVR WR DUWLFXODWH WKH VWUXJJOHV WDNLQJ SODFH LQ WKH 6RXWK" , DGGUHVV
WKLVTXHVWLRQLQWZRZD\V)LUVWERWK3XDUDQG0DVVDGVLJQL¿FDQWO\GUDZ
on Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of power in terms of discipline 
and biopolitics. Thus, in order to interrogate their conceptual apparatus, I 
recover 1980s debates on theoretical practice involving Foucault, Hall, and 
Edward W. Said. Second, I propose an alternative approach to the problems 
of homonationalism and sexual imperialism, drawing on Rahul Rao’s 
DQDO\VHVRI WKHIRUPDWLRQRIKRPRSKRELD LQFRQWHPSRUDU\
Uganda. Through a materialist reading close to Hall’s, Rao reaches a 
key conclusion: rather than “locating” it culturally or geographically, 
homophobia must be “dispersed” as an object of both theoretical inquiry 
and political practice.
Following this call for dispersing homophobia, I conclude the chapter 
by shifting the attention from the global South to the European South. 
Here, I analyze the contemporary war on “gender ideology” taking place 
in both Southern and Eastern European peripheries, with a particular focus 
on Italy. With the term “gender ideology,” its opponents—the Vatican, 
the local far-right, and Catholic conservative formations—draw together 
an heterogeneous ensemble of queer and feminist theories, lobbying 
organizations, equality legislation, and sexual education initiatives. Such 
heterogeneous elements are portrayed as the vectors of an “ideological 
colonization” proceeding from the United States as well as from European 
DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVHH*DUEDJQROL%HUQLQL,VXJJHVW
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that the war on “gender ideology” must be understood in relation to the 
FRQFUHWHFRQMXQFWXUHRI(XURSHDQSHULSKHUDOVRFLDOIRUPDWLRQVGH¿QHGE\
the current politico-economic crisis in Europe (see Grzebalska 2016). On 
the one hand, by turning to Europe itself, I aim to undo the divide between 
Western sexual freedom and Third World homophobia, which structures 
the politics and ideologies of homonationalism and sexual imperialism. 
On the other hand, I emphasize the antagonisms activated among queer 
critics about how to understand and to resist this conservative campaign. 
7KURXJKWKLVGLVFXVVLRQ,FRQFOXGHDUHÀHFWLRQRQWKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFHWKDW
runs throughout the dissertation as a whole. 
0RYLQJ IURP +DOO¶V UHDGLQJ RI *UDPVFL LQ WKH ¿UVW FKDSWHU WR
contemporary queer debates in the next two chapters, this dissertation offers 
an analysis of queer theoretical practices in times of homonormativity, 
homonationalism, and sexual imperialism, and in the context of a “Marxist 
UHQDLVVDQFH´ZLWKLQWKH¿HOG%\FRQGXFWLQJWKLVDQDO\VLVWKURXJKWKHOHQV
of the theory of hegemony, I suggest that queer theory does not lose sight 
of politics and ideology and their relative autonomy. Indeed, one of the 
LQVLJKWVJXLGLQJP\ UHÀHFWLRQV LV WKDW LIRQH VWRSVQDPLQJDSUREOHP²
especially without having shifted the problematic that her or his critique 
is meant to address—that problem will most probably come back with a 
vengeance. In the third chapter, I make this point about ideology. I observe 
that the disappearance of a conceptualization of ideology often ends up 
reintroducing a totalizing notion of it into the analysis, if under the guise 
of different names. A similar point holds for identity politics. A dismissal 
of identity politics can very well coexist with its most circular and vacuous 
SUDFWLFLQJERWKLQWKHWKHRUHWLFDODQGWKHSROLWLFDO¿HOG,QVWHDG,VXJJHVW
that we continue to conceptualize identity politics as an expansive and 
LQWHUVHFWLRQDO¿HOGRI DQWDJRQLVPVDQG UHFRPSRVLWLRQ LQRUGHU WRNQRZ
how to navigate it. I develop this insight by recovering Hall’s approach to 
identity politics as a terrain of hegemonic struggle.
The merge of “queer” and “hegemony” in the title of this dissertation 
indicates this attempt to bring the theory of hegemony into contemporary 
queer debates. Yet, even as “queer hegemonies” also points at some 
elements of my analysis—the centrality of sexual politics to contemporary 
constructions of hegemony and the activation of hegemonic struggles 
ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOG RI TXHHU WKHRU\², GR QRW RIIHU LW DV D QHZ FRQFHSWXDO
construct. In fact, it makes no other appearance in the dissertation except 
for the title. While the invention of concepts forms part of the practice of 
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critical theory, it may have also become a function, today, of an increasingly 
accelerated mode of intellectual labor. In her dissertation, titled Travelling 
Truths: Sojourner Truth, Intersectionality, and Feminist Scholarship 
(2017), Katrine Smiet detects a certain circularity in contemporary debates 
on intersectionality, and comments: “In this publishing market, there is a 
growing pressure to coin new concepts and theories rather than build on 
already existing frameworks. . . . This may be a reason behind the cycle 
of critique and defense within the intersectionality scholarship” (211). For 
similar reasons, I refrain from adding “queer hegemonies” to a theoretical 
landscape saturated with concepts of recent coinage—some of which 
are very effective in naming the contemporary transformations of sexual 
SROLWLFV5DWKHU,SURSRVHWKDWFRQWHPSRUDU\TXHHUGHEDWHVZRXOGEHQH¿W
from an engagement with the theory of hegemony. Puar suggests that 
³>T@XHHU WLPHV UHTXLUH HYHQ TXHHUHUPRGDOLWLHV RI WKRXJKW´ 3XDU 
121). Instead, I suspect that what is most needed in contradictory times are 
concepts and theoretical practices that help us untangle the contradictions. 
Hegemony, as theorized by Gramsci in the 1930s and redeployed by Hall 
in the 1980s, is one such concept.
CHAPTER ONE
THINKING WITH STUART HALL: 
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Gramsci gives us, not the tools with which to solve the puzzle, but the 
means with which to ask the right kind of questions.
Stuart Hall, “Gramsci and Us”
,QWKHVDQGVZKLOHWKH¿HOGRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVZDVFRQVROLGDWLQJ
its presence on the intellectual scene of the Left in Britain, Stuart Hall—
SHUKDSV WKHPRVW VLJQL¿FDQW ³IRXQGLQJ¿JXUH´ LQ WKH ¿HOG²HQJDJHG LQ
the process of appropriating and reactivating the conceptual apparatus 
HODERUDWHG¿YHGHFDGHVHDUOLHUE\,WDOLDQFRPPXQLVWPLOLWDQWDQGWKLQNHU
Antonio Gramsci.1 Of course, Hall was not the only reader of Gramsci 
in Britain at the time.2 Yet his turn to Gramsci was peculiar, for it was 
VSHFL¿FDOO\PHDQWWRFRQFHSWXDOL]HDWULDQJXODUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHULVHRI
Thatcherism, a crisis of the British Left, and the emergence of new social 
movements and identity politics of gender, race, and sexuality.3 Hall and 
other critics who gathered around Marxism Today, the theoretical magazine 
of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), termed this particular 
FRQMXQFWXUH ³1HZ 7LPHV´ +DOO DQG -DFTXHV  4 In Hall’s 
YLHZRQHRIWKHGH¿QLQJIHDWXUHVRIWKDWFRQMXQFWXUHZDVWKHIRUPDWLRQRI
identity as a key terrain of politico-ideological struggle, which the Left—
as opposed to Thatcherism—was failing or even refusing to identify as 
such. In other words, according to Hall’s analysis, the Left increasingly 
lost ground in its confrontation with Thatcherism because of its failure to 
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register a shifting of the very terrain on which the struggle for hegemony 
was taking place.
While this dissertation is primarily concerned with contemporary 
shifts rightward in sexual politics and the corresponding transformations 
RI TXHHU WKHRU\ WKLV¿UVW FKDSWHU H[SORUHV+DOO¶V UHDGLQJRI*UDPVFL LQ
the 1970s and 1980s. I propose to think with Hall for three different but 
interrelated reasons. First, to resituate Hall’s understanding of politics and 
ideology—and, more broadly, his interrogation of the relations between 
FXOWXUHDQGSRZHU²DWWKHFRUHRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVIRUWKLVLVWKH¿HOGLQ
which contemporary queer debates are largely taking place, especially 
in the United States.5 Second, to revisit today, in the face of a “Marxist 
renaissance” in queer theory,6 a particular moment in which identity 
politics made their troubling appearance on the horizon of Marxism and 
the Left.7 Hall’s theorizing is instructive precisely to the extent that it 
GRHV QRW SRVLW DQ ³HDV\¿W´ EHWZHHQ0DU[LVP DQG LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV EXW
rather struggles to work through their tensions and contradictions. Third, 
I turn to Hall because his reading of Gramsci, as mentioned above, led 
him to understand the rise of Thatcherism in a triangular relation with a 
crisis of the British Left and the emergence of identity politics. Despite 
WKHSURIRXQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVRIWKHVRFLDODQGWKHSROLWLFDO¿HOGVWKURXJK
the past forty years, I suggest that Hall’s reading of that conjuncture proves 
still relevant in order to understand the current rearticulations rightward of 
sexual politics.
I turn to Hall in the same spirit with which Hall himself turned to 
Gramsci: looking not for ready-made answers as much as for ways of 
posing the right kind of questions. Indeed, Hall’s reading of Gramsci not 
RQO\SURYLGHVXVZLWKDVHWRIXVHIXOWKHRUHWLFDOFRQFHSWVEXWLV¿UVWDQG
IRUHPRVWH[HPSODU\RIDVSHFL¿Ftheoretical practice. Hall never made use 
RI*UDPVFLDQFRQFHSWVE\VLPSO\³DSSO\LQJ´WKHPWRWKH¿HOGRIVRFLDODQG
political practices he set out to understand. His readings of Gramsci and 
of Thatcherism informed each other in a way that allowed Hall to offer an 
analysis of the political conjuncture and at the same time intervene, through 
that conjunctural analysis, in broader debates going on in Marxist theory. 
The relation between theory and practice, as well as the one between the 
abstract and the concrete, constituted for Hall theoretical problems in their 
RZQULJKW,QDNH\HVVD\WLWOHG³0DU[¶V1RWHVRQ0HWKRG´>@KH
addresses such problems at length while offering a close reading of Marx’s 
“1875 Introduction” to the Grundrisse. Here, Hall argues that Marxist theory 
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neither transparently UHÀHFWVWKHFRQFUHWHVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDO¿HOGVQRUFDQ
develop independently from them. Rather, as he puts it, theoretical practice 
always maintains a relation of “relative autonomy” to the “concrete” that 
it struggles to appropriate. This approach to theoretical practice, which 
Hall recovers from Marx and Gramsci and reactivates in the context of 
Thatcherism, is yet another reason why I propose to think with Hall about 
the current transformations of sexual politics and queer theory.        
,QWKH¿UVWVHFWLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHU,H[SDQGLQPRUHGHWDLORQWKHKLVWRULFDO
and theoretical reasons why this dissertation turns to Hall’s reading of 
Gramsci in the 1970s and 1980s. In the next section, I introduce Hall’s take 
on the Gramscian concept of “hegemony” vis-à-vis the reading of Gramsci 
offered by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy>@,DUJXHWKDWGHVSLWHWKHLUFRQWLJXRXVSROLWLFDODQG
theoretical commitments, what primarily distinguishes Laclau and Mouffe’s 
reading from Hall’s is precisely a divergence of theoretical practices. In the 
WKLUGVHFWLRQ,EULHÀ\LQWURGXFH+DOO¶VDQDO\VLVRI7KDWFKHULVPDVDIRUPRI
“authoritarian populism”: an ideological construction of popular consent to 
a distinctly authoritarian political project. Hence, I zoom in on the theoretical 
problem of ideology in the fourth section, where I trace Hall’s approach 
to ideology through his readings of Marx and Gramsci as well as his 
confrontations with key contemporary interlocutors, particularly Althusser 
and Laclau. The concept of ideology is central to Hall’s understanding of 
Thatcherism, for his analyses suggest that the latter owned large part of its 
success to an ability—unparalleled on the Left—of seizing the emerging 
politico-ideological terrain of identity politics. 
7KXVLQWKH¿IWKVHFWLRQ,GLVFXVVWKHVSHFL¿FUROHSOD\HGE\LGHQWLW\
politics in the struggle for hegemony conducted by Thatcherism through 
the 1970s and 1980s. I do so by focusing on two moral panics: on the one 
hand, a panic about mugging and race in 1972-73, which also allows me to 
recover the monumental analysis carried out by Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony 
Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts in Policing the Crisis: Mugging, 
the State, and Law and Order RQ WKHRWKHUKDQG DSDQLF DERXW
homosexuality in 1987-88, which accompanied the introduction of the 
infamous Section 28 prohibiting the “promotion of homosexuality” in the 
Local Government Act (1988) of the third Thatcher government. Finally, I 
conclude the chapter by recalling the political experience of Lesbians and 
Gays Support the Miners (LGSM). This small group of lesbians and gays 
was formed in London in order to support the miners on strike in 1984-85 
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against the program of pit closures of the second Thatcher government. 
How does this attempt to confront the Thatcherite regime on the basis of a 







the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), at the University 
of Birmingham, in 1964.8 The CCCS was founded by Richard Hoggart, 
who four years later was going to be replaced, as Director of the center, 
by Hall himself. Hall kept the position from 1968 until 1979, when he 
joined the Open University. The so-called Birmingham school of cultural 
studies (or British cultural studies) was characterized since its inception 
by a collective and interdisciplinary practice, located at the crossroads of 
literary criticism, sociology, and critical theory and in polemic, to varying 
degrees, with each one of them. As Cary Nelson, Paula A. Treichler, and 
Lawrence Grossberg point out in their introduction to Cultural Studies 
QRWRQO\GRHV FXOWXUDO VWXGLHV UHVLVWGH¿QLWLRQVDV DGLVFLSOLQDU\
¿HOGEXWLWLVDOVRKDUGWRVLPSO\GH¿QHDVDQinterdisciplinary enterprise: 
³FXOWXUDOVWXGLHVLVQRWPHUHO\LQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\LWLVRIWHQDVRWKHUVKDYH
written, actively and aggressively anti-disciplinary—a characteristic that 





formed integral part of the very project of cultural studies. It was, at least 
LQSDUWLQWHQWLRQDO³7KH¿UVWLVVXHRIWorking Papers in Cultural Studies 
appeared in 1972. The title ‘Working Papers’ was deliberately intended 
to set the terms of our approach. . . . We rejected, in short, a descriptive 
GH¿QLWLRQRUSUHVFULSWLRQRIWKH¿HOG´+DOO>@D7KHVXEVHTXHQW
LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIDOUHDG\VXFKDQRSHQ¿HOG²VXVWDLQHGQRWRQO\EXW
also by the boom of funding opportunities connected to the fresh academic 
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“brand,” particularly in the United States—has been making the task of 
GH¿QLWLRQHYHQKDUGHUWRWKHSRLQWRISURGXFLQJDWHUUDLQRIUHÀHFWLRQLQ
its own right and such publications as What is Cultural Studies? A Reader 
(Storey 1996). As John Storey tellingly points out in the preface to that 
volume, the latter “is an introduction to cultural studies through a series 
RIDWWHPSWVWRGH¿QHFXOWXUDOVWXGLHV´L[,QRWKHUZRUGVEHFDXVHRILWV
origins as well as its subsequent quick expansion, theoretical efforts to 
GH¿QHWKH¿HOGKDYHEHFRPHLQWHJUDOWRWKH¿HOGLWVHOI
Many have been worrying about the effects of the cultural studies 
boom. Hall discussed this matter in his keynote address at a conference on 
‘Cultural Studies Now and in the Future,’ held at the University of Illinois 
in April 1990. The piece was later published in the volume mentioned 
above by Grossberg, Treichler, and Nelson (1992), another famous 
DWWHPSW DWPDSSLQJ DQG GH¿QLQJ WKH ¿HOG+HUH+DOO UHPDUNV WKDW WKH
rapid institutionalization of cultural studies in the United States through 
the 1980s seemed not to be matched by an accurate interrogation of the 
very dangers of institutionalization (Hall 1992a, 285-286). Among such 
dangers, he signals not so much a retreat from the political, but rather a 
tendency to approach the problem of power with a distinctive “theoretical 
ÀXHQF\´³7KHUHLVQRPRPHQWQRZLQ$PHULFDQFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVZKHUH
we are not able, extensively and without end, to theorize power—politics, 
race, class, and gender, subjugation, domination, exclusion, marginality, 
Otherness, etc. . . . Nevertheless, there are ways of constituting power 
DV DQ HDV\ ÀRDWLQJ VLJQL¿HU ZKLFK MXVW OHDYHV WKH FUXGH H[HUFLVH DQG
FRQQHFWLRQVRISRZHUDQGFXOWXUHDOWRJHWKHUHPSWLHGRIDQ\VLJQL¿FDWLRQ´
(286). In his own contribution to the same volume, for instance, Tony 
%HQQHWW   VXJJHVWV WKDWZKDWPD\ GH¿QH FXOWXUDO VWXGLHV DV D
whole is its focus on the relations between culture and power. But what 
LV WKH QDWXUH RI VXFK UHODWLRQV" 'RHV QRW WKH XELTXLWRXV LQYRFDWLRQ RI
the link between culture and power leave it, in Hall’s words, emptied of 
DQ\ VLJQL¿FDWLRQ WKDW LV RI DQ\ FRQFUHWH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ" &RPPHQWLQJ
on Bennett’s proposition, the editors of the volume observe: “To work 
HYHQZLWKLQ WKDW UDWKHU EURDG FRQ¿JXUDWLRQ    UHTXLUHV DQ DQDO\VLV RI
those relations of power. . . . Moreover, the word ‘relations’ opens out into 
cultural studies’ long history of efforts to theorize and grasp the mutual 
determinations and interrelations of cultural forms and historical forces” 
(Nelson, Treichler, and Grossberg 1992, 3).  
By turning to Hall’s reading of Gramsci in the 1970s and 1980s, this 
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chapter recovers one key passage is such a long history of theorization.10 
According to Storey, this legacy of Hall’s is what characterizes even 
“the best” of cultural studies: “It is the ‘Gramscian insistence,’ . . . learnt 
IURP0DU[ WKDWZHPDNH FXOWXUH DQGZH DUHPDGH E\ FXOWXUH WKHUH LV
agency and there is structure. . . . The best of cultural studies has always 
been mindful of this” (Storey 1996, 11). However, while suggesting to 
think with Hall and to recover his reading of Gramsci for contemporary 
TXHHUGHEDWHV,GRQRWLQWHQGWRSROLFHWKHZKROH¿HOGDQGGUDJLWEDFN
to one of its inaugural theoretical moments, if only because this is not a 
chapter aboutFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVDVD¿HOG11 Rather, my focus is limited to 
Hall’s politico-philosophical interventions into the debates of his time.12 
I argue that such Gramscian concepts as “hegemony,” “historical bloc,” 
and “war of position”—which in part hegemonized the work carried out 
at the CCCS under Hall’s directorship, but were later largely abandoned 
under the pressure of new theoretical moments—may help us pose today 
a number of questions that other theoretical languages assimilated by the 
¿HOG VXFKDV0LFKHO)RXFDXOW¶V UDGLFDO UHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRISRZHU LQ
terms of biopolitics, tend instead to overlook.
Turning to Hall’s reading of Gramsci in the 1970s and 1980s also 
entails a turn toward a particular moment in Western Marxism, when the 
politics of gender, race, and sexuality as well as new forms of political 
organizing made a troubling appearance on the theoretical and political 
horizon of the Left. This is, indeed, the second reason why this chapter 
engages with Hall’s work. Unquestionably, we witness today a “Marxist 
renaissance” taking place in feminist and queer theory. This theoretical 
moment is being elicited, on the one hand, by the economic crisis exploded 
in 2008 and, on the other hand, by the rearticulation of progressive sexual 
politics to the politico-economic project of neoliberalism. The current 
UHHQFRXQWHUEHWZHHQTXHHUWKHRU\DQG0DU[LVPLQIRUPVP\RZQUHÀHFWLRQV
in this dissertation. However, there is a tendency of fetishizing the many 
“turns” that keep reorienting theoretical work. Any such “turn”—be it a turn 
back or a turn forward—must be approached with some sense of its history. 
Looking at Hall’s work in the 1970s and 1980s can help us think through the 
relation between Marxism and identity politics: a relation that has been both 
troubled and fertile, and that we shall approach in all its complexity if we 
are not to invoke a “return to Marxism” in a purely rhetorical manner today.
In this respect, thinking with Hall is productive precisely to the extent 
that neither the relation between Hall and Marxism nor the one between 
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0DU[LVP DQG FXOWXUDO VWXGLHVZDV HYHU MXVW DQ ³HDV\ ¿W´ &ROLQ 6SDUNV
(1996) reconstructs the trajectory of Marxism within cultural studies and 
DUJXHV WKDW IURP LWVYHU\ LQFHSWLRQ WKH¿HOGHPHUJHG WKURXJK³DPRYH
away from, and critique of, the established marxist tradition of cultural 
theory embodied in the writing of authors who were members of the British 
&RPPXQLVW3DUW\DQGLWVLQWHUQDWLRQDODI¿OLDWHV´,QIDFWKHJRHVDV
far as to state that the version of cultural studies that began to develop at 
the CCCS in its early phase, before 1968, was “one in which the explicit 
legacy of marxism was more or less absent” (80). This claim is overstated. 
While the reality of Stalinism and the general political climate of the 1950s 
and 1960s may have pushed some critics to dismiss Marxism altogether, 
what marked the emergence of cultural studies was a “struggle” with 
Marxism rather than its absence. The cultural studies that took shape at the 
CCCS came into existence within the context of what Hall has termed the 
³¿UVW1HZ/HIW´+DOO7KLVFULWLFDO/HIWZDVSURIRXQGO\PDUNHGE\
the historical turning point of 1956, that is, on the one hand by the Russian 
repression of the Hungarian revolution, on the other hand by the British, 
)UHQFKDQG,VUDHOLLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHFRQÀLFWRYHUWKH6XH]&DQDO]RQH
Its original gesture was a critique of imperialism and a rejection of Soviet 
socialism, not of Marxism as such. 
6SDUNV FRQWLQXHV E\ DI¿UPLQJ WKDW RQO\ DIWHU  GLG 0DU[LVP
properly appear in Birmingham, now mediated by French structuralism 
(Sparks 1996, 82-83). According to this reading—which problematically 
obliterates the presence of Marxism within cultural studies from the very 
beginning, yet helps stressing the complex relation between the two—the 
0DU[LVPWKDWZDV¿UVWLQWURGXFHGDWWKH&&&6HVSHFLDOO\WKURXJK+DOO¶V
reception of Althusser, was one suspicious of economic determinism and 
attentive to the problem of ideology. But this was not a smooth encounter 
either. Hall once employed the metaphor of “wrestling” to describe his 
own encounter with Althusser’s Marxism (Hall 1992a, 280). Therefore, 
Sparks argues, even the merge between cultural studies and this Marxism 
did not last long. According to his account, Hall (and cultural studies 
at large) soon took a road away from Marx mediated by the reading of 
Gramsci and especially by the work of Laclau. In Sparks’ view, Laclau 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\ZHDNHQHGWKH³ULJRXUV´RI$OWKXVVHU¶V0DU[LVPE\UHMHFWLQJ
the principle of the “determination by the economic in the last instance” and 
E\DI¿UPLQJWKDWLGHRORJLFDOHOHPHQWVVXFKDVQDWLRQDOLVPGRQRWSRVVHVV
any necessary class belonging, but derive their progressive or conservative 
Chapter One20
character from the very processes of their contingent articulation within 
particular ideological formations (Sparks 1996, 89-92). 
Sparks may be right: to a certain extent, Marxism has been a transitory 
moment in Hall’s theoretical trajectory. However, if the theoretical 
encounter with Gramsci may have been the driving force leading Hall 
away from Marxism, it is because Gramsci represented indeed a rupture, 
yet within0DU[LVP¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWZLWKWKHHFRQRPLFUHGXFWLRQLVPRI
“orthodox” Marxism. It may be true that Gramsci’s rupture (and especially 
the interpretation of that rupture offered by Laclau) opened up a path that 
subsequently led Hall elsewhere, but it is equally true that in the 1970s and 
1980s Hall needed this kind of rupture in order to sustain his engagement 
with Marxist theorizing. For, as he once put it, “I came into marxism 
backwards: against the Soviet tanks in Budapest, as it were” (Hall 1992a, 
279).13 To this, we shall add Hall’s commitment to the emerging identity 
politics of race, gender, and sexuality. Such antagonisms, too, represented 
a rupture—both theoretically and politically—within Marxism and 
the Left. Hall made an effort to think through that rupture in order to 
understand his “New Times.” If a contemporary “Marxist renaissance” in 
queer theory is not to take place only rhetorically, Hall’s theoretical effort 
is worth recovering.
But it is also the particular conjuncture to which Hall directed his 
attention in the 1970s and 1980s that makes his reading of Gramsci extremely 
valuable today. One of the main goals of Hall’s intervention at the time was 
to understand not only the rise of Thatcherism, but a shifting of the very 
terrain on which Thatcherism was managing to consolidate its ascendancy. 
In other words, Hall was centrally concerned with Thatcherism’s ability 
to occupy a politico-ideological terrain that the Left, instead, proved 
unable or even reluctant to articulate to its own socialist project. This is 
WKH WHUUDLQ RI LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV GH¿QHG E\ DQWDJRQLVPV RWKHU WKDQ FODVV
FRQÀLFW +DOO IRXQG *UDPVFL¶V FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ RI KHJHPRQ\²ZKLFK
prioritizes the construction of broad political alliances and foregrounds 
the “superstructures of civil society” as key sites of politico-ideological 
struggle—particularly useful to address the challenges faced by the Left 
in that political phase. To be sure, there are profound differences between 
our times and Hall’s “New Times.” Hall warned that if the Left failed 
to open up its language and programs to new forms of antagonism, the 
terrain of identity politics was going to be articulated by Thatcherism along 
conservative lines, for the consolidation of white and heteropatriarchal 
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norms and privileges. The shifts rightward in contemporary progressive 
sexual politics pose quite a different set of questions.14 Thus, Hall’s 
approach to the particular conjuncture of Thatcherism does not lend itself 
as a recipe to understand our times and to answer our questions. Rather, 
his reading of Gramsci can provide us today, three to four decades later, 
with the tools to ask the right kind of questions. In other words, I propose 
to think with Hall not just on the terrain of theory, but also on the terrain of 
theoretical practice.
As I highlight throughout the chapter, Hall used to measure his 
proximities and distances from key interlocutors such as Laclau and 
Althusser by relentlessly testing their conceptual apparatuses—as well 
as his own—before the tribunal of Thatcherism. Indeed, he regarded 
theoretical practice as obliquely and precariously positioned between 
theory and the concrete. In his view, the production of theoretical concepts 
always maintains a degree of relative autonomy from the concrete that 
such concepts aim to appropriate, yet he never conceded that a full 
demarcation exists between the two. The problem of theoretical practice 
always remained for Hall a theoretical problem in its own right—a problem 
inspired by Marx and Gramsci. Although there may be no absolute 
consensus within cultural studies on how to work through this problem, its 
DFNQRZOHGJPHQWFDPHWRGH¿QHWKH¿HOGDVDZKROH-HQQLIHU'DU\O6ODFN
observes: “Cultural studies resists thinking in terms of the ‘application’ 
of theory. . . . In place of that conception of theory, cultural studies works 
with the notion of theory as a ‘detour’ to help ground our engagement with 
what newly confronts us and to let that engagement provide the ground 
for retheorizing” (Slack 1996, 114). In other words, cultural studies works 
with the notion of theory itself as a practice informed, in turn, by other 
cultural, social, and political practices. 
,Q³0DU[¶V1RWHVRQ0HWKRG´>@+DOODGGUHVVHVDWOHQJWK
the problem of theoretical practice while offering some key observations 
on Marx’s epistemology. Here, he carefully differentiates between 
empiricism and what he regards as Marx’s epistemology of the concrete, 
arguing that the concrete is not the empirically-given (129). Theory, Hall 
observes, does not start from the empirically-given in order to produce an 
adequate and transparent representation of it. Rather, theoretical practice 
produces a “concrete-in-thought” that must reconstruct the “concrete-in-
history,” yet maintaining a degree of relative autonomy from the concrete 
that it appropriates.15 In other words, theoretical practice “must ‘rise from 
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the abstract to the concrete’ not vice versa” (131). It should not observe 
the empirically-given and produce concepts able to represent it by way 
of generalization and abstraction, looking for a common essence behind 
D¿HOGRIFRQFUHWHGLIIHUHQFHV2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFHPXVW
produce concepts able to appropriate the concrete while preserving its 
differences and determinations through the very process of appropriation. 
According to Hall, “the method which Marx proposes in the Introduction 
. . . is a method which groups, not a simple ‘essence’ behind the different 
historical forms, but precisely the many determinations in which ‘essential 
differences’ are preserved” (120). This is why “we need concepts . . . which 
differentiate in the very moment that they reveal hidden connections” (118).
Hall’s theoretical practice is central to his reading of Gramsci in 
the 1970s and 1980s: a reading mediated by the concrete conjuncture 
of Thatcherism. Furthermore, it partly explains the very fascination that 
Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks >@ 16 exercised on him. 
Fragmented and never recomposed into a fully systematized political 
theory, written in the 1930s while Gramsci was incarcerated by the Fascist 
regime and not always with primary sources at his disposal, the Prison 
Notebooks confront their reader with a work in progress rather than a 
closed system of thought. For similar reasons, Hall always preferred the 
earlier and more tentative writings by contemporaries such as Laclau and 
$OWKXVVHURYHUWKHLUODWHUZRUNV,Q+DOO¶VZRUGV³,VWLOOSUHIHU>/DFODX¶V@
Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory RYHU >/DFODX DQG 0RXIIH¶V@
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. . . . I prefer The Eighteen Brumaire to 
book II of Capital. I prefer Althusser’s For Marx to Reading Capital. I like 
people’s middle period a lot, where . . . their thought has not yet hardened 
into a system” (Hall 1986c, 56). It thus comes as little surprise that Hall’s 
own work is characterized by a fragmentary style. On the one hand, he 
was essentially a writer of essays rather than books, and the philosophical 
concepts put at work in one piece may be submitted to compelling critique 
in the next, if a shift of the question required it. On the other hand, his 
writings often formed part of broader collective enterprises, lacking the 
precise contours of conventional authorship. 
Therefore, it is also for tactical reasons that I focus on the debates 
between Hall and some of his privileged interlocutors, for these exchanges 
can help us better situate Hall’s own thinking—in spite of, yet preserving, 
its fragmentariness. In the next section, I begin to reconstruct Hall’s 
reading of Gramsci mainly by confronting it with the reading offered 
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by Laclau and Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy >@
2001). Laclau and Mouffe share with Hall a fundamental theoretical and 
political commitment: a rethinking of Marxist categories in the face of the 
appearance of new social movements and identity politics on the horizon 
of the Left. Yet, as I argue, their respective readings of Gramsci in “New 
Times” diverge on the terrain of theoretical practice. While Laclau and 
Mouffe try to identify in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks the formulation of 
DZKROHQHZSROLWLFDOORJLF+DOOUHFRYHUV*UDPVFL¶VUHÀHFWLRQV¿UVWDQG
foremost in order to carry out a conjunctural analysis of the concrete social 
and political transformations of his time.
   
Thinking Hegemony: Reading Gramsci in “New Times”
Central to Gramsci’s theorizing, and to Hall’s recovery of it in the 1970s 
and 1980s, is the concept of “hegemony.” In his famous essay “Gramsci’s 
Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity” (1986a), Hall observes that 
the conceptualization of hegemony in Gramsci’s work must be understood 
in relation to his “rigorous attack on all vestiges of ‘economism’ and 
‘reductionism’ within classical marxism” (10). The term “economism” 
polemically denotes a form of theoretical reductionism that posits the 
economic base of a given society—the mode of production—as its only 
structure of determination. According to this view, which its critics associate 
in particular with the orthodox version of Marxism canonized at the time of 
the Second International,17 the levels other than the economic (the political 
DQGWKHLGHRORJLFDOVWDQGLQDUHODWLRQRISXUHUHÀHFWLRQDQGLPPHGLDWH
correspondence to the economic base and do not possess any structuring 
force of their own. For Hall, it is against this political and theoretical 
background that Gramsci’s work in general, and his conceptualization of 
hegemony in particular, need to be approached. 
Gramsci understood the exercise of power by a dominant class in liberal 
societies to depend on the capacity of that class to forge a “hegemonic bloc”: 
a composite formation able to integrate, in part, the interests of different 
social forces and class fractions. This process is mediated by politico-
LGHRORJLFDO SUDFWLFHV VR WKDW WKH ODWWHU GR QRW MXVW UHÀHFW WKH HFRQRPLF
structure, as the logic of economism would suggest, but play an active and 
central role in the structuring of the social totality. To put it differently, 
economism would posit that power is exercised in any capitalist society 
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by the ruling class, and that all political and ideological apparatuses in 
WKDW VRFLHW\²¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW WKH VWDWH²VLPSO\ UHÀHFW DQG SUHVHUYH
ruling class interests. The notion of a hegemonic bloc displaces this 
economistic reading, for it suggests that the exercise of power in liberal 
societies fundamentally depends on the possibility of partly integrating 
and mediating the interests of heterogeneous social segments. A “gap” is 
introduced between the economic base and the concrete shape of society 
ZKLFKVLJQDOVWKHWKHRUHWLFDODQGSROLWLFDOLQVXI¿FLHQFLHVRIHFRQRPLVP
In order to discern what Gramsci did offer in place of economism, Hall 
turns to the Althusserian distinction between “mode of production” and 
³VRFLDOIRUPDWLRQ´$OWKXVVHU>@$OWKXVVHUDQG%DOLEDU>@
1970). While the mode of production refers to the economic base of a given 
society but constitutes, importantly, an analytic abstraction, the concept of 
social formation indicates, in Hall’s words, that “societies are necessarily 
complexly structured totalities, with different levels of articulation (the 
economic, the political, the ideological instances) in different combinations” 
(Hall 1986a, 12). The concept of “articulation” appearing in this passage, in 
turn, is central to Hall’s understanding of hegemony. In theory, articulation 
signals the opening of a gap between the mode of production and the social 
formation, hence the necessity to leave economism behind. In practice, 
articulation is the work performed by politics and ideology: the closing 
RIWKDWJDSWKURXJKFRQWLQJHQW¿[HVWKDWGHWHUPLQHWKHFRQFUHWHVKDSHRID
social formation at a given historical juncture.  
In “Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance” 
(1980), Hall provides a brief genealogy of the concept of articulation in 
contemporary Marxist theory. Here, he observes that, although its meaning 
UHPDLQVYDJXHDQGRSHQWRGLIIHUHQWDSSURSULDWLRQV WKHFRQFHSW¿QGVLQ
Althusser’s work an unquestionable starting point: “No clear consensus 
RIFRQFHSWXDOGH¿QLWLRQFDQEHVDLGWRKDYHHPHUJHGVRIDU<HWLWUHPDLQV
WKH VLWH RI D VLJQL¿FDQW WKHRUHWLFDO UXSWXUH coupure) and intervention. 
This is the intervention principally associated with the work of Althusser 
and the ‘school’ of structuralist Marxism” (324). According to Hall’s 
reading, the concept of articulation describes a link among elements of a 
VRFLDOIRUPDWLRQWKDWDUHQHLWKHULPPHGLDWHO\UHÀH[LYHRIRQHDQRWKHUQRU
linked spontaneously: the link must be actively established. The critic’s 
task is to identify and expose the articulatory practices, for “no ‘necessary 
correspondence’ or expressive homology can be assumed as given” (325). 
However, Althusser deploys the concept of articulation primarily to account 
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for the combinations of different modes of production within the same 
social formation. Thus, Hall argues that Althusser’s use of the concept must 
be supplemented with other theorizations, if one is to track not only the 
articulatory practices producing structured combinations of different modes 
of production, but also those operating across the different levels of the 
economic, the political, and the ideological: “Here, the work of Althusser, 
and of the ‘Althusserians’ . . . requires to be supplemented by the work of 
  *UDPVFL´  ,W LV LQ*UDPVFL WKDW+DOO¿QGVDFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ
of the articulatory work performed by political and ideological practices. 
According to Hall, turning one’s attention to the social formation and the 
articulatory practices producing it as a structured totality, as Gramsci did, 
means leaving the terrain of abstraction in favor of concrete and historically 
grounded analyses. As Gramsci himself puts it in his Prison Notebooks, 
economism “must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism, and 
combated in practice with the authentic testimony of Marx, the author of 
FRQFUHWHSROLWLFDODQGKLVWRULFDOZRUNV´*UDPVFL>@
From this critique of economism did Gramsci’s conceptualization of 
hegemony emerge, hand-in-hand with a rethinking of the classical Marxist 
base-superstructure metaphor. He writes in the Prison Notebooks: “It is 
the problem of the relations between structure and superstructure which 
must be accurately posed if the forces which are active in the history of 
a particular period are to be correctly analysed and the relations between 
WKHP GHWHUPLQHG´ *UDPVFL >@  0RUH VSHFL¿FDOO\
Gramsci considers the “superstructures of civil society” (the school, the 
church, the institutions of cultural production, and so forth) to be key sites 
for the accumulation and exercise of power, not mere by-products of the 
economic base.18 In other words, the forging of consent is not secondary, 
but central to domination. The political and ideological formations 
WKDW VHFXUH FRQVHQW WR SRZHU DUH QRW MXVW D WUDQVSDUHQW UHÀHFWLRQ RI WKH
economic structure, but they substantially contribute to shape and preserve 
that structure. The concept of hegemony, in the Prison Notebooks, is meant 
WRQDPHWKLVUHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRISRZHUDQGWRSUR¿OHDFFRUGLQJO\WKH
contours of a new political practice. In Gramsci’s view, in order to confront 
and displace the existing hegemonic bloc, a new “historical bloc” must 
WDNHVKDSHWKDWFDQQRWEXWRSHUDWHLQWKH¿UVWSODFHRQWKHGLVSHUVHGWHUUDLQ
of civil society: practicing, indeed, a politics of hegemony.
Gramsci deployed a well-known warfare metaphor in order to 
formulate his understanding of hegemony as a key terrain for communist 
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politics in the twentieth century. He argued that the advent of trench 
warfare in World War I—and the partial replacement, at least on a strategic 
level, of frontal attack—was paralleled, in Western Europe at his time, by 
DVLPLODUVKLIW LQ WKHSROLWLFDO¿HOG IURPD³ZDURIPRYHPHQW´RULHQWHG
toward the direct seizing of state power, to a “war of position” attentive to 
the multiple sites of power distributed across increasingly complex civil 
societies. Again from the Prison Notebooks: 
The superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of 
PRGHUQ ZDUIDUH ,Q ZDU LW ZRXOG VRPHWLPHV KDSSHQ WKDW D ¿HUFH
artillery attack seemed to have destroyed the enemy’s entire defensive 
V\VWHPZKHUHDVLQIDFWLWKDGRQO\GHVWUR\HGWKHRXWHUSHULPHWHUDQG
DW WKHPRPHQWRI WKHLUDGYDQFHDQGDWWDFNWKHDVVDLODQWVZRXOG¿QG
themselves confronted by a line of defense which was still effective. 
. . . Hence it is a question of studying “in depth” which elements of 
civil society correspond to the defensive systems in a war of position. 
*UDPVFL>@
,WLVQRWGLI¿FXOWWRVHHZK\VXFKDUHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQwithin Marxism, 
of the relations between base and superstructures appealed to Hall. In the 
late 1970s and through the 1980s, Hall became increasingly preoccupied 
not only with the rise of Thatcherism, but also with the role played in 
that conjuncture by the crisis of the Left and its failure to understand the 
emergence of new identity politics and social movements, such as feminism, 
gay liberation, and Black Power. As he and Martin Jacques observe in the 
introduction to The Politics of Thatcherism (1983), while the Left did not 
let its language and programs be transformed by these “new social forces 
and movements,” Thatcherism avoided committing the same mistake 
(14). The latter occupied that terrain “with its attention to the centrality of 
women’s domestic role, the policing of black communities and the frontal 
HQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHSHDFHPRYHPHQW´7KDWLV7KDWFKHULVP¿OOHGD
space left vacant by the Left, absorbing into its political project a number of 
emerging social antagonisms that, needless to say, it articulated rightward. 
By doing so, Thatcherism also “allowed many of these contradictory 
forces and pressures to play more freely into the political backyard of the 
left and the labour movement, precipitating its own fracturing and internal 
crisis” (15). Gramsci’s call to identify the elements of civil society that 
correspond to the defensive systems in a war of position provided Hall 
Thinking with Stuart Hall: Hegemony and Identity Politics 27
with the lens to diagnose this particular triangulation between the rise of 
Thatcherism, a crisis of the British Left, and the emergence of new social 
movements and identity politics.
The understanding of hegemony in terms of war of position, which 
Hall recovers and reactivates in the 1970s and 1980s, is the one to be found 
in the Prison Notebooks+RZHYHUWKLVLVQHLWKHUWKH¿UVWWLPH*UDPVFL
GHSOR\HGWKHFRQFHSWQRUWKH¿UVWWLPHWKHFRQFHSWDSSHDUHGRQWKHVFHQH
of Marxist theorizing. In “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci” (1977), 
RQHRIWKHPRVWLQÀXHQWLDO(QJOLVKWH[WVWRSURYLGHDFORVHUHDGLQJRIWKH
Prison Notebooks at the time of Hall’s writing,19 Perry Anderson traces a 
genealogy of hegemony, beginning with the emergence of the concept in 
5XVVLDQ6RFLDO'HPRFUDF\,WLVZRUWKUHFDOOLQJWKLVJHQHDORJ\LIEULHÀ\
because the different reconceptualizations that the concept underwent 
help further explain not only how Hall received the concept, but also 
what made its appropriation in the context of Thatcherism so compelling. 
Anderson writes:
   
The term gegemoniya (hegemony) was one of the most central 
political slogans in the Russian Social-Democratic movement, 
IURP WKH V WR 7KH LGHDZKLFK LW FRGL¿HG ¿UVW VWDUWHG WR
emerge in the writings of Plekhanov in 1883-4, where he urged the 
imperative necessity for the Russian working class to wage a political 
struggle against Tsarism, not merely an economic struggle against its 
employers. (P. Anderson 1977, 15)  
Plekhanov thought so, Anderson observes, because in his view “the 
bourgeoisie in Russia was still too weak to take the initiative in the struggle 
against absolutism: the organized working class would have to take up the 
demands of a bourgeois-democratic revolution” (P. Anderson 1977, 15). 
The concept of hegemony was to be taken up by other Russian Social-
'HPRFUDWVDQGODWHUE\/HQLQLQKLVHVVD\³:KDW,V7R%H'RQH"´>@
1961). Subject to some variations, it ended up circulating in a number 
of documents produced by the Third International, which presumably 
effected the transmission of the concept to Gramsci (P. Anderson 1977, 
18). Yet at this point, through Lenin’s reading, hegemony had come to 
name not only the process by which a class (the proletariat) takes up the 
“historical task” of another class due to historical contingency (leading a 
democratic revolution that the Russian bourgeoisie was not ready to carry 
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out), but also the mechanism by which the proletariat would establish, 
in the process, its political leadership over other class fractions such as 
WKH SHDVDQWU\ KHQFH IRUJLQJ D V\VWHPRI FODVV DOOLDQFHV7KLV LQÀHFWLRQ
of hegemony, of Leninist provenance, is the one to be found at work in 
*UDPVFL¶V³6RPH$VSHFWVRI WKH6RXWKHUQ4XHVWLRQ´ >@ WKH
famous essay predating the Prison Notebooks. Here, Gramsci deploys the 
FRQFHSWIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQRUGHUWRDGGUHVVDTXHVWLRQRISROLWLFDOVWUDWHJ\
how to forge an alliance between the proletariat of the Italian North and the 
peasantry of the South against the capitalist state.
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy >@  (UQHVWR/DFODX
and Chantal Mouffe take up the genealogy traced by Anderson in order 
to argue that Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks represent a fundamental 
break not only with Marxist economism, but also with previous Marxist 
conceptualizations of hegemony. For Laclau and Mouffe, the problem of 
hegemony had been formulated before Gramsci only on strictly pragmatic 
grounds, in ways that did not fundamentally displace the underlying 
logic of economism. As they point out, in the early writings of Russian 
6RFLDO'HPRFUDWV³WKHFRQFHSWRIKHJHPRQ\¿OOVD VSDFH OHIWYDFDQWE\
a crisis of what, according to Plekhanov’s ‘stagist’ conception, should 
have been a normal historical development” (48). Thus, the economistic 
principle is kept in place according to which historical progress proceeds 
through necessary “stages” and the passage from one stage to the other is 
carried out by a particular class whose historical task is determined by its 
location within the mode of production. With hegemony being considered 
as nothing but an exceptional supplement to this logic, the logic itself 
is not transformed. Indeed, as Laclau and Mouffe observe, “none of the 
Russian Social Democratic analyses suggests that bourgeois tasks cease 
to be bourgeois when they are assumed by the proletariat. Class identity 
is constituted on the basis of the relations of production” (50). And, they 
continue, even when the concept of hegemony develops beyond its Russian 
Social-Democratic formulations and comes to denote—in Lenin and the 
Leninist tradition—a system of alliances among different segments of the 
working population, the hegemonic link continues to be considered as 
essentially “external” to the subjects it contingently binds together: “In the 
Leninist conception, the working class and its vanguard do not transform 
their class identity by fusing it with the multiple democratic demands that 
DUHSROLWLFDOO\UHFRPSRVHGE\WKHKHJHPRQLFSUDFWLFHVLQVWHDGWKH\UHJDUG
these demands as stages, as necessary yet transitory steps in pursuit of their 
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own class objectives” (56). This means that political subjects continue 
to be understood as ontologically constituted at the level of the mode of 
production—that is, as bearers of particular class interests—independently 
of politico-ideological practices of recomposition.  
In the work of Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe seek to identify the 
formulation of a whole new political logic. Similarly to Hall, their key 
preoccupation is to understand the emergence of new social movements in 
the 1970s and 1980s organized around axes of antagonism other than class 
FRQÀLFWWKHLUPDLQJRDOLVWRRSHQXSWKHRUHWLFDODQGSROLWLFDOVSDFHVIRUVXFK
movements within the Left, leading to what they term a “radical democratic 
politics.” For an opening of this kind to take place, Laclau and Mouffe 
argue that socialist political practice needs to be reconceived through a full 
displacement of economism: that is, beyond the notion of an alliance among 
VXEMHFWVGH¿QHGE\WKHLULQWHUHVWVDQGSRVLWLRQLQWKHPRGHRISURGXFWLRQ
Such a full displacement is to be found, in their view, in the conceptual 
expansion of hegemony carried out by Gramsci in the Prison Notebooks: 
“More than any other theoretician of his time, Gramsci broadened the 
terrain of political recomposition and hegemony, . . . offering a theorization 
of the hegemonic link which clearly went beyond the Leninist category 
RI µFODVV DOOLDQFH¶´ /DFODX DQG0RXIIH >@ $FFRUGLQJ WR
their analysis, while Lenin deployed the concept of hegemony to name 
the political leadership that the working class had to establish over other 
class fractions to forge an effective class alliance, the main ingredient of 
the practice of hegemony becomes, in Gramsci, intellectual and moral 
leadership: “It is in this movement, from the ‘political’ to the ‘intellectual 
and moral’ plane, that the decisive transition takes place toward a concept 
of hegemony beyond ‘class alliances’” (66). For Laclau and Mouffe, this 
is the case because a practice of hegemony based on intellectual and moral 
leadership requires that the different subjects involved come to share a 
“collective will,” forging what Gramsci called a “historical bloc.” Thus, 
these subjects do not enter the relation as fully constituted agents who make 
a pragmatic use of the hegemonic link in order to pursue their already-
GH¿QHGLQWHUHVWVEXWDUHIXOO\WUDQVIRUPHGE\WKHUHODWLRQLWVHOI
Both Hall and Laclau and Mouffe embrace the conceptualization 
of hegemony to be found in the Prison Notebooks, for it allows them to 
SUH¿JXUH D UDGLFDO RSHQLQJ RI WKH /HIW WR WKH HPHUJHQFH RI QHZ VRFLDO
PRYHPHQWV +RZHYHU GHVSLWH WKH DI¿QLWLHV EHWZHHQ WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH
political commitments, Hall’s insistence on the relation between theory 
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and the concrete marks his distance from Laclau and Mouffe’s reading 
of Gramsci in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. According to the latter, 
Gramsci’s intervention departs from previous Marxist conceptualizations 
of hegemony. But, in order to emphasize the novelty of this turning point 
in their terms—that is, as the transformation of hegemony from the name 
of a political strategy into a whole new political logic—Laclau and Mouffe 
need to locate a point of discontinuity also within Gramsci’s thought: more 
VSHFL¿FDOO\ EHWZHHQKLV HDUOLHU HVVD\ RQ WKH6RXWKHUQ TXHVWLRQ DQG WKH
Prison Notebooks. They write: 
In Notes on the Southern Question  WKH¿UVW*UDPVFLDQ WH[W
in which the concept of hegemony is used, he states . . . that the 
ZRUNLQJFODVV VKRXOGQRW UHPDLQFRQ¿QHG WR WKHQDUURZGHIHQFHRI
its corporative interests, but should take up those of other sectors. 
However, the logic is still only one of preconstituted sectoral interests, 
which is perfectly compatible with the notion of a class alliance. As in 
Lenin, leadership is merely political and not “moral and intellectual.” 
/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@
Thus, according to Laclau and Mouffe, it is in the Prison Notebooks that one 
FDQ¿QGDQRWLRQRIKHJHPRQ\RSHQWRWKHLUSURMHFWRIDUDGLFDOGHPRFUDWLF
SROLWLFV7KLVLVGXHWRWKHVLJQL¿FDQWH[SDQVLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWLQWKHODWHU
text, beyond its Leninist understanding. In their view, only this expansion 
allows Gramsci to be read and reactivated in the 1980s in the face of the 
emergence of new social movements and identity politics on the horizon of 
Marxism and the Left. For, as I have mentioned, they consider it necessary 
to dispense with the notions of “alliance” and “interests” if we are to move 
WKHSROLWLFVRIKHJHPRQ\RQWRDIXOO\QRQHFRQRPLVWLF WHUUDLQ WKDW LV LI
we are to conceptualize the forging of hegemonic links as a process that 
does not operate externally among already-constituted subjects, but rather 
transforms the subjects entering the relation and becomes constitutive 
of the very process of subject formation. But, can such a sharp line of 
demarcation be drawn between Gramsci’s essay on the Southern question 
and his Prison Notebooks"20 
Note that, in order to locate a radical turning point in the shift from one 
text to the other, Laclau and Mouffe only quote the following passage from 
WKHHDUOLHUHVVD\³7KHSUROHWDULDWFDQEHFRPHWKHOHDGLQJ>dirigente@DQG
the dominant class to the extent that it succeeds in creating a system of class 
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alliances which allows it to mobilize the majority of the working population 
DJDLQVWFDSLWDOLVPDQGWKHERXUJHRLV6WDWH´*UDPVFL>@21 
This selective reference tends to reduce Gramsci’s overall argument to its 
strategic scope. Yet “Some Aspects of the Southern Question” is far richer a 
text. Published prior to Gramsci’s imprisonment by the Fascist regime, the 
HVVD\GHSOR\VWKHFRQFHSWRIKHJHPRQ\IRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQRUGHUWRDGGUHVV
the question of how to forge a class alliance between the proletariat of the 
Italian North and the peasantry of the Italian South against the capitalist 
VWDWH7KHPRVW VLJQL¿FDQW REVWDFOH WR WKH HPHUJHQFH RI WKLV DOOLDQFH LV
LGHQWL¿HGE\*UDPVFLLQWKH³DJUDULDQEORF´FKDUDFWHUL]LQJ,WDOLDQVRFLHW\
at the time: a link between the “disintegrated mass of the peasantry” and 
the big landowners in the Italian South, secured by the intellectuals of the 
rural bourgeoisie. The latter are characterized by Gramsci as “democratic 
LQ >WKHLU@ SHDVDQW IDFH UHDFWLRQDU\ LQ WKH IDFH WXUQHG WRZDUGV WKH ELJ
landowner and the government” (454-455). In his view, not only did these 
Southern intellectuals prevent the peasant masses from organizing their 
interests against the bourgeoisie, but they were also the leaders of cultural 
initiatives in Central and Northern Italy hosting those who “sought to leave 
the agrarian bloc and pose the Southern question in a radical form” (459). 
In this way, they “detached the radical intellectuals of the South from the 
SHDVDQWPDVVHVIRUFLQJWKHPWRWDNHSDUWLQQDWLRQDODQG(XURSHDQFXOWXUH
DQG WKURXJK WKLV FXOWXUH >WKH\@ VHFXUHG WKHLU DEVRUSWLRQE\ WKHQDWLRQDO
bourgeoisie and hence by the agrarian bloc” (460).22 
It is clear that, already in this earlier account of the function of 
the intellectuals within the Italian agrarian bloc, Gramsci regards the 
mechanisms of production and circulation of culture, the establishment of 
moral and intellectual leadership, and the terrain of civil society at large as 
crucial sites for the organization of relations of force in society. Certainly 
it makes no sense to entirely contest the reading proposed by Laclau and 
Mouffe. Hall himself (1986a, 16) does not fail to register that in the Prison 
Notebooks WKH FRQFHSW RI KHJHPRQ\ XQGHUJRHV D VLJQL¿FDQW H[SDQVLRQ
However, even a quick glance at Gramsci’s analysis of the Southern 
question and of the role of the intellectuals in the Italian society of the 
1920s reveals a stronger continuity between this earlier thematization 
of hegemony and its subsequent expansion. Laclau and Mouffe trace a 
line of demarcation between the two texts because they are resolute in 
expelling the notions of “alliance” and “interests” from their own theory of 
hegemony. Their goal is to radicalize the claim that the subjects entering 
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a hegemonic relation are fully transformed by it: those subjects cannot be 
FRQVLGHUHG LQ WKHLU YLHZ DV WKH EHDUHUV RI LQWHUHVWV GH¿QHGRXWVLGH WKH
hegemonic relation itself. 
Hall, instead, highlights that the notion of hegemony deployed in 
“Some Aspects of the Southern Question” is “already a theoretically 
complex and rich formulation” (Hall 1986a, 16).23 And in his famous essay 
“The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists” (1988c), in 
which he measures the hold of different political theories before the tribunal 
of Thatcherism, Hall makes implicit reference to the work of Laclau and 
Mouffe and contests the theoretical gesture of dispensing with the notion 
of “interests” altogether: 
,GHRORJLHVPD\QRWEHDI¿[HGDVRUJDQLFHQWLWLHVWRWKHLUDSSURSULDWH
classes, but this does not mean . . . that interests . . . have no part 
LQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHSOD\RILGHDVZLWKLQZKLFKGLIIHUHQWJURXSV¿JXUH
out the world and their role and allegiances in it. The problem is that 
interests are not only not given as an objective feature of a structure of 
positions in a social system . . . but they change historically. . . . Class 
is not the only determinant of social interest (e.g., gender, race). . . . 
:KDWLVPRUHVRFLDOFROOHFWLYLWLHVKDYHPRUHWKDQRQHVHWRILQWHUHVWV
and interests can be and frequently are contradictory, even mutually 




in dispensing with the notions of “class interests” and “class alliance” and 
in displacing class from the core of socialist politics. While a reading of 
Gramsci provides them with a point of support to accomplish these moves, 
they are entirely conscious that their vision of a radical democratic politics 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\GHSDUWVIURP*UDPVFL¶VRZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKHJHPRQ\LQ
the 1930s. In order to make room within the Left for the articulation of 
QHZDQWDJRQLVPVHPHUJLQJLQWKHVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDO¿HOGVLQWKHV
DQGV/DFODXDQG0RXIIHLQIDFWDI¿UPWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIUHFRYHULQJ
the basic concepts of Gramsci’s analysis, but “radicalizing” them “in a 
GLUHFWLRQWKDWOHDGVXVEH\RQG*UDPVFL´/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@
6RZKDWIRUPGRHVVXFKDUDGLFDOL]DWLRQWDNH"$FFRUGLQJWRVRPH
commentators, Laclau and Mouffe are guilty of having abandoned class 
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as a category of analysis and the working class as a privileged political 
subject for the Left. This abandonment granted their theory of hegemony 
the label of “post-Marxism.”24 Hall, instead, elaborates a different critique 
of their theoretical enterprise:  
While they are very responsible—whether you agree with them or not—
about recognizing that their position does have political consequences, 
when they come down to particular political conjunctures, they don’t 
reintegrate other levels of determination into the analysis. Instead, 
they take the abstractions which have been developed and elaborated, 
in a very rigorous and conceptual way at the high philosophical level, 
and insert them into the here and now. You don’t see them adding, 
adding, adding, the different levels of determination. (Hall 1986c, 58)
Following Hall, I argue that the “radicalization” of Gramscian concepts 
that Laclau and Mouffe propose in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is 
carried out by means of increasing abstraction. Hall’s theoretical practice, 
instead, which proceeds from his understanding of Marx’s epistemology 
as well as his reading of Gramsci, suggests that the more complex a social 
formation, the more concrete shall be the concepts we deploy in order 
WR DQDO\]H LW +DOO >@  25 The concepts of “alliance” and 
“interests,” for instance, rather than bearing the mark of the “original sin” 
of economism, are capable of appropriating the social reality theoretically 
while preserving its concrete determinations. It is only by multiplying 
the interests involved in the construction of political alliances, and not by 
expelling such notions from the analysis, that one can better understand, 
Hall suggests, the politics of hegemony and counter-hegemony taking root 
in “New Times.” 
As this discussion shows, Hall resists any trading of the concrete for 
theoretical abstraction. This refusal can be regarded as a quintessential 
mark of his reading of Gramsci and of his work as a whole. Rather than 
searching for a new political logic in the Prison Notebooks, as Laclau 
and Mouffe do, Hall’s primary goal is to reactivate Gramsci’s theoretical 
practice in the particular context of Thatcherism. This means unraveling in 
theory the concrete differences and determinations that shape the social and 
SROLWLFDO¿HOGVUDWKHUWKDQEOXUULQJWKHPWKURXJKWKHSURFHVVRIWKHRUHWLFDO
appropriation. This is what happens when Laclau and Mouffe abandon the 
notions of “alliance” and “interests” altogether in the service of what they 
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regard as a “radicalization” of the logic of hegemony. And, as I am about 
to argue, it is also what happens when the concrete boundaries between 
state and civil society are too quickly blurred or even eclipsed in theory, 
even as they continue to be fully operative in practice. In the next section, I 
EULHÀ\IRFXVRQWKHSUREOHPRIKRZWRFRQFHSWXDOL]HWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
state and civil society, for this problem is central not only to Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony, but also to Hall’s reading of Thatcherism as a form of 
“authoritarian populism”: a construction of popular consent to a distinctly 
authoritarian political project.               
Authoritarian Populism
For Gramsci, hegemonic blocs in liberal social formations must articulate 
and mediate the interests of heterogeneous social segments in order to 
forge a broad base of consent to the exercise of power. This leads him 
to question the traditional boundaries between state and civil society 
and to coin the concept of “integral state” encompassing the two. For, if 
the dominant classes preserve and exercise their power not only by way 
of coercion, but through a constant manufacturing of consent, how to 
PDLQWDLQDVKDUSGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQVWDWHDQGFLYLOVRFLHW\"&RQVLGHUIRU
instance, Gramsci’s following comments on the concept of “law”: “this 
concept will have to be extended to include those activities which are at 
SUHVHQWFODVVL¿HGDVµOHJDOO\QHXWUDO¶DQGZKLFKEHORQJWRWKHGRPDLQRI
FLYLOVRFLHW\´*UDPVFL>@&LYLOVRFLHW\KHIROORZV
“operates without ‘sanctions’ or compulsory ‘obligations,’ but nevertheless 
exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an 
evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc.” (242).26 
However, this does not mean that Gramsci entirely eclipses the boundaries 
between state and civil society. In the notion of “integral state,” state and 
civil society maintain, as Hall would put it, a relation of articulation. 
Gramsci’s rethinking of the relation between state and civil society 
and the centrality of the problem of consent to his analysis of state power 
are central to Hall’s own approach to Thatcherism. Indeed, those elements 
allow him to understand the populist appeal of Thatcherism’s authoritarian 
project, that is, Thatcherism’s consolidation of popular consent—not least 
through a hegemonization of the terrain of identity—in the service of its 
authoritarian practices. Hall never suggests that the Thatcherite attempt 
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to establish a new hegemony relied exclusively on consent. On the 
contrary, he registers “the increasing reliance on coercive authority and 
the repressive apparatuses of the state in disciplining the economic and 
WKH SROLWLFDO VWUXJJOH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI FULVLV´ +DOO >@  
Illustrative of this is, for example, the nearly unprecedented deployment 
of police forces in the management of the 1984-85 miners’ strike, to which 
I return at the end of this chapter. However, this does not mean that the 
state simply revealed, under Thatcherism, its “real” determinant element: 
coercion. Perry Anderson suggests as much when he argues that “the 
‘fundamental’ resort of bourgeois class power, beneath the ‘preponderant’ 
cusp of culture in a parliamentary system, remains coercion” (Anderson 
1977, 44).27 In Hall’s opinion, instead, while a reductionist approach to 
Thatcherism would certainly be the one offered by economism (which 
would consider the Thatcherite project to be nothing but a new attempt 
to secure the interests of the ruling classes), equally reductionist is “to 
deduce both the form and the outcome of a ‘national crisis’ from some 
general theory of the capitalist state, and its inherent general tendencies” 
+DOO>@)RUKLP7KDWFKHULVP¶VUHFRXUVHWRFRHUFLRQGRHV
not expose the ultimate nature of the capitalist state. Rather, he argues that 
central to Thatcherism and its relative success was precisely a construction 
of popular consent to the exercise of force: “a dovetailing of the ‘cry for 
discipline’ from below into the call for an enforced restoration of social 
order and authority ‘from above’” (137). He terms this articulation of 
consent and coercion: “authoritarian populism.”  
As Hall (1985b) recalls, he coined the concept of authoritarian 
populism upon reading the last section of Nicos Poulantzas’ State, Power, 
Socialism (1978).28 Here, Poulantzas registers and theorizes a dramatic 
VKLIWLQOLEHUDOGHPRFUDWLFUHJLPHVDQLQWHQVL¿FDWLRQRIVWDWHFRQWURORYHU
every sphere of social life and a decline of the institutions of political 
democracy, at the expense of so-called “civil liberties.” Poulantzas terms 
this moment “authoritarian statism,” pointing at a rearticulation of the 
relation between consent and coercion in favor of the coercive pole. Hall’s 
concept of authoritarian populism is meant to draw on Poulantzas’ analysis 
while integrating it with an attention to the ideological practices aimed 
at manufacturing—paradoxically, if you wish—popular consent to the 
coercive authoritarianism of Thatcherism. It is primarily to account for 
WKHVSHFL¿FLWLHVRIWKLVSDUWLFXODUFRQMXQFWXUHWKDW+DOOFRLQVWKHFRQFHSW
of authoritarian populism, “adopting this deliberately contradictory 
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term precisely to encapsulate the contradictory features of the emerging 
conjuncture” (Hall 1985b, 118).
Hall’s replacement of “statism” with “populism” in Poulantzas’ original 
formulation points to his understanding of the relation between state and 
civil society. Following Gramsci and his conceptualization of the integral 
state, Hall argues that state and civil society must always be understood 
in a relation of articulation. Neither can they be conceptualized as entirely 
independent from one another, nor can state and civil society be merged 
without accurately charting the boundaries between the two. The very 
concept of authoritarian populism (an articulation of consent and coercion) 
would lose any explanatory force if the boundaries between state and civil 
society were simply eclipsed. Hall puts this argument forward in “The Toad in 
the Garden” (1988c), while discussing Althusser’s theory of the ideological 
VWDWHDSSDUDWXVHV$OWKXVVHU>@2QWKHRQHKDQGKHDJUHHVZLWK
Althusser that “ideology is always materialized in concrete practices and 
ULWXDOVDQGRSHUDWHVWKURXJKVSHFL¿FDSSDUDWXVHV´+DOOF2QWKH
other hand, he contests the proposition that ideological apparatuses be 
always considered state apparatuses:
Althusser would argue that these are all ideological state apparatuses 
. . . by virtue of their function—the function, ascribed to the state, of 
sustaining the “reproduction of the social relations of production” in 
and through ideology. What is striking about Thatcherism is precisely 
its capacity to enter into struggle and win space in civil society itself
WRXVHWKHWUHQFKHVDQGIRUWL¿FDWLRQVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DVWKHPHDQVRI
forging a considerable ideological and intellectual authority outside 
the realm of the state proper and, indeed, before—as a necessary 
condition to—taking formal power in the state. (Hall 1988c, 47)
Therefore, Hall observes, it is a mistake “to collapse the state/civil society 
distinction as if it were without real or pertinent effects” (Hall 1988c, 48). 
This would prevent one from understanding, for instance, the moments 
and modes of emergence of popular consent to the authoritarian practices 
RI WKH7KDWFKHU JRYHUQPHQWV WKDW LV WKH VSHFL¿F DUWLFXODWRU\ SUDFWLFHV
presiding over the emergence of a contradictory formation such as 
authoritarian populism.
That Hall makes this point while commenting on Althusser’s theory 
of ideology is not accidental. In fact, the problem of ideology became one 
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of the main terrains on which Hall confronted his key interlocutors in the 
1970s and 1980s. In the wake of Gramsci’s questioning of the traditional 
base-superstructure metaphor, Hall adopted a distinctive focus on the 
ideological practices that secured the increasing ascendancy of Thatcherism. 
This is how he came to understand Thatcherism in terms of authoritarian 
populism: refusing to read its recourse to the coercive apparatuses of the 
state independently from the ideology it deployed to win over popular 
consent. Moreover, it is precisely this focus on ideology that allowed him to 
understand the rise of Thatcherism in a triangular relation with the crisis of 
the Left and the emergence of new social movements and identity politics. 
Hall insisted that one of the key successes of Thatcherism was its capacity 
to seize the new politico-ideological terrain of identity politics which the 
Left, instead, proved unable to read as a site of hegemonic struggle and to 
occupy on its own terms. Yet, as we shall see, Hall did not limit himself to 
highlight the key role played by ideological practices in the consolidation 
of the Thatcherite project. While thinking through Thatcherism, he also 
made, in turn, a number of original interventions within the broader 
Marxist debate on ideology.  
The Problem of Ideology (If Two Can Play at the Game)
The piece in which Hall more thoroughly than anywhere else addresses 
the problem of ideology is, as its title indicates, “The Problem of Ideology: 
Marxism without Guarantees” (1986b). The essay opens by registering 
the critique directed by some Marxists—among whom Perry Anderson 
in his Considerations on Western Marxism (1976)—against the obsession 
of Western Marxist theory with “superstructural” questions of ideology 
and epistemology, at the expense of more “proper” materialist concerns. 
Hall agrees that a “theoreticist deluge” did in fact take place in Western 
Marxism, but he also remarks: “The rise to visibility of the problem of 
ideology has a more objective basis” (Hall 1986b, 29). By “objective basis” 
he refers, on the one hand, to the changes in the means through which 
mass consciousness is formed (such as the spread of popular media) and, 
on the other hand, to the political question of the working class’ consent 
to the modes of its own exploitation in advanced capitalist societies. The 
challenge, for Hall, is to address both questions without recourse to the 
notion of “false consciousness.” Against an understanding of ideology as 
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mere false representation producing false consciousness, at the beginning 
RIWKHHVVD\KHRIIHUVD¿UVWUHGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSW
By ideology I mean the mental frameworks—the languages, the 
concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of 
representation—which different classes and social groups deploy in 
RUGHUWRPDNHVHQVHRIGH¿QH¿JXUHRXWDQGUHQGHULQWHOOLJLEOHWKH
way society works. (Hall 1986b, 29)
This does not mean that the functioning of ideology is limited to the 
emergence of a coherent set of representations, for Hall immediately 
follows: “The problem of ideology . . . concerns the ways in which ideas 
of different kinds . . . become a ‘material force’” (Hall 1986b, 29). Thus, 
ideology is the result of both the condensation of heterogeneous elements 
into a seemingly coherent discourse and the capacity of the latter to 
DUWLFXODWH D ¿HOG RI VRFLDO IRUFHV ,PSRUWDQWO\ LGHRORJ\ KHUH GRHV QRW
simply name the mechanism by which the ruling classes secure their power 
over the dominated and the exploited. Rather, Hall understands ideology 
as a practice that any class or social group deploys in order to make sense 
of its position in society, and that possesses a capacity to mobilize social 
forces as political subjects. As such, it constitutes a terrain of struggle that, 
in Hall’s view, the Left should occupy on its own terms. As he puts it 
elsewhere, “in the arena of ideological struggle . . . two can play at the 
JDPH´+DOO>@
If this is a notion of ideology adequate to his “New Times,” Hall rightly 
observes that its formulation is not to be found in the writings of Marx 
KLPVHOIVLQFH WKH ODWWHU³PRVWRIWHQXVHGµLGHRORJ\¶ WRUHIHUVSHFL¿FDOO\
WR WKHPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIERXUJHRLV WKRXJKWDQGDERYHDOO WR LWVQHJDWLYH
and distorted features” (Hall 1986b, 30).29 However, rather than rejecting 
the concept of ideology deployed by Marx because of its economistic 
SUHPLVHV²WKH SUHPLVH DFFRUGLQJ WRZKLFK LGHDV XQLODWHUDOO\ UHÀHFW WKH
material conditions of their emergence and the assumption of a necessary 
correspondence between ruling ideas and ruling classes—Hall attempts 
to reread Marx himself, in search of an alternative understanding of the 
concept. In order to do so, he focuses on Marx’s approach to the ideology 
of market exchange.
Hall argues that for Marx, on the one hand, market exchange “is what 
appears to govern and regulate economic processes under capitalism” (Hall 
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1986b, 34). In other words, liberal explanations of capitalism depict market 
exchange as its regulating logic: one can sell and buy products, as well as 
labor force, among equals. Moreover, market exchange also “appears” in 
a more literal sense, because the experience many of us primarily have 
of capitalism is reducible to that of a market place—that is, if one is not 
personally involved in the production moment of the capitalist circuit. Thus, 
market exchange is the “surface” of capitalism, which conceals the whole 
set of social relations of exploitation necessary to capitalist production. 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGPDUNHWH[FKDQJHDFTXLUHVWKHSUR¿OHRIDQLGHRORJLFDO
formation not only by “appearing” to us as the essence of capitalism, but 
also by extending its logic to all the other spheres of social life. Hall quotes 
Marx on this matter:
This sphere . . . within whose boundaries the sale and purchase power 
of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights 
of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. 
Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour-
power, are constrained only by their own free will. . . . Equality, because 
each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of 
commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, 
because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because 
HDFKORRNVRQO\WRKLPVHOI0DU[>@30 
Thus, according to Marx’s account, the bourgeois categories that regulate 
our entire social life—freedom, equality, property, and individualism—
emanate from the logic of market relations. As such, they bear the mark 
of an inaugural gesture of concealment, because only the concealment of 
social relations of exploitation allows market exchange to appear as the 
UHJXODWLQJ ORJLF RI FDSLWDOLVP LQ WKH ¿UVW SODFH WKH EX\HU DQG VHOOHU RI
labor force, of course, neither enter the relation as equals nor exchange 
equivalent for equivalent). As Hall observes, this reading is exemplary of 
the concept of ideology as generally attributed to Marx: ideology as a set 
of “false” ideas hiding the “real” relations of exploitation and securing the 
power of the ruling classes over the exploited. The consent that the latter 
may grant to such ideas is to be explained only as an instance of false 
consciousness. In order to reach a different understanding of ideology, Hall 
rereads this very Marxist reading.
As Hall points out, the falseness—of both the ideology of market 
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exchange and of the consciousness of the exploited who may consent 
to it—arises “not from the fact that the market is an illusion, a trick, a 
sleight-of-hand, but only in the sense that it is an inadequate explanation 
of a process” (Hall 1986b, 37). The explanation is inadequate because 
it metonymically reduces the capitalist circuit as a whole to one of its 
moments. In light of this reading, it is not the real/false pair that shall 
frame our understanding of ideology: “The market is no more or less ‘real’ 
than other aspects—production for example” (37). It is thus misleading to 
simply deem any given ideological formation “false.” Rather, one should 
engage in the analytic work of unpacking its mechanisms of metonymic 
substitution, for only this can allow us to identify the concrete ground on 
which every ideology installs itself. There can be a number of different 
discourses that do make sense, in different ways, of the same set of social 
relations. Given that such discourses are not merely true or false, the 
LGHRORJLFDO¿HOGHPHUJHVDVDQRSHQWHUUDLQRIFRQWHVWDWLRQWREHVL]HGDQG
occupied, rather than dismissed in the name of “truth.” This is, indeed, one 
of the major critiques that Hall formulated against the Left in the 1980s, 
and even one of the lessons that the Left, in his view, must have drawn 
from Thatcherism (see Hall and Jacques 1983). 
Hall’s privileging of the ideological level in analyzing Thatcherism and its 
successes granted him a number of critiques. In an essay published on New Left 
Review, for instance, Bob Jessop, Kevin Bonnett, Simon Bromley, and Tom 
Ling (1984) criticize Hall’s concept of authoritarian populism for what they 
regard as Hall’s “apparent celebration of Thatcherism” (33). Yet Hall’s emphasis 
RQWKHLGHRORJLFDOOHYHOZDVPHDQWSUHFLVHO\WRSUR¿OHDWHUUDLQRIVWUXJJOHIRU
the Left, if the latter was not simply to witness the increasing consolidation 
of Thatcherite hegemony. More to the point, and apart from this polemic, 
Jessop et al. also criticize Hall’s “ideologicism”: his tendency of countering 
economic reductionism with an equally reductionist focus on the ideological 
level alone. Yet, as Hall (1985b) remarks in his response to their critique, his 
concept of authoritarian populism was never meant to offer a general theory of 
Thatcherism. More modestly, it set out to understand its politics of hegemony 
because the latter remained, in his view, a terrain overlooked by the Left. If the 
concept of hegemony, as formulated by Gramsci and developed by many of his 
readers, introduced the problem of the exploited classes’ consent to the mode 
of their exploitation at the core of the Western Left, Hall aimed to understand, 
in the more concrete conjuncture of his time, the popular consent gained by 
Thatcherism in support of its markedly authoritarian political project. To this 
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aspect of the conjuncture Hall’s theorizing contributed the most.
Also Jorge Larraín (1991) focuses on the question of ideology in his 
critique of Hall’s approach to Thatcherism. However, while Jessop et al. 
lament the emphasis on ideology as such, Larraín’s critique is circumscribed 
to the particular notion of ideology deployed by Hall. Larraín distinguishes 
between a “neutral” and a “negative” (or “critical”) notion of ideology. 
According to him, the neutral notion adopted by Hall, “of Gramscian, 
Althusserian and Laclauian inspiration” (2), refers to any articulated 
discourse of a class, party, or social group—a discourse that carries, indeed, 
no necessary negative connotation. The negative or critical notion, instead, 
understands ideology as a process of inversion and distortion of reality 
meant to secure the interests of the dominant classes. This is the notion of 
ideology that Larraín defends and that is to be found, he emphasizes, in the 
work of Marx himself. Although he fails to appreciate that the so-called 
neutral notion of ideology is no less critical than the negative one, Larraín 
is certainly correct in identifying these different approaches. And equally 
correct is to locate, in this regard, Hall, Gramsci, Althusser, and Laclau 
within the same theoretical camp. However, this should not obscure the 
relevant differences among these theorists.31 As we are about to see, when 
it comes to think through the concrete conjuncture of Thatcherism, Hall 
DFFRUGVWR*UDPVFL¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILGHRORJ\DQHI¿FDF\WKDWKHLQSDUW
denies, instead, to both Althusser and Laclau.
+DOO¶VGHEWWRZDUG/DFODX¶VZRUNRQLGHRORJ\LVRIJUHDWVLJQL¿FDQFH
In Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (1977), which predates 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy/DFODX¿UPO\ORFDWHVDWWKHFRUHRIKLV
WKHRUHWLFDOHGL¿FH WKHSULQFLSOHDFFRUGLQJ WRZKLFK LGHRORJLFDOHOHPHQWV
do not possess any necessary class belonging. Here, Laclau disagrees with 
Poulantzas’ argument, formulated in Fascism and Dictatorship (1974), 
according to which different ideological elements (such as nationalism, 
militarism, racism, and so forth) are determined by their belonging to a 
JLYHQFODVVDQGWKXVLGHRORJ\LVWREHDQDO\]HGE\³EUHDN>LQJ@LWGRZQLQWR
its constitutive elements according to their belonging” (Laclau 1977, 93). 
Laclau proposes an opposite approach to the problem of ideology:
I think the correct method is the reverse: to accept that ideological 
“elements” taken in isolation have no necessary class connotation, 
and that this connotation is only the result of the articulation of those 
elements in a concrete ideological discourse. (Laclau 1977, 99) 
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The principle according to which ideological elements lack a necessary 
class belonging, and their position within certain ideological discourses 
entirely depends on their contingent articulation, is put at work, in the last 
two essays of Politics and Ideology in Marxist TheoryQRWWRDI¿UPWKDW
VXFKHOHPHQWVWKXVFRQVWLWXWH³ÀRDWLQJVLJQL¿HUV´QDYLJDWLQJDQRYHUÀRZLQJ
GLVFXUVLYH¿HOGEXWWRHQJDJHLQDKLVWRULFDOO\JURXQGHGGLVFXVVLRQLQRUGHU
to analyze their articulation within particular political projects. Laclau’s 
concrete reference in this earlier work is Latin American social formations 
DQG PRUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI 3HURQLVP LQ $UJHQWLQD
The latter’s strong appeal to both nationalism and socialism explains 
Laclau’s resoluteness in questioning the necessary class belongingness of 
ideological elements—countering Poulantzas’ proposition that nationalism 
always constitutes a bourgeois ideological element (Laclau 1977, 96-
99).32 As Jennifer Daryl Slack puts it, “in Politics and Ideology in Marxist 
Theory, Laclau engages in the play of theorizing the concrete in terms of 
articulation and theorizing articulation in terms of the concrete, principally 
in terms of Latin American politics” (Slack 1996, 119).
The principle of the non-necessary class belongingness of ideological 
elements, which Laclau develops by drawing on the Althusserian notion 
RI ³LGHRORJLFDO LQWHUSHOODWLRQ´ $OWKXVVHU >@  LV SUHVHUYHG LQ
Laclau’s subsequent work with Mouffe. For Laclau and Mouffe, as much 
as for Hall, the acknowledgment of the contingency governing the social 
DQGSROLWLFDO¿HOGVZRUNVQRWRQO\DVDVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
of the Left, but also as a warning. Referring to the popular support gained 
by Thatcherism in the 1980s, Laclau and Mouffe observe:            
There is . . . no subject—nor, further, any “necessity”—which is 
absolutely radical and irrecuperable by the dominant order, and 
which constitutes an absolutely guaranteed point of departure for a 
total transformation. . . . That the forms of resistance to new forms of 
subordination are polysemic and can perfectly well be articulated into 
an anti-democratic discourse, is clearly demonstrated by the advances 
of the “new right” in recent years. . . . Popular support for the Reagan 
and Thatcher projects of dismantling the Welfare State is explained 
by the fact that they have succeeded in mobilizing against the latter 
a whole series of resistances to the bureaucratic character of the new 
IRUPVRIVWDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQ/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@
   
Thinking with Stuart Hall: Hegemony and Identity Politics 43
The same point holds, according to Laclau and Mouffe, for the antagonisms 
articulated by new social movements around issues of race, gender, 
sexuality, ecology, and so forth. In their view, “every antagonism, left 
IUHH WR LWVHOI LV DÀRDWLQJ VLJQL¿HU D µZLOG¶ DQWDJRQLVPZKLFKGRHVQRW
predetermine the form in which it can be articulated to other elements in 
DVRFLDOIRUPDWLRQ´/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@$QG²HQWLUHO\
coinciding, in this respect, with Hall’s diagnosis of the triangulation 
between the rise of Thatcherism, a crisis of the Left, and the emergence of 
identity politics—they direct their critique against the Left itself: “The Left, 
of course, is ill prepared to take into account these struggles, which even 
today it tends to dismiss as ‘liberal.’ Hence the danger that they may be 
articulated by a discourse of the Right, of the defence of privileges” (164).
Thus, for Laclau and Mouffe, the antagonisms embodied by the new 
social movements shall not be assumed to align with a progressive socialist 
politics, but rather should be articulated as a progressive political project 
by inserting them in what they term a “chain of equivalence.”  In the 
preface to the second edition of their work, they state:
One of the central tenets of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is the 
need to create a chain of equivalence among the various democratic 
struggles against different forms of subordination. We argued that 
struggles against sexism, racism, sexual discrimination, and in 
defence of the environment needed to be articulated with those of the 
workers in a new left-wing hegemonic project. (Laclau and Mouffe 
>@[YLLL
The concept of chain of equivalence is Laclau and Mouffe’s way of 
renaming the alliance that different social and political forces should 
establish in order to conduct a politics of hegemony and thus forge a new 
historical bloc able to confront and displace the hegemonic bloc. As I have 
argued earlier, Laclau and Mouffe do away with the notion of alliance 
altogether, because the latter designates, in their view, a relation among 
subjects constituted outside the relation itself. This is why they introduce 
WKHGLVFXUVLYHO\ LQÀHFWHGFRQFHSWRIFKDLQRIHTXLYDOHQFH$FFRUGLQJ WR
them, a chain of equivalence is a relation that articulates different elements 
DQGWHQGVWRGLVVROYHWKHLUVSHFL¿FLW\IHPLQLVPstands for antiracism stands 
for gay and lesbian politics stands for the anti-war movement stands for 
the labor movement, and so forth.33 In this way, the construction of a chain 
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of equivalence polarizes the social into two different camps and fosters the 
emergence of a front of antagonism—for instance, the antagonism between 
a front of the progressive Left and the hegemonic bloc of Thatcherism. The 
theoretical goal is to conceptualize antagonism itself not as the source, but 
as the effect of politico-ideological articulatory practices. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe—who operate here at a level of 
theoretical abstraction increasingly removed from the concreteness of 
social and political struggle—the polarization of the social obtained 
through the construction of a chain of equivalence cannot be stabilized 
RQFHDQGIRUDOORWKHUZLVHWKHUHVXOWZRXOGEHD¿QDOFORVXUHWKDWOHDYHV
no room for further articulations. Rather, in their view, antagonism works 
as a constitutive limit to the social’s full closure and is, in turn, constantly 
limited by the differences of the elements that are articulated in a chain 
of equivalence. The differences that distinguish feminism from antiracism 
fromJD\DQGOHVELDQSROLWLFVDQGVRIRUWKSUHYHQWWKH¿QDOVWDELOL]DWLRQ
RIDVSHFL¿FIURQWLHUZLWKLQWKHVRFLDOIRUWKLVZRXOGUHTXLUHDUHODWLRQRI
perfect equivalence among those elements. Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
each element of a chain of equivalence is “split”: it maintains its difference 
while, at the same time, it embodies the chain as a whole. For them, in fact, 
this is the place of the universal—a universal contaminated by differences:
Social actors occupy differential positions within the discourses that 
constitute the social fabric. In that sense they are all, strictly speaking, 
particularities. On the other hand, there are social antagonisms 
creating internal frontiers within society. Vis-à-vis oppressive forces, 
for instance, a set of particularities establish relations of equivalence 
between themselves. It becomes necessary, however, to represent the 
WRWDOLW\RIWKHFKDLQ:KDWDUHWKHPHDQVRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ"$VZH
argue, only one particularity whose body is split, for without ceasing 
to be its own particularity, it transforms its body in the representation 
of the universality transcending it (that of the equivalential chain). 
/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@[LLL
And they follow: “This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes 
the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is 
what we call a hegemonic relation´/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@[LLL
In other words, a hegemonic relation is for them a relation that articulates 
different elements into a chain of equivalence so that their differences are not 
Thinking with Stuart Hall: Hegemony and Identity Politics 45
entirely dissolved, but are limited by the fact that each element represents 
the chain as a whole. Since feminist struggles, antiracist struggles, gay and 
lesbian struggles, and so forth are not necessarily bound to a progressive 
political project—a principle that Laclau and Mouffe draw from Laclau’s 
earlier conceptualization of the non-necessary class belongingness of 
ideological elements and extend, now, to the new social movements—they 
must be articulated in a chain by virtue of which each of these struggles, 
without losing its autonomy, stands for the chain as a whole.    
However, despite the continuities between Laclau’s earlier work and 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, what gets almost entirely lost in the latter 
is precisely the concrete. While Laclau and Mouffe’s work is disseminated 
ZLWK IHZ H[DPSOHV PHDQW WR H[SODLQ WKH SROLWLFDO VLJQL¿FDQFH RI WKHLU
theoretical intervention—and many of such examples are drawn from 
the context of Thatcherism—they do not theorize through Thatcherism, 
but use it to illustrateWKHLUWKHRUHWLFDOHGL¿FH$V-XGLWK%XWOHUDUJXHVLQ
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality against both Laclau’s and especially 
6ODYRM äLåHN¶V GHSOR\PHQW RI H[DPSOHV LQ WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH WKHRUHWLFDO
works, “the very possibility of illustrating an abstract point by a concrete 
example presupposes the separation of the abstract and the concrete—
LQGHHGSUHVXSSRVHV WKHSURGXFWLRQRIDQHSLVWHPLF¿HOGGH¿QHGE\WKDW
binary opposition” (Butler 2000, 19). This is, in fact, one of the reasons 
why Hall preferred Laclau’s earlier work to Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy (Hall 1986c, 56). 
Symptomatic of Laclau and Mouffe’s failure to think through the 
concrete are, on the one hand, the radical discursive turn they embrace 
and, on the other hand, their indifference to history when it comes to 
conceptualize the mechanisms and the effects of ideology. In order to 
radicalize their claim that the subjects entering a hegemonic relation are 
fully transformed by it, Laclau and Mouffe propose that ideology be 
considered as a fully discursive practice. This does not mean that ideology, 
in their view, is a discourse operating onto a non-discursive terrain. More 
radically, and developing a poststructuralist reading of Gramsci, they 
contest the very distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive. 
Social forces of different kind, to the extent that they emerge as such and 
get articulated to one another through ideological work, must be considered 
as discursive elements that do not possess any determination other than the 
position they are ascribed by and within ideology itself.34 This theoretical 
move is politically informed: its aim is to displace the assumption of an 
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already-constituted historical subject (the working class) from the core 
of the Left, in favor of an opening toward new social movements and 
identity formations. The latter must be transformed—as much as they 
should transform the Left—through the process of their articulation within 
a common political project. In Laclau and Mouffe’s view, to maintain 
that such new formations as well as the working class emerge outside and 
before their articulation on the discursive terrain of ideology would prevent 
such an opening of the Left to fully take place. 
Hall himself does not counter the general effects that the discursive 
turn produced in critical theory from the 1960s onward. Nor does he 
believe that an engagement with the discursive necessarily amounts to a 
retreat from the political. In an interview with Lawrence Grossberg, while 
discussing the recent publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, he 
observes: “The discursive metaphor is . . . extraordinarily rich and has 
massive political consequences. For instance, it enabled cultural theorists 
to realize that what we call ‘the self’ is constituted out of and by difference, 
and remains contradictory” (Hall 1986c, 56). However, he continues:
The question is, can one . . . follow that argument to the point that 
WKHUHLVQRWKLQJWRSUDFWLFHEXWLWVGLVFXUVLYHDVSHFW",WKLQNWKDW¶VZKDW
>/DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶V@UHFHQWERRNGRHV,ZRXOGSXWLWSROHPLFDOO\
in the following form: the last book thinks that the world, social 
practice, is language, whereas I want to say that the social operates 
like a language. (Hall 1986c, 56)35
Hall formulates similar concerns in “The Problem of Ideology” (1986b). 
While commenting on the readings of Gramsci that have sought to rethink 
the problem of ideology in non-economistic terms, an effort that he clearly 
appreciates, he nonetheless warns: “Often this approach replaces the 
inadequate notions of ideologies ascribed in blocks to classes with an equally 
XQVDWLVIDFWRU\µGLVFXUVLYH¶QRWLRQZKLFKLPSOLHVWRWDOIUHHÀRDWLQJQHVVRI
all ideological elements and discourses” (40). In this view, “the elements 
of a discourse appear spontaneously to combine and recombine with each 
other, without material constraints of any kind other than that provided by 
the discursive operations themselves” (40). On the contrary, the question 
of the material forces constituting the points of application of a given 
LGHRORJLFDOGLVFRXUVHLVFHQWUDOLIRQHZDQWVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHHI¿FDF\RI
ideology as such: “No ideological conception can ever become materially 
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effective unless and until it can beDUWLFXODWHGWRWKH¿HOGRISROLWLFDODQG
social forces and to the struggles between different forces at stake” (41).
According to Hall, history is one of the key constrains that frame 
the emergence of effective ideological formations, for every element in 
a given social formation bears the mark of its history of articulations, 
which limits its possibilities to be articulated differently in the present. For 
instance, he observes, it may be perfectly possible to articulate “the nation” 
to a progressive political project and make it embody “a national-popular 
collective will, as Gramsci argued” (Hall 1986b, 41). In Britain, however, 
the historical links of “the nation” to racist ideologies and to the project 
of imperial expansion make any new progressive articulation of it more 
GLI¿FXOWWRUHDOL]H²DQGSHUKDSVOHVVGHVLUDEOHLQWKH¿UVWSODFH
7KHVHDVVRFLDWLRQVDUHQRWJLYHQIRUDOOWLPH%XWWKH\DUHGLI¿FXOWWR
break because the ideological terrain of this particular social formation 
has been so powerfully structured in that way by its previous history. 
These historical connections . . . are the “traces” which Gramsci 
PHQWLRQHG WKH³VWUDWL¿HGGHSRVLWV LQSRSXODUSKLORVRSK\´ZKLFKQR
ORQJHUKDYHDQLQYHQWRU\EXWZKLFKHVWDEOLVKDQGGH¿QHWKH¿HOGVDORQJ
which ideological struggle is likely to move. (Hall 1986b, 41-42)36
As Hall puts it elsewhere: “if you are going to try to break, contest or 
interrupt some of these tendential historical connections, you have to know 
when you are moving against the grain of historical formations” (Hall 
1986c, 54). Hence, his trenchant comment on Laclau and Mouffe’s work: 
“Their problem isn’t politics but history” (58).
Laclau and Mouffe’s wholesale turn toward the discursive and their 
indifference to history—in other words, their obliteration of the concrete—
explain, in general, Hall’s skepticism toward Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy as opposed to Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. However, 
Hall had raised similar questions also about Laclau’s earlier work, in 
WKH FRQWH[W RI D GLVFXVVLRQ RI 7KDWFKHULVP +DOO >@  7ZR
questions, in particular, are relevant to my discussion. First: “If ideologies 
do not belong to classes but are articulated to them through ideological 
VWUXJJOH LW UHPDLQV D GLI¿FXOW\ WR XQGHUVWDQG ZKDW LGHRORJLFDOO\ IUHH
‘class practices’ are and how they function” (140). Second: “The thesis 
of the ‘non-class belongingness’ of ideological elements . . . takes too 
little into consideration the fact that the articulation of certain discourses 
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to the practices of particular classes has been secured over long periods” 
(140). Both questions concern the “material” through which ideologies 
RSHUDWH DQG VSHFL¿FDOO\ WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK WKDW PDWHULDO VKRXOG EH
considered to be free or charged of previous determinations. Who activates 
ideological struggle if ideologies do not belong, at least tendentially, to 
SDUWLFXODUFODVVHVDQGVRFLDOVHJPHQWVLQWKH¿UVWSODFH"$QGWRZKDWH[WHQW
does the theoretical principle of the non-necessary class belongingness 
of ideological elements in fact eclipse histories of articulation of certain 
LGHRORJLHV WR FHUWDLQ FODVVHV"%\SRVLQJ VXFKTXHVWLRQV HYHQEHIRUH WKH
publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Hall in fact seems to 
VXJJHVW WKDW/DFODX¶V HDUOLHU UHÀHFWLRQV DOUHDG\HQJHQGHUHG VRPHRI WKH
abstraction to be found in his later work with Mouffe.
In Hall’s view, Laclau inherits part of these ambiguities from Althusser 
DQGKLVSV\FKRDQDO\WLFDOO\LQÀHFWHGWKHRU\RILGHRORJLFDOLQWHUSHOODWLRQ$
critique of the latter appears, for instance, in “The Toad in the Garden” 
(1988c). I observed earlier that, in this piece, Hall criticizes Althusser’s 
tendency to blur the boundaries between state and civil society rather 
than attending to the articulatory practices operating across the two. In 
the same essay, he also questions the capacity of Althusser’s theory to 
account for the material through which ideology works, that is, the ground 
on which ideology installs itself. It is renown that, for Althusser, power 
produces its subjects through interpellation. His notion of interpellation 
refers to the moment an individual is hailed and, by the very gesture of 
turning and responding to the address, that individual properly becomes a 
subject. Althusser famously illustrates this process through the scene of a 
police hailing:
Ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it “recruits” subjects 
among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the 
individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise 
operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can 
be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police 
RURWKHUKDLOLQJ³+H\\RXWKHUH´$OWKXVVHU>@
According to Hall, “the proposition, derived from Lacan, that ideology is 
material because it operates in and through the production of subjects” is 
to be read as Althusser’s attempt “to secure the materialism of ideology 
without reductionism” (Hall 1988c, 48). In other words, by insisting on 
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the productive function of ideology and on the contingency of the scene 
of interpellation, Althusser avoids assuming that some given material 
FRQGLWLRQVRUJDQLFDOO\JLYH ULVH WRDQGDUH UHÀHFWHG LQDJLYHQ LGHRORJ\
Hall, of course, does not object to this. Neither does he object to the recourse 
to Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to explain “how it is we are formed as 
subjects and how we ever come to enter language, meaning, representation” 
(50). However, Thatcherism in his view poses a different question:
What Thatcherism poses is the problem of understanding how already 
positioned subjects can be effectively detached from their points of 
application and effectively repositioned by a new set of discourses. 
7KLV LV SUHFLVHO\ D KLVWRULFDOO\ VSHFL¿F OHYHO RI DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH
interpellative aspects of ideology that is not adequately resumed 
or explained by the transhistorical speculative generalities of 
Lacanianism. (Hall 1988c, 50)  
In other words, Thatcherism did not emerge out of a historical void. The 
history preceding it and the position that such a history had already ascribed 
to different subjects and social forces within the British social formation 
do matterWRDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSKHQRPHQRQDQGPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\
of the ideological work that sustained the construction of its ascendancy. 
Therefore, part and parcel of Hall’s approach to Thatcherite ideology 
has been a reconstruction of its history. According to his account, the 
emergence of Thatcherism needs to be explained in relation to the crisis 
of the British “post-war settlement,” that is, the historical compromise that 
witnessed both Labour and the Conservatives organize their respective 
political projects around a fundamental social consensus over the 
Keynesian welfare state.37 Throughout the 1960s, that consensus began to 
collapse—as made clear, in Hall’s view, by the upheavals of the 1960s, the 
counter-cultural forms of opposition to the Vietnam War, and the industrial 
militancy of the early 1970s, among other phenomena. As he puts it: 
³2QHSKDVHRIKHJHPRQ\KDGGLVLQWHJUDWHGWKHVRFLHW\HQWHUHGWKDWHUDRI
contestations, crises, and alarms that frequently accompanies the struggles 
for the formation of a new hegemonic stage” (Hall 1988c, 37). Moreover, 
he argues, it is precisely the social democratic management of this 
crisis—especially by Labour governments in 1966-70 and 1974-79—that 
prepared the ground for the subsequent appearance of Thatcherism on the 
British political scene. Labour approached the crisis through “corporatist” 
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strategies of containment, trying to secure a partnership between the 
representatives of capital, those of labor, and the state (representative of 
³WKHSHRSOH´\HWLQIDFWGHPRELOL]LQJSRSXODUVHFWRUV+DOO>@
134-135). According to Hall, this laid the ground for Thatcherism to 
capitalize on “the disorganized discontents of the popular classes,” hence 
constructing “an alternative ‘bloc’ organized around the powerful themes 
of ‘anti-statism,’ ‘anti-collectivism,’ ‘anti-creeping socialism’ and ‘anti-the 
power bloc’ (i.e. social democracy in power)” (136).
“Social democracy in power” denotes, in this context, not simply 
Labour governments as much as the broader post-war settlement involving 
Labour and Tories alike. It is true, as Hall remarks, that Thatcherism 
combined neoliberal ideological elements with conservative elements 
organic to the Tory tradition (Hall 1988c, 37). And it is also true, as he 
further observes, that the conservative government of Edward Heath 
(1970-74) anticipated many of the ideological elements characterizing the 
Thatcherite project, regarding both economic policy and the management 
RIVRFLDOGLVFRQWHQW+RZHYHU³ZKHQ7KDWFKHULVP¿QDOO\HPHUJHGLW
was pitched against the ‘creeping corporatism’ of all recent governments, 
including that of Mr. Heath. . . . Thatcherism thus won and transformed 
WKH&RQVHUYDWLYHSDUW\¿UVWEHIRUHVHWWLQJDERXWZLQQLQJDQGWUDQVIRUPLQJ
the country” (38). More precisely, Thatcherism set out to transform the 
Conservative Party andWKH¿HOGRISRSXODUFRPPRQVHQVHEHIRUHWDNLQJ
power within the party and, through the party, in the state. This process is 
important to register, for it signals the multiple sites of struggle involved in 
a politics of hegemony.
For Hall, neither Laclau’s nor Althssuer’s respective conceptualizations 
of ideology can help us fully understand the process by which Thatcherism 
UHDUWLFXODWHG WKH ¿HOG RI SRSXODU DQ[LHWLHV DQG FRPPRQ VHQVH DW LWV
disposal. Hall turns, instead, to Gramsci’s account of the processes 
of ideological transformation. As he recalls, Gramsci argued that an 
ideological transformation follows from an intervention that builds on 
the old discourse and turns elements already present in it—perhaps as 
secondary elements—into the nucleus of a new ideological formation 
+DOO>@,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHPDWHULDOWKURXJKZKLFK
WKH LGHRORJ\ RI 7KDWFKHULVP WRRN VKDSH DQG DI¿UPHG LWVHOI ZDV QHYHU
fully “rough.” The process is better described as a rearticulation of the 
¿HOGRISRSXODUFRPPRQVHQVHWKURXJKDUHRUJDQL]DWLRQRILWVFRQVWLWXWLYH
elements. According to Hall, this reorganization was accomplished through 
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interpellation and, importantly, did not rest on one interpellative structure 
(such as class interpellation), but on the condensation of a plurality of 
interpellations. The Thatcherite interpellation of “woman” is perhaps the 
best illustration of the process:
Women . . . represented as “guardians” of the family, are also, by 
WKDW SRVLWLRQ FRQQRWDWLYHO\ LGHQWL¿HGZLWK WKH NHHSHU RI WUDGLWLRQDO
ZLVGRPV DQG JXDUGLDQ RI FRQYHQWLRQDO SRSXODU PRUDOLW\ EXW WKLV
composite “she” is, at the same time, the “practical one”—the one who 
knows the “value of money” and the “impact of rising prices in the 
VKRSV´WKDWLVWKH¿JXUHWKURXJKZKLFKWKHHFRQRPLFDQGPRQHWDULVW
themes of Thatcherism can be made to connect with the empirical 
experience of . . . ordinary folk. “She” is, of course, . . . concerned for 
the educational chances of her child: the woman alone on the streets at 
night, who can no longer go about her ordinary business unmolested: 
. . . and, properly addressed, she is the wife of the militant trade 
unionist on strike, who brings home to him the harsh realities and 
consequences of living without the weekly wage, and urges a “speedy 
return to work”—for the sake of the children, of course. Needless to 
say, she is the emblematic mother of conventional sexual ideology, for 
whom abortion is a “crime against nature.” “She” has played a quite 
critical ideological role in the construction of popular moralities in the 
UHFHQWSHULRG+DOO>@
Thus, the ideology of Thatcherism is not regarded, by Hall, as a simple 
collection of false representations hiding the real exercise of power from 
“the people.” Instead, Thatcherism was able to occupy a key ideological 
terrain—that of identity—opened up by the crisis of the British post-war 
settlement and the emergence of new social and political forces. It did so 
to a degree of success that the Left did not achieve, not least, according to 
Hall, because the latter did not take that struggle seriously enough. At work 
in this analysis is what Larraín terms a “neutral” understanding of ideology, 
which Hall shares with Gramsci, Althusser, and Laclau, among others. Yet, 
for Hall, the abstract formulations of how ideology works offered by either 
Laclau or, especially, Althusser, unlike Gramsci’s account of ideological 
transformations, are of little help if one is to account for how Thatcherism 
LQWHUYHQHGLQWRLWVFRQFUHWHFRQMXQFWXUH WKDW LV LIRQHZDQWV WRH[SODLQ
not how individuals were transformed into subjects by authoritarian 
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populism, but rather how subjects and social forces bearing the traces 
of previous histories of articulation were effectively repositioned. This 
analysis allowed Hall to both highlight the identity politics of Thatcherism 
as part of its politics of hegemony and still regard the terrain of identity 
politics as a fertile and necessary ground for the emergence of counter-
hegemonic formations.
The Identity Politics of Thatcherism: From Mugging to Section 28 
In Policing The Crisis: Mugging, The State, and Law and Order (1978), 
Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts 
analyze one particular passage in the crisis of the British social formation. 
This is the moment of 1972-73, when a moral panic about mugging 
makes its appearance in British society, then disappears for some time, 
and resurfaces in 1974-76. The term “mugging” began circulating in the 
British press in 1972 allegedly to describe a new type of street crime, even 
as Hall and his colleagues demonstrate that no evidence could be collected 
of a new wave of crime, much less of a new type of crime. Yet, among 
other factors, the borrowing of the very term from the context of the United 
States and the association of the crime with black (male) youth worked 
to consolidate the belief that something new and foreign was making its 
appearance on British streets (6-28). The apparatuses of the state (the 
media, the police, and the judiciary) were mobilized in exceptional ways 
in the context of the mugging panic. The very project of Policing the Crisis 
took shape out of outrage at the disproportionate sentences handed down in 
1973 to three youths who robbed and injured an elder man in Handsworth, 
Birmingham—twenty years to Paul Storey and ten years to James Duignan 
and Mustafa Fuat. 
Policing the Crisis reads this explosion of a moral panic—punctuated 
by such exceptional sentences as well as by a media campaign about 
³EODFNFULPH´DQGDQHVFDODWLRQRIFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQWKHSROLFHDQGEODFN
communities—as the high point of accumulation of a number of social 
contradictions that could no longer be managed within the frame of the 
British post-war consensus. According to Hall et al., the popular and 
SROLWLFDO ¿[DWLRQ RQPXJJLQJ LQ  DQG ODWHU LQ  VSHDNV
precisely of the crisis of that consensus. In other words, Policing the 
Crisis interprets the moral panic about mugging as a symptom of a crisis 
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of hegemony and, at the same time, as a central articulatory moment in the 
struggle to establish a new hegemony. Importantly, within the frame of this 
analysis, Hall et al. situate the politics of race at the core of the emerging 
hegemonic struggle:
>Policing the Crisis@WULHVWRH[DPLQHZK\DQGKRZWKHWKHPHVRIUDFH
crime and youth—condensed into the image of “mugging”—come 
to serve as the articulator of the crisis, as its ideological conductor. 
It is also about how these themes have functioned as a mechanism 
for the construction of an authoritarian consensus, a conservative 
backlash: what we call the slow build-up towards a “soft” law-and-
order society. But it also has to ask: to what social contradictions does 
WKLVWUHQGWRZDUGVWKH³GLVFLSOLQHGVRFLHW\´UHDOO\UHIHU"+RZKDV




things we mean by “mugging” as a social phenomenon. It is why a 
study of “mugging” has led us inevitably to the general “crisis of 
hegemony” in the Britain of the 1970s. (Hall et al. 1978, viii)
Thus, Policing the Crisis marks a key moment in Hall’s theoretical 
trajectory. As the passage above suggests, its analysis of the moral panic 
about mugging and of the politics of race embedded in it prepared the ground 
for Hall’s later conceptualization of Thatcherism as a form of authoritarian 
populism, operating not only but also on the terrain of identity politics. 
5DFLDODQWDJRQLVPV¿JXUHDOUHDG\LQWKLVHDUOLHUDQDO\VLVQRWDVD³FRYHULQJ
up” of deeper social contradictions, but as a social contradiction in its own 
right that comes to function as a privileged ideological conductor both for 
the crisis of hegemony (how the crisis is felt) and for the manufacturing of 
a new authoritarian consensus in response to it: the incitement of a popular 
call from below in support of law and order. 
Hall et al. identify, in the context of crisis, a shift in the exercise of 
power toward the coercive pole of the consent/coercive pair. Yet they 
also insist that the centrality acquired by coercion does not displace the 
problem of consent from the core of political struggle. The two appear, 
instead, in articulation. Hall himself would later recall that in Policing the 
CrisisWKHLGHDRIDXWKRULWDULDQSRSXOLVPIRXQGRQHRILWV¿UVWLIWHQWDWLYH
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formulations (Hall 1985b, 116).38 Pushing this argument further, while the 
mugging panic predates, as such, the formal rise to power of Margaret 
Thatcher, the analysis offered in Policing the Crisis must be understood, 
retrospectively, as integral to Hall’s analysis of Thatcherism: a politico-
economic project that in part exceeds the sequence of the three Thatcher 
governments (1979-90). Indeed, the relative success of Thatcherism has 
largely depended on its capacity to win space in civil society before taking 
formal power in the state.39 
In light of these continuities between Policing the Crisis and Hall’s 
subsequent analysis of Thatcherism, it is not surprising that the book 
also marks one of Hall’s earlier engagements with Gramsci’s theorizing. 
As Sparks (1996) observes, Policing the Crisis was meant not only to 
understand the moral panic about mugging, but also to synthetize the 
WKHRUHWLFDOZRUNFDUULHGRXWDWWKH&&&6GXULQJWKHSUHYLRXV¿YH\HDUV
These were the years that witnessed the appropriation and translation 
of Althusser’s Marxism into cultural studies. However, “Althusser and 
his idea of the ‘ideological state apparatus’ are invoked more or less in 
passing on a number of occasions, but the real centre of attention is on 
developing aspects of Gramsci’s work on the winning of consent” (88). 
Sparks is right in situating Policing the Crisis as a moment of passage 
from Althusser to Gramsci. If Hall et al. attempt not only to understand the 
social phenomenon of mugging, but also “to contribute to the development 
RIDVSHFL¿FDOO\0DU[LVWWKHRU\RIWKHVWDWH´+DOOet al. 1978, 196), their 
contribution is certainly more Gramscian than Althusserian. 
It is by turning to Gramsci that Hall et al. address the central problem 
of reconciling the principle of “the determination in the last instance by 
the economic” with the “relative autonomy” of the political (the state). 
Indeed, they draw on Gramsci to argue that power is exercised by a 
dominant class in liberal social formations in the form of hegemony—
that is, through the extension of its authority in the state and civil society, 
the negotiation of interests of different classes and class fractions in the 
service of the winning of consent, hence the manufacturing of a relatively 
cohesive hegemonic bloc. It follows, they argue, that the liberal state does 
not (cannot) operate as the direct and transparent expression of ruling class 
interests: “The relative independence of the state (the ‘relative autonomy’ 
of the political from the economic) is, in capitalist societies, the necessary 
condition for this ‘task’ of cohesion and unity” (Hall et al. 1978, 204-205). 
And they continue:
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For this reason, the view of the capitalist state as “the executive 
committee of the ruling class” is not a particularly helpful one. . . . 
The temptation is to “read” the political level of the state as always 
and directly expressive, either of the “needs” of the productive forces 
or of the narrow class interests of one ruling class fraction. This 
obscures the fact that a fundamental class can exercise power through 
the mediation, at the political level, of a ruling or “governing” class 
fraction different from itself. (Hall et al. 1978, 205)           
   
In other words, even if the principle of “the determination in the last 
instance by the economic” may explain, at a higher level of abstraction, 
the relation between the mode of production and the formation of the 
state, it cannot account for the articulation of that relation in the concrete 
life of a social formation. According to Hall et al., a necessary ingredient 
of that articulation in liberal societies is the “relative autonomy” of the 
political. Only by operating within such a regime of relative autonomy can 
a dominant class successfully consolidate and exercise its hegemony. 
The principle of the relative autonomy of the different levels of the 
social formation—which is a correlative of the principle of articulation—
is a guiding thread in Policing the Crisis. This is what allows Hall et 
al. to read the moral panic about mugging as an operation of ideology. 
Their reading is grounded on Stanley Cohen’s classic sociological work 
Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1973), yet supplemented and transformed 
through a Marxist perspective. As one of the authors of Policing the Crisis, 
Tony Jefferson, has recently put it, Cohen’s focus on the what and how 
of moral panics had to be integrated with a historical materialist analysis 
of why the panic about mugging took place when it did (Jefferson 2008, 
114). Yet, Jefferson continues, “we were equally critical of a conventional, 
reductive Marxism. In particular, we were interested in understanding how 
it was that the relative autonomous institutions of the state . . . contributed 
to the panic independently (i.e. in line with their own institutional goals, 
demands, protocols), but also in a way that operated collectively to 
reproduce the ideas of the powerful, ideas that advantaged the ruling class 
alliance: the dominant ideology” (114). In other words, even as Hall et al. 
read the mugging panic as a symptom of the crisis of hegemony and a key 
articulatory moment in the emerging politico-ideological struggle to secure 
a new hegemony—a reading that leads them to reconceptualize the very 
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notion of “moral panic” proposed by Cohen—they also avoid reducing the 
moral panic to a direct effect of the crisis: “We are not of course attempting 
WRIRUFHWKLVFRQYHUJHQFHLQWRWRRWLJKWRUQHDWD¿W   7KHUHDFWLRQWR
mugging has its own ‘inner history,’ within the juridical and ideological 
spheres: crime control, the police and courts, public opinion and the media. 
If it relates to the ‘crisis in hegemony,’ it can only be via the shifting balance 
and internal relations between different state apparatuses in relation to the 
management of crisis” (Hall et al. 1978, 305).
It is worth emphasizing that the principle of the relative autonomy 
of the political is extended, in Policing the Crisis, not only to the state 
as such, but also to each apparatus of the state. This is what Hall et al. 
mean when they argue that the moral panic relates to the general crisis 
in the British social formation via the shifting balance between different 
state apparatuses. Or, as Jefferson puts it in his comment above, one of the 
central goals of the project was to produce an analysis of how different 
state apparatuses operated in concert but also contributed independently to 
the emergence of the moral panic. In other words, implicit in the analysis is 
the idea that a regime of relative autonomy regulates not only the relations 
between the political, the ideological, and the economic (in this case, 
the relation between the state and the mode of production), but also the 
dynamics internal to each level (in this case, the relations among different 
state apparatuses). If the state cannot be understood simply as a direct 
expression and the guardian of ruling class interests, similarly each state 
apparatus must be understood not only as an expression of state ideology, 
but also as operating according to its own internal logics. 
This is clear, for instance, in the discussion of the particular role played 
by the police in the production of the mugging panic. According to Hall et 
al., while the police, like the media, contributed to amplify the popular fear 
of a new wave of crime and to associate mugging with black male youth, it 
did so in a different temporal relation to the explosion of the moral panic as 
such: “The role of the police in any campaign of the sort conducted against 
‘mugging’ is similar to that of the media, but they come in to play at an 
earlier stage in the cycle” (Hall et al. 1978, 38). Indeed, the London police 
became concerned with mugging before the latter turned into a matter of 
widespread public concern. Starting from this observation, Hall et al. come 
to argue that the police, rather than simply reacting to mugging, contributed 
LQSDUWLFXODUZD\VWRSURGXFHLWDVDVRFLDOSKHQRPHQRQLQWKH¿UVWSODFH40 
Importantly, this argument is grounded not just on the assumption that the 
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police, as an apparatus of the state, works as a direct agent of the dominant 
ideology, but on an analysis of its internal logics and of key shifts in its 
organizational practices. 
As Hall et al. observe, the British police forces underwent throughout 
the 1960s a process of increasing specialization, that is, the formation of 
special squads to deal with particular types of crime (Hall et al. 1978, 
46). From this process emerged the London Transport Police Special 
Squad, which came to be known as the “Anti-Mugging” Squad and 
which was quick in mobilizing against mugging early in 1972, producing 
a discourse of emergency that would later enter the media and translate 
into a wave of popular anxiety (39-40). This process was sustained, in 
turn, by the common practice within the police forces of channeling 
more resources into crimes with high detention potential—a practice that 
¿QGVLWVORJLFLQWKHIDFWWKDWWKH³FOHDQXSUDWH´IXQFWLRQVDVDPDWWHURI
fact, as the primary measure of police success. As Hall et al. argue, “this 
ORJLFDOSUDFWLFHLVDOVRDVWUXFWXULQJRQHLWDPSOL¿HVWKHYROXPHRIWKHVH
selected crimes, since the more resources are concentrated, the greater 
WKHQXPEHUUHFRUGHG´7KXVRQWKHRQHKDQGVSHFL¿FSUDFWLFHVDQG
organizational transformations internal to the police forces had a direct 
effect on the emergence of the mugging panic. On the other hand, the 
specialization of the police also contributed to the production of mugging, 
if perhaps more indirectly, by weakening the links between the police and 
the community: “Today, . . . the ‘typical’ policeman is a professional ‘cop,’ 
PHPEHURIDFULPH¿JKWLQJXQLWZKRVHFXOWXUDOFRQWDFWZLWKWKHSHRSOHKH
polices is minimal” (46). According to Hall et al., this erosion of police-
community relations was relevant to the manufacturing of the moral panic 
because of the ideological location of mugging, in fact, within particular 
communities: black urban communities. 
7KHDQDO\VLV , KDYHEULHÀ\ VXPPDUL]HGKHUH VKRZVKRZHDFK VWDWH
apparatus (in this case, the police) contributed to the production of a moral 
panic about mugging within a regime of relative autonomy, that is, according 
not only but also to its inner logics. If this is true of the police, it is all the 
more true of the media, which are formally and institutionally independent 
from the state.41 That analysis also begins to highlight how part and parcel 
of the production of the moral panic was a location of mugging in black 
urban communities: an articulation of mugging and race.42 Also the latter, 
however, possesses its own inner history. That is, also the politics of race 
mobilized in the context of the moral panic operated within a regime of 
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relative autonomy. Hall et al. write: “As race relations have worsened in 
the country generally, as black militancy and politicisation have grown, and 
DVWKHQXPEHURIEODFN\RXWKVXQDEOHWR¿QGHPSOR\PHQWKDVPXOWLSOLHG
. . . so the police in the black communities have come, progressively, to 
perceive the black population as a potential threat to ‘law and order’” 
(Hall et al. 1978, 45). As this passage suggests, at least three different but 
interrelated dynamics produced race as a terrain of antagonism that became 
central to the mugging panic and, more broadly, to the crisis of hegemony 
DQGWKHHPHUJHQFHRIDSRSXOLVWDXWKRULWDULDQUHVSRQVHWRLW WKHVSHFL¿F
position of immigrant and black workers within the British labor force, the 
DUWLFXODWLRQRIKLVWRULFDOO\VSHFL¿FDQWLLPPLJUDWLRQDQGUDFLVWLGHRORJLHV
and the politicization of black communities themselves.
On the one hand, Hall et al. observe that the economic crisis and the 
ULVHRIXQHPSOR\PHQWLQWKHVKDYHKDGDVSHFL¿FLPSDFWRQWKHEODFN
labor force already present in Britain. They argue that this particular moment 
must be understood in relation to the position more generally assigned to 
black workers within British industry: “In the early 1950s, when British 
industry was expanding and undermanned, labour was sucked in from the 
surplus labour of the Caribbean and Asian subcontinent. . . . In periods of 
recession, and especially in the present phase, the numbers of immigrants 
have fallen . . . and a higher proportion of those already here are shunted 
into unemployment. In short, the ‘supply’ of black labour in employment 
has risen and fallen in direct relation to the needs of British capital” (Hall et 
al. 1978, 343). Yet, on the other hand, that relation has been less direct than 
LWPD\VHHP:KLOHWKHÀRZRIEODFNODERULQDQGRXWRI%ULWLVKLQGXVWU\
(and of Britain itself) depended on the vicissitudes of British capital, 
Hall et al. do not fail to highlight that “what has regulatedWKHÀRZLVRI
course, legislative (i.e. political) action. And what has prepared the ground 
IRU WKLV XVH RI EODFN ODERXU DV DÀXLG DQG HQGOHVVO\ µYDULDEOH¶ IDFWRU LQ
British industry is the growth of racism (ideology)” (343). As they point 
out, economic, political, and ideological factors do not directly UHÀHFW each 
other in this process, but rather converge.
&HQWUDOLQWKHDUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHUDFLVWLGHRORJ\VSHFL¿FWRWKLVSHULRG
KDVEHHQWKH¿JXUHRI(QRFK3RZHOO6WURQJO\FRPPLWWHGWRIUHHPDUNHW
capitalism and an earlier critic of the post-war consensus from the Right, 
Powell was also at the forefront of anti-black immigration campaigning, 
especially throughout the 1960s. His “Rivers of Blood” speech, delivered 
on April 20, 1968 at the Birmingham Conservative Political Centre, 
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attacked the Labor government’s Commonwealth Immigrants Act (passed 
in February of the same year) and made him into one of the most popular 
and vocal advocates of anti-immigration and repatriation (Hall et al. 1978, 
$6PLWK%XWLQIDFWWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK,PPLJUDQWV
Act was already Labour’s concessive reaction to Powell’s campaigning 
against the entrance in Britain of Kenyan Asians—indentured laborers 
recruited from British India, now British passport-holders, who had settled 
in East Africa during colonial times mainly to work on the Kenya-Uganda 
railway. Following intense public debates on the matter, of which Powell 
had been a key protagonist, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act imposed 
VWULFWHU FRQWUROVRQHQWU\DVZHOO DVRQ WKH ULJKW WR IDPLO\ UHXQL¿FDWLRQ
With the return of the Conservatives to government in 1970, even stricter 
regulations were implemented through the Immigration Act (1971). And 
although Labour was critical of the latter, it did nothing to repeal it on its 
UHWXUQWRRI¿FHLQ+DOOet al. 1978, 299). If during the 1950s and 1960s 
Powell’s positions, both on free-market capitalism and on immigration and 
race relations, violated the codes and contents of the post-war consensus 
and did not favor him within the Conservative Party, by the 1970s such 
positions not only had been taken up by the Tories, but had managed to 
shift the entire political spectrum further to the right (A. Smith 1994, 136-
138). The process would reach its peak, of course, with the election of 
Thatcher in 1979, who absorbed and fully rearticulated as centrist many of 
WKHWKHPHV¿UVWLQWURGXFHGE\3RZHOOLQWRWKHSXEOLFGHEDWH
In this context, Hall et al. argue that race cannot be inserted into 
Marxist analysis only as an element of the structures (black labor recruited 
from the former colonies being considered as a structural element of British 
industrial expansion in post-war times). Race also becomes “a key element 
in the class struggle—and thus in the cultures—of black labour” (Hall et al. 
1978, 347).43,QDFRQWH[WRIUDPSDQWUDFLVPUDFLDOLGHQWL¿FDWLRQEHFRPHV
an integral component of the way black communities and black workers 
experience their position within the social formation and collectively 
mobilize to transform it. Thus, race is not only central to the ideological 
articulation of mugging, but also forms a terrain on which any counter-
KHJHPRQLFIRUPDWLRQPXVW¿QGLWVFRQGLWLRQVRIHPHUJHQFH
This problem is discussed in the last chapter of Policing the Crisis, 
titled “The Politics of ‘Mugging’” (327-397). Hall et al. write:
It is through the counter-ideology of race, colour and ethnicity that 
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the black working class becomes conscious of the contradictions of its 
REMHFWLYHVLWXDWLRQDQGRUJDQLVHVWR³¿JKWLWWKURXJK´7KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\
so now for black youth. It is race which provides the mediated link 
between the structured position of secondariness and subordination 
which is the “fate,” the “destiny” inscribed in the position of this 
sector of the class, and the experience, the consciousness of their 
being second-class people. (Hall et al. 1978, 347)     
Hall et al. understand this formation of counter-ideological consciousness, 
in Marxist terms, as the process that leads a class “in itself” (in this case, 
DUDFLDOL]HGFODVVIUDFWLRQWREHFRPHDFODVV³IRULWVHOI´VHH0DU[>@
1956). However, what distinguishes the black class fraction discussed at 
this point in Policing the Crisis from the proletariat that Marx had in mind 
is not only the key mediator of postcolonial race relations, but also the very 
material conditions for that formation of consciousness: “It is the common 
experience of ‘worklessness’ rather than the discipline of combination in 
social production which seems to be providing the catalyst” (Hall et al. 
1978, 356).44 In other words, according to their analysis, it is not factory 
life that primarily accounts for the recognition of common interests among 
black working class people (especially black youth) in Britain in the 1970s, 
but rather a common experience of unemployment that begins to translate 
into a refusal to work (under those conditions): “a new form of ‘negative 
consciousness’ around the condition of being unemployable” (356).   
0RUH VSHFL¿FDOO\+DOO et al. focus on the formation of segregated 
communities in the urban centers and the development, within those 
spaces and in the face of both racism and generalized unemployment, of 
strategies of survival other than wage labor, including crime. They term 
this process “the birth of colony society” (Hall et al. 1978, 351). It is 
“colony life,” in their view, which provided the material conditions for 
the formation of a black collective consciousness. Yet once again, they 
read this process by emphasizing its politico-ideological mediations. On 
the one hand, “the formation of the ghetto ‘colony’ was a defensive and 
corporate response. . . . This emphasis on defensive space becomes more 
pronounced in the face of public racism, which rapidly developed in the 
society outside the boundaries of ‘the colony’ through the 1960s” (351). 
Thus, the formation of segregated communities was strongly mediated in 
WKH¿UVWSODFHE\WKHDUWLFXODWLRQRIUDFLVW LGHRORJLHVVXFKDV3RZHOOLVP
On the other hand, this defensive segregation began to give rise to a form 
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of collective consciousness: an apprehension of itself, by this particular 
class fraction, as a force for itself. But also this process was mediated by 
politico-ideological transformations, particularly the emergence of Black 
Power in the United States and its travelling across the Atlantic:
This qualitative shift has not happened spontaneously. It has a history. 
,W EHJDQ ZLWK WKH GLVFRYHU\ RI EODFN LGHQWLW\ PRUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ WKH
rediscovery, inside the experience of emigration, of the African roots 
of “colony” life. The “African” revival in the “colony” population 
was fed and supported by the post-war African nationalist revolutions. 
But it derived its positive content—as well as its clear materialisation 
ZLWKLQWKHOLIHDQGFRQ¿QHVRIWKH³FRORQ\´²IURPWKHEODFNOLEHUDWLRQ
movements in the United States from the early 1960s onwards and the 
black rebellions which spread through the ghettos, behind the mobilising 
slogans of “black is beautiful” and “black power.” (Hall et al. 1978, 356) 
Thus, the travelling of anticolonial and Black Power ideologies helped 
articulating the material conditions of black urban communities—
including the recourse to different types of crime as a strategy of survival 
alternative to wage labor—into a form of oppositional consciousness. Not 
surprisingly, this was a central ingredient in the deterioration of police-
black relations. Therefore, even as they warn against a romanticization of 
“colony life” (Hall et al. 1978, 360), and even as they question at length 
the degree of political effectiveness of a consciousness steeped in such 
material conditions (361-381), Hall et al. DUH ¿UP LQ ORFDWLQJ UDFH DQG
its spatial organization in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, not only as the 
concrete ground on which the moral panic about mugging installed itself, 
but also as a front of struggle in its own right within the broader hegemonic 
struggle taking place in that time and place.
The analysis comes full circle at this point: the formation of a black 
class fraction within the British working class in post-war times and the 
emergence of racist ideologies in the 1960s converged to produce black 
segregated communities in the urban centers peculiarly affected, in turn, 
E\ WKH ULVH RI XQHPSOR\PHQW :KLOH WKLV FRQ¿JXUDWLRQ SURYLGHG WKH
material basis on which the moral panic about mugging installed itself as 
an ideological conductor of a more general crisis of hegemony—for the 
different apparatuses of the state contributed to locate the black neighborhood 
DV D NH\ VLWH RI WKUHDW WR ODZ DQG RUGHU²WKH VDPH FRQ¿JXUDWLRQ DOVR
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began to function as a site for the emergence of counter-ideological forms 
of consciousness. Yet, even as the analysis comes full circle, the “gaps” 
between the different processes involved—the vicissitudes of British 
FDSLWDOWKHUHJXODWLRQRIPLJUDWLRQÀRZVWKHULVHRISRVWFRORQLDOUDFLVP
WKHPXJJHUVZKRGLGPXJWKHSROLFHZKRSROLFHGWKHPHGLDWKDWDPSOL¿HG
the moral panic, the courts that handed down “deterrent” sentences, the 
formation of black consciousness—are not circumvented. Rather, they are 
H[SRVHG WKURXJK DQ DQDO\VLV RI KLVWRULFDOO\ VSHFL¿F SROLWLFRLGHRORJLFDO
articulatory practices. Each moment in this sequence operated within a 
regime of relative autonomy, that is, in a relation of articulation to the other 
PRPHQWV5DFHDQGE\H[WHQVLRQ WKH WHUUDLQRI LGHQWLW\SROLWLFV¿JXUHV
in Policing the Crisis as such a terrain of struggle in its own right yet 
articulated to the totality of the social formation.
Thus, Policing the Crisis was pivotal not only in anticipating Hall’s 
subsequent analysis of Thatcherism, but also in situating the analysis and 
the politics of race on the horizon of cultural studies. It laid the ground for 
later works, such as the CCCS’s collective volume The Empire Strikes Back: 
Race and Racism in 70s Britain (1982), Paul Gilroy’s ‘There Ain’t No Black 
in the Union Jack’: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (1987), and 
Kobena Mercer’s Powellism: Race, Politics and Discourse (1990), among 
RWKHUV*LOUR\PDNHVWKHLQÀXHQFHRIPolicing the Crisis and of Hall’s work 
explicit in the introduction to his volume, when he writes: “In Britain, ‘race’ 
cannot be adequately understood if it is falsely divorced or abstracted from 
other social relations. The chapters which follow will also argue that ‘race’ 
cannot be reduced to the effects of these other relations” (Gilroy 1987, 14). 
In New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality (1994), Anna Marie 
Smith brings this trajectory one step further by exposing the continuities 
between moral panics centrally organized around race, such as the mugging 
panic, and the moral panic about homosexuality that led to the introduction 
of the infamous Section 28 in the Local Government Act (1988) passed 
under the third Thatcher government.45 The Local Government Act 
ZDVPHDQW WR VLJQL¿FDQWO\ UHGXFH WKH SRZHUV RI ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV LQ
line with Thatcher’s centralist project. Yet the act became renown and 
sparked debates especially because of the introduction of Section 28, 
which banned the “promotion of homosexuality” and prohibited local 
authorities from supporting “the teaching in any maintained school of the 
acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship” (183). 
Local governments were constructed, in this context, as the outpost from 
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which a queer attack on the family and a predatory campaign to corrupt 
schoolchildren were being launched. According to Smith, the articulatory 
practices that produced this moral panic about homosexuality in 1987-88, 
as well its very structure, are in many ways similar to those at work in 
the moral panics about immigration and race of the 1960s and 1970s.46 
By tracking these links, she develops one of the insights of Policing the 
Crisis³7KH¿UVWSKHQRPHQDOform which the ‘experience of social crisis’ 
assumes in public consciousness . . . is the moral panic. The second stage 
is where particular moral panics converge and overlap: where the enemy 
becomes both many-faceted and ‘one’” (Hall et al. 1978, 323). In Laclau 
and Mouffe’s terms, Smith constructs a chain of equivalence between race 
and sexuality by exposing the ways in which they have been similarly 
positioned, by the New Right in general and by Thatcherism in particular, 
at the core of a struggle for hegemony.
As Smith insists, the fact that Section 28 was included in a Local 
*RYHUQPHQW$FWLVRIJUHDWVLJQL¿FDQFH,QGHHGORFDOJRYHUQPHQWVEHFDPH
key sites of Labour opposition to Conservative central governments in 
post-war times.47 Moreover, they also became, from the 1970s onward, a 
laboratory of coalition building involving both the traditional labour base 
and the new social movements: “In some cases, such as that of the Greater 
London Council (GLC), local governments became the sites of new leftist 
coalitions, in which the demands of feminists, black activists and lesbians 
and gays were granted an unprecedented degree of legitimacy” (A. Smith 
1994, 185). For example, it was at the GLC that the London Lesbian and 
Gay Centre (LLGC) was established in 1985. However, “the Thatcher 
JRYHUQPHQWUHVSRQGHGZLWKWKHDEROLWLRQRI*/&>LQ@WKHUHGH¿QLWLRQ
of progressive policy changes as the will of un-British pressure groups, and 
the demonization of elected local councillors as the tyrannical ‘loony left’” 
(185). So, the inclusion of the ban on the “promotion of homosexuality” in 
a Local Government Act has a clear history.
To this, we must add the electoral climate of 1987. Hall himself 
points out that the “loony left” label, used to discredit local governments 
in general and the GLC in particular, managed to bring race and sex into 
the election (Hall 1988b, 263). Moreover, the panic about homosexuality 
had been prepared through the previous two years by the concerted effort 
of a variety of actors: segments of the Conservative establishment, parent 
groups aggressively campaigning against GLC’s progressive policies, 
and two right-wing national groups, the Conservative Family Campaign 
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and Christian Action, Research and Education (CARE) (A. Smith 1994, 
187-188). Thus, Section 28 of the Local Government Act, as well as the 
act itself, not only represented yet another moment in the longstanding 
confrontation between the Conservatives and local governments, and 
not only formed integral part of the Conservative Party’s 1987 election 
campaign, but also came about in a context of fully operative authoritarian 
populism: a call (also) from below for authoritarian measures that must be 
dispensed from above.48             
The analysis summarized so far illustrates that Section 28, like 
mugging, must be understood in a relation of articulation to the social 
formation as a whole and as an ideological conductor of a larger struggle 
IRUKHJHPRQ\7KLVLVLQGHHGWKH¿UVWUHDVRQZK\6PLWKIRFXVHVRQUDFH
and sexuality: both perform, in her view, a similar role in British politics 
in the 1970s and 1980s. But this is not the only way in which her analysis 
attempts to establish a chain of equivalence between the two. As she 
demonstrates, racial and sexual moral panics do not just function as discrete 
and analogous articulatory points of the project of Thatcherism, but rather 
draw on one another and even merge in the process. This becomes evident, 
for instance, when references to the teaching of multiculturalism—subject 
to heated controversies in Britain throughout the 1980s—enter the debate 
on Section 28. Smith recalls one such case, involving Margaret Thatcher 
herself: “At a Conservative Party conference in October 1987, Thatcher 
explicitly attacked schoolteachers for politicizing the school curriculum. 
She ridiculed the inclusion of multiculturalism in the schools by suggesting 
that the notion of ‘anti-racist maths’ was absurd. She then declared, 
‘Children who need to be taught to respect traditional moral values are 
being taught that they have the inalienable right to be gay’” (A. Smith 
1994, 218). Noticing these continuous shifts between race and sexuality 
in the ideological discourse of Thatcherism, and registering the historical 
sequence from Powellism to Section 28, Smith argues that “AIDS anxiety 
certainly did give the prohibition of the promotion of homosexuality project 
LWVIRUFH>EXW@UDFLVPSURYLGHGVRPHRILWVPRVWLPSRUWDQWVWUXFWXUHV´
This is, indeed, a second reason why she focuses both on the moral panics 
about black immigration and racialized crime in the 1960s and 1970s and 
on the panic about homosexuality in 1987-88. The two are not simply 
analogous. Rather, according to her analysis, the former structured the 
terrain on which the latter installed itself. 
Finally, there is a third reason underpinning Smith’s joint analysis 
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of Thatcherite racism and homophobia, which indeed has to do with 
the structure of both ideological formations. Smith emphasizes one key 
mechanism of racial and sexual moral panics that Hall et al., instead, 
almost entirely fail to notice in Policing the Crisis. According to her, 
the ideological production of such moral panics in the 1970s and 1980s 
has not taken the form of a total frontal attack on blacks and queers, but 
rather of a partition of racial and sexual differences: “Even though these 
exclusions were extremely ‘popular,’ the British New Right did not engage 
in a simple total war against these elements, but deployed a tremendously 
sophisticated complex of frontiers and differentiations” (A. Smith 1994, 
0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\6PLWKLGHQWL¿HVERWKLQWKHUDFLVWFDPSDLJQLQJRI
the 1960s and 1970s and in the debate on Section 28 in the 1980s, a central 
distinction between assimilable and subversive blackness, respectable 
homosexuality and dangerous queerness. Hence, she comments: “I found 
that the very supporters of Section 28—the law prohibiting the promotion 
of homosexuality—were themselves engaging in the promotion of a very 
particular type of homosexuality. They spoke again and again of a law-
DELGLQJGLVHDVHIUHHVHOIFORVHWLQJKRPRVH[XDO¿JXUHZKRNQHZKHURUKLV
proper place on the secret fringes of mainstream society” (18). One cannot 
miss the irony in Smith’s tone. And yet, as we shall see, her reference to the 
SURPRWLRQRIDVSHFL¿FNLQGRIKRPRVH[XDOLW\RQWKHSDUWRIWKHVXSSRUWHUV
of Section 28 themselves has theoretical and political implications.
Hall et al. seem to glimpse a similar dynamic as the one detected by 
Smith in few scattered passages of Policing the Crisis. For instance, upon 
mentioning the travelling of Black Power from the United States to Britain 
in the late 1960s, they observe: “For several months the media and race-
UHODWLRQVRI¿FLDOVUHIXVHGWREHOLHYHWKDWDQ\WKLQJVRµYLROHQW¶DQGXQ%ULWLVK
as Black Power could take root amongst ‘our West Indian friends’” (Hall 
et al. 1978, 245). And later in the book, while discussing the formation 
of “colony life” and the association it helped cultivating between black 
male youth and crime, they state that a “distinction between respectable 
blacks and the ‘undesirable element’ has become a commonplace in the 
syntax of race” (352). However, such observations remain quite isolated 
in Policing the Crisis and do not form integral part of the analysis.49 For 
Smith, instead, this partition of differences is central to the articulation of 
racism and homophobia in the context of Thatcherism and to the latter’s 
capacity to undermine left-wing resistance:
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Hall does not address one . . . aspect of Thatcherism which is 
UHOHYDQWWRWKHLQFLWHPHQWRIVHOIMXGJHPHQW>ZLWKLQWKH/HIW@QDPHO\
Thatcherism’s ability to mobilize . . . self-surveillance. Hall points to 
the support for Thatcherism among “traditional Labour supporters” 
such as workers, women, blacks, lesbians and gays and so on. From 
a Nietzschean and Foucauldian perspective, however, a study of 
Thatcherism should also analyse its incitement or exacerbation of the 
differentiations among these othernesses. (A. Smith 1994, 121)
$V WKLV SDVVDJH PDNHV FOHDU 6PLWK¶V LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ RI WKH SDUWLWLRQ RI
differences as a key mechanism of Thatcherite ideology leads her to 
propose a theoretical supplementWRWKHWKHRU\RIKHJHPRQ\6KH¿QGVWKDW
VXSSOHPHQW¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWLQ0LFKHO)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRI
disciplinary power and biopolitics, as elaborated in Discipline and Punish 
>@DQGLQWKH¿UVWYROXPHRIThe History of Sexuality>@
1978).50 As Foucault famously argues in the latter, for instance, whether 
one regards sexuality as an instrument deployed to ensure the reproduction 
of an economically productive population or as a device functioning 
according to its own logics, what is certain is that total repression has 
not been its primary tactic from the nineteenth century onward: “The 
nineteenth century and our own have been rather the age of multiplication: 
a dispersion of sexualities, a strengthening of their disparate forms, a 
multiple implantation of ‘perversions.’ Our epoch has initiated sexual 
heterogeneities” (37). For Foucault, it is by multiplying the points of its 
application—a multiplication, rather than a repression of difference—
that power has been operating in modern times. Smith writes: “From a 
Foucauldian perspective, authoritarian discourse does not merely strike the 
VXUIDFHRILWVWDUJHWHGRWKHUQHVVHVLWSHQHWUDWHVWKHLUVSDFHVVHL]HVKROGRI
their logic, separates otherness from its subversive potential, and attempts 
to achieve total domestication by turning otherness against itself” (A. 
Smith 1994, 119). Hence, following Foucault, she supplements the theory 
of hegemony informing Hall’s analysis in order to better chart the identity 
politics of race and sexuality integral to the project of Thatcherism.
Smith asks: “Why should the more subtle aspects of an extremist 
GLVFRXUVHRIELJRWU\EHRIDQ\FRQFHUQ"´$6PLWK7KHTXHVWLRQ
is legitimate and not entirely rhetorical. In her view, two key reasons 
require the critic to engage with the partition of differences characteristic 
of Thatcherism’s identity politics. First, in her view, that partition allowed 
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Thatcherism to position itself as centrist, hence to cultivate a broad 
base of consent to its project. In the case of Section 28, the supporters 
positioned themselves as a middle ground between the queer militants 
and the extremist Left on one side and the extremist Right on the other 
side: “with the heterosexual majority and the good homosexual in the 
FHQWUH´5HIHUHQFLQJGLIIHUHQWRI¿FLDOUHSRUWVSUHVHQWHGDWWKH+RXVH
of Commons and the House of Lords during the debate, Smith shows that 
the supporters went as far as to “express concern regarding the current 
EDFNODVKDJDLQVWOHVELDQVDQGJD\VDQG>WR@DUJXHWKDWWKH6HFWLRQLVWKH
best remedy in that it will ‘remove the source of the disquiet,’ namely the 
‘unacceptable activities of few extremist councils’” (226). The partition 
between the respectable homosexual and the dangerous queer, as well as 
the one between the assimilable and the subversive black, are thus integral 
to the function that identity politics plays within a struggle for hegemony. 
)RU³>L@IDSROLWLFDOSURMHFW LV WRREWDLQDKHJHPRQLFVWDWXV LWPXVW ORVH
every trace of extremism” (19). That is, it must center itself.
Second, the articulation of the divide between respectable and 
dangerous difference by the state also increments and accelerates processes 
RI VWUDWL¿FDWLRQ DOUHDG\ DW ZRUN ZLWKLQ LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFDO IRUPDWLRQV
themselves. Smith puts it bluntly: “Many lesbians and gay men agree with 
the Thatcherites that our communities have been subjected to surveillance 
and oppression because our militant activists have gone too far” (A. 
Smith 1994, 20). The divide between respectable homosexuality and 
GDQJHURXVTXHHUQHVV²QRWDOZD\VEXWRIWHQFRLQFLGLQJZLWKVWUDWL¿FDWLRQV
of race and class within sexual communities—is not an “invention” of 
Thatcherism. Rather, “Thatcherism worked organically, encouraging the 
‘good homosexual’ stance against dangerous queerness, and promoting the 
separation of queer difference from what it can do” (121). Smith shows 
the effect of this process by analyzing a number of letters appeared on 
lesbian and gay publications at the time, in which lesbian and gay readers 
themselves complain against the political militancy of a few extremists 
and express their support for the Thatcherite bloc (228-233). Thus, a very 
practical reason to attend to the sophisticated maneuvers of Thatcherism’s 
identity politics is that the latter owns its success not only to the winning 
over of the white straight majority, but also to its ability to penetrate, in 
part, the very communities under attack.    
While Smith argues that the theory of hegemony must be supplemented 
with an analysis of disciplinary power and biopolitics, I suggest that in 
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the context of contemporary queer debates the reverse is true. I develop 
this argument in the last chapter of this dissertation. However, it is worth 
anticipating here some of the reasons why Foucault’s conceptualization 
RISRZHUZRXOGEHQH¿WIURPDQDQDO\VLVRIKHJHPRQLFIRUPDWLRQVDQG
of the politico-ideological practices that preside over their emergence 
and consolidation. As is well known, Foucault abandons the concept of 
ideology, but his critique of it is not so dissimilar from Hall’s. In his view, 
the concept presupposes both a sharp distinction between ideology and 
“truth” and a relation of unilateral determination between the material 
EDVH DQG WKH VXSHUVWUXFWXUHV )RXFDXOW >@   ,Q RWKHU
words, Foucault questions, like Hall, the key principles of economism, 
but this leads him, unlike Hall, to abandon the concept of ideology 
altogether as well as the broader theoretical terrain of Marxism. If one 
were to stop here, one could start a discussion over the gains and losses 
of either rethinking a concept such as ideology beyond the limits of its 
conventional formulations or abandoning it in favor of more effective 
conceptual devices. However, what drives Foucault away from Marxism 
is not just a critique of its conceptual apparatus, but a more fundamental 
shifting of the problematic informing his theorizing. 
Foucault never wished to occupy the position of the intellectual 
“organic” to an emerging counter-hegemonic bloc (what he terms: the 
“universal intellectual”). While this is the model of the Marxist intellectual 
quintessentially embodied, in his view, by Jean-Paul Sartre in France at his 
time, he argues that a new mode of intellectual practice has been taking 
shape through the second half of the twentieth century: “Intellectuals have 
got used to working, not in the modality of the ‘universal,’ the ‘exemplary,’ 
WKHµMXVWDQGWUXHIRUDOO¶EXWZLWKLQVSHFL¿FVHFWRUVDWWKHSUHFLVHSRLQWV
where their own conditions of life or work situate them (housing, the 
hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family and sexual 
UHODWLRQV´)RXFDXOW>@)RXFDXOWWHUPVWKLVQHZLQWHOOHFWXDO
¿JXUH WKH³VSHFL¿F LQWHOOHFWXDO´$QG LW LVDVDVSHFL¿F LQWHOOHFWXDO that 
he approaches the key problems punctuating his theoretical and political 
trajectory: madness, crime, and sexuality. A focus on hegemony and 
counter-hegemony is largely replaced by the problematic of identifying 
VSHFL¿FDQGORFDOL]HGVLWHVRISRZHUDQGUHVLVWDQFH
Charlie Bertsch suggests that Foucault’s attempt to escape the position 
RIWKHRUJDQLFLQWHOOHFWXDOLQRUGHUWRRFFXS\WKDWRIDVSHFL¿FLQWHOOHFWXDO
at least in part failed: “Although Foucault was undoubtedly committed 
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WRWKHLGHDRIWKHVSHFL¿FLQWHOOHFWXDOKHHQGHGXSEHLQJDSXEOLF¿JXUH
of nearly Sartre’s status. And, because he wrote about such a wide range 
of topics, he became one of those intellectuals asked to speak on almost 
any subject” (Bertsch 2000).51 Thus, it is not surprising that Foucault’s 
reconceptualization of power has been mobilized by some of his readers—
including some contemporary queer critics—within political analyses 
which however fail to register Foucault’s shifting of the problematic, 
from the theory and practice of hegemony and counter-hegemony to the 
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQRI ORFDOL]HGVLWHVRI UHVLVWDQFH52 In the last chapter of this 
dissertation, I argue that to abandon the problem of ideology without 
registering this shift of the problematic has at least two consequences. On 
the one hand, Smith observes that Foucault’s conceptualization of power 
tends to display “functionalist and totalizing tendencies,” suggesting at 
times that “every subversion merely becomes a new target for discipline 
DQG VXUYHLOODQFH VXFK WKDW >ELRSROLWLFV@ XOWLPDWHO\ REWDLQV D WRWDOO\
comprehensive grip on virtually every possible resistance” (A. Smith 1994, 
124). This observation proceeds from the fact that Smith reads Foucault 
while searching for a terrain on which to articulate a counter-hegemonic 
political practice. Smith does register that Foucault’s work alone does not 
SUR¿OHVXFKDWHUUDLQ,QVWHDGFRQWHPSRUDU\FULWLFVZKRVLPLODUO\GUDZRQ
Foucault and project his analyses on the terrain of counter-hegemony, yet 
without a theory of hegemony and ideology, risk reproducing, in practice, a 
totalizing understanding of discursive power that had supposedly motivated 
DGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH0DU[LVWFRQFHSWRILGHRORJ\LQWKH¿UVWSODFH
On the other hand, Foucault’s notion of biopolitics tends to display a 
characteristic indifference to the boundaries and the concrete relations of 
force between different sites of power and resistance. For instance, that 
state ideology is in part reproduced by identity political formations—in the 
case of Section 28, that a distinction between respectable homosexuality 
and dangerous queerness was mobilized by gay and lesbians themselves 
in their community—does not mean that such formations participate in 
the reproduction of ideology in the same way and to the same extent as the 
state and its apparatuses (although they do participate in their own way). 
Smith herself makes this point. Despite her reading of the self-surveillance 
activated within black and gay and lesbian communities as integral to 
the struggle for hegemony conducted by Thatcherism, she points out that 
“no one actually occupies the positions of the assimilated homosexual 
or the assimilated black. To identify the differentiating strategies of the 
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right is not to accuse actual black conservatives of being ‘inadequately’ 
black” (A. Smith 1994, 102). As this passage suggests, losing sight of the 
boundaries—hence the concrete articulations—between different sites of 
power and resistance has political consequences. Hall suggests as much in a 
UDWKHUXQJHQHURXVFRPPHQWRQ)RXFDXOW¶VWKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFH³>)RXFDXOW@
saves for himself ‘the political’ with his insistence on power, but he denies 
himself a politics because he has no idea of the ‘relations of force’” (Hall 
1986c, 49). Once again, Hall is right only to the extent that one fails to 
register Foucault’s shifting of the theoretico-political problematic away 
from the terrain of hegemony and counter-hegemony. 
And yet, as Smith’s analysis shows, a Foucauldian understanding 
of the self-surveillance incited by the multiplication and partition of 
differences can help moving toward a more effective construction of a 
FRXQWHUKHJHPRQLF EORF ¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW E\ LGHQWLI\LQJ WKH REVWDFOHV
proliferating within the very social forces that would supposedly 
participate in its making. We could push this argument even further. In the 
next section, I recover the experience of Lesbians and Gays Support the 
Miners (LGSM), a group of lesbians and gays from London who organized 
in 1984-85 in order to support British miners on strike against the second 
Thatcher government. As this story illustrates, it is also by seizing and 
redeploying the partition of difference within identity political formations 
that the latter can participate, in their own way, in the emergence of a 
counter-hegemonic bloc. While the ideological discourse of Thatcherism 
managed to articulate the interests of certain lesbians and gays, hence 
absorbing segments of such sexual formations into its hegemonic bloc, 
LGSM positioned themselves at the crossroads of gay/lesbian identity and 
working-class belonging in an effort to drive lesbian and gay formations 
into an alliance with the miners on strike. 
Shifting Sites of Hegemonic Struggle:
Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners
The story of Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners (LGSM) has been 
subject to relatively little research and it became widely known only 
recently, through the movie Pride (2014) by Matthew Warchus.53 I recover 
this story because the experience of LGSM can contribute both to the 
theory of hegemony and to contemporary debates about the articulations 
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rightward of sexual politics. On the one hand, the relation established by 
LGSM with the miners on strike illustrates the potential of alliance politics 
as much as the tensions existing between the construction of a counter-
hegemonic bloc and the autonomy of each struggle and social force 
engaging in that process. On the other hand, as Diarmaid Kelliher (2014) 
points out, the experience of the group illuminates a relative decline of 
FODVVDVDKHJHPRQLFPDWWHURIFRQFHUQIRUWKH/HIWLQWKHVEXWDOVR,
add, a decline of the traditional institutions of the Left—such as the union 
and the party—as central sites of hegemonic struggle.    
In 1984-85, a strike led by the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) under president Arthur Scargill took place in Britain, in response 
to the massive program of pit closures launched by the second Thatcher 
government. One of the most intense and protracted industrial disputes in 
post-war times, the strike lasted twelve months, witnessed an unprecedented 
deployment of police forces against the pickets and in the policing of 
entire mining communities, and was the target of an aggressive media 
campaign portraying the striking miners as the “enemy within.” This strike 
was different from the ones that had taken place in the recent past: it was 
experienced on both sides as a point of no return in the confrontation between 
the British working class and the state. Huw Beynon conveys this feeling 
in his introduction to Digging Deeper, a collective effort at understanding 
WKHVWULNHSXEOLVKHGDVHDUO\DVLQ³,QD7RU\*RYHUQPHQW>WKH
+HDWKJRYHUQPHQW@KDGJRQHWRWKHFRXQWU\LQWKHPLGGOHRIDFRDOVWULNH
in 1981 the Thatcher Government had back-pedalled rapidly. . . . In 1984, 
there was no possibility of either course being followed. It was going to be 
a long strike or nothing” (Beynon 1985, 13-14). Indeed, the strike lasted 
one year. It ended with the defeat of the NUM, which as a consequence was 
JRLQJWRORVHVLJQL¿FDQWZHLJKWLQWKH%ULWLVKSROLWLFDO¿HOG
The labour movement found itself far from united in conducting this 
struggle. Beynon observes: “As a major struggle for jobs and employment 
undertaken by a union in the teeth of an offensive from the most right-
wing Tory administration in living memory it would seem, in the face of 
it, to have all the makings of a unifying force within the British labour 
movement. Yet, almost the opposite has happened” (Beynon 1985, 5). 
Not only did some areas of the NUM itself refuse to join the strike but, 
predictably, opposition both to the strike and to the NUM leadership was 
voiced by those sections of the broader Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
involved in the energy industry, such as the electricians and the power 
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station engineers (5). Furthermore, the strength of many segments of the 
labour movement had already been undermined throughout the 1970s. 
In this sense, “the strike represented not so much the front line as the 
last ditch” in the confrontation between the working class and the state 
(20). Finally, the NUM’s decision not to hold a national ballot among its 
members provoked tensions. As Beynon remarks, the question was not just 
instrumentally mobilized by the Right, but it was also present in virtually 
all Labour Party and union meetings. At best, the decision was read as a 
mistake of the leadership, which would jeopardize the miners’ capacity 
to win support for the strike both within and outside the NUM. At worst, 
the image took shape of a leadership coercing miners to take action, even 
against their own interests (6).  
However, despite these fractures within the labour movement, around 
the striking miners and their communities a different movement coalesced 
DWWHPSWLQJ WR FRQVWUXFW²RU DW OHDVW WR SUH¿JXUH in practice—a broader 
counter-hegemonic bloc able to challenge the Thatcherite regime. One 
of the most decisive elements in this other movement was the formation 
of support groups in the big cities, which contributed to sustain the 
communities on strike mostly located in peripheral areas of the country 
such as Wales or Scotland. Their main activity was collecting money, for as 
Kelliher observes, “when mining communities and the NUM realized after 
a few months that the 1984 strike was to be a protracted one, fundraising 
became a central concern” (Kelliher 2014, 242). In their own contribution 
to Digging Deeper, Doreen Massey and Hilary Wainwright (1985) offer 
an account of the diversity of the base that organized into support groups: 
women’s groups, gay and lesbian groups, black groups, and so forth. 
LGSM was one such group. 
In light of this proliferation of support and solidarity across the most 
diverse segments of civil society, many commentators agree that, despite 
the ultimate defeat of the miners, the 1984-85 strike cannot be reduced to 
the story of a wholesale political failure. Hence, Beynon’s almost utopic 
remark: “‘the movement,’ if assessed from the standpoint of the TUC or 
Labour Party headquarters, is in pretty bad shape. However, . . . another 
‘movement’ may have been brought to life and been tapped by the strike. 
It has a future” (Beynon 1985, 25). Kim Howells, coordinator of a NUM 
RI¿FHLQ6RXWK:DOHVGXULQJWKHVWULNHVXJJHVWLYHO\DUJXHVWKDWDGLIIHUHQW
future did already take shape as a present reality for those involved in the 
struggle. In his view, the broad network of solidarity gathered around the 
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mining communities and the creation, in fact, of “an alternative Welfare 
State inside Wales” to cover the costs of surviving through one entire 
\HDU RQ VWULNH ZDV SROLWLFDOO\ VLJQL¿FDQW +RZHOOV   6XFK
FLUFXPVWDQFHVUHYLYHGWKHDZDUHQHVVWKDWLWZDVSRVVLEOHWRWDNHWKH¿UVW
steps toward a “more humanitarian and socialist society now, in the dreary 
midst of Thatcherism, and that it was idiotic to assume that such steps were 
only possible after some special kind of electoral victory or a triumph on 
the barricades” (146).
Hall, instead, did not share such an optimistic view of the events. In fact, 
he made only cursory references to the strike, yet always overdetermined 
by his broader criticisms of the labour movement and what he regarded as 
the Left’s incapacity to transform itself in the face of a rapidly changing 
social formation. In “The Crisis of Labourism” (1988a), for instance, he 
goes as far as to attack the NUM leadership for its decision to “invite 
people in the tightest of economic squeezes to come out on strike” (203). 
Let me bracket out the polemical tone and the lack of vision displayed in 
this sort of comments, in order to register the real nature of Hall’s concerns. 
Few sentences later, and in part contradicting his previous dismissal of the 
strike as such, he slightly adjusts the target: “The cause is correct. The 
language is a dying one” (203). Hence, he explains:
The miners’ strike certainly contained a powerful “class” dimension. 
But politically it was not, as Arthur Scargill represented it, a “class-
versus-class” showdown because, far from “the class” being united, it 
ZDVGHHSO\GLYLGHG7KHSROLWLFDOWDVNZDVQRWWR¿JKWDXQLWHGKHURLF
battle but to unify the miners, in order to unify the class, in order to 
unify a wider social bloc around the issues. . . . Seen in the light of the 
IDLOXUHWRDGGUHVVWKLVFULWLFDODQGGLI¿FXOWSROLWLFDOWDVNWKHDEVHQFHRI
a ballot and the contempt which many showed for the very idea of the 
“bourgeois” deviation of a vote when a 1917 “Winter Palace” scenario 
was unfolding before their eyes, was a gigantic tactical error, as well as 
a major error of principle. . . . There followed the police protecting the 
“right” of one section of “the class” to go to work against the interests 
of another section of “the class,” the media construction of the strike as 
“about” law and order and violence, and the failure of one of the most 
strategic encounters of Mrs Thatcher’s three terms. (Hall 1988a, 204) 
Thus, despite his earlier dismissal of the strike, Hall in fact proves to be 
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conscious of its extraordinary strategic relevance. His critique concerns 
the way in which the struggle was understood and conducted by the labour 
movement, particularly by the NUM. Two arguments are woven together 
in his critique, and one is tactical. According to Hall, the NUM’s decision 
not to hold a national ballot ultimately aided the power bloc’s ability to 
IUDPHWKHVWULNHWKURXJKPHGLDDQGWRPDQDJHWKHFRQÀLFWWKURXJKWKH
deployment of police forces) in ways that jeopardized the miners’ struggle. 
Of course, it would make no sense to argue that the power bloc’s approach 
to the strike was a direct consequence of tactical mistakes committed by 
the NUM. Yet Hall insists that the NUM’s failure to activate a democratic 
process within its ranks provided the ideological machine set in motion 
against the miners with a ground on which to articulate an effective 
narrative against the strike. 
Next to this strategic observation, and strictly related to it, is another 
argument concerning the reading of the political conjuncture. In Hall’s view, 
the NUM leadership offered a representation of the strike that depicted the 
working class as a ready-made antagonistic force launching an attack on 
the state. But as a matter of fact, and as already mentioned, the class did not 
enter the strike as a compact subject. The fractures within the NUM and, 
more broadly, within the TUC affected the miners’ capacity of mobilization 
from the start. According to Hall, the NUM’s misrepresentation of the 
miners and of the working class as a whole as a ready-made effective 
IRUFHHOLGHGWKHGLI¿FXOWWDVNRIWUDQVIRUPLQJWKHFODVVLQLWVHOILQWRDFODVV
for itself. In light of this elision, the choice not to hold a national ballot 
should be read, in his view, not just as a tactical mistake and as an error of 
SULQFLSOHEXW¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWDVWKHV\PSWRPRIDPLVJXLGHGUHDGLQJRI
the political conjuncture and of political practice as such: that is, a reading 
indifferent to the necessary and complex tasks of ideological work and 
political recomposition. Moreover, for Hall, not only the miners targeted by 
the program of pit closures—or, for that matter, the entire working class—
EXWDODUJHU¿HOGRIKHWHURJHQHRXVVRFLDOIRUFHVVKRXOGKDYHFRQVWLWXWHGWKH
terrain on which to operate in order to articulate, around the strike, a broad 
social bloc able to confront and challenge Thatcherism. 
Hall’s criticisms, and the latter argument in particular, derive from 
his reading of Gramsci in “New Times,” that is, from his understanding 
of the triangulation between the rise of Thatcherism, the crisis of the Left, 
and the emergence of new social movements in terms of a war of position. 
More generally, his pessimistic evaluation of the strike and of the way it 
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ZDVFRQGXFWHGE\WKH180UHÀHFWVWKHFHQWUDOLW\KHJUDQWHGWRLGHRORJLFDO
struggle. Yet, while his criticisms of the NUM leadership may have 
entailed certain truths, his polemic against the labour movement blinded 
him toward real if precarious processes of recomposition that were in fact 
taking place within the folds of the 1984-85 strike. In order to register 
such processes, one should at least in part divert the attention from the 
labour movement and its traditional institutions and look, instead, at the 
emergence of that other movement that coalesced around the miners and 
of which LGSM paradigmatically formed part. What are the possibilities 
for counter-hegemony engendered and practiced by new social forces and 
PRYHPHQWVWKHPVHOYHV"
LGSM emerged out of the initiative of two gay men, Mark Ashton 
and Mike Jackson. After the two of them collected money for the miners 
at the 1984 Pride march in London, a group formed that for one year held 
meetings, collected donations outside gay spaces, organized fundraising 
events, took part in demonstrations, and maintained direct contact with 
the miners. Indeed, the organizational practice of the support groups, in 
general, consisted most of the time of establishing direct contact with 
D VSHFL¿F PLQLQJ FRPPXQLW\ /*60ZDV QR H[FHSWLRQ LQ WKLV UHVSHFW
and twinned with a community in the Dulais Valley, South Wales. The 
encounter between the lesbian and gay activists and the mining community 
was transformative for both sides. Once the strike was over, not only did 
the NUM unilaterally support and secure the passing of a resolution in 
favor of LGBT rights at the 1985 Labour Party conference, but the 1985 
Pride march in London witnessed a contingent of miners from South 
Wales marching together with LGSM. As Kelliher points out, “this was 
VHHQDVWKH¿WWLQJFXOPLQDWLRQRIDPRYHPHQWZKRVHFHQWUDODUJXPHQWZDV
that if lesbians and gay men offered solidarity with the miners and their 
communities, this support would be reciprocated” (Kelliher 2014, 241). 
What politico-ideological practices did the group of lesbians and gays 




First of all, it is important to note that the overall strategy appears 
to be twofold, depending on whether we consider LGSM’s attempt at 
forging support for the miners within the lesbian and gay community 
or the group’s effort to establish a relation with the miners themselves. 
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In the latter case, the lesbian and gay activists articulated a discourse 
grounded on the analogies between the two social groups, the modes of 
their oppression, and their interests. In Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, LGSM 
worked to construct a chain of equivalence between the miners and the 
lesbian and gay community, and it did so by focusing on three matters of 
common concern: the state attack on community spaces, police violence, 
and stigmatizing media representation. 
First, as Kelliher argues, the grammar of “community” largely replaced 
that of “class” in the context of the miners’ strike because at stake was not 
only the loss of jobs, but the survival of broader communities depending—
both materially and symbolically—on their bonds with the pits (Kelliher 
2014, 249-250). Thus, the program of pit closures promoted by the 
Thatcher government was interpreted as an attack on entire social milieus 
RUJDQL]HGDURXQGWKHPLQHV)RU/*60LWZDVQRWGLI¿FXOW WRKLJKOLJKW
parallels with what was happening to the lesbian and gay community in the 
urban context of London at that time. Here too, Kelliher points out, “there 
was a sense that certain spaces and organizations that had been established 
to form the basis of a lesbian and gay community . . . were under threat” 
(250). A prominent example was the institutional threat to such community 
spaces as the London Lesbian and Gay Centre (LLGC) established at the 
GLC. As I mentioned in the previous section, the latter was going to be 
abolished by Thatcher in 1986. To this, we must add the routine raiding of 
gay bars and the intrusion of “pretty policemen” into public spaces of male 
gay sex. The grammar of “community” provided a ground to articulate the 
analogies between miners on the one hand, and lesbians and gays on the 
other hand, respectively laying claim to their spaces against an increasingly 
authoritarian state.
The deployment of police forces was key to this dismantling of 
community spaces, which leads us to the second pivotal element in the 
manufacturing of the alliance between LGSM and the miners: that is, a 
critique of police violence. Also in this case, LGSM could easily point to 
the analogies between the police harassment of which lesbians and gays 
were constantly the target and the particular role played by police forces in 
the managing of the 1984-85 strike. In his contribution to Digging Deeper, 
which details the police practices and the use of law in the context of 
the strike, John McIlroy observes: “Any dispute such as this would have 
involved intensive direct policing. But a decision was now taken to use the 
police and the criminal law to a degree, and in a fashion, unprecedented 
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VLQFH >WKH JHQHUDO VWULNH RI@ ´ 0F,OUR\   1RW RQO\ GLG
assault replace containment as the main tactic to confront the pickets (106), 
but police violence entered the mining communities themselves. McIlroy 
reports a number of testimonies, among which that of this woman: “They 
broke down the door, smashed the windows, ripped the phone off the wall 
and gave everyone a good pasting. They were screaming and shouting ‘get 
the bastards’” (108). Thus, police harassment became an experience that 
entire mining communities (not only the miners on strike) came to share 
with both racial and sexual minorities across Britain. As a woman from the 
community of Dulais put it in All Out! Dancing in Dulais (1985), a short 
DIY documentary produced by LGSM at that time, “for years lesbians and 
gay men have been telling us, you know, look at us, we’re under attack, 
we’re being threatened by the police. . . . And then we were there, . . . we 
were next in line after lesbians and gays, black men, black women.”   
Finally, in line with Hall’s conceptualization of Thatcherism as a 
form of authoritarian populism, many commentators emphasize that the 
coercive apparatus deployed by the state in the context of the strike was 
constantly supported by a consolidation of popular consent. The media 
played a central role in this respect and constituted, indeed, the third 
ingredient deployed by LGSM to cement its alliance with the miners 
(Kelliher 2014, 249). The stigmatization to which the miners were subject 
on the media during the strike, represented as the “enemy within,” largely 
resembled the experience that lesbians and gays had been going through 
IRUDOUHDG\TXLWHVRPHWLPHDQGZKLFKQRWDEO\LQWHQVL¿HGGXULQJWKH$,'6
crisis.54 All of these elements—the attack on community spaces, the threat 
of police violence and harassment, and the role of the media in crafting 
popular support to coercive state practices—allowed LGSM and the Dulais 
mining community to form an alliance based on the analogies between the 
two different social groups. 
But the stakes involved even exceeded, to some extent, the 
PDQXIDFWXULQJ RI WKLV SDUWLFXODU DOOLDQFH 7KH LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ RI WKRVH
analogies allowed LGSM to participate, along with many other support 
groups emerged from a variety of constituencies and communities, in 
WKH EURDGHU DWWHPSW WR SUH¿JXUH LQ SUDFWLFH D KHWHURJHQHRXV FRXQWHU
hegemonic bloc around the miners’ struggle. In other words, next to the 
immediate goal of supporting the miners on strike, a large-scale effort 
informed this proliferation of political organizing throughout civil society: 
that of transforming a “last ditch” in the confrontation between the British 
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working class and the state into the point of support for a politics of 
hegemony involving a broader antagonism between Thatcherism and a 
complex of heterogeneous social segments—the working class, feminists, 
environmental activists, black communities, and lesbians and gays. For 
LGSM, this also meant articulating an ideological discourse that may 
gather support for the miners within the lesbian and gay community at 
large. So, what happened when LGSM actually mobilized within their 
FRPPXQLW\LQ/RQGRQ"
While analogies were functional and effective to cement an alliance 
between the group and the Dulais mining community, within the lesbian 
and gay community the arguments deployed were of a different kind. Here, 
/*60PRVWO\SUDFWLFHGDSROLWLFVRIFODVVFRQÀLFWFDOOLQJLQWRTXHVWLRQWKH
supposed homogeneity of that community. Especially for some members 
of the group, organizing support for the miners also meant positioning 
themselves at the crossroads of gay/lesbian identity and working-class 
belonging.55 Kelliher observes: “By taking up a distinctly working-class 
issue as a lesbian and gay group, LGSM could help challenge the middle-
class nature of the lesbian and gay scene in London” (Kelliher 2014, 251). 
Importantly, challenging the middle-class nature of the lesbian and gay 
scene entailed, in that time and place, developing a critique of the links 
between Thatcherism and gay identity.56 
As I argued in the previous section, Thatcher herself has been at the 
forefront of the attacks on lesbians and gays through the 1980s. Under 
her second government, not only was the GLC abolished, but gay men 
became increasingly subject to police harassment as well as the target of 
aggressive media campaigns during the AIDS crisis. Her strong support 
for Section 28 represented a culmination of this trajectory. However, the 
relation between Thatcherism and the lesbian and gay community has been 
more ambiguous than that. For instance, Thatcher had been one of the few 
Conservatives to support the decriminalization of homosexuality in 1967. 
Most importantly, as Smith argues, the Thatcherite attack on lesbians and 
gays produced, at the same time, the imaginary promise of assimilation 
WKURXJKWKH¿JXUHRIWKHUHVSHFWDEOHKRPRVH[XDO7KDWSURPLVHPXVWEH
understood also in light of the fact that Thatcherism, as a broader project, 
paradoxically made room for certain lesbians and gays to craft a social 
position that suited them—through consumer practices. In his contribution 
to the collective volume New Times, edited by Hall and Jacques, gay 
historian Frank Mort observes that there are “some uncanny resemblances 
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between lifestyle market segmentation and the politics of identity which 
have been argued for by the new social movements” (Mort 1989, 168-
169). Such resemblances are not just incidental, for consumer practices 
have been increasingly working, in his view, through the very terrain of 
identity politicized by the new social movements. In “New Times,” Mort 
observes, consumer practices “target their audiences with a new precision: 
Volkswagen for the working woman, Saga Holidays for the young elderly, 
the pink pound for gay men” (167-168). Mort puts these observations in 
the service of a critique of the Left. In his view, the latter should take 
the terrain of consumption more seriously because the extraordinary grip 
on identities exercised by the consumer culture promoted by Thatcherism 
exposes, like a litmus test of some sort, what is still missing from the Left’s 
own political grammar: pleasures and desires. 
LGSM similarly registered the links between Thatcherism and 
lesbian and gay identities, yet to advance a different critique. Rather 
than complaining about the failures of the Left, they took up a working-
class positioning as lesbians and gays in order to launch an attack on gay 
consumerism. During his speech at a LGSM conference, for instance, Mike 
Jackson polemically stated that some lesbians and gays “are quite happy 
ZLWK7KDWFKHULVPWKHVHDUHWKHOHVELDQVDQGJD\VZKREHQH¿WIURP7RU\
rule. They have the economic power to carve out a lifestyle which protects 
them from the harassment, persecution and fear that many lesbians and gay 
men encounter daily” (Jackson, quoted in Kelliher 2014, 252). As Jackson 
and other members of the group explained during an interview, this politics 
RIFODVVFRQÀLFWZLWKLQWKHOHVELDQDQGJD\FRPPXQLW\PDQDJHGWRUDLVH
support for the miners as much as it triggered a number of antagonistic 
responses: from the complaint that money was being donated to a mining 
community at a moment when the gay community itself was confronting 
the threat of AIDS, to a widespread resistance to supporting communities 
that were perceived as fortresses of heteropatriarchy (Flynn, Goldsmith, 
and Sutcliffe 1985, 44). Thus, it comes as little surprise that Mark Ashton, 
in another interview, expressed his desire “to organise with my own kind of 
people. That’s not necessarily lesbians and gay men—that’s working class 
people” (Ashton, quoted in Kelliher 2014, 252).
The positioning of LGSM at the crossroads of gay/lesbian identity and 
working-class belonging speaks of the limits of the logic of equivalence 
that Laclau and Mouffe locate at the core of a radical democratic politics of 
hegemony. Equivalence, as a logic and a political tactic, tends to overlook 
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WKHVWUDWL¿FDWLRQVDQGGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQVLQWHUQDOWRHDFKVRFLDOIRUFHHVSHFLDOO\
identity formations. Smith herself makes this point as a corrective to her 
own analysis of the continuities between race and sexuality, racism and 
homophobia, in the project of Thatcherism: “there are many continuities 




within the lesbian and gay community (221-222). As I suggested earlier, 
IROORZLQJ6PLWKWKHVHVWUDWL¿FDWLRQVDQGFURVVURDGVDPRQJGLIIHUHQWVRFLDO
forces and identity formations provided the ground on which the identity 
politics of Thatcherism—structured by a partition between respectable and 
dangerous difference—could install itself. The respectable homosexual is, 
most often, white and middle-class. But the experience of LGSM shows 
how the same fractured terrain also works as a point of support for the 
articulation of counter-hegemonic politico-ideological practices. The logic 
of equivalence activated by LGSM in their encounter with the Dulais 
PLQLQJFRPPXQLW\UHVWVDOVRRQWKHSROLWLFVRIFODVVFRQÀLFWSUDFWLFHGE\
the group within the lesbian and gay community itself.57
It is important to preserve a distinction between the two strategies—
two different ideological articulations equally making sense of LGSM’s 
political practice, yet put forward at different moments in the experience of 
the group. Preserving a distinction between the two allows this particular 
story to speak back to the theory of hegemony. On the one hand, as I just 
argued, the centrality of LGSM’s positioning at the crossroads of gay/lesbian 
identity and working-class belonging points at the limits of equivalence as 
a logic and a tactic. On the other hand, as we are about to see, looking 
at the combination of the two tactics as it concretely materialized in the 
experience of LGSM throws light on a tension existing between hegemony 
and autonomy. That is, it illustrates how hegemony may easily entail, in 
practice, a partial and temporary suspension of autonomy. 
An acceptance of the boundaries between the miners and the lesbian and 
gay community—which is necessary to an articulation of equivalence—was 
not simply implicit in the discourse often deployed by LGSM,58 but formed 
part and parcel of a conscious strategy. For instance, at some point during an 
interview with three members of the group, Rosie Leach recalls one instance 
when they were contacted by a gay miner—indeed, someone located at the 
crossroads between gay identity and working-class belonging and dealing 
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with the complexities of such a position in the heat of the miners’ struggle. 
7KHJD\PLQHUDVNHGIRU¿QDQFLDOKHOSEXWWKHJURXSUHIXVHGWRRIIHUKLP
individual support. Following up on Mark Ashton’s claim that the whole 
political idea of LGSM had been to take gay liberation and lesbian liberation 
into the organized working class, Leach tells this particular story in order to 
provide an illustration of how they pursued that goal:
what we decided was, we’d send or give some money to the soup 
kitchen that is organized in the village where he lives, because then 
we’ve done it openly as lesbians and gays, and that means that the 
people in that village are going to realize that we do support what 
they’re doing, so they’re less likely to be hostile towards him as a gay 
person. (Flynn, Goldsmith, and Sutcliffe 1985, 41)  
This anecdote is particularly revealing of the difference between the 
politics LGSM deployed within the lesbian and gay community (where 
they positioned themselves as working-class lesbians and gays) and the 
one they mobilized, instead, in their relation with the miners: not only 
accepting the established boundaries between the two social groups, but 
going as far as to turn down a gay miner’s request for support. This certainly 
WHVWL¿HV WR WKH WUXWKRI/DFODX DQG0RXIIH¶V FODLP WKDW HQWHULQJD FKDLQ
of equivalence—that is, practicing a politics of hegemony—necessarily 
brings about profound transformations for the subjects and the struggles 
involved. However, Laclau and Mouffe do not fully acknowledge that such 
transformations may entail both gains and losses, as the anecdote recalled 
above illustrates. 
To be sure, while approaching the politics of LGSM from this critical 
angle and while highlighting its limits, we should take into account that 
the group established a relation with a subject already occupying, both 
materially and symbolically, a hegemonic position within the relation 
itself: the miners on strike organized through a national union. While 
Laclau and Mouffe would not concede that imbalances of power of any 
sort can form part of a politics of hegemony as they understand it—this 
is indeed a critique they direct toward Lenin and the Leninist tradition, 
including Gramsci’s earlier usage of the concept—as a matter of fact 
political alliances do not take shape outside power, nor are they able to 
transcend it. Kelliher argues that LGSM shaped its vision and organizing 
by drawing on the experience of the Gay Liberation Front (GLF), which 
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QRQHWKHOHVVLQRUGHUWRDI¿UPWKHDXWRQRP\RIDSROLWLFVRIVH[XDOLW\LQ
the 1970s, had always maintained a radically antagonistic attitude toward 
the Left as a whole (Kelliher 2014, 246). Things changed by the time of 
the miners’ strike in the 1980s: “LGSM was building on the legacy of 
the GLF, which had been central in establishing a space for lesbian and 
gay people on the left where their identity was not subsumed. . . . At the 
same time, LGSM was clear that it was attempting to integrate that voice 
into a broader movement” (256). Engaging in a politics of hegemony 
with the very subject occupying a hegemonic position within that broader 
movement may have certainly affected the degree of autonomy that LGSM 
could claim for itself throughout the making of the alliance. 
Yet, while to a certain extent all of the above is true, there is another 
side to this story. Not only, as I already mentioned, did the labour 
movement as a whole react weakly to the miners’ strike, but the structure 
of the NUM itself was under severe attack. Indeed, during the 1984-85 
strike, the union’s bank accounts were frozen by the state (McIlroy 1985, 
.HOOLKHUDQG WKLV WXUQHGVXSSRUWJURXSVVXFKDV/*60
into central actors in the struggle. The question of whether LGSM would 
offer its support to the miners by making use of the union’s structure or by 
establishing direct contact with a mining community had been present in 
the group’s discussions. This allows Lucy Robinson to argue that LGSM 
consciously chose to elude the NUM for strategic reasons: “By setting up 
one community group in support of another LGSM hoped it could avoid 
bureaucratic restrictions and the possibility of co-option” (Robinson 2007, 
+RZHYHUZKLOHWKLVPD\UHÀHFWKRZVRPHOHVELDQVDQGJD\VIHOWDW
the time, it is not true that the group consciously refused to work through 
the NUM’s structures. Mark Ashton makes it clear during an interview: 
“What we actually said when we started was that we would support the 
1DWLRQDO8QLRQRI0LQHZRUNHUVWKHHOHFWHGOHDGHUVKLSRIWKH180LWVHOI
we would take guidelines from them, we wouldn’t be in a position to 
speak or tell them what to do” (Flynn, Goldsmith, and Sutcliffe 1985, 43-
44). And, as Rosie Leach immediately adds, if LGSM ultimately did not 
organize and channel its support through the NUM, it is because of the 
attack launched by the state on the union, which undermined the latter’s 
organizational capacities: “that situation has changed a bit . . . because of 
the fact that you can’t send money now directly to the NUM, even if you 
wanted to. . . . In a sense that argument is being by-passed” (44). 
Thus, it does not really matter whether we privilege, as Robinson does, 
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the point of view of those lesbians and gays who may have felt resistant 
to work with the NUM or whether we follow Kelliher, instead, who points 
out that “during a strike in which the union itself was threatened . . . it 
is unlikely that support hostile to the NUM would have been welcome” 
(Kelliher 2014, 244). Indeed, that argument had been by-passed. If 
we approach this question through the lens of the theory of hegemony, 
what does matter is that the hegemony of the NUM in the context of the 
miners’ strike was concretely under erosion. Moreover, we should insert 
WKLVVSHFL¿FTXHVWLRQRIPDWHULDORUJDQL]LQJZLWKLQDEURDGHUSLFWXUH$V
Kelliher observes, “a history of LGSM provides important insights into the 
weakening of the hegemonic position of ‘class’ as a concern for the left in 
the 1980s” (Kelliher 2014, 242). Indeed, as already argued, the grammar of 
“community” largely replaced that of “class” in the context of the 1984-85 
strike. Thus, the very logic of a mobilization concerning industrial relations 
and loss of jobs was nonetheless modeled around the identity politics more 
familiar to the gay and lesbian movement than the labour movement. This 
transformation shaped the ground on which the mining communities could 
meet and join forces with LGSM and other support groups. 
This discussion suggests that the limits of the politics practiced by 
LGSM in their encounter with the miners cannot be reduced to the costs of 
engaging in a politics of hegemony from a non-hegemonic, nearly auxiliary 
position. To some extent, the very contrary is true. Neither a wholesale 
SULYLOHJLQJ RI FODVV FRQÀLFW RYHU LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV QRU D FRRSWDWLRQ RI
LGSM by the traditional structures of the labour movement (in this case, 
the NUM) can be said to have pushed the group to suspend its commitment 
to an uncompromising struggle against homophobia. Paradoxically, in 
fact, the context in which the lesbian and gay activists organized their 
apparently auxiliary support for the miners was marked by the increasing 
ascendancy of “identity” and “community,” at the expense of “class,” 
as new political categories for the Left. Hence, a partial and temporary 
VXVSHQVLRQRIDXWRQRP\²H[HPSOL¿HGE\/*60¶VGHFLVLRQWRWXUQGRZQ
DJD\PLQHU¶VUHTXHVWIRUVXSSRUWGHVSLWHWKHJURXS¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR¿JKW
homophobia and in partial contradiction with the group members’ own 
positioning as working-class lesbians and gays within their own identity-
based community—needs to be understood in relation to its strategic 
relevance, as part and parcel of the politics of hegemony as such. 
Hall seemed not to notice such productive contradictions at work 
within the folds of the political organizing proliferating around the miners’ 
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strike. In fact, what emerged through the work of LGSM and other support 
JURXSV ZDV SUHFLVHO\ DQ DWWHPSW WR JHQHUDOL]H WKH FRQÀLFW EHWZHHQ WKH
working class and the state and to project it onto a wider social bloc 
composed of heterogeneous social segments antagonistic to Thatcherism. 
As I mentioned at the beginning, Hall failed to see this because his reading 
of the events was overdetermined by his polemic against the British labour 
movement. And this is true in a profound sense. The point is not only that 
he may have rendered a limited picture of the strike in order to take a good 
chance to criticize the NUM and its political failures. Rather, immersed as 
he was in this polemic, he most probably really failed to divert his gaze 
toward forms of organizing other than the traditional institutions of the 
labour movement. Yet looking at how progressive social movements and 
identity political formations themselves activate a politics of hegemony—
and not only how the Left, through its traditional structures, may succeed 
or fail to articulate such movements within its own hegemonic project—is 
NH\HVSHFLDOO\WRGD\WKLUW\\HDUVDIWHUWKHPLQHUV¶VWULNHZKHQ
the decline and the shift rightward of those institutions of the Left have 
entirely transformed the political landscape. 
CHAPTER TWO
HOMONORMATIVITY, 
INTERSECTIONALITY, AND THE “MARXIST 
RENAISSANCE” IN QUEER THEORY
85
In effect . . . the social world, contrary to conventional Marxist 
theories and politics, is not remotely near transparent.
Roderick A. Ferguson, “To Be Fluent in Each Other’s Narratives” 
Hall warned in the 1980 that the reluctance of the British Left to 
engage with identity politics would concede terrain to Thatcherism and 
facilitate its struggle for hegemony. Today, we are confronted with a 
GLIIHUHQWFRQ¿JXUDWLRQRIWKHSROLWLFDO¿HOG,QThe Twilight of Equality? 
Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy (2003), Lisa 
Duggan looks at the United States and argues that the politico-ideological 
apparatus of the neoliberal bloc itself has morphed throughout the 1990s.1 
According to her analysis, the alliances with white supremacists and sexual 
conservatives typical of the Thatcher-Reagan era have now been largely 
replaced, in the United States, by a non-redistributive politics of equality 
able to absorb segments of traditionally progressive identity formations. 
On the one hand, Duggan diagnoses an increasing detachment of national 
LGBT lobbying organizations from grassroots activism and from a broader 
¿HOGRIDOOLDQFHVZLWKRWKHUPRYHPHQWVIRUVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFMXVWLFH6XFK
alliances have given way, in her view, to a new alignment between LGBT 
lobbying organizations and neoliberal political forces. The endorsement of 
Bill Clinton by the Human Rights Campaign during the U.S. presidential 
elections in 1992 marks a clear step in this direction. On the other hand, 
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'XJJDQKLJKOLJKWVWKHFRQFRPLWDQWHPHUJHQFHRIVPDOOEXWLQÀXHQWLDOJD\
right-wing formations explicitly committed to neoliberalization and close 
to the Republican Party, such as the Log Cabin Republicans. The result 
of these shifts—a proliferation of struggles for hegemony taking place 
ERWKZLWKLQ/*%74IRUPDWLRQVDQGLQWKHEURDGHUSROLWLFDO¿HOG²LVWKH
emergence of what Duggan terms “homonormativity”: the sexual politics 
of neoliberalism in its current phase.2 
This chapter focuses on the problem of homonormativity as 
conceptualized by Duggan and on the impact of her intervention in the 
TXHHUWKHRUHWLFDO¿HOG, ORFDWHKHUHZKDW, WHUPD³0DU[LVWUHQDLVVDQFH´
in queer theory. Kevin Floyd’s work in 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH7RZDUG
a Queer Marxism (2009) is exemplary of this reencounter between queer 
theory and Marxism. While the latter is taking shape against the background 
of the economic crisis exploded in 2008, and in relation to the more general 
return of Marxism on the intellectual scene of the Left, the “Marxist 
UHQDLVVDQFH´ LQ TXHHU WKHRU\ SRVVHVVHV LWV RZQ VSHFL¿FLWLHV ,QGHHG ,
suggest that this reencounter between the two critical paradigms is also a 
response to homonormativity. This means that one of the starting points for 
the emerging queer Marxism is the acknowledgment that queer sexuality 
and sexual politics are not necessarily sites of counter-hegemony, but rather 
are open to contradictory articulations. This acknowledgment, in turn, is 
strengthen by the intervention of queer of color critique, whose emergence 
is explicitly formulated by Roderick A. Ferguson in Aberrations in Black: 
Toward a Queer of Color Critique (2004). Indeed, in the tradition of black 
lesbian and intersectional feminism (see Combahee River Collective 
>@ +XOO %HOO 6FRWW DQG 6PLWK  /RUGH  &UHQVKDZ
TXHHURIFRORUFULWLTXHLQVLVWVWKDWVH[XDOLW\DQGVH[XDOSROLWLFV
cannot be abstracted from their intersections with the axes of race and class. 
This chapter conceptualizes the emergence of a “Marxist renaissance” in 
queer theory and of queer of color critique in relation to the appearance of 
KRPRQRUPDWLYLW\LQERWKWKHSROLWLFDODQGWKHWKHRUHWLFDO¿HOG
Central to my reading of these theoretical and political formations is 
a discussion of identity politics. Following both Hall and Duggan, I argue 
that identity politics are neither inherently progressive nor conservative. 
Rather, I suggest that they possess a relative autonomy which renders their 
DUWLFXODWLRQ WR VSHFL¿F SROLWLFDO SURMHFWV WKH UHVXOW RI FRQFUHWH SROLWLFR
ideological struggles. From this perspective, I question the current tendency 
on the part of many queer critics—including those participating in the 
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FRQWHPSRUDU\³0DU[LVW UHQDLVVDQFH´ZLWKLQ WKH¿HOG²WR UHJDUG LGHQWLW\
H[FOXVLYHO\ DV D UHVXOW RI WKH UHL¿FDWLRQ RI VRFLDO OLIH XQGHU FDSLWDOLVP
especially in its neoliberal phase. On the one hand, I suggest that this 
reading privileges a focus on the “general laws” of capitalism, operating 
DWDOHYHORIDEVWUDFWLRQWKDWVDFUL¿FHVFRQMXQFWXUDODQDO\VLV2QWKHRWKHU
hand, I argue that to expel identity from the analysis, or to integrate it 
RQO\DVDWDUJHWRISROHPLFPDNHVLWGLI¿FXOWWRFRQFHSWXDOL]HWKHVSHFL¿F
intervention of contemporary queer of color critique. Indeed, I propose to 
UHDG WKHVWUXJJOHDURXQGUDFHFRQGXFWHGE\ WKH ODWWHUZLWKLQ WKH¿HOGRI
queer theory as a form of counter-hegemonic identity politics: a struggle 
to hegemonize the color line. To offer this reading, I conceptualize identity 




the well-known debate on redistribution and recognition between Judith 
Butler (1997b) and Nancy Fraser (1997b). I propose that the salience of 
WKHGHEDWHFRQVLVWVRIKDYLQJDQWLFLSDWHGNH\GHYHORSPHQWVLQWKH¿HOGRI
queer theory, preparing the ground for Duggan’s intervention, while at the 
VDPHWLPHIDLOLQJWRUHJLVWHUWKHVSHFL¿FLWLHVRIWKHHPHUJLQJFRQMXQFWXUH²
¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI KRPRQRUPDWLYLW\ , DOVR DUJXH WKDW
the lack of a theory of hegemony on both sides of the debate facilitated 
this failure. Hence, in the second section, I turn to Duggan’s analysis 
and I trace the multiple struggles for hegemony that have presided over 
the rearticulation of progressive sexual politics to the politico-economic 
project of neoliberalism in the United States. Following this analysis, in 
the third section I zoom in on the problem of identity and I suggest to 
FRQFHSWXDOL]H LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV DV DQ LQWHUVHFWLRQDO ¿HOG RI DQWDJRQLVPV
and recomposition, rather than reducing identity to a mere by-product 
of capitalism or neoliberalism. This discussion proceeds in the fourth 
section, where I turn to the “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory. More 
VSHFL¿FDOO\ , IRFXV RQ WKH TXHHU UHDGLQJV RI*\|UJ\/XNiFV¶ FRQFHSWV
RI ³UHL¿FDWLRQ´ DQG ³WRWDOLW\´ RIIHUHG E\5RVHPDULH+HQQHVV\ LQ3UR¿W
and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism (2000) and by Kevin 
Floyd in 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH7RZDUGD4XHHU0DU[LVP (2009). Not 
RQO\DUHWKHVHUHDGLQJVRI/XNiFVSLYRWDOWRWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\UHHQFRXQWHU
EHWZHHQTXHHUWKHRU\DQG0DU[LVPEXWWKH\DOVRUHÀHFW²DWDKLJKOHYHO
of abstraction—a general problematic addressed by virtually all queer 
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0DU[LVW FULWLFV WRGD\ KRZ WR DSSURDFK WKH UHL¿FDWLRQ RI LGHQWLW\ XQGHU
FDSLWDOLVPIURPDYDQWDJHSRLQWPDUNHGE\VH[XDOLGHQWLW\LQWKH¿UVWSODFH
and how to reconnect the politicization of sexual identity to an analysis of 
the social formation in its totality.
After discussing Hennessy’s and Floyd’s respective approaches to this 
SUREOHP,WXUQWRTXHHURIFRORUFULWLTXHLQWKH¿IWKVHFWLRQ+HUHHVSHFLDOO\
through a reading of José E. Muñoz’s 'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV4XHHUVRI&RORU
and the Performance of Politics (1999) and of Roderick A. Ferguson’s 
Aberrations in Black: Toward A Queer of Color Critique (2004), I argue 
that queer of color critique has been conducting a struggle to hegemonize 
WKHFRORUOLQHZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\,QVRGRLQJ,VXJJHVWWKDW
this theoretical formation mediates today both our understanding of 
homonormativity and the current “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory. 
The chapter ends with a section devoted to the political life narrative of 
Gloria Wekker, an Afro-Dutch lesbian feminist whose participation in 
the intellectual and political scene in the Netherlands stretches from the 
1970s to the present. Ferguson’s project of a queer of color critique takes 
women of color and black lesbian feminism of the 1970s and 1980s as its 
genealogical anchoring point. Similarly, through Wekker’s political life 
narrative, I recall the black lesbian feminist genealogy of contemporary 
Dutch antiracist organizing. Thus, on the one hand, I pose a question of 
political recomposition: do contemporary antiracist formations, rather 
than LGBTQ formations, constitute today a privileged site for the 
DUWLFXODWLRQ RI UDGLFDO TXHHU FULWLTXHV RI VH[XDO SROLWLFV" 2Q WKH RWKHU
hand, while addressing this question, I emphasize Wekker’s struggles 
within the academic institution and the role played by such struggles in 
the circulation of intersectional critique inside and outside the university. 
In this way, I suggest that processes of political recomposition are often 
mediated by the seizing of institutional spaces—especially the spaces of 
knowledge production.  
Rereading Butler and Fraser: 
Missing the Gaps, Missing the Articulations
In 1997, Social Text published a debate between Judith Butler and Nancy 
Fraser concerning the relation between the reproduction of capitalism 
and the regulation of sexuality—and, correspondingly, between socialist 
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politics and progressive sexual politics. The debate comprises Butler’s 
essay “Merely Cultural” (1997b), originally delivered as a lecture at a 
Rethinking Marxism conference in Amherst, Massachusetts in 1996, and 
Fraser’s reply, titled “Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism: A 
Response to Judith Butler” (1997b). It is worth recalling the exchange 
between Butler and Fraser here, for it anticipates some of the contemporary 
debates that I discuss in this chapter: what I term, as a whole, the “Marxist 
UHQDLVVDQFH´ LQ TXHHU WKHRU\ 6XFK GHEDWHV DUH UHGH¿QLQJ WKH ¿HOG E\
revisiting, implicitly and explicitly, the relationship between queer theory 
and Marxism. This shift has been taking place through the past twenty years 
largely as a response to the emergence of what Duggan (2003) has termed 
“homonormativity”: a sexual politics articulated to the politico-economic 
SURMHFWRIQHROLEHUDOLVPLQWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\7KHH[FKDQJHEHWZHHQ
Butler and Fraser appears to anticipate and, at the same time, to be slightly 
out of tune with respect to such contemporary debates. Taking place shortly 
EHIRUHWKHSUREOHPRIKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\FDPHWRUHGH¿QHWKH¿HOGRITXHHU
WKHRU\,VXJJHVWWKDWLWSURYHVVLJQL¿FDQWGXHWRWKHTXHVWLRQVLWUDLVHVDV
much as to its failure to answer them convincingly. 
In her essay, Butler criticizes what she describes as an “orthodox 
Marxist” tendency to install a divide within the Left between socialist 
politics and cultural or identity politics, and to militate against the latter: 
“a tendency to relegate new social movements to the sphere of the cultural, 
indeed, to dismiss them as being preoccupied with what is called the 
‘merely’ cultural, and then to construe this cultural politics as factionalizing, 
identitarian, and particularistic” (Butler 1997b, 265). According to Butler, 
TXHHUVWUXJJOHV¿JXUHLQWKLVFRQWH[WDVWKHTXLQWHVVHQWLDOH[DPSOHRIWKH
PHUHO\ FXOWXUDO :KDW OHG )UDVHU WR UHVSRQG WR%XWOHU LQ WKH ¿UVW
place is the fact that, rather than naming any of the “orthodox Marxists” 
who are the target of her polemical intervention, Butler choses to direct her 
critique against Fraser’s work in -XVWLFH,QWHUUXSWXV&ULWLFDO5HÀHFWLRQV
on the “Postsocialist” Condition (Fraser 1997a). As Butler knows well, 
Fraser would by no means endorse a dismissal of identity politics on 
orthodox Marxist grounds. In fact, in Justice Interruptus and elsewhere, 
Fraser tries to elaborate a model for a united front of the Left combining 
what she terms “politics of redistribution” and “politics of recognition.” 
She does so by proposing an ideal spectrum of political struggles ranging 
from the “economic” to the “cultural” and situating, for example, queer 
struggles at the cultural end of the spectrum. Once analytically parted 
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in this way, Fraser argues that these diverse struggles can only be kept 
together normatively, for each one of them stakes different and irreducible 
claims to justice that the Left must not ignore. While Butler shares the 
political commitments informing Fraser’s work, she nonetheless argues 
that her model “reproduces the division that locates certain oppressions as 
part of political economy and relegates others to the exclusively cultural 
sphere” (Butler 1997b, 270-271). In other words, while Fraser’s normative 
commitments to a diversity of political struggles clearly distinguish her 
from any economistic dismissal of identity politics as merely cultural, her 
model reproduces, in Butler’s view, the very partition between the economic 
DQGWKHFXOWXUDORQZKLFKWKDWGLVPLVVDOGHSHQGVLQWKH¿UVWSODFH3
Thus, Butler offers different arguments in order not simply to defend 
cultural and identity politics as such, but to question the very epistemological 
divide between the material and the cultural. First, Butler points out how 
the exclusion of lesbians and gays from state-sanctioned notions of family, 
for example, has very material effects: the impossibility of inheriting a 
loved one’s property, the impossibility of making medical decisions about 
a dying lover, and so forth (Butler 1997b, 273). Second, by recovering 
the vocabulary of 1970s socialist feminism and its critique of the sexual 
division of labor, Butler argues that heteronormativity is necessary to sustain 
the family as a site of reproduction of a gendered labor force functional 
to capitalism. It follows, Butler suggests, that “a movement concerned to 
criticize and transform the ways in which sexuality is socially regulated” 
also and automatically represents a threat to the functioning of the capitalist 
V\VWHP)LQDOO\E\EULHÀ\WXUQLQJWRFODVVLFDODQWKURSRORJLFDOZRUNV
by Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss, Butler develops a third argument 
meant to deconstruct the boundary between the material and the cultural 
altogether. In her view, Mauss’ and Lévi-Strauss’ anthropological accounts 
of cultural practices of exchange—including the exchange of women—
not only did reveal that such practices possess both material and cultural 
IXQFWLRQVEXWZHQWIXUWKHULQGHPRQVWUDWLQJWKHDQDO\WLFDOLQHI¿FDF\RIWKH
very distinction between the two dimensions (275).
7RWKH¿UVWDUJXPHQWFRQFHUQLQJWKHPDWHULDODVSHFWVRIOHVELDQDQG
gay oppression, Fraser responds by pointing out that, according to her 
own model, misrecognition (that is, the domain of cultural and identity 
politics) is by no means immaterial, but rather depends on very material 
institutions and social practices. In Fraser’s view, Butler confuses here 
the material (or economic) with the structural. From the fact that a form 
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of oppression has very clear material or economic dimensions does not 
follow, for Fraser, that we shall consider it as a direct expression of the 
economic structure. So she writes: “the economic harms of heterosexism 
>DUH@ LQGLUHFW PDOGLVWULEXWLYH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH PRUH IXQGDPHQWDO
injustice of misrecognition. . . . Change the relations of recognition and the 
maldistribution would disappear” (Fraser 1997b, 283). For instance, grant 
gays and lesbians access to marriage and the impossibility of inheriting 
one’s partner’s property will disappear.   
Thus, already at this stage Fraser’s response makes clear that at the core 
of this debate lie two different understandings of the relation between base 
and superstructures. This difference is properly developed in Fraser’s reply 
to Butler’s second argument. According to Fraser, Butler’s recovery of 1970s 
socialist feminism displays “an air of olympian indifference to history” 
(Fraser 1997b, 284) and resurrects the worse aspect of that theorizing: 
“the overtotalized view of capitalist society as a monolithic ‘system’ of 
interlocking structures of oppression that seamlessly reinforce one another” 
(285-286). In short, Fraser contests the idea that contemporary capitalism 
needs heteronormativity and that, consequently, LGBTQ struggles threaten 
the very functioning of capitalism as a coherent whole.4 For Fraser, this view 
misses the gaps. She writes: “With its gaps between the economic order and 
the kinship order, and between the family and personal life, capitalist society 
QRZSHUPLWVVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHUVRILQGLYLGXDOVWROLYHWKURXJKZDJHODERU
outside of heterosexual families” (285). More generally—and moving from 
the terrain of empirical observation to that of theoretical abstraction—it is 
the gaps between the different levels of the social formation (the economic, 
the political, and the ideological) that one must be able to identify in order to 
apprehend the social formation in question as a complex and contradictory 
yet articulated whole. At stake is the capacity to conceptualize the relation 
between the economic and the cultural in non-deterministic terms. 
Butler tends to gloss over that relation. Through a loose deployment 
of terms such as “material” and “economic,” and through a more or 
less conscious recuperation of a functionalist logic from 1970s socialist 
feminism, she expands the domain of the economic base in order to include 
the social regulation of sexuality in it. Fraser, on the other hand, seems to be 
more attentive to the differentiations that characterize contemporary social 
formations. Yet her primary interest is not to track the articulatory practices 
WKDWVXWXUHWKHJDSVVKHLGHQWL¿HVEHWZHHQWKHHFRQRPLFDQGWKHLGHRORJLFDO
levels (or, in her terms, between the economic order and the kinship order). 
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5DWKHUVKHQDPHVWKHJDSVLQRUGHUWRUHDI¿UPKHUQRUPDWLYHFRPPLWPHQW
to heterogeneous struggles that must remain, in her view, analytically 
disarticulated. But that the links among the different levels of a social 
formation do not possess a necessary character and are not reducible to 
a seamless whole, as Fraser points out, does not automatically mean that 
such links do not exist. Following Hall, I suggest instead that such links are 
contingently established through politico-ideological practices which come 
to structure a particular social formation at a given historical juncture. By 
patrolling the borders between the different levels of the social formation 
rather than trying to identify the links contingently established among 
WKHP)UDVHU¶VFRQFHSWXDOHGL¿FHSURYHVFRPPLWWHGDV%XWOHUDUJXHV WR
preserve a distinction between the economic and the cultural.
This leads us to the third point of dissent between Butler and Fraser. To 
Butler’s explicit deconstruction of the distinction between the material and 
the cultural, grounded on classical anthropological works, Fraser replies 
that those works concerned precapitalist societies to whose members 
the distinction in question was indeed not available. For, unlike modern 
capitalist societies, the ones investigated by Mauss and Lévi-Strauss were 
governed by systems of social relations that entirely collapsed kinship 
structures with practices of production and distribution (Fraser 1997b, 286). 
However, Fraser does not simply intend to counter Butler on historical 
grounds. Her observation immediately translates into a point of friction 
over theoretical practice:
:KDWHYHU >0DXVV¶ DQG /pYL6WUDXVV¶@ LQWHQWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ ³WKH
economic” and “the cultural,” we gain less from reading them as 
having “destabilized” the distinction than from reading them as having 
historicized it. . . . Butler’s “destabilization” argument . . . erroneously 
assumes that to historicize a distinction is to render it nugatory and 
useless in social theory. In fact, historicization does the contrary. Far from 
rendering distinctions unstable, it renders their usage more precise. From 
my perspective, then, historicization represents a better approach to social 
theory than destabilization or deconstruction. (Fraser 1997b, 287)
We may interpret this friction over theoretical practice as conditioning, 
in fact, the entire debate between Butler and Fraser. Anna Marie Smith 
suggests as much in her reading of the debate. While discussing Fraser’s 
charge against Butler’s deployment of deconstruction, Smith observes: 
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“Butler does in fact deploy a classic Derridean interpretative strategy 
in her argument. She attempts to demonstrate that the economic cannot 
be analytically separated from the cultural because the latter operates as 
the ‘constitutive outside’ of the former. . . . Butler’s argument, however, 
actually bears a closer resemblance to structuralist Marxist thought” (A. 
Smith 2001a, 107). According to Smith, a deconstructive gesture is at work 
not only in Butler’s reading of Mauss and Lévi-Strauss, whose analyses 
she explicitly recovers in order to deconstruct the boundary between 
the material and the cultural, but also in Butler’s redeployment of 1970s 
socialist feminist arguments concerning the sexual division of labor. Thus, 
Smith collapses two different arguments proposed by Butler as signs of the 
same deconstructive approach. 
Smith’s reading tries to do justice to the spirit of Butler’s intervention. 
As mentioned at the beginning, Butler’s entire essay—hence her reference 
to socialist feminism, too—is meant to deconstruct, indeed, the divide 
between the material and the cultural. Moreover, Smith’s reading manages to 
situate this debate within Butler’s broader intellectual trajectory. However, 
rather than identifying a singular logic throughout Butler’s essay (that is, 
deconstruction), we may gain more by insisting on her recourse to different 
DQGVRPHWLPHVHYHQFRQÀLFWLQJFRQFHSWXDODSSDUDWXVHV,QRWKHUZRUGV,
suggest that Butler does not simply develop a deconstructive argument that 
resembles Marxist functionalism or structuralism, as Smith suggests, but 
rather mobilizes at different points in her essay both deconstruction and 
IXQFWLRQDOLVPZLWK DSSDUHQW GLVUHJDUG IRU WKHLU GLIIHUHQW DQG FRQÀLFWLQJ
contributions to critical theory.5 This reading opens up the possibility of a 
V\PSWRPDWLFUHDGLQJRIWKHGHEDWHZKLFKVLWXDWHVLWDVDUHÀHFWLRQRIWKH
relationship between queer theory and Marxism at the turn of the century. 
Indeed, as the contradictory nature of Butler’s essay makes clear, she 
approaches Marxism without belonging in it—as a temporary incursion. 
,QWKLVFKDSWHU,DUJXHWKDWWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\KDVEHHQZLWQHVVLQJD
key reencounter between queer theory and Marxism. Not that this encounter 
had not been conceptualized and practiced before, but in the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s, especially in its most visible strands, queer theory 
GHYHORSHGDVDWKHRUHWLFDO¿HOGHPSKDWLFDOO\GLVDUWLFXODWHGIURP0DU[LVW
theory. Michel Foucault’s critique of Marxism mentioned in the previous 
chapter, as well as his analysis of sexuality as a power device in its own 
ULJKWLQWKH¿UVWYROXPHRIThe History of Sexuality >@KDYH
certainly contributed to this development. Butler’s own work on gender 
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performativity is a quintessential instance of queer theory’s departure from 
0DU[LVPQRWRQO\EXWDOVRYLD)RXFDXOW%XWOHUD)URPWKH
EHJLQQLQJRIWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\RQZDUGLQVWHDGWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
queer theory and Marxism has been granted unprecedented attention. 
Publications such as the conversation between Marcia Klotz, Rosemary 
Hennessy, and Kevin Floyd in Rethinking Marxism.ORW]+HQQHVV\
)OR\GRUGLQ’s special issue on “Queer Studies and the Crises 
of Capitalism” (Rosenberg and Villarejo 2012), among others, attest to 
WKHHPHUJHQFHRIZKDW,WHUPWKH³0DU[LVWUHQDLVVDQFH´ZLWKLQWKH¿HOG6 
In this chapter, I argue that such a reencounter between queer theory and 
Marxism has been taking root largely as a response to homonormativity: a 
sexual politics articulated to the politico-economic project of neoliberalism 
in its current phase.
That a return of Marxism in queer theory takes place at the time of 
an emerging articulation between LGBT politics and neoliberalism does 
make a difference. The relation between Marxism and queer theory has 
a history that predates their contemporary reencounter. On the one hand, 
there are theorists who have been positioning themselves at the crossroads 
of these two forms of critical knowledge since the 1980s and through the 
1990s. Two cases in point are John D’Emilio’s materialist analysis of the 
emergence of gay identity in his foundational essay “Capitalism and Gay 
,GHQWLW\´DQG5RVHPDULH+HQQHVV\¶VFULWLTXHRIWKH¿HOGRITXHHU
theory for its abstraction of gender and sexuality from the social relations 
of capitalism in “Queer Theory, Left Politics” (1994). On the other hand, a 
body of Marxist and socialist gay critique had already emerged within the 
gay liberation movements of the 1970s. Such is the case of the British Gay 
Left Collective formed in 1974 (see Gay Left Collective 1975) or the Gay 
Socialist Action Project formed in New York in 1974, in which D’Emilio 
himself participated. Moreover, the 1970s also witnessed an appropriation 
of the particular discourse of Freudo-Marxism at the hand of gay liberation 
DXWKRUVDQGSROLWLFDOFROOHFWLYHVVHH0LHOL>@7 Yet, even as this 
history and the forms of knowledge it produced are often recalled today 
DV VRXUFHVRISROLWLFDO LQVSLUDWLRQDQGJHQHDORJLFDO DI¿OLDWLRQ1DW5DKD
observes that the current body of work bringing queer theory and Marxism 
together again “remains largely removed from liberation-era gay left 
critique” (Raha 2014). Among other reasons, this is so because gay Marxist 
critics in the 1970s could take the unequivocal fact of gay oppression as a 
starting point and, like Butler in “Merely Cultural,” they would posit gay 
Homonormativity, Intersectionality, and the “Marxist Renaissance” 95
oppression and compulsory heterosexuality as necessary points of support 
for the reproduction of capitalism. The starting point for contemporary 
queer Marxism, instead, is the emergence of homonormativity, hence 
an acknowledgment of the openness of queer sexuality to contradictory 
political and ideological articulations. 
This does not mean that contemporary queer theory must be 
reinvigorated or amended through a return to Marxism. Most of the authors 
discussed in this chapter make clear that a recuperation of Marxism within 
TXHHU WKHRU\UHTXLUHVDSDUWLDOGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQIURPLW LQ WKH¿UVWSODFH
due to its historical disregard for sexual identity and sexual politics (see 
)HUJXVRQ  )OR\G  ,Q WKLV UHVSHFW %XWOHU¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ LV
paradoxically, out of tune. While her essay presents itself as a polemic 
against orthodox Marxism, she nonetheless seems to feel the urge, as 
Fraser correctly remarks, to prove the credentials of queer politics before an 
imaginary orthodox Marxist tribunal (Fraser 1997b, 281).8 More generally, 
it is the entire debate between Butler and Fraser that appears to be, at least in 
part, out of tune. Taking place in the late 1990s, it fails to read convincingly 
LWVFRQMXQFWXUHDQGWRDQWLFLSDWHNH\GHEDWHVWKDWZLOOUHGH¿QHWKHWHUUDLQ
of queer theory and politics after the turn of the century. Neither Butler’s 
invocation of the necessity of heteronormativity for the reproduction of 
capitalist social relations nor Fraser’s decoupling of socialist politics from 
identity politics can properly account for the struggles coagulating around 
the emergence of homonormativity. 
Additionally, I argue in this chapter that the contemporary reencounter 
between queer theory and Marxism in the face of homonormativity is 
being crucially mediated by the intervention of queer of color critique. 
Also in this respect, the debate between Butler and Fraser fails to anticipate 
NH\WUDQVIRUPDWLRQVZLWKLQWKHWKHRUHWLFDO¿HOGIRUERWKRIWKHLUDQDO\VHV
evade the ways in which race mediates the articulations between sexual 
politics and neoliberalism. This absence is made even more striking by 
the fact that the debate was published in a double special issue of Social 
Text explicitly committed to intersectionality, titled “Queer Transexions of 
Race, Nation, and Gender” (Harper et al. 1997a). At the very beginning of 




of this fact have nevertheless gone largely unexplored—a situation this 
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double issue is meant to address” (Harper et al. 1997b, 1). In the opening 
of her essay, Butler does allude to the intersections of feminist, antiracist, 
LGBTQ, and anti-capitalist formations. Her reading of these intersections 
pushes the analysis in a very interesting direction:
7KHRQO\SRVVLEOHXQLW\>RIWKHVHIRUPDWLRQV@ZLOOQRWEHWKHV\QWKHVLV
RI D VHW RI FRQÀLFWV EXW ZLOO EH D PRGH RI VXVWDLQLQJ FRQÀLFW LQ
politically productive ways, a practice of contestation that demands 
that these movements articulate their goals under the pressure of each 
other without therefore exactly becoming each other. This is not quite 
the chain of equivalence proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, although 
it does sustain important relations to it. New political formations do 
not stand in an analogical relation with one another, as if they were 
discrete and differentiated entities. They are overlapping, mutually 
GHWHUPLQLQJ DQG FRQYHUJHQW ¿HOGV RI SROLWLFL]DWLRQ ,Q IDFW PRVW
promising are those moments in which one social movement comes to 
¿QGLWVFRQGLWLRQRISRVVLELOLW\LQDQRWKHU%XWOHUE
This passage invokes a politics of antagonism and alliance—that is, a 
politics of counter-hegemony—rooted in processes of recomposition that 
FURVVDQGLQWHUVHFWZKDWPD\DSSHDUWREHDW¿UVWJODQFHGLVFUHWHSROLWLFDO
formations. I began to explore such processes at the end of the previous 
chapter, recovering the experience of Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners 
(LGSM). In order to construct an alliance with the miners on strike against 
the second Thatcher government in 1984-85, LGSM did not just insist on 
the analogies between gays and lesbians on the one hand, and the miners on 
the other hand. Rather, they positioned themselves at the crossroads of gay/
lesbian identity and working-class belonging. Thus, Butler is right when she 
suggests that contemporary forms of recomposition taking place within the 
EURDG¿HOGRILGHQWLW\SROLWLFDOIRUPDWLRQVJREH\RQG/DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶V
conceptualization of a chain of equivalence. In this chapter, I continue this 
discussion by exploring the role played by contemporary queer of color 
FULWLTXHLQUHRULHQWLQJWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\DURXQGWKHSUREOHPRIWKH
color line.9 While Butler points at these transformations in the passage 
above, she does not develop this reading in her subsequent analysis of the 
relations between sexual politics and capitalism. Duggan herself, who sides 
with Butler in her reading of the debate, nevertheless signals this point: “The 
future elaboration of Butler’s analysis . . . would need to offer an account that 
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addresses the centrality of racial differentiation, together with gender and 
sexuality, in the history of liberal capitalism in the West” (Duggan 2003, 84). 
One must acknowledge that in 1997 Butler and Fraser lacked full 
access to the debate on homonormativity that was going to properly unfold 
few years after their debate took place. Fraser may seem to hint at the new 
scenario when she observes, against Butler, that “the principal opponents 
of gay and lesbian rights today are not multinational corporations, but 
religious and cultural conservatives. . . . In fact, some multinationals 
. . . apparently see advantages in accommodating gays” (Fraser 1997b, 
285). Yet, as I argued, the search for gaps between the different levels of 
contemporary social formations works in Fraser as a point of arrival, not 
as a point of departure to identify the politico-ideological practices that 
are mobilized to suture those gaps. Reading the debate through the lens 
of Hall’s theory of hegemony and in light of the contemporary debate on 
homonormativity, I suggest that Butler misses the gaps but Fraser misses 
the articulations. Therefore, the exchange between them is not just out of 
tune with contemporary queer debates because of its taking place in the late 
1990s. Its partial failure to read the transformations beginning to unfold, at 
the time, in the political andWKHWKHRUHWLFDO¿HOGKDVDOVRWRGRDV6PLWK
points out, with the lack of a theory of hegemony. 
Smith makes this point when she argues that Fraser’s critique of 
Butler must be reversed: “The problem with ‘Merely Cultural’ is not that 
it illegitimately introduces deconstruction into the terrain of social theory, 
EXWWKDWLWVVRFLDOWKHRU\LVLQVXI¿FLHQWO\SRVWVWUXFWXUDOLVW´$6PLWKD
108).10 Without explicitly mentioning it, Smith alludes to the contribution 
of authors such as Hall or Laclau and Mouffe.11 Hence, she argues that a 
theory of hegemony would displace the very terms of the debate between 
Butler and Fraser. According to Smith, Fraser’s construction of a spectrum 
of political struggles ranging from the cultural to the economic, from 
UHFRJQLWLRQWRUHGLVWULEXWLRQLVIDUWRRDEVWUDFW)RULQVWDQFH)UDVHUDI¿UPV
that the heterosexism of family law could be remedied either by legalizing 
same-sex marriage or by de-institutionalizing marriage as the basis for the 
DOORFDWLRQRIEHQH¿WVDQGSULYLOHJHV)UDVHU$6PLWKD
Since Fraser disarticulates different struggles and addresses each of them 
separately according to her abstract model, the differences between those 
two strategies are irrelevant to her: both would eliminate the principle of 
misrecognition. Smith, instead, comments:
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,WLVLQGHHGSRVVLEOHWKDWVDPHVH[PDUULDJHPLJKWVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLVUXSW
patriarchal heterosexuality in one institutional context. In another, 
however, it might enlarge the privileged married class and contribute to 
the further marginalization of the unmarried class. As an isolated reform, 
same-sex marriage would not change the ways in which contemporary 
American welfare policies target single mothers for moral discipline 
RQWKHEDVLVRIWKHLUPDULWDOVWDWXVQRUZRXOGLWGRDQ\WKLQJWRHQVXUH
HTXDO DFFHVV WREHQH¿WV IRU WKRVH LQGLYLGXDOVZKRVH VH[XDOSUDFWLFHV
and alternative kinship structures do not conform to the cohabiting 
monogamous couple model. In some conditions, the institutionalization 
of same-sex marriage—an apparently progressive reform—might 
actually contribute to new forms of domination. (A. Smith 2001a, 118)
This comment highlights that an apparently progressive sexual reform can 
help secure oppression in another domain, for even as the different levels 
RIDJLYHQVRFLDOIRUPDWLRQGRQRWVWDQGLQDUHODWLRQVKLSRISXUHUHÀHFWLRQ
they are nonetheless contingently articulated to one another.  
Equally important, for Smith, is the fact that if marriage equality can be 
articulated to the hegemonic organization of social relations and its unequal 
GLVWULEXWLRQRISULYLOHJHVLW¿UVWQHHGVWRFRQGXFWDVWUXJJOHIRUKHJHPRQ\
within the LGBTQ movement: it has to transform the movement. This is, 
indeed, one of the cores of Duggan’s analysis of homonormativity. How 
GLG WKDWKDSSHQ"7KURXJKZKLFKDOOLDQFHVDQGDQWDJRQLVPV")RU6PLWK
Fraser’s abstract and static categorization of political struggles “does not 
give us the tools we need to analyze the way in which some demands 
become hegemonic within a given social movement—to the extent that 
they appear to sum up its entire identity—while others are neglected” (A. 
Smith 2001a, 119). In the next section, I recover Duggan’s analysis and 
emphasize the struggles of hegemony—taking place both inside LGBTQ 
IRUPDWLRQVDQG LQ WKHEURDGHUSROLWLFDO¿HOG²ZKLFKKDYHSUHVLGHGRYHU
this rearticulation rightward of progressive sexual politics.
The Emergence of Homonormativity: Struggles for Hegemony 
In The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the 
Attack on Democracy (2003), Duggan virtually takes up the analysis of the 
construction of neoliberal hegemony that Hall proposed in the context of 
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Thatcherism and, with a focus on the United States, drives it forward into 
WKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\12 Yet, next to the different space-time coordinates 
of their analyses, there is at least one other element worth mentioning that 
distinguishes Hall’s reading of Thatcherism from Duggan’s discussion of 
contemporary neoliberalism. Hall understood both the urgency and the 
strategic relevance of the identity politics articulated by the new social 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s, yet he looked at them from a certain 
distance. Theoretically and politically, he fully belongedWRWKH³¿UVW´1HZ
Left, emerged in the wake of 1956.13 Duggan, instead, speaks from within 
contemporary feminist, queer, and antiracist movements. Thus, while Hall 
called for the Left to open up its language and programs to the politics 
of gender, race, and sexuality but referred to such movements mostly in 
the third person, Duggan directly addresses feminist, queer, and antiracist 
IRUPDWLRQV7KH¿HOG GH¿QHGE\ WKHVHPRYHPHQWV WKHPVHOYHV DQG WKHLU
LQWHUVHFWLRQV¿JXUHVLQKHUZRUNDVDWHUUDLQRIKHJHPRQLFVWUXJJOHV
,QRWKHUZRUGV+DOO¶VDQG'XJJDQ¶VGLIIHUHQWYDQWDJHSRLQWVLQÀXHQFH
their respective analyses. Duggan pays attention, like Hall did, to the 
tensions between socialist politics and identity politics, but she does so 
primarily by insisting on how such tensions translate into antagonisms 
within feminist, queer, and antiracist formations. If Hall warned that the 
IDLOXUHRIWKH/HIWWRRFFXS\WKHHPHUJLQJ¿HOGRILGHQWLW\SROLWLFVZRXOG
lead, in the 1980s, to their conservative articulation by Thatcherism, 
Duggan’s work takes a step further and diagnoses the contemporary 
articulation rightward of apparently progressive sexual politics. The politics 
of homonormativity—a politics primarily invested in formal equality, 
stripped of redistributive goals, and adverse to the construction of alliances 
that would link LGBTQ struggles to other identity political formations such 
as feminist and antiracist movements—is a politics actively articulated by 
key segments of the LGBTQ movement. While in Hall’s writings of the 
V LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV ¿JXUHV SULPDULO\ DV D WHUUDLQ WR EH VHL]HG LQ WKH
struggle for hegemony between a Left in crisis and a rising New Right, 
Duggan’s analysis fully triangulates that relationship and regards identity 
political formations themselves as central participants in the struggle. The 
problem of homonormativity emerges at the crossroads of three terrains 
of antagonism: a) the crisis of the post-war social consensus around the 
ZHOIDUHVWDWHDQG WKH ULVHRI WKH1HZ5LJKW LQ LWVZDNHE WKHFRQÀLFWV
ZLWKLQWKH/HIWEHWZHHQVRFLDOLVWSROLWLFVDQGLGHQWLW\SROLWLFVDQGFWKH
antagonisms taking root within and among identity political formations. 
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The histories of these different yet articulated terrains of antagonism form 
the background of Duggan’s analysis of homonormativity.
/LNH+DOO'XJJDQLGHQWL¿HVLQWKHFULVLVRIWKHSRVWZDUVRFLDOFRQVHQVXV
DURXQGWKH.H\QHVLDQZHOIDUHVWDWHD¿UVWSKDVHLQWKHSURFHVVWKDWZRXOG
lead to the rise of a New Right in the 1970s. According to her account, the 
decades of the 1950s and 1960s were characterized in the United States by a 
¿UVWURXQGRIFRQVLVWHQWDWWDFNVRQWKH1HZ'HDORQSURJUHVVLYHXQLRQLVP
and in general on the principle of redistribution downward. Proceeding into 
the next decade, such conservative attacks were directed against both the 
welfare state and the new social movements—Black Power, feminism, gay 
and lesbian liberation, and the counterculture. It is important to observe, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter following Hall’s account, that the 
very emergence of these new social movements signaled the unfolding of a 
crisis in the previous social formation. Indeed, those movements explicitly 
articulated their own critique of the welfare state because of its depoliticizing 
effects and the forms of inequality and social regulation that, in their view, it 
helped preserve. Duggan writes: “During the 1950s and 1960s, criticism of 
WKH86ZHOIDUHVWDWHIURPERWKWKHULJKWDQGWKHOHIWLQWHQVL¿HG&RQVHUYDWLYH
antistatist attacks on New Deal social welfare programs mounted, as the 
new social movements pressed from the left for more equitable distribution 
of many kinds of resources” (Duggan 2003, xi). Many of the emerging 
social movements were primarily organized around identity and often 
deployed modes of analysis that either aimed to supplement Marxism or 
departed from it altogether.14 However, despite such ideological departures, 
as well as the divergences concerning political vision and tactics and the 
FRQÀLFWVRYHUWKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWVLWHVRIRSSUHVVLRQWKRVHPRYHPHQWVDV
Duggan points out, “might be conceptualized as overlapping, interrelated (if 
FRQÀLFWHGcultures of downward redistribution>7@KHRYHUDOOHPSKDVLV
. . . was the pressure to level hierarchies and redistribute down—redistribute 
money, political power, cultural capital, pleasure, and freedom” (xvii). In 
other words, redistribution and recognition, in Fraser’s terms, formed an 
KHWHURJHQHRXVEXWXQL¿HGWHUUDLQ
The new social movements, Duggan follows, were confronted 
throughout the 1970s not only by traditional conservative formations 
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business interests increasingly converged, and business groups organized 
to redistribute resources upward” (Duggan 2003, xii). At the same time, a 
partly overlapping movement of “neoconservatives” emerged, composed 
of former liberals and leftists who now turned rightward and articulated 
a wholesale rejection not just of Stalinism, but also of the New Left and 
the new social movements. Similarly to what was happening in Britain 
at the time, these new right-wing formations in the United States had 
¿UVW WR FRQGXFW D VWUXJJOH IRU KHJHPRQ\within the conservative camp: 
“Traditional conservatives . . . did not easily accept the neocons, who had 
too recently been tarnished with liberal leanings. But the merging of the 
neocons into the conservative political and intellectual movement in the 
United States during the 1980s, along with the election of Ronald Reagan 
to the presidency, helped to push the perceived ‘center’ in American politics 
rightward” (9). Thus, the crisis of the New Deal social consensus began to 
unfold in the 1950s and culminated with the seizing of political power, in 
the early 1980s, by a transformed Republican Party that would embrace the 
politico-economic project of neoliberalism: less welfare, more “law and 
order,” and privatization. 
In terms of cultural politics, the 1980s inaugurated a season of so-
called “culture wars.” As in Britain, the neoliberal bloc in the United States 
DW¿UVWEXLOWDOOLDQFHVZLWKUHOLJLRXVFRQVHUYDWLYHVQDWLRQDOLVWVDQGZKLWH
supremacists, thus launching attacks on the LGBTQ community (notably 
at the time of the AIDS crisis), feminism, and racialized formations, as well 
as on progressive programs that had begun to appear in the universities as 
the intellectual offspring of those very social movements: women’s studies, 
ethnic studies, and gay and lesbian studies.15 At the same time, the LGBTQ 
movement itself started to fragment and recompose:
During the 1980s, as standards of living dropped in the United States 
and global inequalities expanded, social movements responded to 
multiple constrains and pressures in part by fragmenting, in part by 
accommodating to the narrowing horizons of fundraising imperatives, 
legal constrains, and the vice grip of electoral politics. . . . Single-
group or single-issue organizations dedicated to lobbying, litigation, 
legislation, or public and media education had existed earlier as only one 
part of larger, shaping social movements. . . . But during the 1980s, such 
organizations—known collectively as the “civil rights lobby”—began to 
appear as the parts that replaced the wholes. (Duggan 2003, xviii) 
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Duggan remarks that “the remnants of the 1960s and 1970s social 
movements, together with the identity-based organizations and civil rights 
establishment of the 1980s, remained cultures of downward distribution—
even if in a less generally radical sense during the 1980s” (Duggan 
2003, xix).16 However, it is clear that the political culture of the LGBTQ 
movement began to transform and especially a broader progressive horizon 
started receding. Duggan notes that, throughout the 1980s, the more 
transformative segments of the movement survived not only, but also “in a 
growing library of progressive-left intellectual and scholarly projects and 
publications” (xix), that is, in the march through the academic institution. 
And it is precisely this process of academic institutionalization that became 
one of the central terrains of struggle during the culture wars. Advocates 
of neoliberalization waged an attack on progressive university programs 
by “positioning ‘liberals’ and progressives in colleges and universities 
as simultaneously ‘elitist’ and ‘alien,’ in populist mode, and as sucking 
up taxpayer dollars to support cultures of downward redistribution—
multiculturalism, Marxism, ‘theory,’ and feminism particularly. Sex panic 
strategies . . . played a crucial role as well” (40). In other words, the access 
gained by progressive formations to the academic institution provided 
an opportunity for the neoliberal bloc to articulate its economic project 
through moral panics and anti-intellectual populist campaigns. 
The phase of the culture wars inaugurated in the 1980s proceeded into 
the 1990s, hand in hand with the increasing ascendancy of neoliberalism. 
For instance, Duggan devotes an entire chapter of The Twilight of Equality? 
WRDVLJQL¿FDQWSXEOLFFRQWURYHUV\HUXSWHGRQWKHRFFDVLRQRIWKHIHPLQLVW
conference ‘Revolting Behavior: The Challenges of Women’s Sexual 
Freedom,’ organized at the State University of New York (SUNY) at New 
Paltz in 1997. The controversy was initiated by SUNY trustee Candace de 
Russy, who spoke out as a catholic Republican and on behalf of concerned 
citizens against the sexual perversion promoted by the conference and by 
the women’s studies program organizing it. De Russy easily managed to 
LQYROYHNH\SROLWLFDO¿JXUHV LQ WKHFRQWURYHUV\PRVWQRWDEO\1HZ<RUN
Republican governor George Pataki, who was behind her appointment as 
681<WUXVWHHLQWKH¿UVWSODFH1RWRQO\GLGWKHLQFLGHQWUDSLGO\HVFDODWH
and turned into a broad public debate, but the conservative campaign 
DGRSWHGDVSHFL¿FWDUJHWEH\RQGWKHFRQIHUHQFHDVVXFKWKHSUHVLGHQWRI
WKH681<1HZ3DOW]FDPSXV5RJHU%RZHQ7KLVLVVLJQL¿FDQWEHFDXVH
as Duggan highlights, de Russy formed part of a number of activists that 
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Pataki had pushed into the SUNY board of trustees in order to facilitate 
the neoliberalization of the university. As such, she had already voted 
against the appointment of Bowen as president of the SUNY New Paltz 
campus in 1996, for Bowen “considered himself aligned with the classic 
values of academic culture, understood as uneasily at odds with political 
and economic values” (Duggan 2003, 33). Therefore, he was regarded by 
others “as something of a holdout in the zealous campaign to corporatize 
SUNY” (33). The controversy over the feminist conference in 1997 offered 
a new occasion to undermine his position. 
However, while Bowen himself, when resigning in 2001, publicly 
addressed the political forces that had been militating against public education 
in New York for a decade, in 1997 the conference was defended by him and 
by progressive segments of civil society inside and outside the university 
mostly on the grounds of academic freedom. According to Duggan, this 
defense—which is legitimate in its own right—nonetheless failed to provide 
an analysis of the articulation between this particular controversy and the 
EURDGHUQHROLEHUDODWWDFNODXQFKHGDWWKHWLPHRQSXEOLFHGXFDWLRQWKDWLVLW
failed to point out that culture wars are not just about “culture”:
Only a response that exposed the links in the chain of attack from 
culture to politics to economics, and that forged its own links, operating 
WRVWLPXODWHWKHÀRZRIUHVRXUFHVLQWKHRSSRVLWHGLUHFWLRQPLJKWKDYH
VXFFHHGHG²QRWRQO\ LQGHIXVLQJ WKHVSHFL¿FDWWDFNEXW LQEXLOGLQJ
a sustainable progressive opposition. A sustainable opposition would 
QHHGWRFRQQHFWFXOWXUHSROLWLFVDQGHFRQRPLFVLGHQWLW\SROLWLFVDQG
FODVVSROLWLFVXQLYHUVDOLVWUKHWRULFDQGSDUWLFXODULVVXHVDQGLQWHUHVWV
intellectual and material resources. (Duggan 2003, 41)
Duggan’s reading of this 1997 public controversy allows her to emphasize 
the articulation of allegedly “cultural” antagonisms to the politico-economic 
project of neoliberalism. However, she also observes that, by the end of 
the 1990s, this culture wars strategy was in fact a residual one. With the 
emergence of the New Democrats and the election of Bill Clinton to the 
presidency in 1993, the neoliberal bloc had begun to recompose, shifting its 
cultural politics along with its system of alliances: “Neoliberalism’s emergent 
strategy for the new millennium: A new ‘equality’ politics compatible with 
a corporate world order” (Duggan 2003, 42). To be sure, the shift was 
contradictory and uneven. For example, while Clinton promised to advance 
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and protect the rights of LGBT people during his electoral campaign, not 
only did his administration in 1994 institute the infamous “Don’t ask, don’t 
tell” policy allowing gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to serve in the military 
only if remaining in the closet, but in 1996 he also signed into law the 
'HIHQVHRI0DUULDJH$FW '20$7KH'20$GH¿QHGPDUULDJHDV WKH
union of a man and a woman at the federal level and allowed states not to 
recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other states.17
Yet, by integrating a discourse of civil rights and equality, no matter how 
VXSHU¿FLDODQGRQO\SDUWLDOO\ LPSOHPHQWHGDW¿UVW WKH1HZ'HPRFUDWV LQ
fact shifted the ideological apparatus of the neoliberal bloc in a direction that 
would prepare its current phase in terms of cultural politics: a multicultural 
politics of equality stripped of redistributive aims. Key segments of the 
/*%74PRYHPHQWSDUWLFLSDWHGLQUDWKHUWKDQRSSRVHWKLVUHFRQ¿JXUDWLRQ
RIWKHSROLWLFRLGHRORJLFDO¿HOG7KHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKHQHROLEHUDOEORF
was paralleled in the 1990s by a transformation of the movement as well. 
According to Duggan, while the 1980s had already witnessed a process of 
fragmentation and the emergence of a “civil rights lobby” in part detached 
from grassroots activist formations, and disarticulated from other progressive 
social movements, throughout the 1990s “some organizations within the 
‘civil rights lobby’ narrowed their focus and moved dramatically to the right, 
accommodating rather than opposing the global inequalities generated by 
neoliberalism” (Duggan 2003, xix). It is certainly the case of the Human 
Rights Campaign, for instance, which during the 1980s had already begun to 
emerge as the most prominent gay and lesbian political lobbying organization 
LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGLQIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHH[SOLFLWO\HQWHUHGHOHFWRUDO
politics by endorsing Clinton’s presidential candidacy.
Duggan emphasizes the political and ideological practices presiding 
over these realignments. Alexandra Chasin, instead, argues that this 
shifting of the politico-ideological terrain must be understood also in 
light of the unprecedented engagement of the LGBTQ movement with the 
market, in the United States, throughout the 1990s. In Selling Out: The Gay 
and Lesbian Movement Goes to Market&KDVLQREVHUYHV¿UVWDQG
foremost that an increasing engagement with the market helped projecting 
the movement onto the national scale. This inaugurated, ideologically, a 
QRYHOLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIJD\VDQGOHVELDQVZLWK$PHULFDQQHVV\HWRQHWKDW
would not entirely require the erasure of their particular sexual identities. 
For, in Chasin’s view, the market—especially the niche markets emerged in 
the 1970s but exploded in the 1990s—“is the prime mechanism for defusing 
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WKHFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQVDPHQHVVDQGGLIIHUHQFHRUEHWZHHQDVVLPLODWLRQDQG
de-assimilation” (109). However, according to her, this investment into 
WKHPDUNHWDUWLFXODWHGDQGLQWHQVL¿HGDQXPEHURIDQWDJRQLVPVwithin the 
movement itself: not only between national organizations and grassroots 
local formations, but also along lines of class, gender, and race. 
In order to develop this argument, Chasin analyzes various sites of 
the new articulation between the LGBTQ movement and the market. On 
WKHRQHKDQGWKHGLVFRXUVHDERXWWKH³SLQNGROODU´ZKLFK¿UVWHPHUJHG
LQWKHVEXWJDLQHGVLJQL¿FDQWWUDFWLRQLQWKHVH[SOLFLWO\SRVHG
the disenfranchisement of gays and lesbians as a potential opening for 
marketers. Thus, it offered the market as a solution to political inequality, 
that is, as an alternative point of access to the national community. Yet, in 
order to do so, this discourse—developed by market analysts, journalists, 
and advertisers but taken up by segments of the LGBTQ community as 
well, particularly the gay and lesbian press—misrepresented the gay and 
OHVELDQ SRSXODWLRQ DV DQ KRPRJHQHRXV DIÀXHQW FODVV D UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
RUJDQL]HG DURXQG WKH ¿JXUH RI WKH ZKLWH PLGGOHFODVV JD\ PDQ DORQH
(Chasin 2000, 38-39). On the other hand, the organizational structures of 
the LGBTQ movement morphed. It is during the 1990s that the movement 
became part and parcel of what has been termed, in the United States, the 
³QRQSUR¿WLQGXVWULDOFRPSOH[´VHH0DQDQ]DODDQG6SDGH,1&,7(
2009). Chasin demonstrates that with the rapid emergence of large non-
SUR¿WRUJDQL]DWLRQVVXFKDV WKH+XPDQ5LJKWV&DPSDLJQGHSHQGHQWRQ
corporate funding and big donors, the politics and ideology of the movement 
shifted. First, corporations and foundations prefer to fund national centrist 
and liberal organizations as well as less controversial projects, at the 
expense of local grassroots organizing. Second, the dependency on such 
sources of funding tends to sideline the relationship of accountability 
between LGBTQ organizations and their base, favoring the relationship 
with donors themselves—mostly white rich men (Chasin 2000, 190-210).18
&KDVLQ¶V DFFRXQW VSHFL¿HV VRPH RI WKHPHFKDQLVPV WKURXJKZKLFK
the LGBTQ movement in the 1990s became increasingly hegemonized, as 
Duggan observes, by large political lobbying organizations disarticulated 
from feminist and antiracist movements and indifferent to economic justice. 
While the movement, so transformed, tended to converge politically with 
Clinton’s Democratic Party, the 1990s also witnessed the emergence of a 
small yet vocal contingent of openly gay neoliberals close to the Republican 
Party: the Log Cabin Republicans (LCR). Surina Khan discusses this 
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emerging formation in “Gay Conservatives: Pulling the Movement to the 
Right” (1996). Khan terms LCR “gay conservatives”: “Gay conservatives, 
OLNHWKHLUKHWHURVH[XDOFRXQWHUSDUWVJHQHUDOO\UHMHFWZHOIDUHDQGDI¿UPDWLYH
action, and are opposed to immigration. They have strong libertarian 
leanings in that they believe in limited government, individual rights, and 
individual ‘responsibility’—values they claim to share with the majority of 
American people” (1). Like the neoconservatives before them in the 1970s 
and 1980s, gay conservatives—or, more accurately, gay neoliberals—have 
found themselves engaged in a struggle to secure their position within 
Republican ranks: on the one hand, trying to convince Republicans of 
WKHYDOXHRIWKH³JD\YRWH´RQWKHRWKHUKDQGDUWLFXODWLQJLGHRORJLFDOO\
a commitment to limited government intervention in both the economy 
and private (sexual) life (3). As Khan warned already in 1996, “the gay 
conservative movement is growing at a fast pace, garnering a great deal 
of mainstream media attention in the process, and serving as an active part 
of the Right in attacking gay progressive institutions” (1). Thus, in her 
view, even though this formation formed a relatively small segment of the 
LGBTQ movement, it should not be dismissed as a fringe group.
Indeed, while militating to secure their position within the neoliberal 
bloc and the Republican Party, gay neoliberals have waged their own 
culture wars within WKH/*%74PRYHPHQW.KDQUHSRUWV WKHVLJQL¿FDQW
case of the attack launched against the Esperanza Peace and Justice Center, 
a progressive institution devoted to alliance politics and run by a racially 
diverse staff in San Antonio, Texas. The campaign against Esperanza 
was led by Glenn Stehle, editor of the gay publication The Marquise, and 
attacked both the center’s commitment to diversify LGBTQ organizing 
along intersecting lines of race, class, and gender and its displaying of 
allegedly “obscene” art. As Khan recalls, although some protests had 
already appeared on The Marquise through the past two years, it was in 
1995, when San Antonio councilman Roger Perez appointed a person from 
(VSHUDQ]DWRWKHFLW\¶V&XOWXUDO$UWV%RDUGWKDWWKHFDPSDLJQLQWHQVL¿HG
Stehle wrote a letter to Perez and then reprinted it on his magazine:
You choose the most blasphemous, obscene, racist and anti-American 
JURXSLQWRZQWRDZDUGFLW\PRQLHVDQGWKXVOHJLWLPL]H>(VSHUDQ]D@DV
exemplary of the gay and lesbian population. I am here to tell you, Mr. 
Perez, that not all gays and lesbians are Marxist, nor do we all subscribe 
to the theories of French poststructuralism. . . . We don’t go around 
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SLFNLQJ ¿JKWV ZLWK WKH &DWKROLF FKXUFK QRU DQ\ RWKHU UHOLJLRXV RU
secular group in town with our loudmouthed in-your-face histrionics. 
,QWKHSROLWLFDOVSHFWUXP>WKHOHVELDQDQGJD\FRPPXQLW\@YRWHGPRUH
Republican than the Jewish, Black and Hispanic populations in the 
last election. (Stehle, quoted in Khan 1996, 9)
Of course, as many other culture wars, the one involving Esperanza was not 
just about “culture.” The campaign, which lasted several years, articulated 
a condemnation of sexually explicit art and a rejection of Esperanza’s 
alliance politics to a critique of the management of public money. Finally, 
the campaign was successful in getting Esperanza defunded (see also 
&KDVLQ'XJJDQ5DPLUH]
It is while discussing such formations of openly gay neoliberals 
that Duggan coins the concept of homonormativity. In The Twilight of 
Equality?, she focuses on the Independent Gay Forum (IGF), an online 
writers’ group close to LCR and positioning itself as a “third way” against 
both Republican homophobia and LGBTQ progressive politics. The group, 
which no longer exists as such, was composed of public intellectuals and 
academics such as Andrew Sullivan, Bruce Bawer, and Stephen O. Murray. 
Like LCR, members of IGF ideologically support the politico-economic 
project of neoliberalism as the best terrain on which gay emancipation can 
advance. In terms of concrete political goals, their platform focuses on 
granting gays and lesbians access to key institutions such as marriage and 
the military. As Duggan puts it, IGF—and neoliberal gay formations in 
JHQHUDO²ZRUNV WRUHGH¿QHJD\HTXDOLW\³DVDFFHVV WR WKH LQVWLWXWLRQVRI
domestic privacy, the ‘free’ market, and patriotism” (Duggan 2003, 51). 
The concept of homonormativity, in Duggan’s original formulation, is 
meant to signal this rearticulation. 
While Khan and Duggan pay attention to the emergence of similar 
politico-ideological formations, they provide slightly different analyses. 
Khan’s article ends on the following note: “Gay conservatives do not see 
the limits and, indeed, the dangers of identity-based politics centered only 
around gay rights” (Khan 1996, 10). But actually, as her own previous account 
of the attack on Esperanza shows, the operations of homonormativity are 
not the unfortunate by-product of identity or even single-issue politics, but 
an explicit articulation of gay politics adverse to progressive alliances and 
aligned with upward redistribution. Duggan observes: “Often misunderstood 
and criticized by progressive activists as single issue politics . . . national 
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gay civil rights politics in the new millennium is actually developing as 
the ‘gay equality’ branch of multi-issue neoliberalism” (Duggan 2003, 47). 
Urvashi Vaid made a similar point during a keynote speech she delivered 
in 1998 precisely at the Annual Convention of the Log Cabin Republican 
Clubs, later collected in her book Irresistible Revolution: Confronting Race, 
Class and the Assumptions of LGBT Politics (2012). In her speech, Vaid 
addresses the audience of gay neoliberals: “at the same time as progressives 
DUHFULWLFL]HGIRUFKDPSLRQLQJWKHVHµRWKHU¶LVVXHV>UDFLVPGHDWKSHQDOW\
ZRPHQ¶V UHSURGXFWLYH ULJKWV@ \RX KHUH DW /RJ &DELQ DFWLYHO\ SURPRWH
your support for your own ‘other’ issues, like lower taxes, welfare reform, 
DQGRSSRVLWLRQ WRDI¿UPDWLYHDFWLRQ´  ,QGHHGDVERWK'XJJDQ
and Khan observe, antagonisms between radical and assimilationist 
segments have existed within the LGBTQ movement since its inception 
.KDQ'XJJDQ:KDWGLVWLQJXLVKHVWKHSROLWLFVRI
homonormativity is not just an assimilationist ethos, but its articulation to 
the broader politico-economic project of neoliberalism.19  
In 1996, Khan could still wonder “what impact will gay conservatives 
KDYHRQ WKHJD\PRYHPHQW´.KDQ$QG'XJJDQFRXOGDI¿UP
in 2003, that “if they succeed in wrestling the constituencies for identity 
politics further away from the progressive-left, enfolding a larger 
proportion of these populations within neoliberal alliances, the result 
would be a major realignment in U.S. politics” (Duggan 2003, 44-45). 
Today, one has to register that in part that realignment has been carried 
out successfully, not only in the United States. While the struggle for 
WKH KHJHPRQ\ RI QHROLEHUDOLVP LV GH¿QLWHO\ not closed—especially in 
the context of the politico-economic crisis unfolding since 2008—the 
PRVW LQÀXHQWLDO VHJPHQWV RI WKH /*%74 PRYHPHQW DFURVV WKH JOREDO
North (the so-called “mainstream”) often seem to be the least interested 
in joining the construction of a broader counter-hegemony. However, it 
bears repeating, the struggle is not closed. In the face of homonormativity 
and its hegemonizing effects inside and outside the LGBTQ movement, 
Duggan calls for “an interconnected, analytically diverse, cross-fertilizing 
DQGH[SDQVLYH OHIW >WKDW@FDQVHL]H WKLVPRPHQW WR OHDGXVHOVHZKHUH WR
QHZO\ LPDJLQHG SRVVLELOLWLHV IRU HTXDOLW\ LQ WKH WZHQW\¿UVW FHQWXU\´
(Duggan 2003, xxii). The counter-hegemonic bloc she imagines, similarly 
to the one imagined by Hall in the 1980s, must operate not only but also 
on the politico-ideological terrain of identity politics. This is one of the 
core arguments running throughout The Twilight of Equality? In Duggan’s 
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view, “a broad understanding of the neoliberal project . . . will be blocked 
as long as leftists and campaigners for economic justice dismiss cultural 
and identity politics as marginal, trivial, or divisive” (3). And this is so 
because, as her narrative of the construction of neoliberal hegemony in the 
United States shows, in each phase of the process neoliberalism has been 
articulated through cultural and identity politics. 
According to Duggan, identity politics have been integral to the 
relative success of neoliberalism also because the shifting array of alliances 
GHSOR\HGE\ WKHQHROLEHUDOEORFKDVEHHQPHWZLWK LQVXI¿FLHQW DQDO\VHV
on the Left. While economic reform was being constructed as neutral 
by the supporters of neoliberalization and the political antagonism was 
entirely projected on the alternative between Democrats and Republicans, 
“activists and intellectuals on the progressive-left, operating outside the 
terms of two party neoliberalism, fell more deeply into unproductive battles 
over economic versus cultural politics, identity-based vs. left universalist 
rhetoric, theoretical critiques vs. practical organizing campaigns” (Duggan 
2003, xix). This is, indeed, the problem addressed by Butler in “Merely 
Cultural.” Duggan pushes Butler’s critique of left-wing orthodoxy further 
and complements it with an analysis of the emergence of homonormativity. 
Hence, she argues that the antagonisms within the Left between identity and 
socialist politics, recognition and redistribution, have actively contributed 
to the increasing ascendancy of neoliberalism:
On one side, the identity politics camps are increasingly divorced from 
any critique of global capitalism. Some organizations and groups creep 
into the neoliberal fold, shedding downwardly redistributing goals for 
a stripped-down equality, paradoxically imagined as compatible with 
persistent overall inequality. . . . On the other side, critiques of global 
capitalism and neoliberalism, and left populist or universalist politics 
within the U.S., attack and dismiss cultural and identity politics 
at their peril. Such attacks strip them of prime sources of political 
creativity and new analyses, and leave them uncomprehending before 
the cultural and identity politics of the opposition. In addition, they 
drive constituencies seeking equality away, toward the false promises 
RIVXSHU¿FLDOQHROLEHUDO³PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP´'XJJDQ[[
 
In the concluding chapter of The Twilight of Equality?, Duggan examines 
the dismissal of both identity politics and its theoretical counterpart, 
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cultural studies, across contemporary forms of left-wing universalism, 
economism, and populism—from 2000 Green Party presidential candidate 
Ralph Nader (2002) to journalist and writer Naomi Klein (2000), from new 
media scholar Todd Gitlin (1995) to philosopher Richard Rorty (1998). 
3DUDGR[LFDOO\DVVKHREVHUYHV³FULWLTXHVRIµLGHQWLW\SROLWLFV¶KDYH>DOVR@
come from within . . . the political formations generally designed by this 
term” (Duggan 2003, 79). That is, some feminist, queer, and antiracist critics 
have joined others on the Left in dismissing identity politics not only as 
divisive, but as agents that “naturalize” capitalism, especially in its current 
neoliberal phase. Such critiques are stimulated by similar preoccupations 
as the ones informing Duggan’s own critique of homonormativity. Yet, as 
she argues, rather than engaging in conjunctural analysis, the critiques of 
identity politics articulated by feminist, queer, and antiracist commentators 
(as much as those formulated by others on the Left) regularly proceed by 
“abstracting some overall or general effect of ‘identity politics’ from its 
most conservative/neoliberal instantiations” rather than “keeping the most 
radically transformative and creative moments at the forefront of political 
analysis” (79). In her view, this allows the critic to assume a pedagogical 
position vis-à-vis the social forces that form the object of their analysis.20 
)ROORZLQJ 'XJJDQ LQ WKH QH[W VHFWLRQ , SURSRVH VRPH UHÀHFWLRQV RQ
identity politics, in order to conceptualize the latter as an intersectional 
DQGH[SDQVLYH¿HOGRIDQWDJRQLVPVDQGUHFRPSRVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQMXVWD
IXQFWLRQDQGE\SURGXFWRIWKHUHL¿FDWLRQRIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOOLIHXQGHU
capitalism in its neoliberal phase.
The Problem of Identity Politics
Since the time of Duggan’s writing, hand in hand with the increasing 
hegemony of homonormativity as a politico-ideological articulation and as 
a theoretical problem for queer theory, queer critiques of identity politics 
have, not surprisingly, proliferated. Many of the authors discussed in this 
dissertation—such as Kevin Floyd (2009), Roderick A. Ferguson (2004), 
and Jasbir K. Puar (2007)—offer sophisticated arguments to question the 
HI¿FDF\ RI LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV21 Yet in most cases, the critique of identity 
has reached such a level of common sense (for the critic) that it often 
gets reiterated just as a generic call to move “beyond” identity politics. 
Consider the following contradictory passage with which Chasin opens 
Homonormativity, Intersectionality, and the “Marxist Renaissance” 111
her otherwise illuminating work on the articulations between the LGBTQ 
movement and the market in the United States:
These pages point beyond identity politics . . . at the same time that the 
very existence of this book proves that identity politics and identity-
based production and consumption have changed social institutions 
in dramatic, and sometimes progressive, ways. My work is not a 
condemnation of identity politics, any more than it is a denial of the 
fact that legal rights are necessary tools for freedom and equality. This 
work does, however, make the argument that rights, while necessary, 
DUHLQVXI¿FLHQW²DQGWKDWLGHQWLW\SROLWLFVLVLQWXUQLQDGHTXDWH²WR
the task of building a movement for social justice. (Chasin 2000, xvii)
The movement for social justice that Chasin imagines is very similar to 
the one envisioned by Duggan. However, she seems to regard identity 
SROLWLFVWREHLQVXI¿FLHQWRUHYHQLQDGHTXDWHWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDEURDG
counter-hegemonic bloc, even as she acknowledges that her own political 
and intellectual positioning (as a queer feminist writer) is marked by 
LGHQWLW\LQWKH¿UVWSODFHDQGLVmade possible by the seizing of institutional 
spaces at the hand of identity formations. Her critique of identity politics 
proceeds from the fact that the latter are made to overlap, in her argument, 
with single-issue political projects unilaterally invested into the claiming 
of rights. Aware of the common gesture of reducing the vast terrain of 
identity politics only to its most recent and less productive concretions, 
Duggan argues: “Identity politics, in the contemporary sense of the rights-
claiming focus of balkanized groups organized to pressure the legal and 
HOHFWRUDOV\VWHPVIRULQFOXVLRQDQGUHGUHVVDSSHDUHG>LQWKHV@RXWRI
WKH¿HOGRIGLVLQWHJUDWLQJ VRFLDOPRYHPHQWV´ 'XJJDQ[YLLL%XW
“identity politics in the broadest sense arises from the exclusions of the . . . 
nation-state beginning in the early nineteenth century” (89, n4). According 
WRWKLVVHFRQGGH¿QLWLRQLGHQWLW\SROLWLFVLVDQDPHIRUDOOLQWHOOHFWXDODQG
political projects that foreground the salience of race, gender, and sexuality 
(among other axes) for the organization of social relations and the exercise 
RISRZHU¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWVWDWHSRZHU
Because identity politics are often made to overlap with single-issue 
civil rights lobbying organizations, some critics identify intersectionality 
as a form of anti-identity intellectual and political practice. The 
concept of intersectionality was coined by Kimberlé W. Crenshaw in 
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“Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
3ROLWLFV´  \HW RQ D WHUUDLQ SUHSDUHG E\ D VLJQL¿FDQW DPRXQW RI
political and theoretical work by women of color and black lesbian 
IHPLQLVWV EHIRUH KHU VHH &RPEDKHH 5LYHU &ROOHFWLYH >@ 
KRRNV +XOO 6FRWW DQG 6PLWK  /RUGH  ,Q &UHQVKDZ¶V
IRUPXODWLRQ WKH FRQFHSW RI LQWHUVHFWLRQDOLW\ SRLQWV DW WKH LQVXI¿FLHQF\
of analyses and political practices that do not attend to the position of 
those situated at the crossroads of multiple axes of oppression and fronts 
of antagonism. However, Crenshaw’s early essay already suggested that 
intersectionality does not criticize identity politics as such, but rather its 
KLVWRULFDOO\VSHFL¿FIDLOXUHV WRDUWLFXODWH LGHQWLWLHV WKDWDUH LUUHGXFLEOH WR
the single axes of gender or race or class or sexuality. The relationship 
between intersectionality and identity politics is fully addressed in her later 
essay, titled “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
the Violence Against Women of Color” (1991). Here, Crenshaw explicitly 
situates intersectionality as an intervention within the broad terrain of 
identity politics:
If . . . history and context determine the utility of identity politics, how 
then do we understand identity politics today, especially in light of 
RXUUHFRJQLWLRQRIPXOWLSOHGLPHQVLRQVRILGHQWLW\"0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\
what does it mean to argue that gender identities have been obscured 
in antiracist discourses, just as race identities have been obscured in 
IHPLQLVWGLVFRXUVHV"'RHV WKDWPHDQZHFDQQRW WDONDERXW LGHQWLW\"
Or instead, that any discourse about identity has to acknowledge how 
our identities are constructed through the intersection of multiple 
GLPHQVLRQV"&UHQVKDZ
For Crenshaw, the right answer is obviously the latter. In fact, identity 
politics and intersectionality are not only compatible, as she suggests, but 
DOVRJHQHDORJLFDOO\ERXQGWRHDFKRWKHU2QHRIWKH¿UVWH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHV
to identity politics is to be found in the famous statement by the black 
lesbian feminist Combahee River Collective, which virtually inaugurated 
the contemporary tradition of intersectional critique. They wrote: “We 
realize that the only people to care enough about us to work consistently 
for our liberation are us. . . . This focusing upon our own oppression is 
embodied in the concept of identity politics. . . . We believe that sexual 
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politics under patriarchy is as pervasive in Black women’s lives as are the 
SROLWLFVRIFODVVDQGUDFH´&RPEDKHH5LYHU&ROOHFWLYH>@
,QWKLVSDVVDJHLGHQWLW\SROLWLFV¿JXUHVDVVRPHWKLQJGLIIHUHQWIURPZKDW
has become the routine target of contemporary queer critiques.
Thus, without trying to “police” contemporary attempts to deploy 
intersectionality as a critique of identity politics, it is nonetheless worth 
registering the theoretical and political contradictions that they entail. 
Such contradictions are evident, for instance, in Marie Moran’s Identity 
and Capitalism (2015), which offers an otherwise enlightening account of 
WKHHPHUJHQFHRILGHQWLW\LQWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLDODQGSROLWLFDO¿HOGV
inspired by the cultural materialist work of Raymond Williams.22 Moran 
UHFDOOVWKDWWKH&RPEDKHH5LYHU&ROOHFWLYHRIIHUHGRQHRIWKH¿UVWH[SOLFLW
formulations of identity politics, yet she positions the collective within the 
radical women’s liberation movement of the time without registering the 
intersectional critique that it put forward (112). Upon quoting the statement 
of the collective, she comments: “As was the case with Black Power, the 
Women’s Liberation Movement was not content with equal rights before 
WKHODZQRULQGHHGZLWKVLPSOHFXOWXUDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLUVSHFL¿FLW\DV
the label ‘identity politics’ is now sometimes taken to imply. Instead, they 
used the idea of a shared identity to organise vigorously for substantive 
political, social and economic equality too” (113). Thus, Moran does notice 
that the formulation of identity politics by the Combahee River Collective 
in 1977 sharply differs from the way in which the notion circulates today 
among its critics. However, she entirely circumvents the fact that the 
collective participated in the broader feminist movement as much as in the 
construction of an intersectional front of antagonism within it. This allows 
her, later in the same chapter, to construct intersectionality as a “crisis of 
identity” and, at the same time, as a critical intervention which nonetheless 
“further consolidates the very notion of identity” (121), by intersecting 
rather than deconstructing its different axes. This reading depends not 
only on Moran’s previous elision of the intersectional intervention of 
the Combahee River Collective, but also on a privileging of theoretical 
abstraction over concrete intersectional practices—hence her reference to 
the underlying “essentialism” of intersectionality. 
Instead, by emphasizing the genealogical link between identity 
politics and intersectionality and keeping in mind the concrete political 
and theoretical work performed by intersectional critique—such as the 
protest staged by Black Lives Matter at the Toronto Pride in July 2016, 
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mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation—I propose to understand 
intersectionality as one of the best instances of an expansive identity 
politics. More broadly, I suggest to conceptualize identity politics as an 
H[SDQVLYH DQG LQWHUVHFWLRQDO ¿HOG RI DQWDJRQLVPV DQG UHFRPSRVLWLRQ D
¿HOGSXQFWXDWHGE\ IRUPVRI LGHQWL¿FDWLRQVDQGGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQVZKLFK
acknowledge the salience of gendered, racialized, and sexual formations 
(among others), mobilize social forces emerging from such formations and 
at their intersections, and thus interrupt the exclusionary universalisms that 
KDYHKLVWRULFDOO\RUJDQL]HGWKH:HVWHUQSROLWLFDO¿HOG
This reading suggests that rather than moving beyond or even against 
it, the terrain of identity politics must be seized and articulated—not 
just to honor its history, as some critics seem to suggest, but for several 
reasons that continue to be pertinent today: a) as Duggan argues, and as 
Hall argued before her, the neoliberal bloc articulates its politico-economic 
project through LGHQWLW\ DQG FXOWXUDO SROLWLFV E DV 'XJJDQ SRLQWV RXW
LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFDO IRUPDWLRQV GH¿QH WRGD\ D SULYLOHJHG WHUUDLQ IRU WKH
emergence of an effective counter-hegemony: “without the analytic and 
organizing energy found within the identity-based political formations, 
the progressive-left has no hope of effectively grasping the forces it 
seeks to arrest and reverse—those promoting antidemocratic inequality 
RQ PXOWLSOH IURQWV´ 'XJJDQ   F GLVFRXUVHV DQG H[SHULHQFHV
RILGHQWLW\IRUPD¿HOGRIFRPPRQVHQVHWKDWLVSHRSOHGRidentify with 
them. As such, the problem of identity cannot be easily dismissed by any 
counter-hegemonic ideological discourse that aspires to materialize as a 
PHDQLQJIXO VRFLDO IRUFH G WKH PRELOL]DWLRQ RI LQWHUVHFWLRQDO LGHQWLWLHV
within identity political formations—for instance, the mobilization of race 
within LGBTQ formations—constitutes not only a key point of support 
for a critique of homonormativity, but also a privileged point of access to 
a very understanding of the problem. As the culture war waged against the 
Esperanza Peace and Justice Center in the 1990s shows, the gay neoliberal 
attack on progressive LGBTQ formations is primarily mediated by an 
attack on the practicing of antiracist coalitions within such formations.23
To the points mentioned above, we should add the fact that a refusal to 
politicize identity is precisely one of the cornerstones of homonormativity. 
For example, Duggan quotes IGF member Andrew Sullivan: “we have 
now to be political in order to be prepolitical. . . . In the same way that 
many of us had to leave our families in order to join them again, so now 
as citizens, we have to embrace politics if only ultimately to be free of 
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it” (Sullivan, quoted in Duggan 2003, 62). Chasin makes the same 
argument even more explicitly. Referencing Sullivan and others as “gay 
libertarians,” she observes that “within gay and lesbian media, some of the 
most vociferous objections to identity politics are founded in a supreme 
belief in individualism” and in the idea that identity politics cannot make 
people happy, for “the pursuit of happiness takes place in the private 
arena” (Chasin 2000, 222-223). Against the depoliticization of sexuality 
and sexual identity promoted by the gay segment of the neoliberal bloc, 
a counter-hegemonic critique might insist that sexual identity is political, 
HVSHFLDOO\ZKHQORFDWHGZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRILWVLQWHUVHFWLRQDOUDPL¿FDWLRQV
Queer theorists and activists who insist today on a necessary relation 
between homonormativity and identity politics, hence rejecting the latter 
in order to resist the former, usually point at the UHL¿FDWLRQ of identity under 
capitalism, particularly in its contemporary neoliberal phase. For example, 
Chasin emphasizes: “If industrial and postindustrial capitalism have 
enabled us to imagine locating component parts of our identities where 
we are unfree and unequal . . . they have also encouraged us to imagine 
our oppression partially and to design our liberation accordingly” (Chasin 
2000, 18-19). Sexual identity is understood to have found its very conditions 
of possibility, at least in part, within capitalism. To this extent, in typical 
Marxist terms, capitalism is granted a historic liberatory force. However, 
in a dialectical move, identity is also transformed into a property relatively 
detached from the subject: a property that the subject can literally own, 
buy, and sell. Chasin states: “Identity-based marketing and consumption 
are kissing cousins with identity politics” (102). In other words, practices 
of market segmentation are regarded as the main contemporary agent of 
WKHSURFHVVRIUHL¿FDWLRQRILGHQWLW\XQGHUFDSLWDOLVP
A recent body of work in queer theory has been addressing the question 
RIUHL¿FDWLRQE\HQJDJLQJZLWKWKHGLDOHFWLFEHWZHHQUHL¿FDWLRQDQGWRWDOLW\
DV FRQFHSWXDOL]HGE\+XQJDULDQ0DU[LVW*\|UJ\/XNiFV LQKLVHistory 
and Class Consciousness>@7ZRNH\DXWKRUVWXUQLQJWR
/XNiFVDUH5RVHPDULH+HQQHVV\LQ3UR¿WDQG3OHDVXUH6H[XDO,GHQWLWLHV
in Late Capitalism (2000) and Kevin Floyd, in 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH
Toward a Queer Marxism (2009).24 In different ways and to different 
GHJUHHVERWKRI WKHP¿QGLQ/XNiFVDFRQFHSWXDODSSDUDWXVZHOOVXLWHG
to sustain a contemporary reencounter between queer theory and Marxism 
in times of homonormativity.25 While Duggan privileges an attention to 
the balance of forces, an emphasis on the politico-ideological practices 
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articulating sexual politics to the social formation in its totality, and a focus 
RQFRQFUHWHDQGFRQMXQFWXUDODQDO\VLVWKHTXHHUUHDGLQJVRIUHL¿FDWLRQDQG
totality offered by Hennessy and especially by Floyd operate at a higher 
OHYHORIDEVWUDFWLRQ,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ,IRFXVRQVXFKUHDGLQJVRI/XNiFV
On the one hand, I continue my discussion of the problem of identity by 
exploring the place of identity politics in Hennessy’s and Floyd’s Marxist 
analyses. On the other hand, and more broadly, I ask to what extent the 
level of abstraction to be found in this body of work—which derives from 
the particular Marxist tradition it aims to recover, and partly contrasts 
with a Gramscian approach—either illuminates further the problem of 
homonormativity or limits our understanding of it.
4XHHU5HDGLQJVRI5HL¿FDWLRQDQG7RWDOLW\
In History and Class Consciousness>@/XNiFVIDPRXVO\
develops Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism: the mechanism by which 
relations between people come to appear and to be experienced as relations 
EHWZHHQ WKLQJV RUPRUH FRQFUHWHO\ WKHPHFKDQLVP WKURXJKZKLFK WKH
capitalist circuit conceals the social relations necessary to the production 
RIFRPPRGLWLHV,QKLVWKHRU\RIUHL¿FDWLRQ/XNiFVUHJLVWHUVWKHLQFUHDVLQJ
pervasiveness of the commodity-structure in modern capitalist societies 
RUJDQL]HGDURXQG7D\ORULVP,QWKHRSHQLQJRIWKHHVVD\RQ³5HL¿FDWLRQ
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” he writes: “at this stage in the 
history of mankind there is no problem that does not ultimately lead back 
to that question and there is no solution that could not be found in the 
solution to the riddle of commodity-structure´  /XNiFV HVSHFLDOO\
emphasizes the grasp of the commodity-structure on consciousness. That 
is, he argues that the transformations of capitalism under Taylorism have 
not only objective effects on the mode of production, but also subjective 
effects. The deskilling of assembly line workers and the rationalization 
DQGVSHFLDOL]DWLRQRISURGXFWLRQWKURXJKVFLHQWL¿FPDQDJHPHQW²WKDWLV
the decoupling of labor from knowledge—fragment both the production 
SURFHVVDQGWKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIWKHZRUNHU³>WKH@IUDJPHQWDWLRQRIWKH
object of production necessarily entails the fragmentation of its subject. . . . 
1HLWKHUREMHFWLYHO\QRULQKLVUHODWLRQWRKLVZRUNGRHVPDQ>sic@DSSHDUDVWKH
authentic master of the process. . . . As labour is progressively rationalised 
and mechanised his lack of will is reinforced by the way in which his 
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activity becomes less and less active and more and more contemplative” 
,QWKLVSDVVDJHWKHUHL¿FDWLRQRIFRQVFLRXVQHVVDSSHDUVDVDGLUHFW
effect of an objective transformation in the mode of production. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR/XNiFV ERWK WKH FRQVFLRXVQHVV RI WKH SUROHWDULDW DQG
WKDWRIWKHERXUJHRLVLHDUHVXEMHFWWRWKLVSURFHVVRIUHL¿FDWLRQ+RZHYHU
only the proletariat is faced with the “historical task” of reaching a 
FROOHFWLYH FRQVFLRXVQHVV RI LWV RZQ VLWXDWLRQ KHQFH QHJDWLQJ UHL¿FDWLRQ
DQGPRYLQJWRZDUGDUHVWRUDWLRQRIWKHVRFLDO³WRWDOLW\´,Q/XNiFV¶WHUPV
only the proletariat can become the identical “subject-object” of history, 
for only the consciousness resulting from its situation corresponds as 
such to an objective apprehension of the totality of social relations: “The 
self-understanding of the proletariat is . . . simultaneously the objective 
understanding of the nature of society. When the proletariat furthers its 
own class-aims it simultaneously achieves the conscious realisation of 




is crucially mediated by forms of knowledge. As Floyd observes, 
³/XNiFV¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWUHL¿FDWLRQLVREMHFWLYHO\WRWDOXQIROGVLQODUJHO\
HSLVWHPRORJLFDO WHUPV LW LV EDVHG SULPDULO\ LQ KLV GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH
UHL¿FDWLRQRINQRZOHGJH   7KHVHNQRZOHGJHVGRQRWPHUHO\ µUHÀHFW¶
WKH IRUPDO DEVWUDFWLRQ RI FRPPRGLW\ WKH\ DFWLYHO\PHGLDWH FDSLWDO DQG
have their own objective social effects” (Floyd 2009, 24). Both Hennessy 
DQG)OR\GGUDZRQ/XNiFV¶DUJXPHQWDERXWWKHUHL¿FDWLRQRINQRZOHGJH
in order to reexamine the epistemological premises of queer theory as it 
developed through the 1990s and to set the stage for its contemporary 
reencounter with Marxism. Yet they do so in different ways. 
In 3UR¿WDQG3OHDVXUH, Hennessy argues that most of queer theory, like 
LGHQWLW\SROLWLFV UHL¿HV VH[XDO LGHQWLW\E\ UHPRYLQJ LW IURP WKHEURDGHU
terrain of material social relations from which it emerges. A particularly 
pertinent case in point, in her view, is Butler’s foundational work on 
gender performativity, in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion 
of Identity (1990) and Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 
“Sex” (1993a). For Hennessy, what characterizes Butler’s theory as a form 
RIUHL¿HGNQRZOHGJHLVnotDIRUHJURXQGLQJRIDQ\VLPSOHNLQGRIUHL¿HG
identity. As she registers, Butler’s intervention—and the formation of queer 
WKHRU\DWODUJHDVD¿HOGRINQRZOHGJHSURGXFWLRQ²WRRNSODFHLQWKHODWH
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1980s and early 1990s as a critical commentary on identity: “Queer theory 
presented itself in the late 1980s as an emphatically post-marxist critique 
of sexual identity politics. . . . Queer theory distances itself from lesbian 
and gay identity politics because it sees any identity as internally divided 
and therefore not an apt or effective rallying point for change” (Hennessy 
2000, 52-53). This passage is over-generalizing and does not entirely do 
justice to the articulations between queer theory and the complex terrain 
of identity politics. Yet Hennessy is right in pointing out that queer theory 
JHQHUDOO\ UHVLVWV WKH UHL¿FDWLRQ RI VH[XDO LGHQWLWLHV E\ FRQVLGHULQJ WKHP
to be socially produced. Furthermore, in her view, what distinguishes 
Butler’s approach to the social production of sexual identities from a 
Marxist approach to the same problem is not a lack of materialism per se, 
but rather the kind of materialism deployed by Butler (55-57). Hennessy 
had already formulated this argument in an earlier essay, titled “Queer 
Theory, Left Politics” (1994). Here, she observed that Butler adopts from 
)RXFDXOWDPDWHULDOLVWIUDPHWKDWIRFXVHVRQ³>Q@RUPDWLYHGLVFRXUVHVDQG
social practices that regulate action, behavior, speech acts, and institutions” 
(96). These are, indeed, material sites of power and they do contribute to 
produce the materiality of sexual bodies, as Butler argues. But Hennessy 
comments: “Historical materialism understands the social as historically 
produced through normative practices (ideologies) and the law (state 
organization) as well as through the division of labor. That Butler, like 
Foucault, entirely drops labor out of her social analysis marks her claims 
on the material as post-marxist” (97). In other words, Hennessy contests 
an exclusive focus on politics and ideologies that does not articulate those 
levels to the level of the economic. 
Thus, according to Hennessy’s analysis, what renders queer theory 
OHJLEOHDVDUHL¿HGIRUPRINQRZOHGJHUDWKHUWKDQDUHL¿FDWLRQRIVH[XDO
LGHQWLW\DVVXFKLV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWDUHL¿FDWLRQRIZKDWVKHWHUPV³FXOWXUH
ideology.” This point is central, for Hennessy does not reiterate a queer 
critique of more essentializing gay and lesbian identities. Although gay and 
lesbian identities seem to be most immediately available to contemporary 
practices of market segmentation, in her view queer subjectivities do not 
HVFDSHWKHJUDVSRIUHL¿FDWLRQ6KHDUJXHVRQWKHFRQWUDU\WKDWE\RSHUDWLQJ
WKHRUHWLFDOO\RQWKHFXOWXUDOWHUUDLQRIVLJQL¿FDWLRQDORQHTXHHUWKHRULHVRI
performativity function today as privileged points of support for neoliberal 
ideological formations: “postindustrial economies increasingly require a 
high-tech systems management consciousness that knows that identity, like 
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knowledge, is performative” (Hennessy 2000, 68). This critique works by 
signaling DI¿QLWLHV between queer theory and neoliberal social relations. As 
such, it tends to remain abstract rather than engaging in an analysis of how 
queer theoretical practices might actually mediate the concrete politico-
economic project of neoliberalism. As she writes: “My concern is that these 
knowledges are producing subjectivities that seem all too congruent with the 
IRUPVRIUHL¿HGFRQVFLRXVQHVVUHTXLUHGRIWKHQHZVWHZDUGVRIFDSLWDOLVP
the middle-class fraction of professional-service workers” (108). Yet, rather 
than assuming that queer theory produces subjectivity, one would have to 
explain how queer theory’s discourse about subjectivity may or may not 
translate in the production of neoliberal formations. The level of abstraction 
in Hennessy’s analysis does not make room for such explanations.
+HQQHVV\¶V FULWLTXH FRQFHUQV D ¿HOG RI NQRZOHGJH WKDW H[WHQGV
beyond the boundaries of queer theory and involves both post-Marxism 
and cultural studies. Upon noticing Butler’s appropriation of Laclau and 
Mouffe in her theory,27 Hennessy formulates a critique of both Butler 
and Laclau and Mouffe that focuses on their understanding of the social. 
According to her, when the contingency of the social—its openness to 
contradictory articulations—is considered to be dependent exclusively on 
WKH VWUXFWXUDO LQVWDELOLW\ RI VLJQL¿HUV DQG RI WKH SURFHVV RI VLJQL¿FDWLRQ
itself, “the symbolic is the social” (Hennessy 1994, 98).28 This critique in 
part resembles the one that Hall (1986c) directs against Laclau and Mouffe. 
However, Hennessy also criticizes the trajectory of cultural studies and of 
Hall’s work because of their “culturalism.” As Colin Sparks (1996) does 
in his reconstruction of the relation between Marxism and cultural studies, 
discussed at the beginning of the previous chapter, Hennessy seems to 
identify in Hall’s critical engagement with Marxism during the 1970s and 
1980s the roots of his partial departure from it in the 1990s (Hennessy 2000, 
82).29 I argue, instead, that Hall’s work in the 1980s is worth recovering in 
the context of the contemporary “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory. As 
,KDYHDOUHDG\EHJXQWRVKRZDFULWLTXHRIUHL¿FDWLRQVXFKDV+HQQHVV\¶V
LQVSLUHGE\/XNiFV¶0DU[LVPWHQGVWRRSHUDWHDWDOHYHORIDEVWUDFWLRQWKDW
Hall’s reading of Gramsci would help concretize.    
/LNH+HQQHVV\DOVR)OR\G¿QGVLQ/XNiFVDVWDUWLQJSRLQWWRUHÀHFWRQ
queer theory and its relationship with Marxism. However, he is far more 
explicit in pointing out that the articulation of a queer Marxism for the 
WZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\UHTXLUHVDUHYLVLRQRIboth forms of knowledge. Floyd 
writes: “Perhaps the most basic way of understanding the impasse between 
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Marxism and queer theory that persisted through the nineties, and to a lesser 
extent still does, is in terms of Marxism’s traditional emphasis on thinking 
a totality of social relations. . . . Marxism’s totalizing theoretical practices” 
(Floyd 2009, 4). As Floyd registers, one of the effects of Marxist totality 
thinking has been a tendency to deprioritize and subordinate questions 
of sexuality, that is, to relegate them to the “superstructural” domain of 
LGHRORJ\DVPHUHHIIHFWVRIUHL¿FDWLRQ7KXVRQHRIWKHLQDXJXUDOJHVWXUHV
of queer theory has been to refute this particularization of sexuality, which 
amounts, in fact, to a universalization of heteronormativity (5). To be sure, 
)OR\GGRHV LQVLVW WKDW WKHGH¿QLQJIHDWXUHRI0DU[LVW WRWDOLW\ WKLQNLQJLV
QRWDJHQHUDOGLVPLVVDORIGLIIHUHQFHVIRULWVJRDOLVWRQHJDWHUHL¿FDWLRQ
UDWKHU WKDQ DI¿UP XQLYHUVDOLVP ³,I 0DU[LVP DVSLUHV WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH
mediations that articulate different horizons of social reality, if it tends to 
emphasize connection rather than differentiation, this is because a social 
and epistemological severing of connections is precisely one of capital’s 
most consequential objective effects. In this respect, totality thinking is a 
rigorously negative practice” (6).30 Yet his defense of a Marxist theoretical 
practice does not impede him to acknowledge the tensions existing between 
queer theory and the history of Marxism’s dismissal of sexual politics.
Moreover, Floyd maintains that on the terrain of totality thinking queer 
theory and Marxism not only part ways, but can also reencounter each other. 
On the one hand, he observes that queer theory itself has often taken shape 
as an epistemological aspiration to totality: from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s 
assertion that the homosexual/heterosexual divide is central to virtually 
all aspects of Western culture in Epistemology of the Closet (1990), to 
Michael Warner’s deployment of queer as a mode of resistance against all 
regimes of the normal in Fear of a Queer Planet (1993), to Lee Edelman’s 
positing of heteronormative reproductive futurism as the symbolic order 
of the social and the horizon of all politics in No Future (2004). Floyd 
comments: “A constantly expanding focus on the way heteronormativity is 
WKRURXJKO\HQWDQJOHGZLWKDKRVWRIVRFLDOKRUL]RQVWKDWDSSHDUDW¿UVWWR
have nothing to do with sexuality has been a recurring feature of some of 
WKHPRVWWUHQFKDQWZRUNLQWKH¿HOG´)OR\G2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
through an interesting argumentative twist, Floyd suggests that precisely 
the most UHL¿HG IRUPVRITXHHUNQRZOHGJHPD\RIIHU DSULYLOHJHGSRLQW
of support for a contemporary reencounter between queer theory and 
Marxism. Butler’s theory of gender performativity is again a case in point. 
Her work does not entail the expansive gesture mentioned above, but 
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rather “suggests that scrutinizing the discursive complexities of the sexual 
body is at least as important as the sustained examination of that body’s 
concrete social location” (7).31 In what is perhaps the most sophisticated 
chapter of 7KH 5HL¿FDWLRQ RI 'HVLUH, Floyd rereads Butler’s theory of 
gender performativity as a theory of the transformations of gender under 
Taylorism in the United States. His goal is to historicize and concretize 
Butler’s analysis while at the same time performing the potential of a 
contemporary reencounter between queer theory and Marxism.
According to Floyd, the rationalization and mechanization of labor 
promoted by Taylorism, hence the process of deskilling of assembly line 
ZRUNHUVDQGWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIVFLHQWL¿FPDQDJHPHQWQRWRQO\DIIHFWHG
WKHZRUNHUV¶FRQVFLRXVQHVVDV/XNiFVDUJXHGEXWLWDOVRGLVVRFLDWHGWKH
body of the male worker from what were previously considered to be its 
inherent capacities. The male worker ceased to be the natural repository 
of particular expertise and became one interchangeable member of a 
standardized workforce: an element of the chain. Through an opposite 
and parallel process, those belonging to the emerging professional-
managerial class found themselves engaging in forms of intellectual labor 
detached of physical activity. However, Floyd observes, this dissociation 
between body and knowledge taking place at the level of production, 
and threatening the manhood of both male workers and managers, was 
supplemented at the level of consumption. A niche market emerged in 
the early twentieth century that explicitly targeted men and offered them 
WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIUHDUWLFXODWLQJWKHLUPDVFXOLQLW\LQOHLVXUHWLPH¿VKLQJ
hunting, sporting, and so forth. The main example considered by Floyd is 
that of the magazine Esquire:
It featured articles explicitly masculinizing skills that ranged from 
etiquette to cooking to home decor and gardening. It also featured the 
elaborate and overtly pedagogical detailing of techniques of laboring 
PDVFXOLQLW\²KRZ WR KXQW KRZ WR ¿VK²LQ WKH VHULHV RI FROXPQV
or “letters” Hemingway wrote for twenty-eight of the magazine’s 
¿UVW WKLUW\WKUHH LVVXHV   Esquire’s mission, in other words, was 
IRUWKULJKWO\DQGLQVWUXPHQWDOO\SHGDJRJLFDO LWHODERUDWHGWKHPHDQV
rather than the end of masculinity, the how rather than the why, 
consistently articulating the performative practice of masculinity as a 
question of technical competence. (Floyd 2009, 98) 
Chapter Two122
Floyd interprets the emergence of this new form of interpellation 
through Butler’s theory of gender performativity, but historicizing the 
latter in relation to the concrete context of Taylorism. As he points out, 
Butler’s appropriation of Althusser allows her to conceptualize gender 
as a form of skilled labor without capital: the labor of repetitive citation 
that is constitutive of performative gender and yet abstracted, in Butler’s 
work, from the circuit of capital (Floyd 2009, 96).32 According to Floyd, 
Butler’s theory throws light as no one did before on the production and 
UHSURGXFWLRQRIJHQGHUDWWKHVDPHWLPHDVLWSDUWLFLSDWHVLQLWVUHL¿FDWLRQ
by abstracting the gendered laboring subject from the social relations 
that historically constitute it. By rereading her theory in the context of 
Taylorism, Floyd argues that the social conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of performative masculinity33 are to be found in the dissociation 
between body and knowledge taking place at the level of production and 
performatively reconstituted at the level of consumption:
Men who were part of an emerging professional-managerial class 
found themselves engaged in sedentary rather than physical labor 
LQ D FRUSRUDWH RI¿FH ZKLOH ZRUNLQJFODVV PHQ ZHUH LQ 0DU[¶V
metaphor, simultaneously being reduced to so many appendages of 
WKHVFLHQWL¿FDOO\PDQDJHGIDFWRU\:KDWWKHVHPDQDJHUVDQGODERUHUV
shared in common was an experience of work that seemed to threaten 
a loss of manhood itself. As indeed it did: a normalization of the male 
body in terms of manhood began to give way to something called 
masculinity, as corporate marketing efforts like the one that produced 
Esquire seized an opportunity. Consumption now intervened to 
constitute a manliness increasingly less in evidence at the moment of 
production. (Floyd 2009, 105) 
As this reading illustrates, Floyd’s project of a queer Marxist epistemology 
does not amount, like Hennessy’s, to a reorientation of queer theory and 
a critique of its theoretical practice, but rather emerges from a mutually 
transformative encounter between queer theory and Marxism. On the 
RQH KDQG %XWOHU¶V UHL¿HG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI JHQGHU LV KLVWRULFL]HG DQG
concretized, hence dialectically reoriented toward an aspiration to totality. 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQG/XNiFV¶DQDO\VLVRIWKHVXEMHFWLYHHIIHFWVRIUHL¿FDWLRQ
under Taylorism (its grasp on consciousness) is integrated with a reading of 
WKHUHL¿FDWLRQRIPDVFXOLQLW\LQWKHVDPHFRQWH[W34 Floyd goes further and 
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DUJXHVWKDWSUHFLVHO\WKHUHL¿HGHSLVWHPRORJ\GHSOR\HGE\%XWOHULVZKDW
allows her to scrutinize the sexual body with unprecedented precision, thus 
PDNLQJKLV RZQFRQWHPSRUDU\ UHDGLQJSRVVLEOH LQ WKH¿UVW SODFH ³7KLV
scrutiny is ultimately inseparable from what . . . we might reasonably call 
the ‘false’ immediacy of her analysis, an analysis that forthrightly refuses 
to conceptualize anything resembling a social totality, which offers a 
powerful analysis of gender normalization instead, indeed can offer that 
analysis only because of that same refusal” (Floyd 2009, 117). In other 
words, Floyd reads the development of queer theory itself as a dialectical 
SURFHVV 5DWKHU WKDQ FULWLFL]LQJ %XWOHU IRU KHU UHL¿FDWLRQ RI JHQGHU DV
Hennessy does, he regards Butler’s gesture—and the gesture of queer 
theory at large—not only as a negation of Marxism’s totalizing exclusion 
of sexual politics, but also as having produced a necessary analysis of the 
VSHFL¿FPDWHULDOLW\RIWKHVH[XDOERG\$VVXFKLWFRQVWLWXWHVLQKLVYLHZ
the best point of support for a contemporary reencounter between queer 
theory and Marxism. 
Hennessy’s and Floyd’s different assessments of Butler’s work and 
RI WKH ¿HOG RI TXHHU WKHRU\ DUH LQWLPDWHO\ FRQQHFWHG WR WKHLU GLIIHUHQW
FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQVRI UHL¿FDWLRQ LWVHOI+HQQHVV\ LV IDLWKIXO WR/XNiFV LQ
FRQVLGHULQJUHL¿FDWLRQDVDQ LGHRORJLFDOPHFKDQLVPWKDWP\VWL¿HVVRFLDO
reality by means of fragmentation and particularization: the social totality—
the organic totality of social relations—disappears from view in favor of a 
PXOWLSOLFDWLRQRIQDWXUDOL]HGGLIIHUHQFHVLQIRUPLQJLQWXUQUHL¿HGIRUPV
of consciousness, among them sexual identities (Hennessy 2000, 99, 
103-106, 217). According to Hennessy, sexual identities are the product 
RI D UHL¿FDWLRQ RI DIIHFWV DQG GHVLUHV WKDW DFFRPSDQLHG WKH SURFHVV RI
industrialization in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. This process was highly contradictory, for industrialization did 
not just contribute to reify such affects into sexual identities, but began to 
UHOHDVHWKHPLQWKH¿UVWSODFHIURPWKHFRQVWULFWLYHVSDFHRIWKHIDPLO\
It did so, as John D’Emilio has famously argued, by displacing production 
from the family to the factory and thus creating, for example, the conditions 
of possibility for the formation of urban gay (male) communities (D’Emilio 
+HQQHVV\35+RZHYHUIURPKHUWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\
YDQWDJHSRLQW+HQQHVV\SRLQWVRXWWKDWVXFKUHL¿HGVH[XDOLGHQWLWLHVKDYH
become increasingly functional to the ideological channeling of what 
she terms “human affective potential” into contemporary identity-based 
practices of market segmentation. A conjunctural analysis of the concrete 
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articulations between the LGBTQ movement and the market, such as the 
one offered by Chasin, is integrated and partly replaced here, at a higher 
level of abstraction, with a general theory of the ideological function of 
identity in neoliberal capitalist social formations. 
/LNH WKHSUROHWDULDW IRU/XNiFVDTXHHUFROOHFWLYHVXEMHFWDFFRUGLQJ
WR+HQQHVV\PXVWQHJDWHWKHSURFHVVRIUHL¿FDWLRQWKDWKDVEHHQSURGXFLQJ
particularized sexual identities and articulate, instead, a political 
consciousness that dialectically aspires to the social totality: “One of the 
VWHSV LQ IRUPLQJ FROOHFWLYH DJHQF\ HQWDLOV µGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ¶    7KLV
‘work’ is a process of unlearning that opens up the identities we take 
for granted to the historical conditions that make them possible. . . . The 
disidentifying subject taps into the ways her outlawed needs, including her 
affective needs, are channeled by culture-ideology” (Hennessy 2000, 229). 
In other passages, Hennessy is more ambiguous about the nature of the 
SURFHVV WKDWPXVWQHJDWH WKH UHL¿FDWLRQRI VH[XDO LGHQWLWLHV DQG UHRULHQW
queer politics toward the social totality. For instance, while calling for this 
reorientation, she does acknowledge the extent to which identities form a 
¿HOGRIFRPPRQVHQVHRQZKLFKDQ\FRXQWHUKHJHPRQ\PXVWLQVWDOOLWVHOI
³+RZFDQ>DUDGLFDOVH[XDOSROLWLFV@DFFRPPRGDWHWKHPDWHULDOKLVWRU\RI
identity thinking—including its hold on the public imagination in certain 
social formations and its lived effects on individual lives—and also bring 
WRVH[XDOLW\DJOREDODQDO\VLVWKDWEHJLQVLQDQRWKHUOHVVIHWWHUHGSODFH"´
(35). However, not only such tactical remarks are generally obscured, 
in 3UR¿W DQG 3OHDVXUH, by Hennessy’s emphasis on the negation of 
LGHQWLWLHVEXWDWDPRUHIXQGDPHQWDOOHYHOLGHQWLWLHVDQGLGHQWLW\SROLWLFV
DUHSULPDULO\ LQWHUSUHWHG DV DP\VWLI\LQJ HIIHFW RI UHL¿FDWLRQ WKDW LV DV
a function of ideology: “This evaluation of identity politics as ideology 
invites consideration of it as one way class struggle under late capitalism 
is being displaced” (227).36 As such, Hennessy suggests that the terrain of 




to a certain extent, brings his analysis closer to Hall’s reconceptualization of 
ideology discussed in the previous chapter. Relying on Edward W. Said’s 
(1983) critique of the concept, Floyd begins by registering a key limitation 
RIUHL¿FDWLRQDVWKHRUL]HGE\/XNiFVLWV WHQGHQF\WRZDUGDEVWUDFWLRQDQG
partial dehistoricization.37 According to this critique, the dialectic between 
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UHL¿FDWLRQDQGWRWDOLW\UXQVWKHULVNRIWUDQVODWLQJLQWRDQDOOHQFRPSDVVLQJ
narrative of decline seamlessly absorbing all aspects of capitalist social 




QRWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKUHL¿FDWLRQDFTXLUHVDtotal dimension, affecting 
all aspects of social life, marks the concept as increasingly abstract (Floyd 
2009, 17-18). Even as this expansion of the concept is to be found less in 
/XNiFV WKDQ LQ VRPH RI KLV UHDGHUV )OR\G DJUHHVZLWK 6DLG LQ DVVHUWLQJ
WKDW³WKLVFHDVHOHVVH[SDQVLRQZDV¿QDOO\WKHGLUHFWLRQLQWHQGHGE\/XNiFV
himself with his emphasis on the total character of the process to which the 
term refers” (18). Against such limitations, Floyd sets out to historicize the 
SURFHVVRIUHL¿FDWLRQ
Importantly, Floyd’s queer vantage point is not incidental to his 
DWWHPSWWRKLVWRULFL]HDQGHYHQFRQFUHWL]HUHL¿FDWLRQ³7KRXJKWKHRUL]LQJ
VH[XDOLW\LQWHUPVRIUHL¿FDWLRQPD\DW¿UVWVHHPOLNH\HWDQRWKHUH[SDQVLRQ
of the concept beyond useful limitations, this effort in fact emphasizes 
UHL¿FDWLRQ¶VKLVWRULFDOO\DQGVRFLDOO\VSHFL¿FRSHUDWLRQ´)OR\G
We saw this at work in Floyd’s reading of Butler. In Floyd’s view, that 
reading does not only historicize Butler’s theory of gender performativity, 
EXW/XNiFV¶WKHRU\RIUHL¿FDWLRQDVZHOO,WPDQDJHVWRH[SODLQE\PHDQV
RIFRQMXQFWXUDODQDO\VLVQRWRQO\KRZUHL¿FDWLRQSURGXFHV WKHZRUNHU¶V
contemplative consciousness, but also how it extends its reach to other 
aspects of social relations, such as gender. Rather than assuming the 
WRWDOL]LQJ UHDFKRI UHL¿FDWLRQ)OR\G¶V UHDGLQJ ORFDWHV%XWOHU¶V WKHRU\DV
a point of support to help explainingWKHVSHFL¿FH[WHQVLRQRIUHL¿FDWLRQ
IURPWKHGRPDLQRIODERUWRWKDWRIJHQGHULGHQWLW\7KLVIXUWKHUFODUL¿HV
that, for Floyd, the articulation of a queer Marxism does not take shape 
just as a Marxian amendment of queer theory: “a queer critique of the 
UHL¿FDWLRQWRWDOLW\ GLDOHFWLF WKDW LV DOVR D 0DU[LDQ FRQFUHWL]LQJ RI WKLV
dialectic is my most basic objective, an objective that insists throughout 
RQWKHVLPXOWDQHRXVFRQYHUJHQFHDQGGLYHUJHQFHRIWKHVHRSHQXQ¿QLVKHG
forms of critical knowledge” (33). In other words, reading Butler through 
/XNiFVLVDOVRDZD\IRU)OR\GRIUHDGLQJ/XNiFVWKURXJK%XWOHU
It is precisely by further historicizing and concretizing the concept of 
UHL¿FDWLRQ IURPDTXHHU VWDQGSRLQW WKDW)OR\GGHSDUWV LI LPSOLFLWO\ IURP
D SXUHO\ QHJDWLYH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI LGHRORJ\ ,I UHL¿FDWLRQ FHDVHV WR EH
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FRQFHLYHGRIDVDSURFHVVRILQFUHDVLQJLGHRORJLFDOP\VWL¿FDWLRQRIVRFLDO
reality and begins to be reformulated as an historical process producing, 
among other effects, queer sexual identities, one has to pose the following 
question: “What historically subsequent chains of determination can result 
IURP WKHG\QDPLFRI UHL¿FDWLRQ DQGFDQ WKHVHEH DGHTXDWHO\XQGHUVWRRG
LQ WHUPV RI WKH SRVVLEOH RXWFRPHV WKH FRQFHSW RI UHL¿FDWLRQ W\SLFDOO\
SUHVXSSRVHVWRWDOP\VWL¿FDWLRQRUWRWDOQHJDWLRQ"´)OR\G,QRWKHU
ZRUGVLITXHHUVH[XDOLGHQWLWLHVDUHWKHPVHOYHVWKHSURGXFWRIUHL¿FDWLRQLV
the only option available for a queer Marxism to help forging a collective 
consciousness that shall negate those identities altogether in order to 
DUWLFXODWHDQDVSLUDWLRQWRWRWDOLW\")OR\GDGGUHVVHVWKLVTXHVWLRQE\VKLIWLQJ
WKHIRFXVIURP/XNiFV¶HPSKDVLVRQWKHsubjectiveHIIHFWRIUHL¿FDWLRQWKDW
is, its grasp on the consciousness of the proletariat, to its objective effect: in 
this case, the materialization of particular sexual bodies. It is through this 
VKLIWWKDWKHFRPHVWRUHIRUPXODWHUHL¿FDWLRQDVDSURFHVVRIP\VWL¿FDWLRQ
as well as an opening of critical spaces. His reading of the emergence of 
performative masculinity under Taylorism, for instance, proceeds later in 
the book with an analysis of the formation of an underground gay consumer 
culture in the 1950s and 1960s, mostly through the circulation of erotic visual 
material. According to Floyd, this gay consumer culture worked precisely 
on the “weakness” of performative masculinity (what Butler would call 
the precariousness of performative gender) and prepared the terrain for the 
emergence of a gay male community in the United States (Floyd 2009, 157-
)OR\GDUJXHV ³:KLOH UHL¿FDWLRQ LVQHLWKHU D IRUPRI OLEHUDWLRQQRU
liberation’s teleologically posited, anticipatory promise, it does open certain 
FRQMXQFWXUDO KLVWRULFDOO\ VSHFL¿F FRQGLWLRQV RI SRVVLELOLW\ IRU OLEHUDWLRQ´
 ,Q WKLV UDGLFDO UHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ RI /XNiFV¶ FRQFHSW UHL¿FDWLRQ
produces a terrain on which, as Hall would put it, two can play at the game.38
)OR\GUHDFKHVWKLVUHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIUHL¿FDWLRQQRWWKURXJK+DOO
RU *UDPVFL EXW WKURXJK %XWOHU DQG LPSRUWDQWO\ )RXFDXOW ,Q WKH ¿UVW
chapter of 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH, he deploys the same reading strategy 
WKDW KH DGRSWV LQ KLV UHDGLQJRI%XWOHUZKLOH UHYLVLWLQJ WKH¿UVW YROXPH
of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality >@ 39 Here, he argues 
that what Foucault terms the “deployment of sexuality,” inaugurated in the 
ODWHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\PXVWEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDQLQVWDQFHRIUHL¿FDWLRQ
Especially with the emergence of psychoanalysis, Floyd argues that sexual 
desire is epistemologically abstracted from the whole of the subject as well 
as from the whole of the subject’s social relations. Rereading Foucault via 
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/XNiFVDQGIRFXVLQJRQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVKHVXJJHVWVWKDW
the quick spread of psychoanalytic knowledges and practices be understood 
within the context of a growing service sector, an increasing differentiation 
between manual and intellectual labor, and an expansion of the terrain of 
FRQVXPSWLRQ XQGHU 7D\ORULVP$W WKH VDPH WLPH KH TXHVWLRQV /XNiFV¶
H[FOXVLYHIRFXVRQ WKHUHL¿FDWLRQRINQRZOHGJH)ROORZLQJ)RXFDXOWKH
SRLQWVRXWWKDWNH\HIIHFWVRIWKLVSURFHVVRIUHL¿FDWLRQDUHWREHREVHUYHG
on the body itself. This chapter is key to Floyd’s project, for it is through 
)RXFDXOW WKDW )OR\G EHJLQV WR UHFRQFHSWXDOL]H UHL¿FDWLRQ ³QRW LQ WKH
/XNiFVLDQWHUPVRIDUHODWLRQEHWZHHQNQRZOHGJHDQGFRQVFLRXVQHVVEXWLQ
the Foucauldian terms of a relation between knowledge and bodies” (Floyd 
2009, 41). In other words, it is Foucault who provides Floyd with a point 
RIVXSSRUWWRVKLIWIURPWKHVXEMHFWLYHWRWKHREMHFWLYHHIIHFWVRIUHL¿FDWLRQ
DQGWRRSHQXSWKHQRWLRQEH\RQGLWVSXUHO\QHJDWLYHLQÀHFWLRQ
)OR\G¶V UHDGLQJ RI )RXFDXOW DQG /XNiFV WKURXJK RQH DQRWKHU LV
exemplary, like his reading of Butler, of the potential of a contemporary 
reencounter between queer theory and Marxism. Yet that Foucault provides 
)OR\GZLWKDSRLQWRIVXSSRUWWRUHWKLQNUHL¿FDWLRQEH\RQGLWVSXUHO\QHJDWLYH
LQÀHFWLRQPD\VXJJHVWWKDW)OR\Gneeds to step out of Marxism in order to 
accomplish this move. As I have argued in the previous chapter, instead, 
Hall’s reading of Gramsci in the 1980s, as well as Gramsci’s own work, 
already offer a notion of ideology that transforms it into an open terrain of 
VWUXJJOHUDWKHUWKDQMXVWDPHFKDQLVPRIP\VWL¿FDWLRQRIVRFLDOUHODWLRQV
Moreover, Floyd’s recourse to Foucault and Butler undermines the negative 
LQÀHFWLRQRIUHL¿FDWLRQEXWQRWHQWLUHO\LWVWHQGHQF\WRZDUGDEVWUDFWLRQ,Q
other words, the concept alone, even in its less negative version developed by 
)OR\GZRXOGVWLOOLPSHGHKLPWRLQWHUFHSWWKHZRUNLQJVRIVSHFL¿FSROLWLFR
LGHRORJLFDOSUDFWLFHVWKDWPHGLDWHWKHSURFHVVRIUHL¿FDWLRQDVLWPDWHULDOL]HV
in concrete social formations. In fact, Floyd is aware of this problem. This 
LV ZK\ KH VXSSOHPHQWV KLV UHDGLQJ RI /XNiFVZLWK LQVLJKWV GUDZQ IURP
regulation theory: “Regulation theory focuses not on capital’s general laws 
RIPRWLRQ>VXFKDVWKHGLDOHFWLFEHWZHHQUHL¿FDWLRQDQGWRWDOLW\@EXWRQWKH
KLVWRULFDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO VSHFL¿FV RI DFFXPXODWLRQ LQ D UHODWLYHO\ZHOO
GH¿QHG SHULRG DQG ORFDWLRQ´ )OR\G  5HJXODWLRQ WKHRU\ LQVLVWV
on the contingent articulations between a given “regime of accumulation” 
and a given “mode of regulation,” where the latter refers to the ensemble 
of politico-ideological practices and institutions shaping a particular social 
formation. Moreover, regulation theory emphasizes that “any successful 
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harmonizing of a regime of accumulation and a mode of regulation is only 
ever a hegemonic process, which is to say a potentially unstable one, and in 
this respect the work of Gramsci is one of regulation theory’s more obvious 
touchstones” (34).40 Indeed, if Foucault and Butler help Floyd tracking 
WKHREMHFWLYHHIIHFWVRIUHL¿FDWLRQRQVH[XDOERGLHVDQGKHOSKLPSXVKLQJ
WKH FRQFHSW RI UHL¿FDWLRQ EH\RQG WKH ERXQGDULHV RI LWV RULJLQDO QHJDWLYH
connotation, it is actually Gramsci—if mediated by regulation theory—who 
allows him to fully historicize and concretize the concept.41 
However, by drawing on regulation theory, Floyd’s attempt to 
VXSSOHPHQW/XNiFVZRUNVRQO\RQHZD\ZLWKLQWKHHFRQRP\RIWKHGLDOHFWLF
EHWZHHQUHL¿FDWLRQDQGWRWDOLW\7KDWLVZKLOHUHJXODWLRQWKHRU\KHOSVKLP
track the politico-ideological practices that stabilize a given hegemonic 
formation and, in the process, mediate the fragmentation of social life in 
concrete social formations, that supplement does not explain the politico-
ideological practices articulated by counter-hegemonic formations. Or, 
LQRWKHUZRUGVWKHVXSSOHPHQWLVDEOHWRLGHQWLI\WKHKLVWRULFDOO\VSHFL¿F
PHGLDWLRQVRIWKHPRYHPHQWIURPWRWDOLW\WRUHL¿FDWLRQEXWLWQHJOHFWVWKH
politico-ideological practices through which a given political formation 
PD\QHJDWHUHL¿FDWLRQDQGDUWLFXODWHDGLDOHFWLFDODVSLUDWLRQWRWRWDOLW\,Q
fact, in Floyd’s analysis this second movement appears to be unmediated, 
to escape articulation. 
This is most clear in the last chapter of 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH, where 
Floyd posits a contemporary divide between homonormativity and queer 
FULWLFDOSUDFWLFHDVDQHIIHFWLWVHOIRIUHL¿FDWLRQ)OR\GHPSKDVL]HVWKDW
RQHRIWKHGH¿QLQJIHDWXUHVRIKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\LVQRWMXVWWKHSULYDWL]DWLRQ
of homosexuality, as Duggan argues, but its concomitant desexualization: 
³7KH FLWL]HQV >WKDW FLYLO ULJKWV OREE\ RUJDQL]DWLRQV@ SURSRVH WR VSHDN
for are . . . not merely equivalent citizens but equivalently desexualized 
citizens, and the agenda they pursue begins to look a lot like the embrace 
of a closet that pretends not to be” (Floyd 2009, 200). The desexualizing 
impulse of homonormativity is indeed central to the contemporary debate 
LQTXHHUWKHRU\2QHRILWVWXUQLQJSRLQWVLVURXWLQHO\LGHQWL¿HGQRWRQO\LQ
the LGBT movement’s almost unilateral investment in same-sex marriage, 
EXW ¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW LQ WKHZD\ WKH GHSHQDOL]DWLRQ RI VRGRP\ LQ WKH
United States was articulated by the Supreme Court in the 2003 Lawrence 
v. Texas case, which replaced the prohibition of sodomy with a right to 
intimacy. As Teemu Ruskola comments, in anchoring sex to intimacy, 
the Court’s decision shifted the demarcation between good straight sex 
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and bad gay sex by projecting it within LGBTQ constituencies, thus 
disarticulating both real and potential alliances in favor of new forms of 
antagonism (Ruskola 2005, 242). 
But the emphasis on homonormativity’s desexualizing impulse has a 
PRUHVSHFL¿FIXQFWLRQLQ)OR\G¶VDUJXPHQWIRULWDOORZVKLPWRJRDVIDUDV
to read cultures of public sex as the dialectical other of homonormativity. 
For example, drawing on an analysis offered by Lauren Berlant and 
Michael Warner in “Sex in Public” (1998), Floyd discusses a zoning 
ordinance pushed by the Rudy Giuliani administration in New York in 
1995, which attacked the sexual cultures of Times Square by forbidding 
the presence of adult businesses in the area. He writes: “Social policies like 
this zoning law only reinforce the privatization of sex already inherent in 
WKHQHROLEHUDOORJLFRIOHVELDQDQGJD\ULJKWVWRSURSHUW\DQGFRQVXPSWLRQ
they threaten not an identity but a world of inherently critical practices 
and knowledges that directly contradict identity’s glossy normalization” 
(Floyd 2009, 203). This passage suggests that cultures of public sex 
(pornographic bookstores, clubs, and so forth) are inherently critical and 
directly contradict homonormativity. This is so because Floyd’s reading of 
their emergence and of the attacks of which they subsequently became the 
target is entirely reabsorbed, at a high level of abstraction, by the dialectic 
EHWZHHQ UHL¿FDWLRQ DQG WRWDOLW\ )RU )OR\G WKRVH FXOWXUHV RI SXEOLF VH[
dialectically emerged within the folds of a Fordist mode of regulation 
DQGKHOSHGVKDSLQJWKHIRUPDWLRQRIDUHL¿HGJD\LGHQWLW\WKDWZDVonce 
antagonistic, but that today has lost its capacity to sustain a queer critical 
vantage on the social totality because of the desexualizing impulse of 
homonormativity. It is this dialectical movement that directly produces, 
according to Floyd’s analysis, the contemporary antagonism between gay 
homonormativity and queer critical practices:




itself carried radically negative implications back when a movement 
out of the closet was inconceivable except in relation to a movement 
into the streets, when “coming out” represented a revolutionary 
publicizing of tabooed sexuality, when the identitarian and the socially 
radical seemed less persistently at odds. (Floyd 2009, 210) 
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Thus, even as Floyd’s radical reconceptualization of the concept of 
UHL¿FDWLRQVHHPHGWRKDYHRSHQHGDVSDFHWRWKLQNDERXWLGHQWLW\SROLWLFV
and the social totality without dismissing the former, bringing his analysis 
close to Hall’s understanding of ideology, in times of homonormativity 
he suggests the contrary. As the passage above illustrates, his analysis 
ultimately converges with those who identify today a necessary link 
between identity politics and homonormativity. Also Ruskola suggests 
that, to the desexualization of homosexuality articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Lawrence v. Texas, queer politics must respond with an emphasis 
on sexual acts rather than sexual identities, that is, with a recovery of 
sodomy. Yet he makes clear that this is the case exclusively for tactical 
reasons: “a return to a relative emphasis on acts rather than identities need 
not imply a metaphysical distinction between the two. Rather, an emphasis 
on acts can be a political tactic aimed at making certain acts available to the 
largest number of actors possible, rather than merely the respectable few” 
(Ruskola 2005, 240).42 Floyd’s critique of identity, instead, proceeds from 
his reading of identity and identity politics, in the last instance, as a moment 
RI WKH GLDOHFWLF EHWZHHQ UHL¿FDWLRQ DQG WRWDOLW\ D KLVWRULFDOO\ VSHFL¿F
concretion of sexual politics that once offered a critical standpoint but is 
today dialectically and directly negated, in the face of its homonormative 
desexualization, by “inherently resistant” cultures of public sex. 
,Q WKLV UHVSHFW )OR\G¶V DEDQGRQPHQW RI /XNiFV¶ IRFXV RQ WKH
UHL¿FDWLRQ RI NQRZOHGJH ZKLFK +HQQHVV\ LQVWHDG HQWLUHO\ SUHVHUYHV
proves to be enabling as much as limiting. On the one hand, it allows Floyd 
WRUHFRQFHSWXDOL]HUHL¿FDWLRQDVDSURFHVV WKDWP\VWL¿HVVRFLDOUHDOLW\DV
much as it produces critical vantages on the social. On the other hand, it 




in favor of an aspiration to totality must be considered as mediated by 
KLVWRULFDOO\ VSHFL¿F SROLWLFRLGHRORJLFDO SUDFWLFHV 7R WKLV HQG +DOO¶V
reading of Gramsci in the 1980s is more effective than regulation theory. 
Lacking a theory of counter-hegemony, positing the inherently resistant 
character of certain sexual formations, and joining those who dismiss 
identity politics in order to resist homonormativity, I suggest that Floyd’s 
analysis cannot properly theorize the counter-hegemonic forms of identity 
politics practiced within contemporary LGBTQ formations to understand 
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and resist the neoliberal articulation of homonormativity. As I argue in 
the next section, one such counter-hegemonic ideological formation is the 
contemporary body of work that has been termed queer of color critique. I 
propose that the latter is mediating the reencounter between queer theory 
and Marxism in times of homonormativity by struggling to hegemonize 
WKHFRORUOLQHZLWKLQWKH¿HOG43  
Queer of Color Critique 
and the Struggle to Hegemonize the Color Line
Following Duggan, I have argued that homonormativity is not just the 
QDPHIRUDVKULQNLQJIRUPRIVLQJOHLVVXHLGHQWLW\SROLWLFVEXWDVSHFL¿F
articulation of sexual politics to a multi-issue neoliberalism. According 
to Duggan’s analysis, the emergence of homonormativity forms part of 
a broader shift in the ideological apparatus of the neoliberal bloc. The 
GLDOHFWLF EHWZHHQ UHL¿FDWLRQ DQG WRWDOLW\ HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH UHUHDGLQJ
offered by Floyd and through the supplement of regulation theory, may 
be able to translate Duggan’s conjunctural analysis at a higher level of 
abstraction. Yet it is less able to account for the construction of counter-
hegemony. Following both Hall and Duggan, I have suggested that the 
terrain of identity politics is key to the emergence of a counter-hegemonic 
bloc, provided that identity politics is conceptualized as an expansive 
DQG LQWHUVHFWLRQDO ¿HOG SXQFWXDWHG E\ IRUPV RI LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ DQG
GLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ+HQFH , KDYH VXJJHVWHG VRPH RI WKH VSHFL¿F UHDVRQV
not to retreat from identity politics in times of homonormativity. Among 
such reasons is the fact that the mobilizing of race and the practice of 
antiracist critique within LGBTQ formations functions today as a main 
point of support for understanding and resisting the articulation of 
homonormativity. I must focus now on this dynamic with more precision, 
emphasizing how the emergence of queer of color critique over the past 
twenty years has been mediating not only the debate on homonormativity 
ZLWKLQTXHHUWKHRU\EXWWKHYHU\³0DU[LVWUHQDLVVDQFH´ZLWKLQWKH¿HOG
$V$DURQ /HFNOLQGHUZULWHV ³>T@XHHU RI FRORU FULWLTXH DQ LQFUHDVLQJO\
LQÀXHQWLDO DQG SUHGRPLQDQW VWUDLQ ZLWKLQ TXHHU WKHRU\ KDV EHHQ DW WKH
YDQJXDUG RI >WKH@ UHWXUQ WR0DU[LVW FDWHJRULHV DQGPDWHULDOLVW DQDO\VLV´
(Lecklinder 2012, 184). In this section, I suggest that not only queer of 
color critique theoretically mediates the contemporary reencounter between 
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TXHHUWKHRU\DQG0DU[LVPEXWDOVRWKDWLWVLQWHUYHQWLRQZLWKLQWKH¿HOGFDQ
be understood as activating processes of antagonism and recomposition. In 
RWKHUZRUGV,UHDGWKHWKHRUHWLFDO¿HOGLWVHOIDVDVLWHRIVWUXJJOH
The contemporary body of work that goes under the name of queer of 
FRORUFULWLTXHLVQRWWKH¿UVWDWWHPSWWRWKHRUL]HWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQVRIUDFHDQG
TXHHUQHVVZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHV7KHZRUNRI.REHQD0HUFHU
in Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies (1994) 
DQGWKDWRI¿OPPDNHU,VDDF-XOLHQ44 both close to Hall, are early instances 
of such an attempt. As Mercer recalls, the main goal of the Gay Black Group 
formed in London in 1981, in which himself participated, was “speaking out 
against the stereo silence created by homophobia in black communities and 
racism in white gay communities” (10). Similarly to contemporary queer 
RIFRORUFULWLTXHWKLVHDUO\JD\EODFNFULWLTXHIRXQGLWVHOIQDYLJDWLQJD¿HOG
of multiple antagonisms and drew much inspiration from the theorizing and 
organizing of women of color and black lesbian feminists (11). Hall offers 
a reading of such intersectional formations in his essay “New Ethnicities” 
>@+HUHKHVSHDNVRIDVKLIWEHWZHHQWZRGLIIHUHQW³PRPHQWV´
in black cultural politics in Britain. Although he considers the two moments 
to be interwoven, he maintains that their differences are politically salient. 
7KH¿UVWPRPHQWLVSRUWUD\HGLQW\SLFDOO\*UDPVFLDQWHUPV
Politically, this is the moment when the term “black” was coined as 
a way of referencing the common experience of racism . . . and came 
to provide the organizing category of a new politics of resistance, 
among groups and communities with, in fact, very different histories, 
traditions and ethnic identities. In this moment, politically speaking, 
“the black experience” . . . became “hegemonic” over other ethnic/
UDFLDOLGHQWLWLHV+DOO>@
To this political moment corresponded, in Hall’s view, a cultural politics 
focused on the problem of representation. On the one hand, this cultural 
politics aimed at providing black subjects with access to the means and 
the rights of representation. On the other hand, it struggled to counter 
racist representations with a “positive” black imagery. Hall argues that this 
moment in black cultural politics cannot be deemed exhausted, at the time 
of his writing, in any simple way—especially given the reinvigoration of 
a racist imaginary under Thatcherism. Nonetheless he registers a shift: “a 
change from a struggle over the relations of representation to a politics 
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RIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLWVHOI´+DOO>@7KHPDLQLQJUHGLHQWRI
this second moment is a politics of antagonism within black formations. 
As he states, “black radical politics has frequently been stabilized around 
particular conceptions of black masculinity, which are only now being put 
into question by black women and black gay men” (447). Thus, according 
to his analysis, the emergence of intersectional critiques within black 
formations do not just redress the heteropatriarchy of those formations, but 
give way to a different cultural politics.    
Hall reads these transformations, again, in terms of the theory and 
politics of hegemony. He writes: “The end of the essential black subject also 
entails a recognition that the central issues of race always appear historically 
in articulation, in a formation, with other categories and divisions” (Hall 
>@  $QG LQ D ODWHU HVVD\ WLWOHG ³:KDW LV WKLV µ%ODFN¶ LQ
%ODFN 3RSXODU &XOWXUH"´ E KH SRVLWV WKDW WKHVH DUWLFXODWLRQV DUH
the very explanation for the connivance of certain politics of liberation 
with forms of oppression exercised in other domains: “The way in which 
a transgressive politics in one domain is constantly sutured and stabilized 
by reactionary or unexamined politics in another is only to be explained by 
this continuous cross-dislocation of one identity by another, one structure 
by another” (31).45 This reading begins to approximate the reading I wish 
to provide here of contemporary queer of color critique. I argue that the 
latter can be understood as a counter-hegemonic ideological formation 
whose goal is to transform the very balance of forces within queer theory. 
However, Hall writes at a moment when intersectional formations tended 
to gravitate away from Marxism, or to emerge within the folds of entirely 
different theoretical and political languages. This is why he speaks of the 
terrain of identity politics as one to be seized and articulated by the Left. 
Contemporary queer of color critique, instead, mediates a reencounter 
between queer theory and Marxism.46    
Floyd’s project is not oblivious to this mediation. In the introduction 
to 7KH 5HL¿FDWLRQ RI 'HVLUH, when he discusses the queer impulse of 
generalization to be found in authors such as Sedgwick or Warner, he 
also argues that this impulse “has given rise to important critiques of the 
gendered, racial, and indeed global blindnesses persistently risked by the 
abstraction ‘queer’” (Floyd 2009, 8). On the one hand, Floyd remarks that 
these intersectional critiques within queer theory have expanded rather 
WKDQOLPLWHGWKH¿HOG2QWKHRWKHUKDQGKHJRHVIXUWKHUDQGDUJXHVWKDW
while questioning queer theory’s totality thinking, such critiques at the 
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same time are immanent and constitutive of that very aspiration to totality, 
for they are animated by a “genuinely dialectical refusal to isolate sexuality 
from other horizons of knowledge” (9). Thus, Floyd proposes a careful 
reading of these dynamics that both emphasizes the politics of difference 
DQGDQWDJRQLVPLQWHUQDOWRWKH¿HOGand its quest for connections:
These more recent developments in queer studies can . . . be understood 
not in terms of a persistent rejection of generalizing impulses but in 
terms of a critique immanent to this generalizing impulse itself, a 
critical dynamic in which analytic intersection and differentiation, at 
WKHOHYHORIWKH¿HOGDQGVRPHWLPHVDWWKHOHYHORIVSHFL¿FLQWHUYHQWLRQV
LQWKH¿HOGWHQGWRRSHUDWHLQWDQGHP)OR\G
In other words, we could say that antiracist critiques within queer theory 
bear both the mark of identity politics and that of the politics of hegemony. 
More precisely: intersectional critiques interrupt any attempt to practice 
a politics of hegemony or any other form of aspiration to totality that 
would demand an elision of difference and identity. They turn the latter, 
instead, into a privileged terrain from which a queer politics of hegemony 
can begin to be articulated. Another way of putting this is by arguing that 
intersectionality marks the difference between queer totality thinking 
and universalism. The question was posed in these terms, for instance, 
during a roundtable discussion published in GLQ’s special issue on 
“Queer Studies and the Crises of Capitalism” (Rosenberg and Villarejo 
2012). In the context of that conversation, Floyd asks how to repose the 
question of totality in queer theory without reproducing the elisions and 
exclusions of universalism, so he answers: “grasping the ways in which 
capitalism’s gendered, racialized, sexualized violence is inseparable from 
. . . capitalism’s simultaneous identity and nonidentity with itself” (Crosby 
et al. 2012, 138). In other words, intersectionality interrupts any approach 
to the social formation that would reduce the latter to a seamless totality, 
calling attention to the articulatory practices that necessarily preside over 
the production of such a structured whole. 
Thus, as Floyd puts it, “I take the practice of thinking totality to be 
DQHFHVVDU\FULWLFDOHIIRUWWRJUDVSDVRFLDO¿HOGDVXQL¿HGSUHFLVHO\LQLWV
disunity” (Crosby et al. 2012, 139). However, in spite of contemporary 
critiques of identity politics—that Floyd himself, at least in part, reiterates 
in his work—the question of identity is central to that critical effort. 
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$QVZHULQJ WR )OR\G 5RGHULFN $ )HUJXVRQ DI¿UPV ³7KH TXHVWLRQ RI
totality . . . begs us to consider the critique of identity as well as the politics 
of identity that has often undergirded the term totality” (139). How else to 
question the politics of identity implicitly or explicitly informing different 
forms of totality thinking and universalism—that is, the politics of white 
heteropatriarchy—if not by mobilizing counter-hegemonic identity 
IRUPDWLRQV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWLQWHUVHFWLRQDORQHV"47 Ferguson asserts that 
³>Z@HFDQ¶WKHOSEXWµGR¶WRWDOLW\VREHVWZHNQRZKRZZH¶UHGRLQJLW´
We may paraphrase him and add that, precisely in the course of a critical 
engagement with the question of totality, we cannot help but “do” identity, 
so best we know how to do it. Later in the same roundtable, Heather Love 
makes a similar point: “The question of totality must be routed through 
PRUHVXVWDLQHGUHÀHFWLRQRQWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSUHVFULSWLYHDQG
the descriptive. . . . To play this out in terms of the question of identity: 
whatever we think of identity, whether or not we believe in it or approve of 
it, it continues to exist, to shape our experience, to affect our life chances, 
and so on” (144). And, we shall add, it continues to inform our theoretical 
and political practices. Queer of color critique is a case in point, for it 
emerges as a form of intersectional critique—a counter-hegemonic form 
of identity politics—that compels the contemporary “Marxist renaissance” 
in queer theory to articulate an aspiration to totality without universalism.48
While this reading begins to grasp the central role played by queer 
of color critique in mediating the contemporary reencounter between 
queer theory and Marxism, it also tends to reduce it—and to reduce 
intersectionality, more broadly—to a means by which queer theory can 
better access the social in its fragmented complexity. In other words, queer 
of color critique would appear as an “epistemic corrective” that reveals 
a complex reality lying beneath non-intersectional theorizations of the 
social. To a certain extent, this reading is correct. Yet it is also important 
to resist a reading of intersectionality that would reproduce the assumption 
of a transparent relationship between theoretical practice and the social 
¿HOGWKDWLVWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHRU\PLJKWEHDEOHWRJDLQXQPHGLDWHG
access to the social and provide a pure representation of it. In order to 
displace this assumption, and to fully appreciate the intervention of 
queer of color critique, I propose to interrogate its ideological work. As 
I suggest, queer of color critique mediates the contemporary critique of 
homonormativity and the “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory not just 
E\³FRUUHFWLQJ´WKHWKHRUHWLFDOSURWRFROVRIWKH¿HOGKHQFHRIIHULQJDPRUH
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precise understanding of the social formation, but also by struggling to 
hegemonize the color line in queer theory. 
Examples of this dynamic are numerous. One only has to look at the 
special issue of Social Text, titled “What’s Queer About Queer Studies 
1RZ"´ (QJ+DOEHUVWDPDQG0XxR]D LQRUGHU WRQRWLFHVXFKD
VWUXJJOH WR UHFRPSRVH WKH ¿HOG$W WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI WKHLU LQWURGXFWLRQ
David L. Eng, Judith (Jack) Halberstam, and José E. Muñoz write: 
“The contemporary mainstreaming of gay and lesbian identity—as 
a mass-mediated consumer lifestyle and embattled legal category—
demands a renewed queer studies ever vigilant to the fact that sexuality 
is intersectional” (Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz 2005b, 1). As Ferguson 
himself remarks, “the editors of this special issue point to what we might 
consider a hegemonic struggle within queer studies” (Ferguson 2007, 111). 
In his own contribution to the special issue, Halberstam is explicit about 
WKHQHHGWRUHDUWLFXODWHWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\DVDZKROH³7KHIXWXUH
of queer studies, I claim, depends absolutely on moving away from white 
gay male identity politics and learning from the radical critiques offered 
by a younger generation of queer scholars who draw their intellectual 
inspiration from feminism and ethnic studies rather than white queer 
studies” (Halberstam 2005, 220). In the face of homonormativity, the goal 
of this special issue and of other similar interventions is not merely to 
carve a space for intersectional conversations within queer theory, or even 
WRH[SDQGWKH¿HOGE\PHDQVRILQWHUVHFWLRQDODQDO\VLVEXWWRVXJJHVWWKDW
TXHHUWKHRU\LVLQWHUVHFWLRQDORULVQRW²LQGHHGWRUHGH¿QHZKDWLVTXHHU
about queer studies now: race.49
Queer of color critique can be read as a form of counter-hegemonic 
identity politics to the extent that it proceeds through practices of 
disLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ 'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ DV D TXHHU RI FRORU WKHRUHWLFR
SROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHZDV¿UVWFRQFHSWXDOL]HGE\0XxR]LQKLVKRPRQ\PRXV
'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV4XHHUVRI&RORUDQGWKH3HUIRUPDQFHRI3ROLWLFV (1999).50 




(Muñoz 1999, 29).517KLV LV VREHFDXVH WKHSUDFWLFHRIGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ
as he conceptualizes it, maintains a particular relationship with ideology. 
'UDZLQJRQ0LFKHO3rFKHX[¶V>@UHDGLQJRI$OWKXVVHU0XxR]
argues that there are three ways of responding to the interpellative call 
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of ideology, that is, identifying with it (assimilation), counteridentifying 
and thus refusing the very terms of the hailing (utopia), or disidentifying: 
³'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQLVWKHWKLUGPRGHRIGHDOLQJZLWKGRPLQDQWLGHRORJ\RQH
that neither opts to assimilate within such a structure nor strictly opposes 
LWUDWKHUGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQLVDVWUDWHJ\WKDWZRUNVRQDQGDJDLQVWGRPLQDQW
ideology” (Muñoz 1999, 11). Importantly, despite this passage’s insistence 
RQGRPLQDQWLGHRORJ\TXHHURIFRORUFULWLTXHGLVLGHQWL¿HVZLWKKHJHPRQLF
as well as counterKHJHPRQLFLGHRORJLFDOIRUPDWLRQVPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\LW
GLVLGHQWL¿HVZLWKERWKTXHHUDQGDQWLUDFLVWGLVFRXUVHV8SRQUHFDOOLQJ+DOO¶V
reading of Gramsci in the 1980s, Muñoz writes: “Within Gramsci’s writing 
RQWKHLGHRORJLFDO¿HOGZHFRPHWRJOLPSVHWKDWVXERUGLQDWHGLGHRORJLHV
are often rife with contradictory impulses. . . . Gramsci lets us understand 
not only working-class racism, but also gay racism or homophobia within 
FRPPXQLWLHVRI FRORU´ 'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQEHFRPHV WKHQDPH IRU DQ
intersectional practice grounded on the theory of hegemony and articulation. 
Thus, on the one hand, Muñoz points out that Duggan’s work 
on homonormativity is particularly relevant to his conceptualization 
RI TXHHU RI FRORU SUDFWLFHV RI GLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ IRU WKH ODWWHU PXVW EH
understood also as critical commentaries on “white gay male normativity 
and its concomitant corporate ethos” (Muñoz 1999, 112).52 In times of 
KRPRQRUPDWLYLW\ TXHHU RI FRORU FULWLTXH GLVLGHQWL¿HV ZLWK ERWK TXHHU
theory and LGBTQ political formations: it works within and against 
them by means of antiracist antagonism. On the other hand, this does not 
mean that queer of color critique can straightforwardly identify with the 
history of antiracist and anticolonial ideologies. Muñoz makes this point, 
for instance, by recalling instances of homophobia in Frantz Fanon’s 
foundational text Black Skin, White Masks >@  6R KH DVNV
³:KDW SURFHVV FDQ NHHS DQ LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ ZLWK )DQRQ KLV SROLWLFV KLV
ZRUNSRVVLEOHIRU>DTXHHUZRPDQUHYROXWLRQDU\IURPWKH$QWLOOHV@"  
'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ RIIHUV D )DQRQ IRU WKDW TXHHU DQG OHVELDQ UHDGHUZKR
ZRXOG QRW EH VDQLWL]HG LQVWHDG KLV KRPRSKRELD DQG PLVRJ\Q\ ZRXOG
be interrogated while his anticolonial discourse was engaged as a still 
YDOXDEOH\HWPHGLDWHGLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ´0XxR]+HQFHLWLVDWWKH
FURVVURDGVRILWVGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQVZLWKERWKTXHHUDQGDQWLUDFLVWLGHRORJLHV
that queer of color critique emerges as a counter-hegemonic ideological 
formation in its own right: “‘Queerness’ and ‘blackness’ need to be read as 
ideological discourses that contain contradictory impulses within them—
VRPHOLEHUDWRU\RWKHUVUHDFWLRQDU\7KHOHQVRIGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQDOORZV
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us to discern seams and contradictions and ultimately understand the need 
for a war of position” (115). That a queer of color war of position primarily 
RSHUDWHV WRGD\ ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOG RI TXHHU WKHRU\²ZKHUH LW VWUXJJOHV WR
hegemonize the color line—should not blind us to its complex politics of 
positionality across a terrain of multiple antagonisms.                   
Muñoz’s text begins to suggest how queer of color critique mediates 
the contemporary “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory.53 However, it 
is Ferguson, in Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique 
(2004), who explicitly deploys an historical materialist analysis to frame 
the intervention of this emerging theoretical formation. Following Muñoz, 
Ferguson argues that the very relation between queer of color critique 
DQG0DU[LVP LV LQ IDFW D UHODWLRQ RI GLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ ³4XHHU RI FRORU
DQDO\VLVGLVLGHQWL¿HVZLWKKLVWRULFDOPDWHULDOLVPWRrethink its categories 
and how they might conceal the materiality of race, gender, and sexuality. 
In this instance, to disidentify in no ways means to discard” (5). To this 
extent, Ferguson’s approach to Marxism is not dissimilar from Floyd’s. 
+RZHYHU ZKLOH )OR\G¶V UHUHDGLQJ RI UHL¿FDWLRQ DQG WRWDOLW\ WHQGV WR
track the materiality of sexual bodies as an objective effect of the laws 
of capitalism,54 Ferguson emphasizes that culture—or ideology, following 
Hall’s approach to the concept—is the primary site where to retrieve that 
PDWHULDOLW\QRWEHFDXVHUDFHJHQGHUDQGVH[XDOLW\DUHPDWWHUVRI³PHUHO\
FXOWXUDO´FRQFHUQEXWEHFDXVHFXOWXUHLVDVLWHWKDW³FRPSHOVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV
with and antagonisms to the normative ideals promoted by state and capital. 
$VLWIRVWHUVERWKLGHQWL¿FDWLRQVDQGDQWDJRQLVPVFXOWXUHEHFRPHVD
site of material struggle” (3). It is such an understanding of culture that 
JURXQGV)HUJXVRQ¶VGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQZLWK0DU[LVP
$V WKH VLWH RI LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ FXOWXUH EHFRPHV WKH WHUUDLQ LQ ZKLFK
formations seemingly antagonistic to liberalism, like marxism and 
revolutionary nationalism, converge with liberal ideology, precisely 
WKURXJK WKHLU LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ ZLWK JHQGHU DQG VH[XDO QRUPV DQG
ideals. Queer of color analysis must examine how culture as a site of 
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQSURGXFHVVXFKRGGEHGIHOORZVDQGKRZLW²DVWKHORFDWLRQ
of antagonisms—fosters unimagined alliances. (Ferguson 2004, 3)
Ferguson’s analysis of industrialization in the early twentieth century 
illustrates how culture emerges from the contradictions between state and 
capital as such a site of material struggle. According to his reconstruction, 
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the process of industrialization in the United States was accompanied by 
waves of African American migration to Northern urban centers (Ferguson 
2004, 39). This gave rise to the formation of the African American 
neighborhood as a “vice district”: “African American vice districts were 
socially heterogeneous zones in which blacks and whites, as well as 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, could congregate” (40). The concentration 
RI D GLVSODFHG UDFLDOL]HG SRSXODWLRQ LQ VSHFL¿F QHLJKERUKRRGV GULYHQ
by industrialization, turned such neighborhoods into sites of gendered 
and sexual heterogeneity. As Ferguson recalls by focusing especially on 
the context of Chicago, a typical instance of this heterogeneity were the 
black and tans, that is, “parties known for open displays of sex, for their 
inversion of racial hierarchies, for ‘race mixing,’ and as sites from which 
same-sex relationships and identities could emerge” (40). However, as 
industrialization produced the conditions of possibility for such racialized 
nonheteronormative formations to take shape, the latter also became the 
site for the articulation of competing ideological discourses.
On the one hand, a state discourse emerged. For instance, city 
governments in Chicago and elsewhere enacted laws against vice that led 
to increased surveillance of African American neighborhoods, including 
recurrent police raids of black and tans and other such instances of racial 
and sexual transgression (Ferguson 2004, 41). Moreover, a discourse 
concerning black cultural difference became central to New Deal policies. 
African American gender, sexual, and kinship practices—brought into 
view and reshaped, in fact, by industrialization and migration—came to be 
understood as “cultural” causes of poverty and as barriers to assimilation 
that welfare programs must help remove. In this way, Ferguson observes, 
the ideological articulation of African American cultural difference 
emerged from the contradictions between state and capital: “By investing 
culture with moral agency, New Deal ideology obscured the contradictions 
between the state’s enforcement of heteropatriarchal ideals and capital’s 
encouragement of African American nonheteronormative formations” (38). 
On the other hand, Ferguson tracks the ways in which New Deal ideology 
was sustained by the discourse of the new Chicago School of sociology, 
formed through the 1920s and 1930s and specializing on urban sociology. 
Chicago School sociologists regarded the racial heterogeneity produced 
by African American migration, and the consequent gendered and sexual 
heterogeneity to be found in African American neighborhoods, as symptoms 
of the social disorganization caused by industrialization. What was coded 
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as “vice” by state ideology was articulated as “deviance” in sociological 
terms. Ferguson comments: “The Chicago School’s construction of African 
American neighborhoods as outside heteropatriarchal normalization 
XQGHUZURWHPXQLFLSDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHJXODWLRQRI>&KLFDJR¶V@6RXWK6LGH
making African American neighborhoods the point at which both a will to 
knowledge and a will to exclude intersected” (41). In other words, state 
discourse and sociological discourse overlapped and sustained each other.
Finally, converging with both state ideology and Chicago School 
sociology on the terrain of culture was also the black cultural nationalism 
articulated, among others, by Richard Wright. Ferguson highlights that 
Wright made direct use of both sociological theories of social disorganization 
and Marxism in order to formulate his black nationalist ideology: “Wright 
drew upon marxism and sociology to narrate the gendered and sexual 
transgressions inspired by industrial capital. Borrowing from sociology, 
Wright’s work located African American nonheteronormative formations 
within the feminizing dysfunctions of capital” (Ferguson 2004, 44). 
So, Wright’s work reproduced the Chicago School’s normative view of 
African American gendered and sexual heterogeneity, yet supplemented 
with black nationalist investment: against the feminization brought 
about by industrialization, black political agency must be muscular and 
masculine. Ferguson writes: “While installing an antiracist practice, this 
version of nationalism proved aggressively heteropatriarchal. Emerging 
RXW RI WKH FRQWH[W RI JHQGHU DQG VH[XDO ÀXLGLW\ DQG GLYHUVLW\:ULJKW¶V
QDWLRQDOLVP ZRUNHG WR NHHS WKDW ÀXLGLW\ DQG GLYHUVLW\ DW ED\ WKURXJK
heteropatriarchal regulation” (45). Thus, from a queer of color vantage 
point, Wright participated in the hegemonic regime of sexual regulation 
targeting nonheteronormative formations.
The task of queer of color critique, as formulated by Ferguson, is 
to retrieve those nonheteronormative formations as the ground for both 
theoretical and political practice. In other words, Ferguson does not reduce 
the preoccupations with gendered and sexual heterogeneity to be found in 
VWDWHVRFLRORJLFDODQGEODFNQDWLRQDOLVWLGHRORJLHVWRPHUHP\VWL¿FDWLRQV
of African American reality. Rather, he questions their heteropatriarchal 
regulation of that heterogeneity. As he argues, this attempt to regulate was 
¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW VXVWDLQHG E\ DQ LGHRORJ\ RI transparency, which led 
those competing discourses to posit gendered and sexual heterogeneity as 
a direct symptom of capitalism—a pathological effect of industrialization. 
Against such transparent readings, queer of color critique sets out to revisit 
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¿JXUHV DQG IRUPDWLRQV RI UDFLDOL]HG QRQKHWHURQRUPDWLYLW\ DV VLWHV RI
FRXQWHUKHJHPRQLFLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ
2QHVXFK¿JXUHLVWREHIRXQGLQ&RQUDG%HQW]HQ¶VVRFLRORJLFDOVWXG\
of a black and tan (Bentzen 1938). Bentzen, a student of Chicago School 
sociologist Ernest Burgess, conducted in 1938 an ethnographic study of a 
black and tan cabaret in the South Side of Chicago, where he could observe 
the performance of a transgendered mulatta. Ferguson quotes him:
(YHU\ QLJKW ZH ZLOO ¿QG WKH SODFH FURZGHG ZLWK ERWK UDFHV WKH
black and the white, both types of lovers, the homo and the hetro 
>sic@%HIRUHORQJWKHRUFKHVWUDVWULNHVXSDWXQHDQGWKHPDVWHURI
ceremonies appears on the stage. This person is a huge mulatto with 
wide shoulders and narrow hips. . . . It is a lascivious creature that 
strikes the normal as extremely repulsive. With a deep husky voice it 
begins to sing a wild song and as the tempo increases the stage rapidly 
¿OOVZLWKDUHPDUNDEOHFROOHFWLRQRIVH[XDOLQGHWHUPLQDQWV%HQW]HQ
quoted in Ferguson 2004, 40)
Bentzen reads the transgendered mulatta as a pathological symptom 
of industrialization. This reading—offered, in this case, by canonical 
sociology, yet virtually by state ideology and black nationalism as well—
parallels Marx’s own reading of the prostitute in the Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 >@  ZLWK ZKLFK )HUJXVRQ
opens Aberrations in Black. Ferguson quotes Marx: “Prostitution is only 
a VSHFL¿F expression of the general prostitution of the laborer. . . . In the 
approach to woman as the spoil and handmaid of communal lust is expressed 
WKHLQ¿QLWHGHJUDGDWLRQLQZKLFKPDQH[LVWVIRUKLPVHOI´0DU[TXRWHGLQ
Ferguson 2004, 7-8). As state ideology, Chicago School sociology, and 
black nationalism converged, in the early twentieth century in the United 
States, in their reading of African American nonheteronormativity as a 
pathological effect of industrialization, Ferguson observes that bourgeois 
ideology and Marxism converged, in the nineteenth century, in their 
reading of the working class as pathologically sexual (8-9). The prostitute 
LQ 0DU[ DQG WKH WUDQVJHQGHUHG PXODWWD LQ %HQW]HQ DUH ¿JXUHV RI VXFK
pathologizing readings.55 For Ferguson, as already mentioned, an ideology 
of transparency underlies these readings:
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Taking the prostitute to be the obvious and transparent sign of capital, 
at what point could Marx approach the prostitute and her alleged 
pathologies as discursive questions, rather than as the real and 
REMHFWLYHRXWFRPHVRIFDSLWDOLVWVRFLDOUHODWLRQV"$WZKDWSRLQWPLJKW
he then consider the prostitute and others like her to be potential sites 
IURPZKLFKWRFULWLTXHFDSLWDO")HUJXVRQ
           
As Ferguson suggests, only by disidentifying with Marxism, black 
nationalism, and any transparent reading of the social can queer of color 
FULWLTXHUHFRYHU¿JXUHVRIUDFLDOL]HGQRQKHWHURQRUPDWLYLW\IRUWKHDUWLFXODWLRQ
of queer critical standpoints on the social formation. At this point, it is 
important to emphasize that, in Ferguson’s analysis, the nonheteronormative 
does not just coincide with transgressions of heterosexuality and the 
gender binary recognizable as such. More broadly, as his recovery of 
the prostitute from Marx’s text suggests, the nonheteronormative names 
various gender, sexual, and kinship formations that do not conform to the 
dictates of heteropatriarchal regulation. The female-headed household, 
for instance, emerges throughout Aberrations in BlackDVDNH\¿JXUHRI
the nonheteronormative, troubling in equal measure the ideologies of the 
state, of canonical sociology, and of black nationalism. Like the “vice 
district” and the emergence of gendered and sexual transgressions in it, 
the female-headed household was read as a moral perversion of African 
American culture by New Dealers, who would exclude single mothers from 
WKHDOORFDWLRQRIEHQH¿WV)HUJXVRQDQGDVRQHRIWKHIHPLQL]LQJ
effects of industrialization by Wright (46-53).56  
By placing particular emphasis on the African American female-
KHDGHGKRXVHKROGDVD¿JXUHRIWKHQRQKHWHURQRUPDWLYH)HUJXVRQWDNHV
up Cathy Cohen’s famous call for queer theory and politics to make space 
IRUQRQQRUPDWLYH¿JXUHV VXFKDV WKH³ZHOIDUHTXHHQ´ &&RKHQ
This is no simple gesture of liberal inclusion. Rather, it is precisely in this 
VLJQL¿FDQWH[SDQVLRQRIWKHQRQKHWHURQRUPDWLYHWKDWZHFDQORFDWHDZD\
in which Ferguson’s text, like Cohen’s, participates in the contemporary 
struggle to hegemonize the color line in queer theory. Indeed, Ferguson 
DI¿UPV WKDW ³>W@KH UDFLDOL]HG HURWLFL]DWLRQ RI EODFN KHWHURVH[XDOV DQG
homosexuals outside the rationalized (i.e., heteronormative) household 
symbolically aligned black straight and gay persons” (Ferguson 2004, 87). 
7KLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWWKHYDULRXV¿JXUHVRIWKHQRQKHWHURQRUPDWLYHPXVW
be understood in a relation of pure equivalence, or that Ferguson abdicates 
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the critical task of calling into question the articulations of African 
American heteropatriarchy. On the contrary, we saw how a critique of 
heteropatriarchal black nationalism takes center stage in his project. But it 
is precisely through this critique—of black nationalist attempts to discipline 
African American gendered and sexual heterogeneity—that Ferguson can 
recover African American formations as sites of nonheteronormativity 
broadly understood. In this way, he can formulate a project of queer of 
color critique that does not just add color to queer, but invests the color line 
as such with queerness. 
Ferguson’s expansion of the nonheteronormative also sustains his key 
turn, in the last chapter of Aberrations in Black, to the history and works of 
women of color and black lesbian feminists, such as the Combahee River 
Collective, Barbara Smith, and Audre Lorde.57 Amy Villarejo suggests as 
much: “Ultimately, Ferguson cements feminist critique with queer critique 
through two key descriptors of his object, naturalized ‘heteropatriarchy’ 
and its companion term, the ‘nonheteronormative’” (Villarejo 2005, 72). 
Ferguson situates the emergence of women of color and black lesbian 
feminist formations in the 1970s and 1980s, yet in an ideological context 
resembling to a certain extent the early twentieth century, that is, at the 
crossroads of competing ideological discourses converging on the terrain of 
heteropatriarchy. First of all, Ferguson states: “These feminist formations 
can be located within the wake of Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 text, 
The Negro Family: A Case for National Action (popularly known as the 
Moynihan Report)” (Ferguson 2004, 111). As he recalls, the Moynihan 
Report was commissioned one year after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and it 
was meant to provide a sociological analysis of the factors preventing a full 
realization of racial equality. The report substantially reiterates the normative 
assumptions of Chicago School sociologists and early-twentieth-century 
New Dealers, identifying the biggest impediment to the realization of civil 
rights in the African American dysfunctional family. According to the report, 
not only the history of slavery and segregation has castrated the black man, 
thus removing him from his leadership place in the family, but has proceeded 
to replace black men with black women, giving rise to dysfunctional (read: 
nonheteronormative) female-headed households (119-122). 
A similar reading was shared at the time by black and anticolonial 
revolutionary movements. Ferguson traces various articulations of 
revolutionary agency—through the ideologies of the Black Power 
movement and the Marxist-Leninist Black Panther Party (BPP) as well 
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as in the work of revolutionary theorists and leaders such as Fanon and 
Amílcar Cabral—as attempts to recover heteropatriarchal masculinity 
(Ferguson 2004, 112-115).58 As he argues, anticolonial and black 
revolutionary movements were critical of civil rights, cultural nationalism, 
and U.S. nationalism, yet largely converged with all of them on the terrain 
of heteropatriarchy. Women of color and black lesbian feminist formations 
emerged in the United States out of this ideological context, and in a 
relation of antagonism with a predominantly white feminist movement: 
“Rendered invisible by the political subjects of hegemonic feminism, 
minority nationalism, and marxism, women of color feminists attempted 
to articulate identity formations that would work to negate the nationalist 
presumptions and protocols of identity” (126). Or, in my own terms, they 
articulated a counter-hegemonic intersectional identity politics.
:KLOH)HUJXVRQ HPSKDVL]HVEODFN IHPLQLVP¶VGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQZLWK
black revolutionary movements in the 1970s and 1980s—and Aberrations 
in Black is predominantly framed as an intervention in American studies—
in times of homonormativity queer of color critique conducts a key struggle 
ZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\DQG/*%74IRUPDWLRQV59 Aberrations in 
Black does not explicitly address the problem of homonormativity.60 Yet 
Martin F. Manalansan IV takes up Ferguson’s reading strategy in “Race, 
Violence, and Neoliberal Spatial Politics in the Global City” (2005), in 
order to analyze, by means of ethnography, the combined effects of 
KRPRQRUPDWLYLW\DQGQHROLEHUDOJHQWUL¿FDWLRQSURFHVVHVRQFRQWHPSRUDU\
queer of color formations in New York. Manalansan’s analysis focuses on 
the transformations affecting the neighborhood of Jackson Heights and 
Christopher Street. For example, through the narratives of his informants, 
he observes how the racially diverse neighborhood of Jackson Heights—
where “gay bars and other queer spaces coexist with the multiethnic 
enclave economies that inhabit the same geographic location” (45)—
mutated in the aftermath of 9/11. On the one hand, increasing police 
surveillance both undermined the presence of communities of color in 
public space and provoked the dispersal of practices of public sex that used 
to characterize the neighborhood (45-47). On the other hand, this coincided 
with the emergence of a portrayal of Jackson Heights, in the mainstream 
gay press, as a new “gay mecca.” For example, Manalansan quotes an 
article appeared in NEXT, a weekly gay guide to New York: “Might there 
be something that Manhattan snobs (like myself) are missing out on in 
WKRVHRWKHUERURXJKV"7R¿QGRXWDIHZIULHQGVDQG,JRW0HWURFDUGV
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brushed up on our Spanish, prepared ourselves for the unknown, and 
ventured out to Jackson Heights, a racially diverse neighborhood in 
Queens which hosts a thriving gay scene and sublime Mexican food” 
(NEXT, quoted in Manalansan 2005, 47). For the middle-class gay man 
from Manhattan, Jackson Heights appears as a space of both sexual and 
ethnic consumption. According to Manalansan, the narrative of loss 
offered by his queer of color informants and the narrative of gay consumer 
excitement articulated by NEXT are not just two contradictory narratives 
about the same neighborhood, but “mutually constitutive elements of a 
neoliberal portrayal of Jackson Heights” (Manalansan 2005, 49).61 As this 
DQDO\VLVVKRZVKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\LQWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\PDWHULDOL]HV
as yet another ideological formation that participates in the disciplining of 
nonheteronormative racial difference. 
It is through Manalansan’s essay that race makes its only incursion 
in Floyd’s analysis, during his discussion of homonormativity in the last 
chapter of 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQ RI'HVLUH.62 The way in which this incursion 
takes place is worth examining. According to Floyd, Manalansan’s reading 
of the spatial politics affecting Jackson Heights and Christopher Street 
can be understood as an “update” on Berlant and Warner’s (1998) earlier 
analysis of the neoliberal attack on public sexual cultures in New York, 
such as the zoning law with which the Giuliani administration helped 
dispersing the sexual culture of Times Square (Floyd 2009, 205). In Floyd’s 
YLHZ0DQDODQVDQ¶V UHDGLQJ UHYHDOV WKH VSHFL¿FRSHUDWLRQVRIQHROLEHUDO
homonormativity at the time of the “war on terror.”63 Drawing on David 
Harvey, he argues that homonormativity after 9/11 must be understood 
within a context of raising authoritarianism: “David Harvey remarks of 
this simultaneously neoliberal and militarized conjuncture that ‘the U.S. 
has given up on hegemony through consent and resorts more and more to 
domination through coercion’” (207).64 According to this reading, the racial 
operations of homonormativity tracked by Manalansan via ethnography 
appear as one instance among others of coercive state power—a state that 
has given up on the construction of hegemony through consent. 
Although there is some truth in this reading, two problems emerge. First, 
recalling Hall’s conceptualization of Thatcherism as a form of authoritarian 
SRSXOLVP+DOO>@ZHPD\DVNZKDWLVKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\LIQRW
the product of politico-ideological practices that work to construct consent 
WR DXWKRULWDULDQ QHROLEHUDOLVP" 7KLV LV SUHFLVHO\ why homonormativity 
has emerged as a central problem transforming and recomposing the 
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FRQWHPSRUDU\¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\:KLOHWKHQHROLEHUDOEORFLVQDYLJDWLQJ
an evident crisis of legitimacy, the problem of homonormativity points at 
the fact that broad segments of LGBTQ formations seem to be the least 
interested in taking part in the construction of a counter-hegemony. I suggest 
that a privileging of coercion over consent does not describe the relation 
between homonormativity and neoliberalism as such. Rather, it depends on 
Manalansan’s choice to center, in his analysis, the segments of the LGBTQ 
community that are most directly affected by the contemporary operations 
of state and market forces, thus emphasizing the authoritarian effects of 
neoliberalization. Floyd, however, appropriates Manalansan’s analysis 
(through Harvey) as a transparent rendering of the articulated operations 
of homonormativity and neoliberalism: as a theory of the relation between 
the two. This leads us to a second problem with his appropriation. Queer of 
color critique makes this incursion in 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH in order to 
specify the objective effects of neoliberalization in its current phase. We may 
speculate on the extent to which this appropriation of queer of color critique as 
a transparent optic is facilitated by the ethnographic nature of Manalansan’s 
essay. Certainly, Floyd’s redeployment of Manalansan’s analysis tends to 
obscure the fact that, as any counter-ideological formation, queer of color 
critique does install itself on a “real” ground but it also “reads” that ground. 
Ferguson himself seems to suggest this point in an essay titled “To Be 
Fluent in Each Other’s Narratives: Surplus Populations and Queer of Color 
Activism” (2010). The essay addresses the relations between queer of 
color intellectual labor, queer of color activism, and communities of color. 
Here, Ferguson signals the limits of Gramsci’s theorization of the “organic 
LQWHOOHFWXDO´ ,Q KLV YLHZ ³*UDPVFL XQIRUWXQDWHO\ SURPRWHG D ¿FWLRQ RI
immediacy that has helped to shape understandings of radical intellectuals’ 
and activists’ relationships with marginalized communities—a theory 
LQ ZKLFK WKH LQWHOOHFWXDO LV WKH UHÀHFWLRQ RI WKH GRZQWURGGHQ DQG WKH
compromised—as if” (157). Yet rather than dismissing the concept of the 
organic intellectual, Ferguson turns to its particular rearticulation in Hall’s 
work and, more broadly, in the work carried out at the CCCS at the time 
of Thatcherism. He writes: “The need for progressive interventions was 
HYLGHQW EXW VRZDV WKH REOLJDWLRQ WR SXW DVLGH ¿FWLRQV WKDW WKH KLVWRULF
conditions and the potential interventions of progressive actors would be 
transparent and wholly intelligible” (158).65 The same spirit must guide our 
understanding of the contemporary intervention of queer of color critique. 
Certainly the latter mediates today our understanding of homonormativity 
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and the “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory because racial antagonisms 
are central both to the operations of homonormativity and to the broader 
historical conjuncture. However, we gain less by apprehending this 
intersectional intervention just as a transparent rendering of the present 
conjuncture than by appreciating the ideological work it performs within 
WKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\WKHstruggle it conducts to hegemonize the color 
OLQH$WVWDNHLVDPRUHJHQHUDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVSHFL¿FVRFLDOORFDWLRQ
of theoretical practice and intellectual labor. I continue to address these 
questions in the next section by recovering the political life narrative of 
Gloria Wekker, an Afro-Dutch lesbian feminist who has been navigating 
feminist, antiracist, and LGBTQ formations as well as institutional spaces, 
especially within the university, from the 1970s to the present.   
Harming the Institution: 
The Political Life Narrative of Gloria Wekker
On February 13, 2015, students and staff members of the University of 
Amsterdam occupied the Bungehuis, where the Faculty of Humanities 
is located, to oppose a plan of severe budget cuts. The occupation ended 
with the eviction of the protesters by the police. Thus, on February 25, 
student organizations and unions organized a demonstration to protest 
KRZWKHXQLYHUVLW\DGPLQLVWUDWLRQKDGGHDOWZLWKWKH¿UVWRFFXSDWLRQ7KH
demonstration morphed into a new occupation, now of the Maagdenhuis, 
the main administrative building of the University of Amsterdam. As soon 
as the protests crystallized into a discussion about the democratization of 
the university, a University of Color (UoC) collective formed in order to 
DI¿UPWKDW WKHUHFDQEHQRGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQZLWKRXWGHFRORQL]DWLRQ7KH
story of UoC parallels that of similar political formations elsewhere, most 
notably the emergence of the South African student movement Rhodes 
Must Fall within the folds of the movement for a free education, Fees Must 
Fall.66 Moreover, like Rhodes Must Fall as well as Black Lives Matter, if 
operating on a smaller scale, UoC is primarily organized around the problem 
of the color line and the decolonization of knowledge but is explicitly 
intersectional in content and composition.67 Working together with other 
collectives already present at the University of Amsterdam, UoC was at 
the forefront of the process that led to the establishment of a Diversity 
Commission in charge of transforming the structure of the university and 
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its curricula.68 Afro-Dutch lesbian feminist and anthropologist Gloria 
Wekker was asked to chair the Commission, and she accepted.
I conclude this chapter by recovering Wekker’s political life narrative, 
in order to pose two different sets of questions.69 On the one hand, how have 
contemporary antiracist formations come to be led by women and queers 
RIFRORU",KDYHEHHQDUJXLQJVRIDUWKDWTXHHURIFRORUFULWLTXHPHGLDWHV
today the debate on homonormativity and the reencounter between queer 
theory and Marxism by struggling to hegemonize the color line within the 
¿HOG+DVWKLVVWUXJJOHEHHQSDUDOOHOHGE\DKHJHPRQL]DWLRQRIJHQGHUDQG
VH[XDOLW\ZLWKLQWKHSROLWLFDOVSDFHRIDQWLUDFLVP"+DVDQWLUDFLVWRUJDQL]LQJ
become a privileged site for the articulation of a queer intersectional 
VWDQGSRLQWRUHYHQDTXHHU0DU[LVP",DGGUHVV WKHVHTXHVWLRQV WKURXJK
:HNNHU¶VVWRU\KHQFHIRFXVLQJRQWKHVSHFL¿FLWLHVRIWKH'XWFKFRQWH[W
On the other hand, tracing not only Wekker’s passages through feminist, 
antiracist, and LGBTQ formations, but also her seizing of institutional 
spaces, I ask how intellectual labor performed within the university relates 
WRWKHVHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVLQWKHSROLWLFDO¿HOG
:HNNHU KDV EHHQ D FHQWUDO ¿JXUH LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI IHPLQLVW
and queer of color theory and politics in Europe. She was born in 1950 
in Paramaribo, Suriname, and moved with her parents and siblings to the 
Netherlands in 1951. As she recalls during an interview I conducted with 
KHUKHU IDPLO\ZDVRQHRI WKH¿UVW6XULQDPHVH IDPLOLHV WRDUULYH LQ WKH
Netherlands, before the wave of migration that took place in the wake of 
Suriname’s independence in 1975. While studying law at the Radboud 
University of Nijmegen in the late 1960s—after a travel to the United 
States as a high school student, which had brought her into contact with 
black liberation—Wekker found herself involved in the Dutch anticolonial 
movement, mostly composed of students from Suriname and the Antilles. 
She recalls:
this is 1969, and they were also into texts of Huey Newton . . . all 
those Black Panthers writing in the United States, and translating 
their work. . . . So, for a lot of black women, our trajectory was . . . 
¿UVWDQWLFRORQLDOPRYHPHQWZLWKPHQZKRZHUHGRPLQDQWDQGZKR
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In Wekker’s memory, at least two events mark the emergence of 
UDFLDO DQWDJRQLVPV ZLWKLQ WKH 'XWFK ZKLWH IHPLQLVW PRYHPHQW ¿UVW
a confrontation that took place at the Winter University of Women’s 
Studies held in Nijmegen in 1983, where black feminists protested their 
PDUJLQDOL]DWLRQ LQ WKH SURJUDP70 second, the publication in 1982 of an 
article by Philomena Essed, titled “Racisme and feminisme” (Racism 
and Feminism) (1982), in the Dutch Socialisties feministiese teksten 
(Socialist Feminist Journal). Thus, it was in 1984 when Wekker, together 
with Tania Leon, Tineke Sumter, and José Maas, formed Sister Outsider, 
a black lesbian feminist literary collective. As Wekker recalls, by the time 
the group was formed traces of the earlier anticolonial movement had 
vanished and men had not organized into a broad antiracist movement.71 It 
was women of color—especially lesbian women—who gave rise and came 
to lead antiracist organizing in the Netherlands in the 1980s.72          
In a comparative analysis of queer of color mobilization in the Netherlands 
and the United States, Nicholas Boston and Jan Willem Duyvendak offer 
very different portraits of the two contexts (Boston and Duyvendak 2015). 
Boston traces a lively trajectory in the United States, from the black lesbian 
feminism of the 1970s and 1980s, through queer of color visibility within 
WKH/*%74PRYHPHQWLQWKHVWRWKHVKLIWVLQWKHYHU\GH¿QLWLRQRI
queer of color identity in the context of an expanding multiculturalism in 
the 1990s and 2000s (138-141). According to Duyvendak’s reconstruction, 
LQVWHDGUDFHDQGVH[XDOLW\EHJDQWRLQWHUVHFWLQWKH1HWKHUODQGVLQVLJQL¿FDQW
ways only in the early 2000s, when white Dutch gay politician Pim Fortuyn 
appeared on the political scene combining a commitment to sexual freedom 
and gay rights, a support for neoliberal deregulation, and an attack on 
immigration and Islam. Fortuyn, who was murdered by an environmental 
activist only nine days before the general election of 2002, constructed his 
political platform by drawing on the history of Dutch progressive sexual 
movements and by capitalizing, at the same time, on the terrorist attacks of 
9/11. His 2002 electoral campaign was centered around the argument that the 
struggles conducted in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s to secularize 
WKHVRFLDOIDEULFDQGWRDI¿UPVH[XDOIUHHGRPZHUHQRZEHLQJLQYDOLGDWHG
by new migrant communities of Muslim background, constructed as the 
bearers of a heteropatriarchal cultural difference.73 In Duyvendak’s view, it 
is only in this context that sexual politics came to be articulated to race and 
homosexuality itself entered the Dutch public debate again, after it had been 
depoliticized throughout the 1990s (142). 
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7KLVDQDO\VLVSURFHHGVIURPDVSHFL¿FXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHUHODWLRQV
of force between the Dutch LGBT movement and the state. Duyvendak has 
been developing this analysis for several years. According to his reading, 
the close cooperation between the state and the movement has historically 
prevented the latter from radicalizing in ways comparable to other national 
contexts, such as France or the United States. In his comparative essay 
with Boston about queer of color mobilization, he focuses especially on the 
matter of civil rights legislation. Elsewhere, he argues that central to the 
relation between the LGBT movement and the Dutch state has been their 
exceptional cooperation in the context of the AIDS crisis. As he observes 
in “The Depoliticization of the Dutch Gay Identity” (1996), gay men in 
the Netherlands were even put in the position of actively determining 
governmental policies concerning AIDS, especially during the early years 
of the epidemic. Hence, “homosexuals did not have to take the streets 
in the Netherlands—after all, the campaign against the epidemic was in 
their hands” (424). And in “Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural 
Citizenship in the Netherlands” (2010), Paul Mepschen, Duyvendak, and 
Evelien Tonkens argue that such a depoliticization of Dutch gay identity 
helped preparing the ground, retrospectively, for its successful articulation 
within the nationalist and racist ideological discourse put forward by Pim 
Fortuyn in the early 2000s.
Duyvendak’s analysis is valuable, for it situates sexual politics 
in relation to the Dutch corporativist approach to politics (or “polder 
model”), hence specifying the balance of forces that has presided over 
the exceptional traction gained by homonormativity in the Netherlands. 
However, especially in the context of a discussion about queer of color 
mobilization, that analysis risks morphing into a narrative of white gay 
exceptionalism. In her own discussion of the depoliticization of the Dutch 
LGBT movement, Wekker partly agrees with Duyvendak, yet she suggests 
that the articulation between the movement and the state in the context of 
the AIDS crisis must be read also through the operations of the color line: 
white gay men, in collaboration with the Dutch state, were able to carve 
RXWVRPHVLJQL¿FDQWLQVWLWXWLRQDOQLFKHVLQWKHVWUXJJOHDJDLQVW+,9
AIDS, which still exist to this day (Duyvendak 1996). . . . A division 
RIODERURIWHQWDNHVSODFHLQWKH$,'6RUJDQL]DWLRQDO¿HOGLQZKLFK
people of color are the objects of care, not independent knowers, and 
white people are the subjects of knowledge, the experts, even when 
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the target populations are people of color. However, such questions 
hardly ever surface in the gay movement. (Wekker 2016, 116-117)74
,QRUGHUWRDI¿UPWKDWUDFHZDVLUUHOHYDQWWR'XWFKVH[XDOSROLWLFVXQWLOWKH
appearance of Fortuyn on the political scene in the early 2000s, Duyvendak 
needs to avoid mentioning Sister Outsider as well as Suho, an earlier group 
of Surinamese gays and lesbians based in Amsterdam.75 Wekker, on the 
contrary, argues that the facility with which major segments of the Dutch 
LGBTQ movement came to identify with Fortuyn, and more recently even 
supported the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) led by Geert Wilders,76 
must be understood in light of the “invisible” color line running through 
WKHKLVWRU\RIWKHPRYHPHQW+HUUHDGLQJRIWKH¿JXUHRI)RUWX\QDYRLGV
fetishizing the turning point of 9/11 and is preceded, instead, by an analysis 
of the racial antagonisms within the Dutch LGBTQ movement throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, including the presence of queer of color formations 
:HNNHU   ,Q KHU YLHZ WKH VSHFL¿F UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH
movement and the state diagnosed by Duyvendak has not just prepared the 
terrain for the appearance of race in the 2000s, but rather has been mediated 
by the problem of the color line since its inception. Duyvendak’s failure to 
read this mediation leads him to circumvent the existence of Dutch queer 
of color formations in the 1980s precisely in a piece devoted to queer of 
color mobilization.
7REHVXUH'X\YHQGDN¶VRPLVVLRQRIWKHVSHFL¿FH[SHULHQFHRI6LVWHU
Outsider may be due to the fact that the group did not operate, strictly 
speaking, within the space of the LGBTQ movement.77 However, such an 
omission contrasts with the reconstruction of queer of color mobilization 
in the United States offered by Boston in the same essay. Boston’s account 
does begin precisely with black lesbian feminism (Boston and Duyvendak 
2015, 138). Interestingly, integrating black lesbian feminist organizing 
within the genealogy of queer of color mobilization in the Netherlands—
in particular the story of Sister Outsider—would reveal not just more 
similarities between the Netherlands and the United States, but a history of 
encounter and cross-fertilization. This history was crucially mediated by 
WKH¿JXUHRI$XGUH/RUGH,WLVZHOONQRZQWKDW/RUGHVSHQWDVLJQL¿FDQW
amount of time in Berlin from 1984 to 1992, and that she was instrumental 
to the emergence of an Afro-German movement.78 Perhaps less known is 
the fact that, during those years, Lorde also visited the Netherlands, invited 
E\6LVWHU2XWVLGHU:HNNHUUHFDOOVKHU¿UVWHQFRXQWHUZLWK/RUGH¶VZULWLQJ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Once I had a meeting in Rotterdam while I was working for the 
Ministry, and I went to the women’s bookstore in Rotterdam. I was 
looking at books and there I saw this beautiful purple color book with 
a lot of clouds on it and the cover, the cover of a book is so important. 
. . . Anyway, the cover of the book really spoke to me, so I started 
reading the back cover and this was the book of a black lesbian writing 
about her life: Zami, it was Zami.79        
:HNNHUUHPHPEHUVWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQVWKDWZami made possible for her—
from the memory of growing up as a black child to the experiences of 
dating white women as a black lesbian.80 Not long after her encounter with 
Zami, Sister Outsider was formed, named after the famous collection of 
Lorde’s writings published the same year (Lorde 1984). When Wekker 
heard that Lorde would come to teach at the Free University in Berlin in 
the summer of 1984, she wrote to her publisher, Kitchen Table Press in 
New York, and invited her to Amsterdam. Lorde visited Amsterdam twice, 
in 1984 and 1986.
In European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe 
(2011), Fatima El-Tayeb offers a reading of Lorde’s impact on the Afro-
German movement. It is the pivotal role played by Lorde that made it 
possible for that movement to take shape from its inception around the 
standpoint of queer black women. For example, Showing Our Colors: 
Afro-German Women Speak Out>@DYROXPHHGLWHGE\$IUR
German activists Katharina Oguntoye and May Opitz also thanks to the 
intervention of Lorde,81 is considered to be the foundational text for the 
Afro-German movement as a whole. El-Tayeb insists on the difference 
that it made for the movement to take root through the work of queer black 
women: “because of the central role of Showing Our Colors, the life stories 
of women stood for the emerging community of Afro-Germans as a whole, 
thus radically changing the usual pattern in which the male experience is 
presented as normative. . . . This differentiated black Germans from almost 
any other ethnic, diasporic, or nationalist movement in which typically 
women, as well as queers, while taking part in the struggle additionally 
KDYHWR¿JKWIRUWKHLULQFOXVLRQLQDFRPPXQDO:H´(O7D\HE
Moreover, the reach of this inaugural queer feminist standpoint extended 
well beyond the group of women who worked with Lorde in Berlin and 
who participated in the project of Showing Our Colors. As El-Tayeb 
points out, the Initiative Schwarze Deutsche (Initiative Black Germans) 
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,6'ZKLFKUHVXOWHGIURPWKH¿UVWQDWLRQDOPHHWLQJRIEODFN*HUPDQVLQ
DUWLFXODWHGDIHPLQLVWDQGWUDQVQDWLRQDOGLVFRXUVHIURPWKHVWDUWDQG
ADEFRA, a network of Afro-German women founded in 1986, added a 
strong lesbian presence to black German organizing (70-71). Even today, 
LIFRQÀLFWVRYHUVH[XDOLW\HPHUJHZLWKLQWKHPRYHPHQW(O7D\HEUHPDUNV
WKDW³>G@XHWRWKHLUZHOONQRZQFHQWUDOUROHOHVELDQDQGIHPLQLVWDFWLYLVWV
cannot easily be marginalized as irrelevant or dangerous to a black German 
movement that was decisively shaped by them” (72). While the history 
of a movement does not determine its shape, it certainly contributes to 
articulate the balance of forces within it. 
$VLPLODUWUDMHFWRU\GH¿QHVWKHHPHUJHQFHRIDQWLUDFLVWRUJDQL]LQJLQ
the Netherlands, which indeed maintained strong links with the German 
movement, especially through Sister Outsider. Wekker remarks that a 
substantial difference between the German and the Dutch context—a 
difference that was dear to Lorde herself—consisted of the fact that black 
lesbian feminists had begun organizing in the Netherlands before their 
encounter with Lorde (Ellerbe-Dueck and Wekker 2015, 67). Nonetheless, 
the two contexts remain similar in many respects. As Showing Our 
Colors was the foundational text for the Afro-German movement, the text 
that inaugurated the debate on race and racism in the Netherlands was 
Everyday Racism: Reports from Women of Two Cultures >@
by Philomena Essed.82 Like its German counterpart, if different in shape, 
Essed’s pioneer analysis of the everyday practices and effects of racism in 
the Dutch context was articulated through the experiences of black women. 
These historical trajectories can begin to explain, as far as the Dutch and 
the German contexts are concerned, why women and queers (especially 
queer women) often can be found at the forefront of antiracist political 
formations today. As El-Tayeb’s analysis suggests, the hegemonization of 
DTXHHUIHPLQLVWVWDQGSRLQWIRUPVLQWHJUDOSDUWLQWKHVHVSHFL¿FFRQWH[WV
of the very emergence of black antiracist organizing. 
However, such an explanation would remain incomplete—and 
excessively circumscribed to the Dutch and German contexts—if it failed 
to include an account of the seizing of institutional space, especially in 
the university. Wekker was never scared of the institution. Already in the 
1980s, alongside her black lesbian feminist organizing, she took active part 
LQGH¿QLQJ'XWFKDQWLUDFLVWSROLF\ERWKDWWKHORFDODQGWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOV
In 1981, she began to work for the Dutch Ministry of Well-Being, Health, 
DQG&XOWXUHLQ7KH+DJXHDVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHPLQLVWU\LQWKH¿HOGRI
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ethnic minority policy in the province of South Holland, and took part in 
WKHFRQYHUVDWLRQVWKDWOHGWRWKH¿UVWPolicy Paper for Ethnic Minorities 
published in 1983. In 1987, in the function of Policy Associate at the 
$PVWHUGDP2I¿FHIRUWKH&RRUGLQDWLRQRI(WKQLF0LQRULWLHV¶$IIDLUVVKH
wrote the Anti-Racism Policy Paper of the city.83 But policy making was 
not to become the terrain of Wekker’s main interventions. In 1987, she left 
the Netherlands to start her PhD research on Afro-Surinamese women’s 
sexual culture at the University of California, Los Angeles.84
Wekker returned to the Netherlands after she obtained her PhD in 
1992.85 Her research, which translated years later in the publication of 
The Politics of Passion: Women’s Sexual Culture in the Afro-Surinamese 
Diaspora (2006), investigated the mati work among Afro-Surinamese 
working-class women: a practice of same-sex relationships, sustained by 
VSHFL¿F LQVWLWXWLRQV WKDW :HNNHU LQWHUSUHWHG DV EDVHG RQ :HVW $IULFDQ
principles.86 In 1994, Wekker began to work at the Department of Women’s 
Studies at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, and in 2001 she was assigned 
a chair on Gender and Ethnicity at the Faculty of the Humanities of the same 
university. Her work at Utrecht University throughout the 1990s and the 
2000s was key to the introduction of intersectionality in Dutch academic 
and public debates.87 Next to her struggle within the university—more 
VSHFL¿FDOO\ZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRIJHQGHUVWXGLHV²WRDUWLFXODWHDQ$IUR'XWFK
OHVELDQIHPLQLVWVWDQGSRLQWDQGWRDI¿UPWKHFHQWUDOLW\RILQWHUVHFWLRQDOLW\
Wekker never lost touch with black antiracist organizing. For example, 
VKH EHFDPH D NH\ SXEOLF ¿JXUH LQ WKH QDWLRQDO GHEDWH RYHU =ZDUWH 3LHW
(Black Pete), a Dutch blackface caricature that has been contested by the 
black Dutch population since the late 1960s but has become the center 
of new antiracist struggles since 2011.88 Now that she is retired, both her 
intellectual and political work over the past twenty years has converged in 
the recent publication of White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and 
Race (2016), a collection of essays that aims to dissect the “cultural archive” 
informing—intersectionally—the construction of the white Dutch self.89 
In White Innocence, Wekker also looks retrospectively at her work 
at Utrecht University (Wekker 2016, 70-79). Comparing the vicissitudes 
of intersectionality in the different institutional spaces that she navigated 
through the years—governmental policy making, the academy at large, 
DQG WKH VSHFL¿F ¿HOG RI JHQGHU VWXGLHV²VKH FRPPHQWV ³:KHUHDV WKH
government and the academy at large could afford to overlook and dismiss 
the cogency of intersectionality, that was not possible for gender studies, 
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which, after the largely unresolved battles around the status of race in the 
GLVFLSOLQH LQ WKH V DQG V KDG WR ¿QG DZD\ WR FRPH WR WHUPV
with race/ethnicity and other axes, not as an afterthought but as a central 
ingredient of its mission” (51-52). However, contrary to what this initial 
observation may suggest, Wekker is by no means optimistic about the 
impact of intersectionality on gender studies in the Netherlands. Instead 
RI UHDUWLFXODWLQJ WKH SUHPLVHV RI WKH ¿HOG²DV LW ZDV LQWHQGHG WR GR²
she suggests that intersectionality helped defusing the feminist antiracist 
critique that had been developed in the 1970s and 1980s: “In fact, I am 
arguing that the introduction of intersectionality came at an opportune 
moment not to continue, much less resolve, the debates about race in the 
feminist movement” (71). Rather, those debates have been interrupted and 
displaced through the assimilation of intersectionality. This happened, in 
Wekker’s view, to the extent that intersectionality was incorporated into 
WKH ¿HOG DV DQ RSWLRQDO GHYLFH ³GHSHQGLQJ RQ FRQWH[W LW ZDV RSWLRQDO
which axes one had to engage with seriously” (71). Thus, she notices that 
race would routinely disappear from the analysis.
On the one hand, Wekker’s account emphasizes a central argument 
of this chapter: intersectional critique past and present takes shape not 
as a liberal call for inclusion, but rather as a hegemonic struggle. Her 
analysis seems to register, with regret, that the struggle was lost at her 
own department at Utrecht University. In so doing, on the other hand, this 
analysis makes little room for the ambiguities that any war of position 
entails. We may integrate her critique of the institution with an emphasis 
on the ambiguities entailed, in fact, by any attempt to seize institutional 
VSDFHV:KLOHWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRILQWHUVHFWLRQDOLW\LQWRWKHGLVFLSOLQDU\¿HOG
of gender studies may have defused the struggle over race that had been 
unfolding within the feminist movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
I suggest that the work carried out by Wekker and others in the institutional 
space of the university—both in Europe and the United States—has kept 
an intersectional antiracist theorizing alive even through moments of 
decreased political mobilization, helping rearticulate new struggles in the 
present both inside and outside the institution. 
Thus, let me conclude by returning to the emergence of the UoC 
collective during the protests against neoliberalization at the University of 
Amsterdam. As I mentioned in the opening of this section, Wekker was asked 
to chair the Diversity Commission that was established at that university 
in the wake of the protests and to whose establishment UoC centrally 
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contributed. Of her encounter with the collective, Wekker says: “I’m 
always so surprised, when I’m with people from the University of Color, 
that they know everything about intersectionality, you know, it’s so nice, 
such a nice surprise always.” In fact, far from being a surprise, this is also 
the result of the intellectual labor of Wekker and other queer of color critics 
like her, who found in the academic institution both a terrain of struggle 
as well as a space where to keep critical knowledge production alive. This 
dynamic—this war of position—can help understand the hegemonization 
of feminist and queer standpoints in contemporary antiracist organizing. 
History, such as the history of the German and Dutch black movements 
recalled earlier, cannot be invoked alone as an unmediated explanation for 
WKHVSHFL¿FFRQ¿JXUDWLRQVRIFRQWHPSRUDU\VWUXJJOHV5DWKHUWKDWKLVWRU\
KDVDUWLFXODWHG¿HOGVRISRVVLELOLWLHV LQFOXGLQJ WKHSRVVLELOLW\RI VHL]LQJ
institutional spaces for the production of counter-hegemonic ideological 
knowledges. Such knowledges, in turn, may have not immediately 
transformed the institution itself, but have been mediating the articulation 
of new terrains of struggle both inside and outside the institutional space. 
One has to know how to seize that space. When I ask Wekker how 
does she feel about chairing the Diversity Commission at the University 
RI$PVWHUGDP²ZKLFK ORRNHG WR PH DW ¿UVW JODQFH DV DQ DWWHPSW RI
the university to disarticulate the antagonism of the student movement, 
including the radical critique of the UoC collective—she makes clear that 
two conditions were key to convince her: on the one hand, the central 
board of the university has now a binding responsibility to implement the 
FKDQJHVSURSRVHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQDIWHULWVRQH\HDURIZRUN90 on the 
other hand, importantly, the student collectives are far from dissolved, but 
preside over the operations of the Commission and keep it to its mandate. 
She concludes: “You have to organize dissent around you. But you have 
WRJHWLQWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQRWKHUZLVHLW¶VKDUPOHVV<RXNQRZ\RXQHHGWR
harm the institution.” Harming the institution, or at least trying to do so, is 
what Wekker has been doing all along. Of course, this is only part of what 
is to be done, but a very important part nonetheless.    
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If certain forms of queer and progressive organizing
remain tied to forms of nationalist and imperial domination,
how can queers of color both here and across the globe
disrupt the neat folding in of queerness into
QDUUDWLYHVRIPRGHUQLW\SDWULRWLVPDQGQDWLRQDOLVP"
Jasbir K. Puar and Amit S. Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag” 
The debate on homonormativity discussed in the previous chapter has 
H[SDQGHG LQ VSHFL¿FGLUHFWLRQVDW WKHFURVVURDGVZLWK WKH³WUDQVQDWLRQDO
WXUQ´ LQ TXHHU VWXGLHV VHH 3RYLQHOOL DQG&KDXQFH\  &UX]0DODYp
and Manalansan 2002). In this context, the nationalist and imperialist 
UDPL¿FDWLRQVRIKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\KDYHFRPHWRFRQVWLWXWHDSULPDU\WHUUDLQ
of analysis. Two interventions have been pivotal in orienting this analysis. 
First, in Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007), 
Jasbir K. Puar draws in part on Duggan’s critique of homonormativity in 
order to diagnose the emergence of a national homonormativity, which she 
terms “homonationalism.” According to Puar’s analysis, in the context of 
the “war on terror” unleashed on a global scale in the aftermath of 9/11, 
segments of LGBTQ formations in Europe and the United States have 
taken part in the rearticulation of a virulent nationalism against Arab and 
Muslim populations. Second, in Desiring Arabs (2007), Joseph A. Massad 
tracks the operations of what he calls the “Gay International,” an ensemble 
Chapter Three158
of international LGBTQ organizations and intellectuals committed to 
the saving of Arab gays, lesbians, and homosexuals. Massad argues that 
even as the Gay International advocates sexual freedom, it must be held 
responsible for the production of homophobia in Arab social formations. 
In his view, this sexual imperialism is not accidental, but rather organic to 
WKHEURDGHUHGL¿FHRI:HVWHUQLPSHULDOLVPLQWKH$UDEZRUOG
In this chapter, I discuss these critiques of homonationalism and sexual 
imperialism. In order to do so, I locate Puar’s and Massad’s respective 
analyses on the terrain of queer diasporic critique. Queer diasporic critique 
is a contemporary theoretical formation that joins queer of color critique 
LQLWVLQWHUVHFWLRQDOLQWHUYHQWLRQZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\7KHWZR
IRUPDWLRQVLQIDFWVLJQL¿FDQWO\RYHUODS\HWTXHHUGLDVSRULFFULWLTXHSODFHV
a distinct emphasis on the transnational scale and on the sexual politics of 
nationalism and imperialism (Gopinath 2005b). To be sure, neither Puar’s 
analysis of homonationalism nor Massad’s analysis of sexual imperialism 
represent quintessential examples of queer diasporic critique. Even if their 
works have substantially contributed to the contemporary recomposition 
of queer theory around the problem of the color line, both of them depart, 
if in different ways and to different extents, from the theoretical practices 
and even the political commitments characterizing queer of color and 
queer diasporic critique. Additionally, Massad is an intellectual historian 
ZKRVHZRUNLVQRWHYHQORFDWHGVWULFWO\VSHDNLQJZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRITXHHU
theory. Thus, I position both Massad and Puar on the terrain of queer 
GLDVSRULFFULWLTXH¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWWRUHJLVWHUWKHDPELJXLWLHVWKDWVXFKD
positioning produces.
In particular, even as Puar and especially Massad distance themselves 
IURPWKH¿HOGRITXHHUGLDVSRUDVRPHRIWKHPRVWFRJHQWFULWLTXHVRIWKHLU
work have focused precisely on their diasporic location in the United States. 
This critique suggests that, if not acknowledged, the diasporic standpoint 
prevents rather than facilitate an articulation between different political 
struggles across the transnational divide (see Castro Varela and Dhawan 
5LWFKLH,QRWKHUZRUGVVRPHFULWLFVDVNWRZKDWH[WHQWDUH
Puar’s and Massad’s analyses of homonationalism and sexual imperialism 
able to articulate the struggles against heteropatriarchy and imperialism 
WDNLQJSODFHLQWKHJOREDO6RXWK"7RWKLVTXHVWLRQ,DGGWRZKDWH[WHQWDUH
their respective analyses able (if willing) to articulate such struggles to the 
struggles conducted by queer of color and queer diasporic formations in the 
JOREDO1RUWK"$V5DKXO5DRSXWVLWLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDGLIIHUHQWGLVFXVVLRQ
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“what if the liminal space is a dangerous one—from the point of view 
of producing progressive scholarship—threatening both the loss of Third 
World positionality as a result of immersion in the protocols of First World 
Knowledge, and the acquisition of First World imperial baggage by the 
PLJUDQWVFKRODURIFRORXU"´5DR1 These are some of the questions 
that guide my discussion of homonationalism and sexual imperialism in 
this chapter. Thus, central in the chapter is the problem of queer diasporic 
theoretical practice. 
,Q WKH ¿UVW VHFWLRQ , RIIHU VRPH QRWHV RQ WKH HPHUJHQFH RI TXHHU
GLDVSRULFFULWLTXHDVD WKHRUHWLFDOIRUPDWLRQ0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\ ,GLVFXVV
the differences and overlaps between queer diasporic and queer of color 
critique. In the next section, I track the emergence of the concept of 
homonationalism from Puar’s earlier essays to Terrorist Assemblages. 
While doing so, I also show the extent to which Puar progressively departs 
IURPWKHWKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFHVWKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HWKHEURDGHU¿HOGRITXHHU
diasporic critique. Then, in the third section, I turn to Massad’s work on 
sexual imperialism in the Arab world. Upon discussing his analysis and 
some of the critiques it received, I highlight points of divergence and 
convergence between Puar and Massad. I suggest that, despite their different 
approaches, they in fact converge on the terrain of theoretical practice: both 
of them tend to deploy theoretical abstractions that appropriate political 
struggles without fully preserving their concrete determinations. In the 
fourth section, I further develop this point by turning to key theoretical 
VRXUFHVRI3XDU¶VDQG0DVVDG¶VUHVSHFWLYHDQDO\VHV+HUH,EULHÀ\JREDFN
to debates on theoretical practice that took place in the 1980s and involved 
Michel Foucault, Edward W. Said, and Hall. 
+HQFHLQWKH¿IWKVHFWLRQ,LOOXVWUDWHDQDOWHUQDWLYHDSSURDFKWRWKH
problems of homonationalism and sexual imperialism. By looking in 
particular at Rahul Rao’s analyses of the emergence of homophobia in 
FRQWHPSRUDU\8JDQGD 5DR , VXJJHVW WKDWDTXHHUFULWLTXH
of homonationalism and sexual imperialism must attend to the complex 
articulations of local and transnational struggles for hegemony. Finally, 
the chapter ends by shifting the attention from the global South to the 
European South. The last section focuses on the current war on “gender 
ideology,” a conservative campaign that is taking place in Europe and 
especially in its Eastern and Southern peripheries. On the one hand, by 
looking at Europe, I aim to undo the divide between Western sexual 
freedom and Third World homophobia that structures the politics and 
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ideologies of homonationalism and sexual imperialism. On the other hand, 
I emphasize the antagonisms activated among queer critics themselves on 
how to understand the conservative attack. In so doing, I conclude my 
UHÀHFWLRQVRQWKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFH
Notes on Queer Diasporic Critique
In Impossible Desires: Queer Diasporas and South Asian Public Cultures 
(2005a), Gayatri Gopinath observes that conservative ideologies of 
diaspora genealogically tie diasporic formations to “their” homelands 
through nationalism. Both diasporic and state nationalisms, in turn, tend 
to be articulated through heteropatriarchy, for heteropatriarchy secures 
the nation-state as a site of purity to which one must return or that 
one must reproduce as loyally as possible in the diaspora. In this way, 
diasporic and state nationalist ideologies collude, even if the diaspora as 
such often appears in state nationalist ideology as a sign of impurity. In 
other words, the relation between the two is contradictory. As Gopinath 
puts it, “while the diaspora within nationalist discourse is often positioned 
as the abjected and disavowed Other to the nation, the nation also 
simultaneously recruits the diaspora into its absolutist logic” (7). Such a 
recruitment is not just symbolic, but very material: “The policies of the 
Hindu nationalist government in India in the mid- to late 1990s to court 
overseas ‘NRI’ (non-resident Indian) capital is but one example of how 
diaspora and nation can function together in the interests of corporate 
capital and globalization” (7). But the accumulation of capital is not the 
only interest that allows state and diasporic nationalisms to converge. 
Heteropatriarchy is, according to Gopinath’s analysis, one of the key 
terrains for the articulation of that convergence.
Therefore, the key analytic gesture of queer diasporic critique closely 
resembles that of queer of color critique. As I argued in the previous chapter, 
in Aberrations in Black)HUJXVRQLGHQWL¿HVKHWHURSDWULDUFK\DVWKH
terrain on which otherwise divergent and antagonistic ideologies (such 
as Marxism, black revolutionary nationalism, and liberalism) converge, 
producing culture as a terrain of struggle for feminist and queer of color 
formations. In her discussion of Ferguson’s work, Gopinath points out 
that queer diasporic critique deploys a similar approach, “identifying and 
unraveling those peculiar alliances, the ‘odd bedfellows,’ that emerge 
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in the global restructuring of capital and its attendant gender and sexual 
hierarchies” (Gopinath 2005b, 159). Additionally, parallel to queer of color 
critique but with greater emphasis on the transnational scale, queer diasporic 
critique highlights not only the heteropatriarchal articulations of diasporic-
nationalist formations, but also the nationalist and imperialist articulations 
of hegemonic LGBTQ formations in Europe and the United States:
If “diaspora” needs “queerness” in order to rescue it from its 
genealogical implications, “queerness” also needs “diaspora” in order 
to make it more supple in relation to questions of race, colonialism, 
migration, and globalization. . . . A queer diasporic formation works in 
contradistinction to the globalization of “gay” identity that replicates a 
colonial narrative of development and progress that judges all “other” 
sexual cultures, communities, and practices against a model of Euro-
American sexual identity. (Gopinath 2005a, 11) 
 
Thus, on the one hand, queer of color and queer diasporic critique work 
in concert: “Together queer of color and queer diasporic critique reveal 
the gendered and sexualized dimensions of imperial projects both 
domestically (in relation to U.S. communities of color) and internationally” 
(Gopinath 2005b, 160). On the other hand, as this passage suggests, what 
distinguishes queer diasporic critique is its emphasis on the transnational 
scale. Indeed, its emergence coincides with a broader “transnational turn” 
in queer theory, pioneered by the work of lesbian feminists of color such as 
M. Jacqui Alexander (1994) and Gloria Wekker (1992) in the early 1990s 
and fully manifesting itself, at the turn of the century, in publications such 
as GLQ’s special issue on “Thinking Sexuality Transnationally” (Povinelli 
and Chauncey 1999) or the collective volumes Queer Globalizations: 
Citizenship and the Afterlife of Colonialism (Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan 
2002) and Queer Migrations: Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border 
Crossing (Luibhéid and Cantú 2005).2
At this point, it is worth stressing that queer of color and queer diasporic 
critique are not simply two analogous yet discrete formations, as these 
preliminary observations may suggest. Gopinath herself highlights that the 
differences between the two are rather a matter of emphasis and that the 
SDUDOOHOVVKHLGHQWL¿HVGRQRWVLJQDODUHODWLRQRISXUHDQDORJ\DVPXFKDVD
QXPEHURIVLJQL¿FDQWRYHUODSV:LWKVSHFL¿FUHIHUHQFHWRWKHWUDQVQDWLRQDO
optic that distinguishes queer diasporic critique from queer of color critique, 
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she states: “I do not mean to suggest here that queer of color critique and 
queer diasporic critique exist in a binary relation to each other, where the 
former is narrow, local, and national, as opposed to the latter’s apparent 
cosmopolitanism and expansiveness” (Gopinath 2005b, 159). Indeed, on 
the one hand, Ferguson frames queer of color critique as a postnationalist 
LQWHUYHQWLRQLQWRWKH¿HOGRI$PHULFDQ6WXGLHV)HUJXVRQ3 
On the other hand, many queer diasporic analyses produced in the United 
6WDWHV GR QRW DOWRJHWKHU GHFHQWHU WKLV VSHFL¿F QDWLRQDO FRQWH[W 5DWKHU
they highlight the emergence of transnational diasporic formations within 
and across its borders. A case in point is Chandan Reddy’s Freedom with 
Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the US State (2011).4 Here, Reddy deploys 
the queer of color theoretical practice elaborated by Ferguson and extends 
its reach beyond African American formations. He does so to foreground 
queer of color immigrant formations as privileged sites of critique of the 
racialized borders of the nation-state in times of globalization. 
,Q SDUWLFXODU 5HGG\ GLVFXVVHV WKH ¿JXUH RI WKH ³JD\ 3DNLVWDQL
immigrant” petitioning for asylum in the United States, taking as his starting 
point the narrative testimony of Saeed Rahman, a Pakistani immigrant 
living in New York City and a member of the South Asian Lesbian and Gay 
Association (SALGA). Rahman successfully claimed asylum in 1997 as a 
member of a persecuted social group (Reddy 2011, 150).5 Reddy situates 
5DKPDQ¶V VWRU\ZLWKLQ D ¿HOG RI QDWLRQDO DQG WUDQVQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV RI
IRUFH WKDW KHOS SURGXFLQJ WKH¿JXUH RI WKH JD\3DNLVWDQL DV\OXP VHHNHU
LQ WKH ¿UVW SODFH )LUVW RI DOO IROORZLQJ *D\DWUL & 6SLYDN  KH
points out that any discussion of political asylum today must include an 
understanding of the different impact of the neoliberal undermining of 
state and civil society in the global North and the global South: “A general 
contrast can be made: in the North, welfare structures long in place are 
being dismantled. The diasporic underclass is often the worst victim. In 
the South, welfare structures cannot emerge as a result of the priorities of 
WKHWUDQVQDWLRQDODJHQFLHV3ROLWLFDODV\OXPDW¿UVWVLJKWVRGLIIHUHQW
IURPHFRQRPLFPLJUDWLRQ¿QDOO\¿QGVLWPXFKHDVLHUWRUHFRGHFDSLWDOLVP
as democracy” (Spivak, quoted in Reddy 2011, 152). According to this 
analysis, the failures of postcolonial and decolonizing states vis-à-vis their 
citizenry must not be disarticulated from the impact of neoliberalism on 
politico-economic structures in the South, only to ideologically rearticulate 
the nation-state in the global North as a site of democratic accountability—
for instance, toward asylum seekers.
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This observation gains further salience, in Reddy’s discussion of 
the gay Pakistani asylum seeker, when combined with an analysis of 
immigration management in the United States. As Reddy points out, 
“although immigrants are attracted to places like New York City by the 
number of entry-level jobs in the service, industrial, and informal sectors 
of the economy, the federal government continues to recruit such workers 
WKURXJKWKHODQJXDJHDQGQHWZRUNVRIIDPLO\UHXQL¿FDWLRQ´5HGG\
159). Emphasizing this contradiction, Reddy observes that the Immigration 
Act (1990), with its mandate that petitioning families provide for the welfare 
of newcomers and combined with the general dismantling of welfare set 
in motion by the Clinton administration, “has exposed queer immigrants 
of color in particular to remarkable hetero-patriarchal coercion and has 
produced the disproportionate enforcement of hetero-patriarchal relations 
within immigrant of color communities” (161). Indeed, referencing a report 
by the Audre Lorde Project on queer immigrants of color in the United States, 
Reddy highlights that many queer immigrants “spoke about the impossibility 
of being gay in a context in which their dependence on family—broadly 
GH¿QHG²LVHVVHQWLDOWROLYLQJDVDQLPPLJUDQWLQ1HZ<RUN´6 
Thus, Spivak is right to criticize a recoding of capitalism as democracy 
through political asylum or any other seemingly non-economic practice of 
migration management. The United States, according to Reddy’s analysis, 
recruits and produces a racialized and gendered labor force through family 
UHXQL¿FDWLRQ6XFKDODERUIRUFHIRUPVWKH³GLDVSRULFXQGHUFODVV´WKDWDV
Spivak remarks, is often the worst victim of the dismantling of welfare 
in the global North—and the queer diasporic underclass even more so, 
its social location being mediated by the combination of both state and 
diasporic heteropatriarchy. Through this reading, Reddy argues that the 
JD\3DNLVWDQL LPPLJUDQWH[WHQGV WKHJHQHDORJ\RITXHHURIFRORU¿JXUHV
offered by Ferguson in Aberrations in Black, such as the transgendered 
mulatta and the female-headed African American household. Thus, Reddy 
projects Ferguson’s analysis in the contemporary conjuncture, in which 
“industrial capitalism is reconstituted by transnationality” (Reddy 2011, 
163). His queer diasporic critique refuses to articulate the United States 
as a site of freedom and democracy, or to recode capitalism as democracy. 
0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\ LW UHIXVHV WR UHDG³WKHHPHUJHQFHRI WKHJD\3DNLVWDQL
immigrant within the legal text as a victory for gay visibility in the archive” 
2QWKHFRQWUDU\³LWUHDGV>WKDW¿JXUH@DVIRUPHGLQWKHFRQWUDGLFWLRQ
between heteronormative social relations mandated for immigrants of color 
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by the state’s policies and the liberal state’s ideology of universal sexual 
freedom as a mask for growing these social relations” (163-164). In other 
words, Reddy locates the discourse of U.S. sexual freedom on an ideological 
terrain emerging from the contradictions between state and capital.7
Like Ferguson, Reddy emphasizes how the contradictions between 
state and capital—that is, the articulations between the economic, the 
political, and the ideological—produce the social location of queer diasporic 
formations. Other critics, instead, privilege an analysis of queer diasporic 
identity and consciousness. For instance, in Global Divas: Filipino Gay 
Men in the Diaspora (2003), Martin F. Manalansan IV addresses the 
question of queer diaspora through the lived experiences of Filipino gay 
men in the United States—from their negotiations of different grammars 
of sexual identity to the strategies they deploy in order to navigate both 
white and multicultural sexual spaces in New York City. By means of 
ethnography, Manalansan highlights some of the key social contradictions 
that concern queer diasporic critique at large. However, he does so by 
placing a distinctive emphasis on the subjective articulations of such 
contradictions. As he writes, “this book confronts and queries globalization 
and diaspora . . . through the lives and words of Filipino gay men living 
in New York City” (viii). This does not mean that Manalansan entirely 
HYDGHVWKH¿HOGRIREMHFWLYHUHODWLRQVRIIRUFHZLWKLQZKLFKWKHSURFHVVHV
of identity formation unfold. As Eithne Luibhéid observes with reference to 
Manalansan’s work, “while queer Filipino migrants may be searching for 
IUHHGRPIURPRSSUHVVLRQWKHLURSSUHVVLRQKDVEHHQVLJQL¿FDQWO\VKDSHG
by the legacies of U.S. colonization and by ongoing economic and political 
relationships between the United States and the Philippines” (Luibhéid 
2005, xxv-xxvi). This acknowledgment allows Manalansan to explore the 
formation of diasporic identity and consciousness of gay Filipino men in 
the United States without rearticulating “a teleological narrative of the 
movement from tradition to modernity, and from discomfort to settlement 
into gay and lesbian life” (Manalansan 2003, 5). Luibhéid continues:
Under these circumstances, queer Filipinos’ migration emerges not 
simply as a search for freedom in the United States, but also as a search 
for alternatives to circumstances in the Philippines in which the United 
States is centrally (though not solely) implicated. Consequently, queer 
Filipino immigration cannot be read as a comfortable reiteration of 
dominant U.S. nationalist myths. (Luibhéid 2005, xxvi)  
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This reading of the queer Filipino diasporic subject echoes Reddy’s 
discussion of the gay Pakistani asylum seeker. Taken together, these 
different analyses show that queer diasporic critique—at the level of 
its overall intervention as a theoretical formation—attends both to the 
objective and the subjective articulations of queer diaspora, its material 
conditions as well as its forms of consciousness. On the one hand, in 
so doing, it takes part with queer of color critique in the contemporary 
reencounter between queer theory and Marxism, which I discussed in the 
previous chapter. On the other hand, it also participates in a reorientation of 
WKHDQDO\VLVRIGLDVSRUDZLWKLQWKHEURDGHU¿HOGRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHV
The question of diaspora was brought within the orbit of cultural 
studies by such pioneering analyses as Hall’s, in “Cultural Identity 
and Diaspora” (1990) and Gilroy’s, in The Black Atlantic: Modernity 
and Double Consciousness (1993). Gopinath explicitly draws on this 
genealogy, which “embraces diaspora as a concept for its potential to 
foreground notions of impurity and inauthenticity that resoundingly reject 
the ethnic and religious absolutism at the center of nationalist projects” 
(Gopinath 2005a, 7). Yet, with particular reference to Gilroy, she notes 
that this work on diaspora in cultural studies has sometimes tended toward 
DQDEVWUDFWLRQRIGLDVSRULFIRUPDWLRQVIURPWKH¿HOGRIPDWHULDOUHODWLRQV
ZLWKLQZKLFKWKH\WDNHVKDSH,QVWHDGLQKHUYLHZ³ZH>PXVW@EHDWWHQWLYH
to the ways in which diasporic cultural forms are produced in and through 
transnational capitalist processes” (9). This is true not only of diasporic 
cultural production, but also of diasporic social formations and forms of 
consciousness. As Spivak remarks, “transnationality is becoming the name 
of the increased migrancy of labor. To substitute this name for the change 
from multinational capital in the economic restructuring of the (developed/
developing) globe—to re-code a change in the determination of capital 
as a cultural change—is a scary symptom of Cultural Studies, especially 
Feminist Cultural Studies” (Spivak 1996, 245). Both queer of color and 
queer diasporic critique, at their best, resist such a recoding.8
Writing in 2005, Gopinath mentions that queer diasporic critique “is 
a particularly urgent and necessary project in the context of the Indian 
diaspora, given the centrality of the diaspora in the material and ideological 
maintenance of Hindu nationalism in India, and in light of the unholy alliance 
between the Hindu Right in India and the current Bush regime in the United 
States” (Gopinath 2005b, 159). On the one hand, through this remark, she 
highlights some of the characteristic features of queer diasporic critique 
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discussed so far: the transnational nature of its terrain of intervention as well 
as its emergence as an antagonistic formation vis-à-vis the convergence 
between state and diasporic nationalisms. On the other hand, she also 
situates her analysis of South Asian queer diasporic formations within the 
context of the “war on terror.” The latter is not a central aspect of Gopinath’s 
own work, but her passing reference to it is not accidental. Indeed, it is in 
the wake of 9/11 and against the background of the “war on terror” that 
TXHHUGLDVSRULFFULWLTXHKDVEHHQWDNLQJVKDSHGXULQJWKHSDVW¿IWHHQ\HDUV
especially in the United States. In this context, one of its key interventions 
KDV EHHQ D FULWLTXH RI WKH QDWLRQDOLVW DQG LPSHULDOLVW UDPL¿FDWLRQV RI
homonormativity. Two analyses have been pivotal in orienting this critique: 
Jasbir K. Puar’s work on homonationalism in Terrorist Assemblages: 
Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007) and Joseph A. Massad’s work 
on sexual imperialism in Desiring Arabs (2007). The rest of this chapter 
is devoted to a discussion of Puar’s and Massad’s respective interventions, 
with particular emphasis on the theoretical practices they deploy as well 
as the debates that their analyses provoked both in the theoretical and the 
SROLWLFDO¿HOG
Homonationalism: Assembling a Concept
Perhaps no other concept of recent coinage has been able to reorient 
contemporary debates in queer theory and LGBTQ politics as much as 
the concept of homonationalism. While Terrorist Assemblages marks the 
HQWUDQFHRIWKHFRQFHSWLQWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\DQGWKHEHJLQQLQJRI
its viral circulations, a number of previous interventions by Puar, as it is 
usually the case, prepared the ground for the arguments put forward in the 
book. In order to understand the impact of the concept of homonationalism, 
it is worth tracking the trajectory of its emergence and the shifts that the 
FRQFHSWXQGHUZHQW WKURXJK WKHSDVW¿IWHHQ\HDUV ,QGHHG , VXJJHVW WKDW
LQWKHVHFRQFHSWXDOVKLIWVZHFDQORFDWHVRPHRIWKHVSHFL¿FPHFKDQLVPV
through which homonationalism has come to hegemonize, to a certain 
H[WHQWWKH¿HOGRIFRQWHPSRUDU\TXHHUGHEDWHV
7KH VWDUWLQJ SRLQW IRU 3XDU¶V UHÀHFWLRQV RQ KRPRQDWLRQDOLVP LV DQ
earlier essay she published with Amit S. Rai, titled “Monster, Terrorist, 
Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots” (2002). 
The essay poses a rather straightforward question: “How are gender and 
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VH[XDOLW\FHQWUDOWRWKHFXUUHQWµZDURQWHUURULVP¶"´3XDUDQG5DL¶V
answer, however, is far from straightforward. Their central argument is that 
WKH¿JXUHRIWKHWHUURULVWHPHUJHVLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIDVD³PRQVWURXV´
¿JXUH7KLVOLQNVLWLQWKHLUYLHZWRWKHKLVWRU\RI:HVWHUQWD[RQRPLHVRI
sexual monstrosity and perversity. In order to make this argument, Puar 
DQG5DL ¿UVW WXUQ WR )RXFDXOW¶VZRUN RQ WKH KLVWRULFDO IRUPDWLRQ RI WKH
³DEQRUPDOV´ )RXFDXOW >@ 9 Foucault distinguishes between 
WKH³PRQVWHU´DQGWKH³LQGLYLGXDOWREHFRUUHFWHG´DVDUWLFXODWRU\¿JXUHV
respectively of sovereign power and disciplinary power: while the earlier 
¿JXUHRI WKHPRQVWHU HVVHQWLDOO\SHUWDLQV WR WKHGRPDLQRI WKH/DZ WKH
formation of the individual to be corrected “is contemporaneous with 
the putting into place of disciplinary techniques during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century, in the army, the schools, the workshops, then, a 
little later, in families themselves” (52). Puar and Rai draw on Foucault 
EXWVXJJHVW WKDW LQ WKHVSHFL¿FFRQWH[WRI WKH³ZDURQ WHUURU´³ZH¿QG
WKH WZR¿JXUHV >RI WKHPRQVWHU DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDO WR EH FRUUHFWHG@   
in some ways converging in the discourse of the terrorist-monster” (Puar 
and Rai 2002, 121). For instance, they observe that within the academic 
¿HOGRIWHUURULVPVWXGLHV²ZKLFKKDVEHHQGHYHORSLQJLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
since the late 1960s, in close relation to the shifting imperatives of foreign 
SROLF\²WKH WHUURULVW LV QRW MXVW SRUWUD\HG DV D ¿JXUH WR EH TXDUDQWLQHG
5DWKHU D VLJQL¿FDQW ERG\ RI SV\FKRORJLFDO ZRUN ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOG
approaches the terrorist “psyche” as an effect of “inconsistent mothering,” 
“sexual frustration,” or “failed heterosexuality” (122-124). Through this 
heteropatriarchal focus on a deviant psyche, the terrorist emerges as “both 
a monster to be quarantined and an individual to be corrected” (121).10
Puar and Rai’s analysis is meant to expose the ways in which the 
PRQVWURXV ¿JXUH RI WKH WHUURULVW²SUROLIHUDWLQJ LQ VWDWH DFDGHPLF
and popular discourses in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11—
VHUYHV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWDGLVFLSOLQLQJRIGLIIHUHQW86 IRUPDWLRQV LQWR
heteropatriarchal nationalism:
Posters that appeared in midtown Manhattan only days after the 
attacks show a turbaned caricature of bin Laden being anally 
penetrated by the Empire State Building. . . . Or think of the Web 
site where, with a series of weapons at your disposal, you can torture 
Osama bin Laden to death, the last torture being sodomy. . . . What 




normalize and discipline a population through these very monstrous 
¿JXUHV3XDUDQG5DL
 
These popular representations of the “terrorist-monster-fag,” supplementing 
the previous recourse to Foucault’s historical analysis, allow Puar and Rai 
WRIXOO\XQHDUWKWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\DUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHWHUURULVWDVD¿JXUHRI
VH[XDOSHUYHUVLW\7KDWLVPRQVWURVLW\LVQRW MXVWDIUHHÀRDWLQJVLJQL¿HU
that connects the contemporary terrorist with sodomites, hermaphrodites, 
onanists, and other historical predecessors by way of analogy. Or, in other 
words, the terrorist is not just as monstrous asWKRVH¿JXUHVSRSXODWLQJWKH
Western archive of sexual perversity. Rather, as Puar and Rai show, the 
monstrosity of the terrorist is explicitly articulated as sexual perversity, 
or queerness. This anticipates one of the central arguments of Terrorist 
Assemblages, that is, a displacement of LGBTQ formations as the 
privileged referent of queer critique. The hegemonic struggle around the 
color line in queer theory reaches one of its peaks here, for Puar is only 
partially interested in the concrete intersections between sexual and racial 
formations. Rather, at a higher level of abstraction, her goal is to reframe 
queerness itself as an articulatory mechanism of racialization.
 But, as I already mentioned, the passage quoted above also illustrates 
WKHLGHRORJLFDOZRUNSHUIRUPHGE\WKH¿JXUHRIWKHWHUURULVWGLVFLSOLQLQJ
different U.S. formations, according to Puar and Rai, into heteropatriarchal 
QDWLRQDOLVP 7KLV LGHRORJLFDO ZRUN LV ¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW FRQWUDGLFWRU\
7KH HPEOHPDWLF ¿JXUH RI ELQ /DGHQ LV WKUHDWHQHG ZLWK VRGRPL]DWLRQ
and emasculation—a typical homophobic threat—at the same time as 
his “culture” is marked as exceptionally homophobic and patriarchal. 
The contradictory nature of this articulation consists of absorbing 
elements of feminist and queer discourses in order to supplement and 
consolidate, in fact, forms of heteropatriarchal nationalism. In Puar and 
Rai’s view, the terrorist-monster-fag primarily serves to discipline the U.S. 
population into heteronormative patriots, including segments of feminist 
and LGBTQ formations. This process, in turn, disarticulates struggles 
against heteropatriarchy from struggles against nationalism, racism, and 
imperialism.11 For example, Puar and Rai recall: “When a U.S. Navy bomb 
DERDUGWKH866(QWHUSULVH>LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHLQYDVLRQRI$IJKDQLVWDQ@
had scrawled upon it ‘Hijack This Fags,’ national gay and lesbian rights 
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organizers objected to the homophobia of this kind of nationalist rhetoric, 
but not to the broader racist war itself” (Puar and Rai 2002, 127). 
Framing Puar and Rai’s discussion is the explicit assumption of a queer 
diasporic standpoint. On the one hand, they remark that the articulation of 
the terrorist as fag not only works as a process of racialization of all those 
recognizable (or “misrecognized”) as Muslims, but also “incites violence 
DJDLQVW TXHHUV DQG VSHFL¿FDOO\ TXHHUV RI FRORU$QG LQGHHG WKHUH KDYH
been reports from community-based organizations throughout New York 
City that violent incidents against queers of color have increased” (Puar 
and Rai 2002, 126). On the other hand, the essay ends with an analysis 
of diasporic Sikh organizing in the context of the “war on terror.” Puar 
and Rai point out that Sikh American men wearing turbans have deployed 
VSHFL¿FSUDFWLFHVRIVHOIGLVFLSOLQHLQRUGHUWRDYRLGEHFRPLQJWKHWDUJHW
of racist attacks, their turban being “mistaken” for that of Osama bin 
Laden: “Many Sikhs . . . have simply abandoned their turbans. . . . Others 
have contributed to the current fervor of American patriotic/multicultural 
exceptionalism by donning red, white, and blue turbans” (137). Yet these 
DUH QRW WKH RQO\ FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH ³WXUEDQ SUR¿OLQJ´ WDUJHWLQJ 6LNK
men in the aftermath of 9/11. In a typical queer diasporic critical gesture, 
Puar and Rai are equally suspicious of these self-disciplining displays of 
Sikh multicultural patriotism and of the reactivation of forms of cultural 
nationalism as a response to racialization:
7KH WXUEDQ LV D FRPSOLFDWHG DQG DPELYDOHQW VLJQL¿HURI ERWK UDFLDO
and religious community as well as of the power of masculine 
heteronormativity. . . . As such, we are as troubled by the increasing 
IRUPV RI WXUEDQ SUR¿OLQJ DQG LWV FRQVHTXHQFHV DV ZH DUH DERXW
the reemergence of cultural nationalism in Sikh and South Asian 
communities, which often obscures issues of gender and sexuality. 
(Puar and Rai 2002, 137)12
7KXV DV WKLV HVVD\ DUJXHG IRU WKH ¿UVW WLPH SUHSDULQJ WKH JURXQG IRU
Terrorist Assemblages WKH ¿JXUH RI WKH WHUURULVW LQ WKH DIWHUPDWK RI
 PXVW EH RI FHQWUDO FRQFHUQ WR TXHHU WKHRU\ 7KDW ¿JXUH ZRUNV DV
the articulatory center of a contradictory discourse that racializes Arabs, 
Muslims, and other populations of color as heteropatriarchal and sexually 
perverse while consolidating, at the same time, forms of heteropatriarchal 
QDWLRQDOLVPIRUKHWHURJHQHRXVIRUPDWLRQVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLWDEVRUEV
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segments of feminist, queer, and diasporic formations at the same time as 
it renders queers of color, located at the intersections of such formations, 
the targets of increased violence. The contradictory nature of this politico-
ideological process must be stressed: “on the one hand, the United 
States is being depicted as feminist and gay-safe by . . . comparison with 
Afghanistan, and on the other hand, the U.S. state, having experienced a 
castration and penetration of its capitalist masculinity, offers up narratives 
of emasculation as appropriate punishment for bin Laden, brown-skinned 
folks, and men in turbans” (Puar and Rai 2002, 126). 
Puar and Rai do not conceptualize this process as an ideological 
formation. Rather, evoking Foucault, they describe it as a discourse 
deployed in order to “discipline” the population. However, I suggest 
that the contradictory nature of the process is better explained through a 
theory of hegemony and ideology, which foregrounds the ways in which 
a hegemonic bloc is able to “center” itself by absorbing segments of 
VXERUGLQDWHVRFLDOJURXSV$V,DUJXHGLQWKH¿UVWFKDSWHUIROORZLQJ$QQH
Marie Smith’s (1994) analysis of the political struggles around Section 
28, a Foucauldian analytics of power helps supplementing a Gramscian 
conceptualization of hegemony. Especially in times of identity politics, 
the former highlights the processes of self-discipline activated within 
heterogeneous social forces in the course of hegemonic struggle. In the wake 
of 9/11, potentially antagonistic social forces such as feminist, LGBTQ, 
and diasporic formations are not simply recruited into the consolidation of 
heteropatriarchal nationalism. Rather, as Puar and Rai’s own analysis shows, 
such formations are fractured and contribute unevenly and contradictorily 
to that consolidation. While these contradictions can be understood as the 
result of self-disciplining mechanisms activated within such formations, 
these mechanisms are an effect, in turn, of a partial articulation of feminist 
and LGBTQ interests to the hegemonic bloc at this particular historical 
juncture. It is this articulation of heterogeneous interests that allows that 
bloc to “center” itself and thus further consolidate its own hegemony. To 
put it differently, by articulating the interests of segments of feminist and 
/*%74IRUPDWLRQVDQGE\UHGH¿QLQJWKHVHYHU\LQWHUHVWVLQWKHSURFHVV
the hegemonic bloc could temporarily secure a broader base of consent to 
UDFLDOSUR¿OLQJDQGDQWLLQWHOOHFWXDOFHQVRUVKLSLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDVZHOO
as to the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.13
In 2004, a number of pictures began circulating which exposed the 
WRUWXUHVSHUSHWUDWHGE\86PLOLWDU\RI¿FHUVRQ,UDTLSULVRQHUVDWWKH$EX
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Ghraib prison in Iraq—including rape, cross-dressing, public nudity, and 
masturbation, as well as the mimicking of sexual acts associated with 
homosexuality and sadomasochism. Puar analyzes the scandal in an essay 
titled “Abu Ghraib: Arguing against Exceptionalism” (2004). Here, she 
H[WHQGVVRPHRI WKHUHÀHFWLRQVSXWIRUZDUG LQ WKHHDUOLHUHVVD\ZLWK5DL
and takes a step further toward her conceptualization of homonationalism. 
Puar pays particular attention to the reactions that the pictures provoked in 
the United States. A critical analysis of such reactions is indeed relevant, 
and not just as a form of more or less polemical cultural politics. The Abu 
Ghraib scandal potentially represented a key turning point in the U.S. wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even as anti-war sentiments had been already 
accumulating for some time, reaching their peak in the worldwide protests 
against the invasion of Iraq on February 15, 2003, the circulation of the 
pictures in 2004 threatened to erode, at the level of popular common sense and 
beyond the terrain of organized political protest, what was left of the consent 
to the U.S. wars among European and especially U.S. publics. However, 
Puar’s analysis suggests that, even as virtually all reactions to the pictures 
displayed sympathy with the tortured prisoners and denounced the actions 
RIWKHPLOLWDU\RI¿FHUVLQYROYHGPRVWRIWKHPQRQHWKHOHVVUHSURGXFHGWKH
very logic behind the tortures themselves: U.S. (sexual) exceptionalism. 
7KLVLVIDUIURPVXUSULVLQJLQWKHFDVHRIWKHRI¿FLDOVWDWHUHVSRQVH7KH
Bush administration and the military establishment attempted to portray the 
$EX*KUDLEWRUWXUHVDV³H[FHSWLRQDO´DQGQRWUHÀHFWLYHRI³WKHQDWXUHRIWKH
American people,” in Bush’s own words (Bush, quoted in Puar 2004, 523).14 
But the core of Puar’s argument is to illustrate how this state response found 
echoes among liberal, feminist, LGBTQ, and even queer diasporic formations. 
As she points out, liberal commentators complained that the moral authority 
of the United States—indeed, its hegemony—had been jeopardized by the 
circulation of the pictures,15VRPHIHPLQLVWVUHJDUGHGWKHVSHFL¿FLQYROYHPHQW
RIIHPDOHRI¿FHU/\QQGLH(QJODQGLQWKHVFDQGDODVDORVVRIKRSHIRUWKH
difference that women could have allegedly made in the military,16 and the 
gay press predominantly focused on the homophobia running rampant within 
the military. All such reactions are primarily concerned with “the nature of 
the American people,” rather than with the Iraqi prisoners themselves. About 
the reaction of the gay press, for instance, Puar comments: “To foreground 
homophobia over other vectors of shame is to miss that these photos are not 
PHUHO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHKRPRSKRELDRIWKHPLOLWDU\WKH\DUHDOVRUDFLVW
misogynist, and imperialist” (Puar 2004, 529). 
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At the same time, Puar stresses that when the victims of the tortures 
were granted attention, it was done in the language of “cultural difference”: 
cultural difference . . . has been used by both conservatives and 
progressives to comment upon the particularly intense shame with 
which homosexual and feminizing acts are experienced by Muslims 
(and for this, there is vast sympathy for the prisoners from the general 
SXEOLF7KHWDERRRIKRPRVH[XDOLW\DVIHPLQL]HGPDVFXOLQLW\"ZLWKLQ
,VODPLFFXOWXUH¿JXUHVKHDYLO\LQWKHH[SODQDWLRQVDVWRZK\WKHWRUWXUH
has been so devastating to its victims. This interpretation of sexual 
norms in the “Middle East”—repressed, but with perversity bubbling 
just underneath the surface—is part of centuries-long Orientalist 
traditions, an Orientalist phantasmatic that certainly informed the 
photographs of the torture at Abu Ghraib. (Puar 2004, 524)          
Thus, it reappears, in the particular context of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the 
¿JXUHRIWKH³WHUURULVWPRQVWHUIDJ´QRZPRUHH[SOLFLWO\H[WHQGHGWRDQ
entire population. Arab and Muslim sexuality (not just the terrorist’s) is 
repressed and perverse, sexual perversity being deployed as an articulatory 
mechanism of Orientalization and racialization. Puar’s reference to a link 
between Orientalist knowledge and the tortures in Abu Ghraib is very 
FRQFUHWH$V MRXUQDOLVW 6H\PRXU +HUVK UHSRUWHG ³>R@QH ERRN WKDW ZDV
IUHTXHQWO\FLWHG>DPRQJSURZDU:DVKLQJWRQFRQVHUYDWLYHVLQWKHPRQWKV
EHIRUHWKHLQYDVLRQRI,UDT@ZDVThe Arab Mind, a study of Arab culture 
DQGSV\FKRORJ\¿UVWSXEOLVKHGLQE\5DSKDHO3DWDL7KHERRN
LQFOXGHVDWZHQW\¿YHSDJHFKDSWHURQ$UDEVDQGVH[GHSLFWLQJVH[DVD
taboo vested with shame and repression” (Hersh, quoted in Puar 2004, 
524). The book, which was mentioned by Edward W. Said himself in his 
foundational work Orientalism (1978a) as one contemporary instance 
of Orientalist knowledge, helped articulating the very logic behind the 
tortures: break down the prisoners by breaking their “cultural codes.”17 
Therefore, Puar argues that liberal, feminist, and LGBTQ commentators 
who sympathized with the Iraqi prisoners, and who insisted on the exceptional 
violence of the tortures on the grounds that they violated Muslim or Arab 
³FXOWXUH´ UHLWHUDWHG WKH ORJLF LQIRUPLQJ WKH WRUWXUHV LQ WKH ¿UVW SODFH
These included queer diasporic commentators: “Faisal Alam, founder and 
director of the international Muslim lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
intersex, questioning (LGBTIQ) organization, Al-Fatiha, states that ‘Sexual 
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humiliation is perhaps the worst form of torture for any Muslim. . . . Forcing 
men to masturbate in front of each other and to mock same-sex acts or 
homosexual sex, is perverse and sadistic, in the eyes of many Muslims’” 
(Puar 2004, 526).18 Such comments, in Puar’s view, also contributed to 
consolidate the contradictory articulation of elements of feminist and 
LGBTQ discourse to U.S. heteropatriarchal nationalism: “Given the 
unbridled homophobia demonstrated by the U.S. guards, it is indeed ironic, 
yet predictable, that the United States nonetheless emerges as more tolerant 
of homosexuality (and less tainted by misogyny and fundamentalism) than 
the repressed, modest, nudity-shy ‘Middle East’” (Puar 2004, 527).
The name for that contradictory articulation is, indeed, 
homonationalism. Puar coins the concept in an essay published two 
years later, titled “Mapping US Homonormativities” (2006). She writes: 
“What I aim to demonstrate in this article is that . . . the war on terror 
has rehabilitated some—clearly not all or most—lesbians, gays, and 
queers to US national citizenship within a spatial-temporal domain I am 
invoking as ‘homo-nationalism,’ short for ‘homonormative nationalism’” 
(68). Thus, Puar coins the concept of homonationalism by drawing on 
her earlier analyses of the sexual politics of the “war on terror” as well 
as on Duggan’s conceptualization of homonormativity, discussed in the 
previous chapter. Puar’s reference to the concept of homonormativity is 
meant to stress here, more explicitly than in her previous interventions, 
that LGBTQ formations themselves have actively contributed to the 
emergence of homonationalism. As she argues, “the Orientalist invocation 
of the ‘terrorist’ is one discursive tactic that disaggregates US national 
gays and queers from racial and sexual ‘others,’ foregrounding a collusion 
between homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated both 
by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects 
themselves: homo-nationalism” (68).
Thus, homonationalism is not just the name for a state ideology, unless 
we expand our understanding of the state through the Gramscian notion of 
integral state.19$V,DUJXHGLQWKH¿UVWFKDSWHUIROORZLQJ+DOOWKHQRWLRQ
of integral state encompasses both political society (the state traditionally 
understood) and civil society. According to Hall, the notion posits a relation 
of distinction and articulation between state and civil society, and such a 
relation must be always kept at the center of the analysis if the rise of 
popular consent to forms of state authoritarianism is to be traced in its 
concrete manifestations. Yet, anticipating Terrorist Assemblages, there is 
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no notion of such a relation in Puar’s essay. Rather, what she registers is the 
entrance of LGBTQ formations into a network of power understood, along 
Foucauldian lines, as operating beyond or above any concrete distinction 
EHWZHHQVWDWHDQGFLYLO VRFLHW\0RUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ WKLVHVVD\ LGHQWL¿HVD
seamless chain of connections among three different sites of emergence 
of homonationalism: knowledge production about terrorism, practices 
of LGBTQ consumerism (especially gay tourism), and representations 
of sexual and racial difference in the cartoon South Park. Puar rightfully 
argues that the heterogeneity of these sites exposes “the radical contingency 
of any nationalist homosexual formation, and the potency of their potential 
consolidation” (Puar 2006, 69). However, in order to fully grasp both the 
contingency of homonationalism and the mechanisms of its consolidation, 
it is important to track not just its diverse sites of articulation, but also the 
UHODWLRQVRIIRUFHLQYROYHGLQWKHVSHFL¿FSUDFWLFHVRIDUWLFXODWLRQ2QO\DQ
analysis of such relations of force can expose the mechanisms of potential 
consolidation, or interruption, of such a contingent and contradictory 
politico-ideological formation as homonationalism.     
Let me insist on this point from a slightly different angle, that is, 
the disappearance of the problem of consent from Puar’s analysis. About 
her reading of South Park, she writes: “I am interested in South Park not 
because of the size or location of its audience nor because of its potential 
RUSHUFHLYHGFXOWXUDOLPSDFW5DWKHUZKDWLQWULJXHVPHLVWKHUHÀHFWLRQRI
and continuities with critiques of the war on terror and the pathologization 
of terrorist bodies that is surfacing in popular culture” (Puar 2006, 79). 
We may contrast this approach to popular culture with the approach 
FKDUDFWHUL]LQJWKH¿HOGRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVHVSHFLDOO\LQLWVHDUO\SKDVH+DOO
>@EIRUH[DPSOHIDPRXVO\SURSRVHGWKDWWKHIRXUPRPHQWVRI
production, circulation, consumption, and reproduction of cultural products 
be understood as distinct moments that nonetheless work in articulation to 
one another, that is, within a regime of relative autonomy. His primary goal 
was to insist on the ideological work performed by popular culture while 
circumventing reductionist notions of false consciousness.20 Puar, instead, 
regards popular culture as one point of support among others of a less 
differentiated and admittedly more abstract network of power—a reading 
that depends on the appropriation and circulation of Foucault within the 
¿HOGRIFRQWHPSRUDU\FXOWXUDOVWXGLHV7KLVH[SODLQVKHULQGLIIHUHQFHWRWKH
consumption of South Park by concrete audiences and her privileging of a 
focus on the cartoon’s reproduction of broader discursive tendencies. 
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In fact, even as I have been reconstructing Puar’s analysis, so far, 
on the terrain of politico-ideological critique, this is not the terrain on 
which her analysis primarily operates. Her discussions of multiple cultural 
archives have opened up a space of politico-ideological struggle that has 
EHHQ UDGLFDOO\ UHGH¿QLQJTXHHU WKHRU\ DQG/*%74SROLWLFV WKURXJK WKH
SDVW¿IWHHQ\HDUV+RZHYHUKHUSULPDU\WKHRUHWLFDOJRDOLVWRLGHQWLI\WKH
internal logic of homonationalism—its regularity in dispersion, as Foucault 
himself put it in The Archaeology of Knowledge>@21—rather 
than tracking the concrete politico-ideological practices through which that 
IRUPDWLRQKDVEHHQDEOHWRDUWLFXODWHDFRQWUDGLFWRU\¿HOGRIVRFLDOIRUFHV22 
In so doing, Puar’s analysis departs not only from the theoretical practice 
of the early cultural studies, but also, implicitly, from Duggan’s own 
work on homonormativity. As I argued in the previous chapter, Duggan 
locates the problem of homonormativity within a broader analysis of the 
struggles for hegemony conducted by the neoliberal bloc in the United 
States from the 1970s to the present. Puar, instead, draws on Duggan’s 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ\HWUHGH¿QHVKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\DVDQLQVWDQFHRIGLVFLSOLQDU\
power: “the US nation not only allows for homosexual bodies, but also 
actually disciplines and normalizes them—suggesting, in fact, the need to 
attend to theorizations of the nation as not only heteronormative, but also 
homonormative” (Puar 2006, 72). While a disciplining of LGBTQ bodies 
and formations certainly contributes to the emergence of homonormativity, 
¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW E\ KDUQHVVLQJ DQG UHDUWLFXODWLQJ UDFLDO DQG FODVV
segmentations within those formations, in Puar the focus on disciplinary 
power does not just supplement an analysis of hegemonic struggle in order 
to specify its concrete articulatory moments. Rather, one tends to replace 
the other. This approach is fully developed in Terrorist Assemblages, 
where Puar’s earlier analyses converge within a much stronger theoretical 
framework. As we shall see, Foucault’s conceptualization of power, on 
which the earlier essays only loosely relied, gains center stage in the book, 
bringing the concept of homonationalism further in tension with an analysis 
of hegemony and counter-hegemony. 
A central goal of Terrorist Assemblages is to identify and analyze “a 
transition under way in how queer subjects are relating to nation-states, 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVIURPEHLQJ¿JXUHVRIGHDWKLHWKH$,'6
epidemic) to becoming tied to ideas of life and productivity (i.e., gay 
marriage and families)” (Puar 2007, xii). Such a transition, Puar argues, 
must be understood as contingent on the processes of racialization 
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activated in the context of the “war on terror”: “In Terrorist Assemblages, 
my primary interest is in this process of the management of queer life 
at the expense of sexually and racially perverse death in relation to the 
contemporary politics of securitization, Orientalism, terrorism, torture, and 
the articulation of Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and South Asian sexualities” (xiii). 
As these passages already suggest, life and death become not only political, 
but core theoretical concerns for Puar in Terrorist Assemblages. Indeed, 
her understanding of homonationalism is framed here, more consistently 
than in her earlier essays, by an analysis of what Foucault famously termed 
biopolitics: a technology of power “addressed to a multiplicity of men 
>sic@ QRW WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW WKH\ DUH QRWKLQJPRUH WKDQ WKHLU LQGLYLGXDO
bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that 
is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, 
LOOQHVVDQGVRRQ´)RXFDXOW>@
Even as disciplinary power and biopolitics overlap, for Foucault they 
do not coincide: “Unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the 
QHZ QRQGLVFLSOLQDU\ SRZHU >ELRSROLWLFV@ LV DSSOLHG QRW WRPDQDVERG\
EXWWRWKHOLYLQJPDQWRPDQDVOLYLQJEHLQJXOWLPDWHO\LI\RXOLNHWR
PDQDVVSHFLHV´ )RXFDXOW >@  23 On the one hand, that 
Puar’s analysis in Terrorist Assemblages primarily relies on Foucault’s 
conceptualization of biopolitics does not mean that she loses interest in 
the disciplining of queer bodies. As she writes, “biopolitics delineates not 
only which queers live and which queers die—a variable and contestable 
demarcation—but also how queers live and die” (Puar 2007, xii). In this 
respect, she follows Foucault himself, who argues that discipline and 
biopolitics, as distinct technologies of power operating on the scales 
of the individual body and of the population respectively, nonetheless 
work together.24 Yet, on the other hand, Puar’s emphasis on biopolitics 
marks a certain shift compared to her previous analyses. By partially 
UHGLUHFWLQJ WKHDWWHQWLRQIURPGLVFLSOLQH WRELRSROLWLFV WKH¿JXUHRI WKH
terrorist (the “terrorist-monster-fag”) ceases to be understood primarily 
DVDGLVFLSOLQDU\¿JXUHDQGPDWHULDOL]HVLQVWHDGLQFRQFUHWHSRSXODWLRQV
targeted for death in the context of the U.S. “war on terror.” 
:KLOHWKLVVKLIWWDNHVSODFH¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWE\GUDZLQJRQ)RXFDXOW¶V
conceptualization of biopolitics, it also leads Puar to stress the limits of the 
concept and to turn to Achille Mbembe’s work on “necropolitics.” In his 
essay “Necropolitics” (2003), Mbembe asks: “Is the notion of biopower 
VXI¿FLHQW WR DFFRXQW IRU WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ZD\V LQZKLFK WKH SROLWLFDO
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XQGHUWKHJXLVHRIZDURIUHVLVWDQFHRURIWKH¿JKWDJDLQVWWHUURUPDNHVWKH
PXUGHURIWKHHQHP\LWVSULPDU\DQGDEVROXWHREMHFWLYH"´7KHTXHVWLRQ
is not meant to suggest that killing is entirely banished from Foucault’s 
understanding of biopolitics. As Mbembe highlights, Foucault himself 
does confront this problem: “how will the power to kill and the function of 
PXUGHURSHUDWHLQWKLVWHFKQRORJ\RISRZHU>ELRSROLWLFV@ZKLFKWDNHVOLIH
DVERWKLWVREMHFWDQGREMHFWLYH"´)RXFDXOW>@)RXFDXOW¶V
answer is: through racism. In his view, racism introduces a partition into 
the domain of life, articulating the “other” race as a threat to the life of the 
population, hence allowing the state to kill without its commitment to the 
cultivation of life being contradicted (254-263). Yet, while Foucault seems 
to regard the function of murder as a residue of a more ancient technology 
of power—sovereignty—that continues to operate within a regime 
nonetheless primarily characterized by the technologies of discipline and 
biopolitics, Mbembe foregrounds the “creation of death-worlds” (Mbembe 
2003, 40) in the colonies, postcolonies, and new colonies of the world as a 
fundamental mark of our times. 
By bringing discipline, biopolitics, and necropolitics together and in 
tension with one another, Puar aims to conceptualize the process by which, 
LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH³ZDURQWHUURU´³>W@KHFXOWLYDWLRQRIKRPRVH[XDO
subjects folded into life . . . is racially demarcated and paralleled by a rise 
LQWKHWDUJHWLQJRITXHHUO\UDFHGERGLHV>DQGSRSXODWLRQV@IRUG\LQJ´3XDU
2007, xii).25 This theorization of homonationalism through the conceptual 
pair biopolitics/necropolitics has produced what we may consider a small 
but expanding terrain of analysis in its own right: “queer necropolitics.”26 
As the collective volume edited by Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, and 
Silvia Posocco, Queer Necropolitics (2014), illustrates, the concept of 
queer necropolitics has expanded in the process: “Throughout this book, 
‘queer necropolitics’ emerges as the concept-metaphor that illuminates and 
connects a range of spectacular and mundane forms of killing and of ‘letting 
die’ while simultaneously radically reimagining the meanings, purchase 
and stakes inherent in ‘queerness’ as a category of analysis and critique” 
(4). On the one hand, the emergence of queer necropolitics as a terrain of 
critique marks a key step in the hegemonic struggle around the color line in 
contemporary queer debates. As Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco note 
in the passage above, queerness itself as a category of analysis and as a 
SROLWLFDOVLJQL¿HUPXVWXQGHUJRDUDGLFDOUHYLVLRQZKHQFRQIURQWHGZLWKLWV
implication in the production of racialized “death-worlds.”27 On the other 
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hand, the turn toward the biopolitical/necropolitical has been driving queer 
theoretical practice further away from hegemony, ideology, and consent as 
objects of analysis.28
In Puar’s own analysis, this aspect is radicalized by her appropriation of 
a Deleuzian reading of Foucault. In “Postscript on the Societies of Control” 
(1992), Deleuze builds on Foucault’s conceptualization of biopolitics 
in order to analyze what he terms “societies of control.” But Deleuze’s 
analysis of control mechanisms substantially transforms Foucault’s 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIELRSROLWLFV)RU)RXFDXOWELRSROLWLFVLV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVW
WKHGRPDLQRIWKHVWDWH)RXFDXOW>@'HOHX]H¶VQRWLRQRI
control, instead, is by and large indifferent to the problem of state formation. 
What characterizes contemporary societies of control, in his view, are not 
the rigid apparatuses of the state, but the modulation mechanisms of the 
corporation: “The family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer 
the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner—state or 
SULYDWH SRZHU²EXW FRGHG ¿JXUHV²GHIRUPDEOH DQG WUDQVIRUPDEOH²RI
a single corporation that now has only stockholders” (Deleuze 1992, 6). 
$QGDJDLQ³(QFORVXUHV>WKHIDPLO\WKHVFKRROWKHIDFWRU\WKHSULVRQDQG
VRIRUWK@DUHmolds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like 
a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to 
another, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point” 
(4). In this Deleuzian reading of Foucault, power acquires a distinct level 
of abstraction andLPPHGLDF\D³SRZHU´WKDWLVQRWORFDWHGLQDQ\VSHFL¿F
apparatus but is granted an immediate grasp on its subjects.
,W LV WKURXJK WKH ¿OWHU RI WKLV 'HOHX]LDQ UHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ RI
biopolitics as control that Puar appropriates the concept of “assemblage” 
from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia >@  ,Q Terrorist Assemblages, the concept 
works in concert with the biopolitical/necropolitical pair and performs a 
number of different yet related functions. First of all, it helps Puar insist 
on the contradictory nature of homonationalism and the contingency of its 
formation, for assemblages are combinations of elements that do not belong 
together by necessity.29 In this respect, the concept of assemblage echoes 
that of articulation as developed by Hall. However, Hall distinguishes 
between the process of articulation through which different discursive 
elements cohere into an ideological discourse and the process through 
ZKLFK WKDW LGHRORJ\PDQDJHV WRDUWLFXODWHDJLYHQ¿HOGRIVRFLDO IRUFHV
“The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between that articulated discourse 
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and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, 
but need not necessarily, be connected. Thus, a theory of articulation is 
both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under certain 
conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how 
WKH\GRRUGRQRWEHFRPHDUWLFXODWHGDWVSHFL¿FFRQMXQFWXUHVWRFHUWDLQ
political subjects” (Hall 1986c, 53). In Puar’s analysis, instead, assemblages 
absorb and neutralize any such distinction between ideological formations 
and political subjects.300RUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ DVVHPEODJHV DUHPRGXODWLRQV
of power without subjects (either individual or collective). For, while 
granting “power” unprecedented pervasiveness, Deleuze also implodes the 
QRWLRQRIDVXEMHFWDOWRJHWKHU³:HQRORQJHU¿QGRXUVHOYHVGHDOLQJZLWK
the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, 
samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze 1992, 5). 
This leads us to a second aspect of the concept of assemblage. Its 
deployment by Puar situates Terrorist Assemblages within what has 
been termed the “affective turn”—or, sometimes interchangeably, the 
“ontological turn”—in contemporary critical theory and cultural studies 
(see Clough and Halley 2007). This body of work, especially in its 
)RXFDXOGLDQ'HOHX]LDQLQÀHFWLRQVVXJJHVWVWKDWDIIHFWVRIWHQXQGHUVWRRG
as a pre-social and pre-subjective force, constitute the most promising 
challenge to various power formations. By invoking affect,31 Puar calls into 
question the central role often accorded to representation (that is, ideology) 
in analyses of power. Following Deleuze, she argues that power primarily 
works in societies of control not through representation and interpellation, 
but by harnessing and channeling affect itself. Hence, she also contests 
representation as a privileged terrain for political practice.32 The main 
target of her critique is identity politics. In her view, through representation, 
LGHQWLW\SROLWLFV¿[HVWKHVXEMHFW³>L@QWKHVWLOOQHVVRISRVLWLRQ´SURGXFLQJ
D ¿HOG LQZKLFK ³ERGLHV DFWXDOO\ ORVH WKHLU FDSDFLW\ IRUPRYHPHQW IRU
ÀRZIRUVRFLDOFKDQJH´3XDU33 However, I suggest that the 
bracketing of the social in this quote is not accidental, for it suggests, in 
spite of Puar’s intentions, that the passage from affective force to social 
force, from bodily movement to social movement, is a passage necessarily 
mediated by politico-ideological (representational) practices. 
&ORVHO\ LQWHUWZLQHGZLWK WKLV FULWLTXH RI LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV LV ¿QDOO\
Puar’s deployment of assemblage as an alternative to intersectionality. 
Unlike some of the critics discussed in the previous chapter who identify 
intersectionality as a critique of identity politics, Puar correctly reads 
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intersectionality as identity politics, yet with the goal of leaving both behind 
3XDU   ,Q VR GRLQJ KHU DQDO\VLV GHSDUWV WR D VLJQL¿FDQW
H[WHQW IURP WKHEURDGHU¿HOGRI FRQWHPSRUDU\TXHHURI FRORU DQGTXHHU
diasporic critique.34 This is most evident in her discussion of Sikh diasporic 
formations in the last chapter of Terrorist Assemblages. Puar and Rai’s 
HDUOLHUHVVD\HQGHGZLWKDFULWLTXHRIWKHSUDFWLFHRI³WXUEDQSUR¿OLQJ´LQ
the aftermath of 9/11. In a typical queer diasporic gesture, Puar and Rai 
GHQRXQFHGWKHUDFLDOSUR¿OLQJRI6LNKWXUEDQHGPHQDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPH
the consolidation of heteropatriarchy within Sikh diasporic formations in 
UHVSRQVHWRVXFKDSUR¿OLQJ,QWKHODVWFKDSWHURITerrorist Assemblages, 
instead, a brief discussion of queer diaspora paves the way for a more detailed 
analysis of the turban as an affective assemblage. Here, Puar registers 
that in the context of the “war on terror” not only the subject wearing the 
turban, but the turban itself has become the target of racist violence. Hence, 
she suggests that we read “the turbaned man as an assemblage that cuts 
through such easy delineations between body and thing, an assemblage 
that fuses, but also scrambles into chaotic combinations, turban into body, 
cloth into hair, skin, oil, pores, destabilizing the presumed organicity of the 
body” (193). Such a reading privileges a conceptualization of affect and 
assemblage over the theoretico-political rubric of queer of color and queer 
diasporic critique. 
Most importantly, by deploying assemblage against identity politics and 
intersectionality, Puar’s analysis tends to erode what constitutes, according 
to my analysis so far, a key politico-ideological terrain for the articulation 
of a progressive counter-hegemonic bloc in times of homonormativity and 
homonationalism. Admittedly, this erosion takes place in theory, rather 
than theoretical practice. Puar (2012) herself implicitly acknowledges 
this difference in a later essay, where she tries to rethink, perhaps more 
generously, the relation between assemblage and intersectionality. Here, 
she insists on privileging assemblage over intersectionality by emphasizing, 
with Deleuze, control over discipline: “to dismiss assemblages in favor of 
retaining intersectional identitarian frameworks is to dismiss how societies 
of control tweak and modulate bodies as matter, not predominantly through 
VLJQL¿FDWLRQRULGHQWLW\LQWHUSHOODWLRQEXWUDWKHUWKURXJKDIIHFWLYHFDSDFLWLHV
and tendencies” (63).35 However, Puar opens this essay by acknowledging 
the deployment of an intersectional vantage point in her own work:
On the one hand I have been a staunch advocate of what is now 
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commonly known as an intersectional approach: analyses that 
foreground the mutually co-constitutive forces of race, class, sex, 
gender, and nation. . . . At the same time, . . . I also argued in my 
book . . . that intersectionality as an intellectual rubric and a tool for 
political intervention must be supplemented—if not complicated and 
reconceptualized—by a notion of assemblage. (Puar 2012, 49-50) 
While Terrorist Assemblages was far more determined in replacing 
intersectionality with assemblage than this passage wishes to suggest, it 
is true that an articulation of intersectionality and assemblage is what we 
¿QGin practice, at work in the book. Thus, the latter remains not only a 
key and necessary intervention in contemporary queer theory and LGBTQ 
politics, but also an archive that can be reconstructed on the terrain of 
politico-ideological critique. However, as I shall argue through the next 
WZR VHFWLRQV VRPHRI WKHSUREOHPV LGHQWL¿HG VR IDUZKLFK DUH VRXUFHV
of ambiguity in Terrorist Assemblages DUH IXUWKHU DPSOL¿HG LQ 3XDU¶V
ODWHULQWHUYHQWLRQVKDQGLQKDQGZLWKDVLJQL¿FDQWH[SDQVLRQRIWKHYHU\
concept of homonationalism.
Homonationalism and Sexual Imperialism: 
Divergences and Convergences 
In 2002, the same year that Puar and Rai published the essay that inaugurated 
3XDU¶VUHÀHFWLRQVRIKRPRQDWLRQDOLVP-RVHSK$0DVVDGSXEOLVKHGDQRWKHU
essay that was going to attract much attention and provoke intense debates 
ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOGV RI TXHHU WKHRU\ DQG /*%74 SROLWLFV ³5H2ULHQWLQJ
Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World” (2002). In this piece, 
later included in his book Desiring Arabs (2007), Massad coins the notion 
of the “Gay International” to name the network of institutions, political 
formations, NGOs, and forms of knowledge—both in the West and in the 
Arab world—invested in “saving” Arab gays, lesbians, and homosexuals 
from their own societies and, in the process, according to Massad’s analysis, 
“exporting” a Western understanding of sexuality to the Arab world.36 
Massad’s and Puar’s respective concerns overlap but also diverge. From 
her earlier interventions until Terrorist Assemblages, Puar predominantly 
focuses on the effects of 9/11 on heterogeneous formations in the United 
States, increasingly focusing on LGBTQ formations as key reproducers of 
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U.S. nationalist ideology at the time of the “war on terror.” Massad, instead, 
emphasizes the impact of the internationalization of Western LGBTQ 
politics on Arab social formations (in particular on Arab intellectual debates 
on sexual desire).37 In other words, while Puar analyzes homonationalism 
DVDVSHFL¿FSROLWLFRLGHRORJLFDOIRUPDWLRQHPHUJLQJLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
in the wake of 9/11, Massad more explicitly focuses on sexual imperialism, 
situating LGBTQ international organizations in an organic relation to 
Western imperialism. On the one hand, this has exposed Massad’s analysis 
to much more intense criticisms than Puar’s. Yet, on the other hand, some 
of Puar’s more recent interventions, following Terrorist Assemblages, have 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\VKRUWHQHGWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQKHUDUJXPHQWVDQG0DVVDG¶V,Q
fact, as I shall argue, it is their very theoretical practices that, while initially 
diverging, have come later to increasingly converge. 
0DVVDG LGHQWL¿HV WKH HPHUJHQFH RI WKH *D\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO LQ WKH
1980s and the process of its consolidation in the 1990s. Two prominent 
international organizations still active to this day—ILGA and IGLHRC—
stand at the beginning of his essay as an exemplary starting point: 
“Organizations dominated by white Western males (the International 
/HVELDQ DQG *D\ $VVRFLDWLRQ >,/*$@ DQG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO *D\ DQG
/HVELDQ+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLVVLRQ>,*/+5&@VSUDQJXSWRGHIHQGWKH
rights of ‘gays and lesbians’ all over the world and to advocate on their 
behalf. . . . It is these missionary tasks, the discourse that produces them, 
and the organizations that represent them that constitute what I call the Gay 
International” (Massad 2002, 361-362). In line with the broader project 
of reconstructing the intellectual history of the representation of sexual 
desire among the Arabs within the context of Western imperialism in the 
Arab world—a project that will materialize in Desiring Arabs—Massad 
primarily focuses, already in this earlier essay, not on the politics of the 
Gay International as much as its production of knowledges. As he points 
out, “supporters of the Gay International’s missionary tasks have produced 
two kinds of literature on the Muslim world: an academic literature of 
historical, literary, and anthropological accounts . . . which purport to 
describe and explain ‘homosexuality’ in the past and present of the Arab 
DQG0XVOLPZRUOGVDQGMRXUQDOLVWLFDFFRXQWVRIWKHOLYHVRIVRFDOOHGJD\V
and (much less so) lesbians in the contemporary Arab and Muslim worlds” 
7KXVHYHQLI0DVVDGGRHVQRWGHSOR\DQ\VSHFL¿FFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ
of ideology—and I will return on this point—his text can be considered to 
offer an analysis of the ideological practices of the Gay International.
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The three main arguments formulated by Massad, and those that have 
generated the most intense debates, posit that: a) the Gay International 
does not just aim to save Arab gays, lesbians, and homosexuals, but 
attempts to produce them as such in social formations where they did 
QRWH[LVWEHIRUHE WKLVDWWHPSWVRIDUKDV ODUJHO\IDLOHGRU WREHPRUH
precise, its little success is unevenly distributed across class divides, for 
JD\ OHVELDQ DQG KRPRVH[XDO LGHQWL¿FDWLRQV KDYH HPHUJHG LQ WKH$UDE
ZRUOG H[FOXVLYHO\ZLWKLQ WKHPLGGOH DQGXSSHU FODVVHV DQGF WKH*D\
International substantially contributes to the articulation of state as well as 
popular forms of homophobia in Arab countries, which it then represents 
as the target of its own missionary intervention. 
7KXV¿UVWRIDOO0DVVDGGRHVQRWPHUHO\SRLQWRXWWKDWWKHPLVVLRQDU\
efforts of the Gay International display an imperialist attitude. Rather, 
he argues that its practices and knowledges are organic to European and 
U.S. imperialism in that its self-proclaimed responsibility to save Arab 
homosexuals actually produces (or attempts to produce) the subjects it 
names: “it is the discourse of the Gay International that both produces 
homosexuals, as well as gays and lesbians, where they do not exist, and 
represses same-sex desires and practices that refuse to be assimilated into its 
sexual epistemology” (Massad 2002, 363). In order to make this argument, 
0DVVDGWXUQVWRWKH¿UVWYROXPHRI)RXFDXOW¶VHistory of Sexuality>@
1978) and to its conceptualization of sexuality as a technology of disciplinary 
SRZHUFRQVLVWLQJ¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWRIDQ³LQFLWHPHQW WRGLVFRXUVH´$V
Foucault famously argued against a “repressive” understanding of power, 
“what distinguishes these last three centuries is the variety, the wide 
GLVSHUVLRQRIGHYLFHVWKDWZHUHLQYHQWHGIRUVSHDNLQJDERXW>VH[@5DWKHU
than a massive censorship, . . . what was involved was a regulated and 
polymorphous incitement to discourse” (34). Even as Massad, in this earlier 
essay, makes explicit reference to Foucault only once and in a footnote, this 
understanding of sexuality is clearly the main theoretical point of support 
for his argument.38 In the introduction to Desiring Arabs, he writes: “It is 
important to insist that not only did the concept of homosexuality itself not 
exist but also that if exclusive ‘homosexual’ male desires as such existed at 
all, it was not the main topic of discourse” (Massad 2007, 30-31).39 
As one instance among many of the incitement to discourse articulated 
by the Gay International in the Arab world, Massad mentions an essay on 
WKHQHJRWLDWLRQVRIJD\ LGHQWLW\DQGVSDFHV LQ%HLUXWE\6R¿DQ0HUDEHW
(2004),40 published on the Middle East Report:
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Take the example of one sexual rights missionary writing in Lebanon. 
He accuses those Lebanese men who refuse to identify as “gay” and 
answer Western questions about their alleged gayness by insisting that 
“I’m not like that” as “self-hating” or even as expressing “homosexual 
homophobia.” This missionary even marshals Freud’s authority 
WR GH¿QH WKRVH XQ¿W WR GH¿QH WKHPVHOYHV DV KDYLQJ D ³VSOLW LQ WKH
HJR´³7KLVUHSXGLDWLRQIXQFWLRQVDVWKHIRXQGDWLRQV>VLF@RIGHIHQVH
and is part of an individual protection mechanism that Freudian 
psychoanalysis calls ‘disavowal of difference.’” (Massad 2007, 43)        
In this passage, Massad’s distinctive polemical tone leads him, in 
fact, to partially misread Merabet. It is true that the latter’s recourse to 
SV\FKRDQDO\WLFDOH[SODQDWLRQVIRUWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIJD\LGHQWL¿FDWLRQLQ
Lebanon is unconvincing, and moreover sits uncomfortably with his own 
scattered invocations of more historical and sociological analyses of the 
same problem.41 However, Massad gives us the impression that Merabet is 
FDVWLJDWLQJ/HEDQHVHPHQIRUDFWLYHO\UHVLVWLQJJD\LGHQWL¿FDWLRQDJDLQVWD
:HVWHUQLQWHUSHOODWLRQ0HUDEHWLQVWHDGDQDO\]HVVXFKDGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQLQ
the context of a different encounter. Registering a lack of solidarity among 
men in the face of the homophobic policies of a donut shop in Beirut, which 
continued to function as a meeting place for men who desire men although it 
had repeatedly removed customers deemed “inappropriate” because of their 
“feminine” behavior, Merabet writes: “The general lack of solidarity . . . 
results in part from the fear of becoming socially ostracized. Moreover, this 
prevalent disengagement often has to do with the consequences of resisting 
VHOILGHQWL¿FDWLRQµAna mesh heek’ (‘I’m not like that’), numerous gay men 
in Beirut will say, ambiguously, as they reject an ‘overtly feminine’ customer. 
Hence, the frequent disavowal of any kind of homosexual identity on their 
part” (Merabet 2004, 30-31). From this passage, Massad extrapolates a 
IRUP RI GLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ WKDW0HUDEHW KRZHYHU GRHV QRW REVHUYH LQ WKH
context of a Western interpellation (as Massad suggests), but rather in the 
encounter with male femininity. Thus, Merabet interprets what he regards 
as “internalized homophobia” among Lebanese gay men primarily as the 
UHVXOWRIDVSHFL¿FUHJLPHRIKHJHPRQLFPDVFXOLQLW\0DVVDGPD\EHULJKW
in pointing out that Marabet misreads the situation and that such a rejection 
RIJD\RUKRPRVH[XDOLGHQWL¿FDWLRQVKDOOEHXQGHUVWRRGLQVWHDGDVDIULFWLRQ
between sexual imperialism and Arab social formations. Yet to make his 
point, he misreads Marabet rather than engaging in a rewriting of his analysis.
Queer Diasporic Critiques of Homonationalism and Sexual Imperialism 185
This problem notwithstanding, Massad’s misreading of Marabet 
LOOXVWUDWHV TXLWH ZHOO QRW RQO\ KLV ¿UVW NH\ DUJXPHQW²WKDW WKH *D\
International tries to produce the subjects it names through an incitement to 
discourse—but also his second one: such an implantation of sexual identity 
has mostly failed, so far, in the Arab world. To be more precise, for Massad 
the little successes of the Gay International are distributed unevenly across 
FODVV GLYLGHV LQ$UDE VRFLDO IRUPDWLRQV ³,W LV DPRQJPHPEHUV RI >WKH@
wealthier segments of society that the Gay International has found native 
informants. Although members of these classes who engage in same-sex 
relations have more recently adopted a Western identity . . . they remain 
a minuscule minority among those men who engage in same-sex relations 
and who do not identify as ‘gay’ or express a need for gay politics” (Massad 
2002, 372-373).42 At this point in his analysis, Massad seems to implicitly 
integrate his Foucauldian approach with an analysis of hegemony. In the 
introduction to Desiring Arabs, he writes: 
7KLVERRNZLOO FKURQLFOHKRZ >WKH:HVWHUQ VH[XDO@ HSLVWHPHZKLOH
hegemonic in intellectual and elite circles, has failed to become 
hegemonic among the population and how assiduous efforts are 
appealing to the state to employ its juridical and coercive abilities 
to render this sexual ontology—which is hegemonic in the West—
dominant in the interstices of Arab societies and psyches in order to 
break down the resistance of these desiring Arabs. (Massad 2007, 49)
Such appeals to the state are articulated, according to Massad, not only by 
Western organizations working on the international scale, but also by Arab 
LGBTQ organizations both in the Arab world and in the diaspora. Examples 
of the latter are the now dissolved Al-Fatiha Foundation, the international 
LGBTQI Muslim organization founded by Pakistani American Faisal 
Alam in 1997 and mentioned earlier, as well as the Lebanese Helem, 
registered in Canada but based in Beirut, and the Palestinian alQaws based 
in Jerusalem. According to Massad, such organizations and the individuals 
working in them are not just passive targets of Western sexual imperialism, 
as his reference to them as “native informants” may otherwise suggest, but 
UDWKHUDUHRUJDQLFWRLW,QKLVYLHZE\¿JKWLQJDJDLQVWKRPRSKRELDDQG
heteropatriarchy in the Arab world and by doing so while identifying as 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, trans, and queer Arabs, they form part and parcel 
of the Gay International.
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Massad writes: “Because it has solicited and received some support 
from Arab and Muslim native informants who are mostly located in the 
United States and who accept its sexual categories and identities, the Gay 
International’s imperialist epistemological task is proceeding apace. . . . 
Its missionary achievement, however, will be the creation not of a queer 
planet but rather a straight one” (Massad 2002, 385).43 Indeed, the third core 
argument put forward by Massad is that homophobia, rather than sexual 
liberation, continues to be the key import of Western imperialism in the 
Arab world, not only historically (in the encounter between Catholic and 
Victorian Europe and its colonies),44 but also—paradoxically yet logically, 
according to Massad’s analysis—through the present efforts of the Gay 
International. For Massad, the latter does not simply try to export and 
JOREDOL]HVSHFL¿FVH[XDOLGHQWLWLHVEXWWKHQRWLRQRIVH[XDOLGHQWLW\LWVHOI
a sexual epistemology grounded on the distinction between homosexuality 
and heterosexuality. He writes in Desiring Arabs: “While subjectivities in 
many non-Western contexts do not include heterosexuality and exclude 
homosexuality, as that very binarism is not part of their ontological 
structure, what the incitement and intervention of international human 
rights activism achieves is the replication of the very Euro-American 
human subjectivity its advocates challenge at home” (Massad 2007, 41). 
Thus, in Massad’s account, even as the Gay International continues to fail 
LQ LWV HIIRUW WR LQFLWH JD\ OHVELDQ DQGKRPRVH[XDO LGHQWL¿FDWLRQV DW WKH
level of popular common sense and beyond the middle and upper classes 
of the Arab world, it has been very successful in inciting the emergence of 
both state and popular homophobia, in a postcolonial context that already 
facilitates the ideological articulation of a link between same-sex practices 
and Western imperialism. As he puts it in an interview by Félix Boggio 
Éwanjé-Épée and Stella Magliani-Belkacem published on Jadaliyya 
in 2013, making explicit reference to the Lebanese organization Helem 
and the Palestinian alQaws, “what their intervention participates in is the 
heterosexualization of the majority of Arabs and the homonormativization 
of a minority of them” (Massad 2013).
Massad argues that this incitement of homophobia—and, strictly 
speaking, of heterosexuality itself—has been aided by two phenomena: 
“the spread of AIDS on an international scale, with the Western homophobic 
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQRILWDVWKHµJD\¶GLVHDVHDQGWKHULVHRI,VODPLVPLQWKH$UDE
and Muslim worlds, with its stricter sexual mores” (Massad 2002, 374-
375). Yet the Gay International is granted a central role in accelerating and 
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amplifying the process. Not only is this passage in the essay immediately 
IROORZHGE\WKHDVVHUWLRQWKDW³>W@KH*D\,QWHUQDWLRQDOKDVVXFFHHGHGLQ
inciting discourse by attracting antigay Islamist and nationalist reactions 
to its efforts” (375), but the essay itself is followed, in Desiring Arabs, 
by a chapter devoted to such Islamist reactions. The latter are presented, 
both explicitly as well as implicitly by virtue of their position in the 
economy of the book, as a shift in discourse primarily effected by the Gay 
International itself.
A rather illustrative example of this dynamic, as well as of Massad’s 
indifference to the relations of force involved in the production and 
consolidation of homophobia, is his commentary on a polemical exchange 
that took place in 1996 between the Arabic newspaper Al-Hayah, based 
LQ /RQGRQ DQG5DP]L =DNKDULD D 3DOHVWLQLDQ$PHULFDQ JD\PDQZKR
in 1989 had founded in Washington, D.C. the Gay and Lesbian Arabic 
Society (GLAS). When the editor-in-chief of Al-Hayah referred to gays 
with the Arabic term shuthuth (sexual deviance) in the context of a tirade 
DJDLQVW:HVWHUQWHOHYLVLRQQRUPDOL]LQJGHYLDQF\=DNKDULDZURWHD OHWWHU
of protest to the newspaper. Massad notes that the letter did not focus on 




on explaining not only that homosexuality is genetic and that homosexual 
relations are based on sex and love, but also that his organization is on 
the front line, together with the feminist movement, in the struggle to 
HUDGLFDWHSDWULDUFK\IURPWKH$UDEZRUOG7R=DNKDULD¶VOHWWHUWKHHGLWRU
replied that he simply used the Arabic term for homosexuals and that the 
only other term available—mithliyyah (sameness)—is unknown to most 
UHDGHUV+H WKHQ UHDI¿UPHG WKDW ERWK KLP DQG WKH QHZVSDSHUAl-Hayah 
oppose sameness, deviance, or however one wants to call homosexuality, 
“for reasons of traditions, religion, and inherited conventions, but without 
insulting anyone and without coercion, imposition, or oppression and 
without making a case out of it, as this was not the intention . . . moreover, 
the editor in chief admits his ignorance of this issue more generally as 
he did not realize that this issue was on the table” (al-Khazin, quoted in 
Massad 2002, 379). Massad, rather surprisingly, comments:
,QGHHG>WKHLVVXH@ZDVQRW>RQWKHWDEOH@DVDO.KD]LQ¶VFRQFHUQZDV
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with the spread of “deviance” from the West to the Arab world and not 
its actual existence in the Arab world. Neither the editor of al-Hayah 
nor the newspaper itself would have declared explicit opposition to 
³VDPHQHVV´LQWKH$UDEZRUOGKDG=DNKDULDDUHVLGHQWRIWKH8QLWHG
States, not incited this condemnation—which will affect not him but 
people in the Arab world. (Massad 2002, 379)
7KXVHYHQDV0DVVDGDI¿UPVWKDWWKHHGLWRU¶V³FRQFHUQDERXWµGHJHQHUDWLRQ¶
is borrowed wholesale from late-nineteenth-century European discourse” 
(Massad 2002, 378), and even as he adds a remark, in the version of the 
same passage appearing in Desiring Arabs, about the fact that the editor 
“feigned ignorance” on the actual existence of same-sex practices in the 
Arab world (Massad 2007, 179), he nonetheless insists on identifying 
=DNKDULD¶VOHWWHUDVWKHSULPDU\cause of the homophobia articulated in the 
course of this exchange.
This misreading of the relations of force involved in the link between 
the Gay International and the production of homophobia in the Arab 
world appears even more striking within the broader analysis developed 
by Massad in Desiring Arabs. The book offers an intellectual history of 
the representation of sexual desire among Arabs (especially Arab men) 
IURP WKH ODWH QLQHWHHQWK WR WKH HDUO\ WZHQW\¿UVW FHQWXU\ ,W IRFXVHV RQ
the debates taking place among Arab intellectuals, yet arguing that such 
debates unfolded in relation to the vicissitudes of Western imperialism 
in the Arab world and the attendant production of Western Orientalist 
knowledge on Arab societies and cultures, including sexual desires (see 
Boone 2014). Through the reading of a vast archive, Massad shows that 
from the Arab “renaissance” (Nahdah) onward—that is, from the mid-
nineteenth century to the present—Arab intellectuals have increasingly 
engaged with the question of sex and sexual desire as a barometer of 
civilizational development or decadence. Massad argues that the emergence 
of this correlation and of the very notions of “civilization,” “culture,” 
“development,” “degeneration,” “decadence,” “progress,” “renaissance,” 
DQG VR IRUWK LV V\PSWRPDWLF RI WKH LQÀXHQFH RI 2ULHQWDOLVP RQ$UDE
intellectual life (Massad 2007, 5-29).
The earlier essay on the Gay International appears as the third chapter 
in Desiring Arabs, preceded by two chapters that analyze the ways in which 
Arab intellectuals from the late nineteenth century to the 1970s engaged 
in the enterprise of writing the history of Arab civilization (tamaddun or 
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hadarah) while emphasizing the sexual desires and practices of Arabs 
and Muslims. According to Massad, these efforts were undertaken with a 
distinct pedagogical purpose, positing different readings of the Arab past as 
the basis for present and future progress (taqaddum). Focusing especially 
RQ WKH FRQÀLFWLQJ UHDGLQJV RI$EEDVLG SRHW$EX1XZDV DQG HVSHFLDOO\
of his ghazal in the masculine (poems composed for young boys), 
Massad argues that same-sex desires and practices came increasingly to 
EHH[SHOOHGIURPWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIDOHJLWLPDWH$UDEKHULWDJHturath) and 
WREH LGHQWL¿HGZLWKGHJHQHUDWLRQ inhihal) and civilizational decadence 
(inhitat). It is precisely by borrowing all of these notions from the European 
GLVFRXUVHWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIVH[DQGVH[XDOGHVLUHWRWKHLUGH¿QLWLRQKHQFH
the Orientalist perception of the Arabs as sexually perverse vis-à-vis 
European Victorian morals, that Arab intellectuals themselves, throughout 
WKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\FDPHWRH[SHOVDPHVH[SUDFWLFHVIURPWKHGH¿QLWLRQ
of Arab and Muslim “culture.” 
As Massad himself puts it in the interview on Jadaliyya³>W@KHVH[XDO
order of the postcolonial context to which contemporary western sexual 
identities are introduced is already the effect of a colonial epistemology 
that has been translated and iterated earlier. As I chronicle in Desiring 
Arabs, the European shaming of non-Europeans on the basis of sexual 
desires and practices begins at the dawn of the colonial encounter, inciting 




Peter Drucker makes this point in his critical review of the book: “The 
irony of this line of argument is that Massad provides so much evidence 
that hostility to same-sex sexualities in the Arab world long predated the 
arrival of LGBT movements. He describes a host of modern Arab attempts 
to deny, downplay or condemn traditional Arab openness to same-sex 
sexual desire” (Drucker 2008). 
Massad insists that such attempts on the part of Arab intellectuals 
UHPDLQHG UHODWLYHO\ FRQ¿QHG WR WKH WHUUDLQ RI LQWHOOHFWXDO GHEDWH XQWLO
the appearance of the Gay International on the international political 
scene. Yet, even if this was the case, if his own lengthy and sophisticated 
analysis of those debates is not to be reduced to a redundant lingering on 
D UHODWLYHO\ LUUHOHYDQW ¿HOG RI NQRZOHGJH SURGXFWLRQ WKH ODWWHUPXVW EH
DFFRUGHGDPRUHVXEVWDQWLDOUROHLQVKDSLQJFRQWHPSRUDU\FRQÀLFWVDURXQG
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sexuality in the Arab world. In other words, whether one considers the 
Gay International to have produced homophobia in the Arab world, as 
Massad sometimes seems to suggest, or one instead considers it to have 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\DFFHOHUDWHGDQGDPSOL¿HG WKHSURFHVVDVKHPRUHFDUHIXOO\
suggests in other passages, one is nonetheless privileging its determining 
force compared to other conjunctural elements that Desiring Arabs 
foregrounds as central. In light of Massad’s own analysis, for instance, the 
homophobia with which Al-HayahUHVSRQGHGWR5DP]L=DNKDULD¶VFODLP
of an Arab gay identity is hardly the direct product of the incitement to 
GLVFRXUVH DUWLFXODWHGE\=DNKDULD KLPVHOI5DWKHU WKDW KRPRSKRELD KDG
been prepared by a vast (colonial and postcolonial) archive of intellectual 
debates. In fact, despite his opposite conclusions, Massad seems to 
suggest as much when he mentions that the editor-in-chief’s “concern 
about ‘degeneration’ is borrowed wholesale from late-nineteenth-century 
European discourse” (Massad 2002, 378).
As this discussion makes clear, Massad’s analysis is uncompromisingly 
critical of queer diasporic formations, which he regards are organic to the Gay 
International. If Puar, in Terrorist Assemblages, to a certain extent departs 
IURPWKHWKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFHVWKDWE\DQGODUJHGH¿QHWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\¿HOG
of queer of color and queer diasporic critique—that is, she departs from 
intersectionality theoretically even as she practices it in her analysis—Massad, 
a diasporic intellectual himself in the United States, maintains no theoretical 
RUSROLWLFDODI¿OLDWLRQVZLWKTXHHUIRUPDWLRQVHLWKHULQWKHGLDVSRUDRULQWKH
Arab world. This difference between Massad and Puar is well illustrated, 
for instance, by their respective critiques of the Al-Fatiha Foundation. As 
I already mentioned, Massad considers this international LGBTQI Muslim 
organization founded in the United States to be a quintessential example of 
the diasporic segment of the Gay International. In fact, he attributes to it a 
key role in shaping the Egyptian government’s management of the infamous 
Queen Boat controversy in 2001, that is, the arrest of 55 men charged with 
the accusation of “offending religion” and “practicing debauchery” because 
of their same-sex practices.45 According to Massad’s analysis, the arrests 
caused “a torrent of media collusion with the government, condemning 
the practice of ‘deviance’ as a new Western imposition” as well as an 
international campaign by the Gay International (Massad 2002, 382). Here, 
he emphasizes the role played by Al-Fatiha’s founder Faisal Alam:
Al-Fatiha’s now infamous founder Faisal Alam . . . not only called 
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for worldwide demonstrations in support of the arrested men, but also 
solicited the signatures of members of the U.S. Congress, who were 
recruited by openly gay Massachusetts congressman Barney Frank 
and by the anti-Arab and anti-Egyptian Tom Lantos to sign a petition 
threatening a cutoff of U.S. aid to Egypt if the government failed to 
release the men. (Massad 2002, 382)
Thus, upon recalling such mobilizations by Al-Fatiha as well as other 
international organizations, Massad argues that both the Egyptian 
JRYHUQPHQW DQG WKH (J\SWLDQ SUHVV UHDFWHG ZLWK ³PRUH YLOL¿FDWLRQ
campaigns of deviant sex as an imperialist plot, as evidenced by the real 
alliances that the Gay International makes with imperialists—Al-Fatiha’s 
activities were seen as particularly egregious” (Massad 2002, 383). Once 
again, even as the political practice of Al-Fatiha can and must be the subject 
of critique, a misreading of the relations of force—and quite a deliberate 
one, it seems—leads Massad to privilege the role of the Gay International 
in consolidating homophobia. Puar, instead, criticizes Alam in her analysis 
of the U.S. reactions to the Abu Ghraib scandal. As I argued earlier, for her 
Alam participated in the queer racialization of Arab populations by insisting 
that the sexual tortures violated Arab and Muslim “culture” and must be 
condemned on these grounds. Yet unlike Massad, and underscoring in fact 
the salience of a conjunctural intersectional reading, she adds: “I want to 
underscore the complex dance of positionality that Muslim and Arab groups 
such as the Muslim American Society and especially Al-Fatiha must perform 
in these times, during which a defense of ‘Muslim sexuality’ through the 
lens of culture easily becomes co-opted into racist agendas” (Puar 2007, 91).
Thus, it is not surprising that Massad’s analysis has provoked more 
intense and polemic debates than Puar’s. Some have noted, indeed, 
Massad’s indifference to concrete relations of force. Peter Drucker, 
in his review of Desiring Arabs DI¿UPV WKDW ³>W@KH SRZHU RI >WKH*D\
,QWHUQDWLRQDO@LVGHULVLEOHFRPSDUHGWRWKDWRIWKHIRUPHUFRORQLDOHPSLUHV
WKH 86 PLOLWDU\ PDMRU PXOWLQDWLRQDOV RU WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ¿QDQFLDO
institutions. . . . Arab governments may vilify these organizations in their 
propaganda, but Massad provides little evidence that they have had any 
VLJQL¿FDQW HIIHFW RQ ODZ RU SROLF\ HYHQ QHJDWLYHO\´ 'UXFNHU 
Similarly, Jason Ritchie states: “Massad’s critique . . . vastly overstates the 
power of the Gay International and misreads the actual implications of its 
project” (Ritchie 2010, 566). However, most critics focus on the charge 
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of “inauthenticity” that, in their view, Massad formulates against Arabs 
who identify and organize politically as gays, lesbians, or homosexuals. 
Massad himself, in turn, is accused of “nativism.” Thus, Ritchie suggests 
that Massad’s account “looks a lot like an orientalist fantasy of ‘authentic’ 
Arab sexuality” (567) and Drucker argues that Desiring Arabs “tends to 
idealize the indigenous sexual culture of the Arab world” (Drucker 2008). 
Amal Amireh, referring to the work of alQaws in Israel-Palestine, laments 
that “these queer activists have to contend with accusations that they are 
embracing an ‘inauthentic’ identity that is foreign to Arab and Muslim 
culture” (Amireh 2010, 644). And Tom Boellstorff, who is alone among 
these commentators in directing the critique against both Massad and 
Puar, states that their work “often presumes that persons outside the West 
terming themselves lesbian or gay are inauthentic” (Boellstorff 2007, 23).
Strictly related to the question of “inauthenticity” is, according to 
virtually all of Massad’s critics, the question of “agency.” Sahar Amer 
writes: “Reading Massad’s work, one gets the sense that Arabs are 
passive, always in a reactive position vis-à-vis the West, never actors or 
LQ FKDUJH RI GH¿QLQJ WKHLU RZQ OLYHV RU VH[XDOLWLHV    ,I IRU WKH*D\
International, an Arab who rejects the label gay is victim of self-hatred or 
internalized homosexual homophobia, it would appear that for Massad, 
an Arab who asserts a gay identity is a victim of orientalist fantasies, of 
colonial imposition, and of the universalizing claims of Western gay rights 
groups” (Amer 2010, 652). Both critiques, strictly speaking, proceed from 
a misreading of Massad’s analysis. On the one hand, Massad insists that 
the recovering of a more “authentic” Arab sexual culture by no means 
IRUPV SDUW RI KLV SURMHFW ,Q IDFW KH GHYRWHV WKH ¿UVW WZR FKDSWHUV RI
Desiring Arabs to exposing how such pedagogical efforts at recovering an 
Arab cultural heritage are themselves products of the colonial encounter, 
for Arab intellectuals borrowed the very notions of “culture,” “heritage,” 
DQG ³FLYLOL]DWLRQ´ IURP WKH (XURSHDQ GLVFRXUVH LQ WKH ¿UVW SODFH 2Q
the other hand, concerning the question of agency, I have been arguing 
so far that Massad considers LGBTQ formations in the Arab world and 
the diaspora to be organic to the Gay International, not its victims. Thus, 
in the third chapter of his most recent book Islam in Liberalism (2015), 
a chapter where he replies to most of his critics, Massad comments: 
“explaining the process through which a small number of people outside 
Europe and its settler colonies come to adopt the term ‘gay’ is not a refusal 
to recognize the agency of these individuals but rather a recognition of 
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the complicity of such agency with gay universalism” (250). Indeed, it is 
precisely the insistence on this complicit agency—often morphing into a 
focus on Arab LGBTQ formations themselves as the central actors in the 
heterosexualization of the Arab world—that granted Massad the critique of 
a distinct indifference to concrete relations of force.
<HWWKHVHSDUWLDOPLVUHDGLQJVRI0DVVDG¶VDQDO\VLVDUHMXVWL¿HGE\KLV
polemical tone as well as the inconsistencies to be found in his own texts. 
His essay on the Gay International, for instance, ends with the following 
assertion: “the Gay International’s imperialist epistemological task is 
proceeding apace with little opposition from the majority of the sexual beings 
it wants to ‘liberate’ and whose social and sexual worlds it is destroying in 
the process” (Massad 2002, 189-190). Such polemical passages punctuate 
Massad’s interventions and seem to contradict time and again both his 
assertion that the existence of a more “authentic” Arab sexual culture does 
not concern him and his denial of an underestimation of Arab agency in his 
work. Most importantly, Massad is rather ambiguous regarding the nature 
of the imperialism that he attributes to the Gay International—especially 
WR LWV VHJPHQWV LQ WKH$UDEZRUOG DQG WKHGLDVSRUD$ VSHFL¿FSROHPLF
for instance, developed around the LGBTQ group Helem based in Beirut, 
/HEDQRQ$IWHU0DVVDGIRU WKH¿UVW WLPHH[SOLFLWO\UHIHUUHGWR WKHJURXS
as part of the Gay International, in an interview published on the online 
magazine ResetDOC (Massad 2009a), Ghassan Makarem—Helem’s 
executive director—replied with a letter to the magazine, titled “We are 
not Agents of the West” (2009).46 In the letter, Makarem both summarizes 
the history of Helem and insists on its anti-imperialist politics.47 He recalls:
,Q-XO\+HOHPZDVDOVRRQHRI WKH¿UVWRUJDQL]DWLRQVWRUHDFW
to the Israeli aggression and become part of the massive grassroots 
solidarity movements that sprung up during the attacks. The gay 
and lesbian community center became part of Beirut’s busiest relief 
headquarters during 4 weeks of bombing. Joining with allies from the 
anti-war movement, environmentalists, student groups, collectives, 
and Palestinian refugee associations, Helem became part of Samidoun, 
the largest independent campaign in solidarity with the resistance and 
working for the relief of civilian refugees and war victims. . . . In 
line with this position, Helem had called for the boycott of Jerusalem 
World Pride earlier that summer. Does Massad seriously believe that 
WKH*D\,QWHUQDWLRQDOZDVEHKLQGDOOWKLV"0DNDUHP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The dialogue between Massad and Makarem on ResetDOC is not, as 
such, of particular interest, yet it forced Massad to specify in what ways 
organizations such as Helem could be considered to be organic to Western 
imperialism. Thus, in the interview published on Jadaliyya four years after 
this polemical exchange with Makarem, Massad states:
I have never called “LGBT Arabs” agents of imperialism, as Gay 
Internationalists often misquote me. . . . I have however said that 
Gay Internationalist Arabs are complicit with imperialism, and their 
complicity is not unlike the complicity of nationalist Arabs or Islamist 
Arabs. . . . The fact that all of these groups (and in the case of Gay 
Internationalists, I am referring here to those who are located in 
Beirut and Israel) are anti-imperialist in the sense that they oppose 
the imperial political, economic, and military presence of the United 
States or European countries in the Arab world, that they oppose US 
wars on the Arab and Muslim worlds, that they oppose Israeli and 
=LRQLVW DJJUHVVLRQ DJDLQVW 3DOHVWLQH DQG WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQV LV ZHOO
HVWDEOLVKHGLQWKHRI¿FLDOVWDWHPHQWVRIWKHLURUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGWKHLU
literature. I am speaking of complicity at the level of epistemology and 
ontology. (Massad 2013)48    
This passage opens up a key question of theoretical practice. Indeed, the 
problem is not so much that Massad often seems to forget the distinction 
he posits here between epistemological and political imperialism.49 More 
importantly, his own analysis loses any theoretical and political salience 
if the relation between epistemological and political imperialism—that is, 
between the economic, the political, and the ideological—is not properly 
conceptualized. In other words: if the epistemological imperialism that 
Massad attributes to organizations such as Helem or alQaws does not 
necessarily coincide with, or in some other ways relate to, the political 
project of imperialism, why would Massad devote his intellectual energy 
WRH[SRVLQJLWZLWKVRPXFK]HDO"
I address this question—as a question of theoretical practice—in the 
QH[WVHFWLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHU%HIRUH,SURFHHGWRGRVRKRZHYHUOHWPHEULHÀ\
return to Puar in order to signal a number of diverges and convergences, 
precisely on this terrain, between her analysis of homonationalism and 
Massad’s analysis of the Gay International. As I already mentioned, Terrorist 
Assemblages has not incited the same critical outburst of which Massad, 
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instead, has been the target.50 This is so, in part, because of their different 
readings of the relation between sexual politics and imperialism—that is, 
their different understandings of sexual imperialism. Massad makes this 
point in the interview on Jadaliyya³3XDU¶V¿QHERRNSURFHHGVIURP
an objection not to the universalization of sexuality or of sexual identities, 
which, if I understand her correctly, are taken as givens in her book, but 
UDWKHUWKHVSHFL¿FQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIJD\QHVVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGDOVR
in Europe) in the form of homonationalism (Puar’s important coinage) and 
the imperial form of its internationalization” (Massad 2013). Hence, he 
argues that Puar’s analysis does not force Arab LGBTQ formations to face 
the impasse with which his own analysis, instead, confronts them. On the 
contrary, “Gay Internationalist organizations like Helem and the Israeli-
EDVHG DO4DZV DQG WKHLU VXSSRUWHUV ¿QG DZD\ RXW RI WKHLU RQWRORJLFDO
and epistemological complicity with imperialism in annexing Puar’s 
intelligent and very useful book to their cause, as they see themselves 
as opponents of US homonationalism and its imperial pretensions, thus 
exonerating themselves of the charge of imperial complicity” (Massad 
2013). This point is reiterated in Islam in Liberalism, yet with an emphasis 
RQ3XDU¶VRZQVXSSRUWIRUVXFKSROLWLFDOIRUPDWLRQV³>3XDU¶V@FULWLFLVPV
target the imperial circuits through which the dissemination of sexuality 
is enacted but not its universalization as a category and as epistemology 
and ontology, which she seems to think can be universalized through non-
imperial channels” (Massad 2015, 270). What Massad has in mind, in this 
passage, is Puar’s explicit support for alQaws.
Puar’s support for alQaws materialized, for instance, in her 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH¿UVW86/*%74GHOHJDWLRQ WR3DOHVWLQH LQ-DQXDU\
2012. 51 However, even as she continues to express her support for alQaws 
as well as other formations organizing at the crossroads of sexual politics 
and anti-imperialism in Israel-Palestine, such as Palestinian Queers for 
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (PQBDS), Puar recently engaged in 
a polemical exchange with Palestinian activists that closely resembles 
the one between Massad and Makarem. The exchange concerned the 
nature of the state practice of “pinkwashing” in Israel-Palestine and of 
the “pinkwatching” activism emerged in order to expose and counter the 
former. The term pinkwashing, in the context of Israel-Palestine, describes 
the attempt on the part of the state to diverge attention from the occupation 
and its human rights violations by presenting Israel to the world as the 
only safe space for gays in the Middle East. Paradigmatic of this practice 
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is the extension to gays and lesbians—particularly through gay tourism—
of the campaign “Brand Israel,” launched in 2005 by the Israeli state in 
FRQVXOWDWLRQ ZLWK 86 PDUNHWLQJ ¿UPV LQ RUGHU WR UHEUDQG WKH LPDJH
of Israel worldwide (especially in the United States) as “relevant and 
modern.”52 In turn, pinkwatching activism in Israel-Palestine and abroad 
labors both to counter such a representation and to gather solidarity with 
the broader Palestinian struggle. As I shall argue, Puar’s disagreement 
with queer Palestinian rights activists over the nature of pinkwashing 
and pinkwatching coincides with an expansion of her understanding of 
homonationalism and, at the same time, brings her analyses closer to 
Massad’s critique of epistemic imperialism.53
In 2012, Jadaliyya published an intervention by Puar and Maya 
Mikdashi, titled “Pinkwatching and Pinkwashing: Interpenetration 
and its Discontents” (2012a), which offers a critique of pinkwatching 
activism. The main point put forward by Puar and Mikdashi is that “both 
pinkwashing and pinkwatching operate within and reproduce a discourse 
of homonationalism” (Puar and Mikdashi 2012a). This is so, in their 
view, because homonationalism has become the necessary terrain for the 
articulation of any sexual (identity) politics:  
Many progressive critics miss the point: pinkwashing . . . is part of 
a larger project to anchor all politics within the axis of identity and 
LGHQWLWDULDQDQGLGHQWL¿DEOHJURXSV7KXVFULWLTXHVRISLQNZDVKLQJ
who assume an international queer camaraderie, repeat a central 
tenet of homonationalism: homosexuals should be in solidarity and 
empathize with each other because they are homosexual. (Puar and 
Mikdashi 2012a)
This argument, which had been already formulated in a previous intervention 
E\0LNGDVKL  UHOLHV RQ D VLJQL¿FDQW H[SDQVLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI
homonationalism that punctuates Puar’s writings after Terrorist Assemblages. 
For instance, in a brief essay titled “Rethinking Homonationalism” (2013a), 
upon noticing the “reductive,” tactical applications of the concept in activist 
projects, Puar states: “Instead, . . . I have been thinking about it as an analytic 
to apprehend state formation and a structure of modernity” (337). In fact, 
what Puar suggests here is that homonationalism be understood as another 
name for biopolitics itself.54 It is on the basis of such an expansion that any 
formation privileging sexuality, or at least deploying sexuality, as a terrain 
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of political organizing and ideological critique can be said to reproduce the 
discourse of homonationalism.55
Yet, especially as Puar and Mikdashi engage, from this perspective, 
LQ D FULWLTXH RI VSHFL¿F SROLWLFDO SUDFWLFHV WKH FRQFHSWXDO H[SDQVLRQ RI
homonationalism must not be regarded exclusively as a theoretical question, 
but as a question of theoretical practice. In their response, C. Heike Schotten 
and Haneen Maikey—the former a queer scholar and activist based in the 
United States, the latter a Palestinian pinkwatching activist and co-founder 
of both alQaws and PQBDS—make this point:                  
>3XDUDQG0LNGDVKL¶V@DUWLFOHOHIWXVZRQGHULQJ³KRZFDQWKLVFULWLFLVP
KHOS WR DGYDQFH RXU ZRUN"´ 3DUW RI WKH UHDVRQ ZH EHOLHYH ZH FDQ
¿QGQRDQVZHU WR WKLVTXHVWLRQ LVEHFDXVH WKHFULWLTXHRI³WKH\´DQG
“them” unfolds in a moralizing manner that would otherwise have been 
impossible if the authors had included themselves within the movement. 
. . . Unfortunately, this dynamic is nothing new in solidarity work. 
Many of us may recall working under the powerful shadow of Joseph 
Massad’s work on the Gay International. (Schotten and Maikey 2012)
In their own rejoinder to this response, Puar and Mikdashi neither assume 
a tone as polemic as the one that Massad reserves for his critics, nor align 
themselves with Massad’s view of Helem and alQaws as formations 
organic to the Gay International.56(YHQDV3XDUDQG0LNGDVKLUHDI¿UPWKHLU
critique of pinkwatching activism within the framework of an expanded 
notion of homonationalism—“Like modernity, homonationalism can be 
UHVLVWHGDQGUHVLJQL¿HGEXWQRWRSWHGRXWRIZHDUHDOOFRQGLWLRQHGE\
LWDQGWKURXJKLW´3XDUDQG0LNGDVKLE²WKH\LQVLVWWKDWWKHLU¿UVW
piece be understood as a contribution to the struggle conducted by LGBTQ 
formations in Israel-Palestine. However, in spite of these divergences, 
Schotten and Maikey are right in registering a convergence between 
Massad and Puar and Mikdashi on the terrain of theoretical practice. 
They do converge, indeed, in their theoretical indifference to the concrete 
relations between theory and practice. 
As Massad insists on the “epistemic complicity” of Helem or AlQaws 
with Western imperialism regardless of their participation in concrete 
DQWLLPSHULDOLVW VWUXJJOHV 3XDU DQG 0LNGDVKL DI¿UP WKDW SLQNZDWFKLQJ
activism “reproduces” homonationalism simply by privileging sexual 
identity as a politico-ideological standpoint. But, as I asked earlier: 
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if epistemic imperialism is kept entirely disarticulated from politico-
economic imperialism and is preserved as a terrain of critique in its own 
ULJKWZKDWLVWKHSROLWLFDORUHYHQWKHRUHWLFDOVDOLHQFHRIVXFKDFULWLTXH"
Or, as Schotten and Maikey put it, how does this critique help advancing 
SROLWLFDOZRUN",QRUGHU WRDGGUHVV WKHVHTXHVWLRQV LQ WKHQH[WVHFWLRQ,
EULHÀ\ WXUQ WR V GHEDWHV RQ WKHRUHWLFDO SUDFWLFH LQYROYLQJ (GZDUG
W. Said, Michel Foucault, and Stuart Hall. As Said and Foucault are 
key theoretical references of Massad and Puar, my goal is to explore the 
relation between theory and theoretical practice: what is the link between 
Puar’s and especially Massad’s indifference to the relation between theory 
and practice andWKHVSHFL¿FWKHRUHWLFDODSSDUDWXVHVWKDWWKH\GHSOR\"
Theory, Practice, and Theoretical Practice
Massad repeatedly makes reference, in his analysis, to Said’s work on 
Orientalism and on the relations between culture and imperialism. Yet 
there are important differences between their respective understandings of 
culture, which Massad does not acknowledge. In Culture and Imperialism 
6DLGZULWHV³%HFDXVH>WKHFRORQLDO@UHGUDZLQJRIWKHZRUOG¶VPDS
was so dramatic, we have lost (and perhaps have been encouraged to lose) 
an accurate historical, let alone moral sense that even in the contentiousness 
of struggle, imperialism and its opponents fought over the same terrain, 
contested the same history” (Said 1993, 199).57 By highlighting that 
“there are two sides,” Said echoes Hall’s assertion that “in the arena of 
LGHRORJLFDOVWUXJJOHWZRFDQSOD\DWWKHJDPH´+DOO>@
In Said’s analysis, culture does not immediately correspond to ideology, 
for he reserves the former term for the more circumscribed terrain of high 
cultural production, literature in particular. Yet, even as overlooking this 
point would mean obscuring a number of Said’s irreducible concerns with 
aesthetic form and content, it is undeniable that his approach to culture and 
literature comes very close to Hall’s approach to the problem of ideology: 
As I use the word, “culture” means two things in particular. First of all it 
means all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, 
and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, 
social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one 
RIZKRVHSULQFLSDODLPLVSOHDVXUH6HFRQG>FXOWXUH@LVDVRXUFH
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of identity, and a rather combative one at that, as we see in recent 
“returns” to culture and tradition. . . . In this second sense culture is a 
sort of theater where various political and ideological causes engage 
one another. (Said 1993, xii-xiii)    
Thus, culture (like ideology, or even as ideology)58 constitutes for Said a 
terrain of struggle that relates to the political and the economic within a 
UHJLPHRIUHODWLYHDXWRQRP\WKDWLVWKH\H[LVWLQDUHODWLRQRIDUWLFXODWLRQ
rather than expressive correspondence. On this terrain there are (at least) 
two sides, and both can play at the game. This is, indeed, one of the lessons 
of Culture and Imperialism and of Said’s work as a whole.
,KDYHEULHÀ\ UHFDOOHG6DLG¶V DSSURDFK WRFXOWXUHQRW WR VXJJHVW WKDW
Massad or Puar, instead, posit sexuality as a mere by-product of more 
“real” politico-economic relations of force. Neither of them regards sexual 
imperialism as a superstructural expression of imperialism at large. On the 
contrary, as I argued, both grant sexuality a fundamental role in articulating 
imperial domination. Yet this is the case not because they follow Said or Hall 
in conceptualizing the relations between the economic, the political, and the 
ideological from a non-reductionist perspective. Rather, following Foucault, 
they regard sexuality as a biopolitical technology of power in its own right 
whose conceptualization is by and large indifferent to the boundaries 
between those different levels of the social formation. Thus, ironically, 
WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH DQDO\VHV DUH QRW JURXQGHG RQ D VSHFL¿F XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of ideology but end up deploying—implicitly—a rather totalizing and 
reductionist understanding of ideological power. For Puar (and Mikdashi), 
any political formation that articulates itself and its struggles through 
sexual identity inevitably reproduces the “discourse” of homonationalism. 
For Massad, similarly, any such political formation is organic to the Gay 
International, hence to the broader project of Western imperialism. By by-
passing a conceptualization of the articulations between the economic, the 
political, and the ideological, as well as an analysis of the relations of force 
presiding over such articulations, both Massad and Puar seem to be unable 
to identify any crack within the social formations they set out to analyze. 
As Said himself puts it while formulating, via Gramsci, one of his most 
H[SOLFLW FULWLTXHV RI)RXFDXOW ³>H@YHQ LIZH OHDYH DVLGH WKH FRPSOH[LWLHV
of Gramsci’s philosophy and the political organization it entails, as well 
as what he calls ‘the conquest of civil society,’ there is the theoretical 
LQVLVWHQFHDJDLQVW)RXFDXOWRIDJXDUDQWHHGLQVXI¿FLHQF\LQWKHGRPLQDQW
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culture towards which it is possible to mount an attack” (Said 1986, 154).
The redeployment of a totalizing and reductionist notion of ideology in 
the absence of its proper conceptualization is perhaps more evident in the case 
of Massad than Puar. While the latter is resolute in addressing imperialism 
and anti-imperialism through a Deleuzian reading of Foucault, Massad, as 
I mentioned, seems to implicitly supplement Foucault with an analysis of 
hegemony. Indeed, the key insight of his analysis is that the incitement to 
discourse hegemonic in the West fails to gain hegemony when deployed 
by the Gay International in the Arab world, that is, it fails to materialize as 
FRPPRQ VHQVH H[FHSW DPRQJ VSHFL¿F VHJPHQWV RI WKHPLGGOH DQG XSSHU
classes. However, he barely explains why this is the case. In the interview on 
Jaddiyya, he states: “I am not arguing that these sexual identities always fail 
to institute themselves inside or outside the West and that this failure is total, 
rather that they succeed and fail differentially across classes and countries 
depending on the effect of capitalist structures, and their production of certain 
lifestyles, forms, and modes of intimate life on different classes, which are 
in turn the outcome of uneven capitalist development” (Massad 2013). In 
this passage, Massad seems to suggest a rather economistic reading of the 
problem at hand.59 Thus, on the one hand, the ideological power of the Gay 
International is as total as to impede any counter-ideological articulation 
of sexual identity outside its grasp. Yet, on the other hand, the absence 
of any actual theory of ideology allows Massad to shift seamlessly, from 
a Foucauldian approach to sexuality as a fully autonomous technology 
of power to an economistic reading of sexuality and sexual identities as 
mere effects of uneven capitalist development. In fact, it is precisely his 
appropriation of Foucault that opens up the space for such contradictions.60
Said, instead, has been far more careful in this respect. On the one 
hand, his notion of Orientalism is highly indebted to Foucault’s work. In 
Orientalism, he writes:  
I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of 
a discourse, as described by him in The Archaeology of Knowledge 
and in Discipline and Punish, to identify Orientalism. My contention 
is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot 
possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which 
European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient 
SROLWLFDOO\VRFLRORJLFDOO\PLOLWDULO\ LGHRORJLFDOO\VFLHQWL¿FDOO\DQG
imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. (Said 1978a, 3)61 
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Yet, on the other hand, already in Orientalism and increasingly in his 
subsequent works, Said limits some of the abstraction to be found in 
Foucault by turning, among others, to Gramsci: “Gramsci has made the 
useful analytic distinction between civil society and political society. . . . 
Culture, of course, is to be found operating within civil society, where the 
LQÀXHQFHRILGHDVRILQVWLWXWLRQVDQGRIRWKHUSHUVRQVZRUNVQRWWKURXJK
domination but by what Gramsci calls consent” (Said 1978a, 6-7). Thus, 
Orientalism is conceptualized by Said as a discourse (in Foucault’s sense) 
whose operations, however, are circumscribed by the boundaries that make 
XS WKHHGL¿FHRIPRGHUQVRFLDO IRUPDWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQGLVSHUVHGDFURVV
those boundaries. In fact, the Foucauldian notion of discourse is deployed 
WRFKDUDFWHUL]H2ULHQWDOLVPDVDVSHFL¿FIRUPRILGHRORJ\WKDWSRVVHVVHV
the consistency and the internal constraints of a disciplinary formation, not 
to replace the notion of ideology altogether. 
The notion of ideology, coupled with a conceptualization and a concrete 
analysis of its relations to the social formation as a whole, forces one to 
LGHQWLI\DQGQHYHUOHWJRRIWKHVSHFL¿FPRGHVDQGSRLQWVRIDSSOLFDWLRQ
RI SRZHU LQ D VSHFL¿F VLWXDWLRQ²LW LPSHGHV RQH WRabstract from those 
DUWLFXODWRU\SRLQWVDQGIURPWKHERXQGDULHVWKDWGH¿QHWKHYDULRXVWHUUDLQV
of articulation (such as the boundary between state and civil society). 
According to Said, instead, Foucault’s understanding of power crosses 
and neutralizes all such boundaries: “Many of the people who admire and 
have learned from Foucault, including myself, have commented on the 
undifferentiated power he seemed to ascribe to modern society” (Said 1986, 
151).62 As he puts it elsewhere and more explicitly, Foucault’s work lacks, 
in his view, “something that resembles Gramsci’s analyses of hegemony, 
historical blocks, ensembles of relationships” (Said 1978b, 710). Said does 
not lament a lack of historical analysis on the part of Foucault. The latter’s 
sophisticated readings of multiple historical archives—his archaeology—
would easily contradict any such claim. However, he suggests that Foucault 
too easily shifts from the concrete to the abstract without retaining the 
concrete as an integral element of his very conceptualization of power. 
$V6DLGSXWV LW ³WKHGLI¿FXOW\SRVHGE\)RXFDXOW¶VZULWLQJV LVZKHQKH
PRYHVIURPVSHFL¿FKLVWRULFDOVWXG\WRPRUHJHQHUDOWKHRUHWLFDOFODLPV,W
is when Foucault’s language becomes general . . . that the methodological 
breakthrough becomes the theoretical trap” (Said 1983, 244). That this 
assessment appears in Said’s famous essay “Traveling Theory,” where he 
UHÀHFWVRQWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHFLUFXODWLRQRIDQ\WKHRU\DZD\IURPWKH
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time, space, and problematic that it was originally meant to address and 
from which it organically emerged, is noteworthy. Indeed, some of the 
OLPLWDWLRQV WKDW6DLG LGHQWL¿HV LQ)RXFDXOW¶V WKHRUHWLFDO SUDFWLFH DUH OHVV
acutely at work in Foucault’s own analyses than in the appropriations of 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power by some of his readers—such as 
Puar and Massad.63 
According to Said as well as Hall, who share many of these concerns, 
one of the most salient consequences of Foucault’s undifferentiated 
conceptualization of power is his incapacity to offer any meaningful 
account of resistance.64 Said argues that with Foucault’s “hypertrophied 
vision of power . . . went also a singular lack of interest in the force of 
effective resistance to it, in choosing particular sites of intensity” (Said 
1986, 151). Or, as Hall puts it, it is not resistance as such, but rather a 
tentative explanation of resistance that disappears from Foucault’s analysis: 
“Nobody knows where it comes from. Fortunately, it goes on being there, 
always guaranteed: in so far as there is power, there is resistance. But at 
any one moment, when you want to know how strong the power is, and 
how strong the resistance is, and what is the changing balance of forces, it’s 
LPSRVVLEOHWRDVVHVVEHFDXVHVXFKD¿HOGRIIRUFHLVQRWFRQFHSWXDOL]DEOH
in his model” (Hall 1986c, 48).65 According to Hall, this is the case 
because Foucault reconstructs a plurality of discursive regimes but does 
not analyze the relations of force between them andWKHVSHFL¿FSUDFWLFHV
articulating this plurality as a “formation,” that is, not just a “unity” but 
a structured totality. In his view, in the seamless unity that results from 
Foucault’s analyses, the concrete politico-ideological cracks that might 
open up spaces for resistance disappear from view, even as the presence of 
resistance is “guaranteed” by the pervasive presence of power. 
Importantly, Hall argues that this model leads to the risk of transforming 
the discursive regime into just another name for the dominant ideology, yet 
without conceptualizing it as such: “If Foucault is to prevent the regime 
of truth from collapsing into a synonym for the dominant ideology, he 
has to recognize that there are different regimes of truth in the social 
IRUPDWLRQ$QGWKHVHDUHQRWVLPSO\µSOXUDO¶²WKH\GH¿QHDQLGHRORJLFDO
¿HOGRIIRUFH´+DOOF:KDW+DOOVXJJHVWVLQWKLVSDVVDJHLV
that, despite Foucault’s abandonment of the concept of ideology because 
RILWVWRWDOL]LQJWHQGHQFLHV)RXFDXOW>@66 this conceptual 
abandonment may provoke in fact a return of the concept with a vengeance. 
,QGHHGDV,DUJXHGDWOHQJWKLQWKH¿UVWFKDSWHU+DOOGRHVVKDUHDFULWLTXH
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of the totalizing character of ideology in much Marxist theory. Yet, rather 
than abandoning the concept, he thinks though its limitations in order to 
displace it, following Gramsci, on a different terrain. Following Hall, it is 
my argument that not so much a recognition of agency—as virtually all 
RIKLVFULWLFVSRLQWRXW²EXW¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWDJRRGFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ
of ideology might have forced Massad to provide a different analysis 
of sexual imperialism. Similarly, it might have prevented both Massad 
and Puar from entering into polemics with Helem and alQaws and from 
DEVWUDFWLQJWKHLUSROLWLFRLGHRORJLFDOVWUXJJOHVIURPWKHFRQFUHWH¿HOGVRI
forces of their emergence. 
The discussion so far suggests that Massad’s and Puar’s 
conceptualizations of power—borrowed from Foucault—may in part 
explain their tendency to theoretically appropriate political struggles 
without preserving, in the process, their concrete determinations. Yet, at 
WKLVSRLQWD ODVWVSHFL¿FDWLRQRIP\DUJXPHQW LVQHFHVVDU\:KLOH6DLG¶V
and Hall’s critiques of Foucault’s theorizing are pertinent, Foucault always 
maintained, from his theoretical standpoint, a peculiar position vis-à-vis 
political practice. Perhaps nowhere is his understanding of the relation 
between theory and practice more explicit than in his famous intervention 
LQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKH,UDQLDQ5HYROXWLRQWLWOHG³,V,W8VHOHVV7R5HYROW"´
and published on Le MondeRQ0D\)RXFDXOW>@+HUH
he states: “Revolts belong to history. But, in a certain way, they escape from 
it. The impulse by which a single individual, a group, a minority, or an 
entire people says, ‘I will no longer obey’ . . . seems to me to be something 
irreducible” (449). Thus, in light of the replacement of the Shah with the 
theocratic regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Foucault avoids registering 
his earlier support for the revolution as a misreading of the situation. Rather, 
VLQFH ³WKHPDQ >sic@ ZKR UHEHOV LV ¿QDOO\ LQH[SOLFDEOH´  )RXFDXOW
XQFRPSURPLVLQJO\UHDI¿UPVWKDWDQ\UHYROWDJDLQVWSRZHUPXVWEHOLVWHQHG
to. The article ends by making clear that this is Foucault’s positioning as an 
intellectual:
I am an intellectual. If I were asked for my conception of what I 
do, the strategist being the man who says, “What difference does a 
particular death, a particular cry, a particular revolt make compared 
to the great general necessity, and, on the other hand, what difference 
does a general principle make in the particular situation where we 
DUH"´ZHOO,ZRXOGKDYHWRVD\WKDWLWLVLPPDWHULDOWRPHZKHWKHUWKH
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strategist is a politician, a historian, a revolutionary, a follower of the 
VKDKRURIWKHD\DWROODKP\WKHRUHWLFDOHWKLFLVRSSRVLWHWRWKHLUV,WLV
“antistrategic”: to be respectful when a singularity revolts, intransigent 
DVVRRQDVSRZHUYLRODWHVWKHXQLYHUVDO)RXFDXOW>@
According to Lorenzo Bernini (2013), this text is a quintessential 
illustration of Foucault’s practical posture throughout his entire intellectual 
trajectory.67 Following Paul Veyne (2010), Bernini reads Foucault as a 
skeptic, a “dual being”: not a public intellectual of the same kind as Hall 
or Said, but a critical intellectual who struggles to adopt the position of 
the observer in his intellectual function and immediately abandons it when 
LW FRPHV WR HQJDJH LQ WKH ¿HOG RI SROLWLFDO VWUXJJOH$V%HUQLQL SXWV LW
IRU )RXFDXOW ³>WKH VNHSWLF SKLORVRSKHU@ FDQQRW DYRLG WDNLQJ SDUW LQ WKH
political struggles of his or her time yet without ever presuming to hold 
solutions—hence as a governed, not as an aspiring ruler” (Bernini 2013, 
195). This is perhaps another way of naming the difference that Foucault 
himself formulates between the organic or “universal intellectual” and the 
³VSHFL¿FLQWHOOHFWXDO´)RXFDXOW>@7KHVSHFL¿FLQWHOOHFWXDOGRHV
not aspire to theorize a social totality and to orient a counter-hegemonic 
political practice, but is concerned with localized struggles and takes 
SDUW LQ WKHP IURPKLV RU KHU VSHFL¿F ORFDWLRQ68 Foucault’s commentary 
in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution adds to that distinction the fact 
WKDWZKHUHYHU UHVLVWDQFH DQG UHYROW DJDLQVW SRZHU HPHUJHV WKH VSHFL¿F
intellectual listens to it and supports it.69
%HUQLQLDUJXHVWKDWE\DVVXPLQJWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKHFULWLFDODQGVSHFL¿F
intellectual, Foucault refuses to provide “epistemic guarantees” for the 
articulation of political practice (Bernini 2013, 198). On the contrary:
WKHUHLVDFOHDUFXWGLVWLQFWLRQLQ>)RXFDXOW@EHWZHHQpraxis and 
theorìa DFWLRQ DQG NQRZOHGJH WZR ¿HOGV RI KXPDQ DFWLYLW\ WKDW
entertain different relations with truth. It is precisely in the name of 
such an ontological hiatus that Foucault regards any theoretical attempt 
WRJUDQWWUXWKYDOXHWRVSHFL¿FSROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHVDVLOOHJLWLPDWH7KH
intellectual, in his view, is neither a scientist nor a prophet: it is not his 
role “to tell others what they have to do.” (Bernini 2013, 199)70    
Thus, Said and Hall are right to point out that Foucault’s work does not 
offer any consistent explanation for resistance. But this is not just a side 
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HIIHFWRIKLVFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQVRISRZHU,WLVDVSHFL¿FFKRLFHRQKLVSDUW
a choice of theoretical practice. In other words, Foucault not only avoids 
a conceptualization of ideology, but he also stubbornly refuses to consider 
his own theorizing as a form of counter-ideological practice. One can 
DJUHHRUGLVDJUHHZLWKKLPDQGZLWKKLVYLVLRQRIWKHVSHFL¿FLQWHOOHFWXDO
as opposed to the organic intellectual. What matters in the context of my 
discussion is that Massad and Puar appropriate Foucault’s theory even as 
they do not subscribe, at least in practice, to his understanding of theoretical 
practice and intellectual labor. As their respective polemics with Helem 
and alQaws illustrate, they certainly do not refrain from deploying abstract 
conceptualizations of power—of Foucauldian derivation—to tell others 
what they have to do. 
This discussion of Foucault and of his appropriation by Puar and 
Massad suggests that a given theoretical and conceptual apparatus does not 
determineLQDGYDQFHWKHDGRSWLRQRIDVSHFL¿FWKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFH$WWKH
same time, theory and theoretical practice cannot be entirely disjoined. Hall 
expresses this tension during his discussion of Foucault’s abandonment of 
ideology: “I don’t much care whether you call it ideology or not. What 
matters is not the terminology but the conceptualization. . . . I go on using 
the term ‘ideology’ because it forces me to continue thinking about that 
problem” (Hall 1986c, 49). This passage makes clear that Hall’s critique 
of Foucault is not an orthodox polemic about the preservation of Marxist 
ODQJXDJH%XW LW DOVR VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH FRQFHSWVZLWKZKLFKRQH WUDI¿FV
do condition one’s relation to the problem at hand. In the next section, I 
continue and expand this discussion. On the one hand, I explore approaches 
to the problems of homonationalism and sexual imperialism that avoid 
LPSRVLQJWKHRUHWLFDODEVWUDFWLRQVRYHUFRQFUHWH¿HOGVRIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDO
struggles—and they do so by offering a politico-ideological critique of 
hegemonic formations. Thus, implicitly or explicitly, these approaches 
FRQ¿UP WKDW HYHQ LI WKHRU\ GRHV QRW GHWHUPLQH WKHRUHWLFDO SUDFWLFH D
tendential relation does exist between the two. On the other hand, some 
of the authors discussed in the next section question not so much Puar’s 
and Massad’s theoretical apparatuses as their diasporic location in the 
United States. These critics suggest that, when not acknowledged as such, 
the diasporic standpoint prevents rather than facilitate the articulation of 
concrete struggles unfolding on the other side of the transnational divide. 
Through their critique, I expand the analysis conducted so far, now posing 
DVSHFL¿FTXHVWLRQDERXWdiasporic theoretical practice.
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Articulating Transnational Hegemonic Struggles
In the context of her own critique of Foucault, Gayatri C. Spivak is right 
to suggest, as Said himself does, that the limits of Foucault’s theorizing 
come into full view especially when the latter is appropriated by some 
of his readers: “Because of the power of the word ‘power,’ Foucault 
admits to using the ‘metaphor of the point which progressively irradiates 
its surroundings.’ Such slips become the rule rather than the exception 
in less careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an effectively 
KHOLRFHQWULF GLVFRXUVH ¿OOV WKH HPSW\ SODFH RI WKH DJHQW ZLWK WKH
historical sun of theory, the Subject of Europe” (Spivak 1988, 274).71 In 
this passage, Spivak suggests that Foucault’s approach to the problem of 
power, especially when circulating among some of his readers, reveals 
the tendency of theory to cannibalize the concrete via abstraction. But it 
also suggests that this theoretical abstraction of “power” from a concrete 
¿HOG RI UHODWLRQV RI IRUFH EH XQGHUVWRRG DV D TXLQWHVVHQWLDOO\ (XURSHDQ
gesture—especially when European intellectuals set out to theorize about 
the global South. In her view, the place left vacant by the vanishing of 
concrete social forces and political subjects operative in the global South 
is implicitly rearticulated as the place of European theory (and theorists).
When redirected toward diasporic intellectuals in Europe and the 
United States, Spivak’s critique acquires a particular meaning. Is this 
how we shall read Puar and Mikdashi’s effort to distance the theory of 
homonationalism from the politico-ideological practices deployed by 
pinkwatching activists in Israel-Palestine and elsewhere, to the irritation of 
6FKRWWHQDQG0DLNH\"3XDU¶VFULWLTXHRIKRPRQDWLRQDOLVPKDVFRQWULEXWHG
HQRUPRXVO\WRWKHKHJHPRQLFVWUXJJOHVWKDWDUHUHFRPSRVLQJWKH¿HOGVRI
contemporary queer theory and LGBTQ politics in Europe and the United 
States. Yet how is this related to Puar’s refusal—especially in her most 
recent interventions—to theoretically appropriate queer struggles in the 
JOREDO 6RXWK ZKLOH SUHVHUYLQJ WKHLU FRQFUHWH GHWHUPLQDWLRQV" +RZ WR
articulate sexual struggles in the global South with the struggles conducted 
E\TXHHURIFRORUDQGTXHHUGLDVSRULFIRUPDWLRQVLQWKHJOREDO1RUWK"
Jason Ritchie partly addresses these questions in his essay, 
“Pinkwashing, Homonationalism, and Israel-Palestine: The Conceits of 
Queer Theory and the Politics of the Ordinary” (2014). Ritchie begins his 
analysis by recalling a typical “culture war” waged within the LGBTQ 
community in New York City in 2011. Upon receiving protests against the 
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organization of a party by Siege Busters, an anti-occupation collective, 
not only did the New York LGBT Community Center cancel the party, 
EXW LWV H[HFXWLYH GLUHFWRU *OHQQGD 7HVWRQH DI¿UPHG WKDW 6LHJH %XVWHUV
and other such groups would not be welcome anymore at the Center, 
for their focus is not on LGBT issues (1).72 Few weeks later, a meeting 
took place at the Center to address the controversy. Ritchie notes that 
Sarah Schulman, in Israel/Palestine and the Queer International (2012), 
narrates the meeting “as an almost epic battle between good queers and 
bad queers for control over queer space in the city” (Ritchie 2014, 2).73 
Unsurprisingly, the meeting reinforced the antagonism between the two 
positions and the Center even announced, few months later, “a moratorium 
. . . on renting space to groups that organize around the Israeli-Palestinian 
FRQÀLFW´DOOHJHGO\DQGLURQLFDOO\³WRHQVXUHWKDWDOOLQGLYLGXDOVLQ>WKH@
FRPPXQLW\IHHOZHOFRPHWRFRPHWKURXJK>WKH&HQWHU¶V@GRRUV´/*%7
Community Center, quoted in Ritchie 2014, 2). Only two years later was 
the ban lifted, to the approval of Schulman and the indignation of Michael 
Lucas, the man who had initiated the protest against Siege Busters’ party 
LQWKH¿UVWSODFH/XFDVEHJDQFDPSDLJQLQJIRUSULYDWHVWRVWRSGRQDWLQJ
and for the city of New York to stop funding the Center (Ritchie 2014, 3).
According to Ritchie, this and other such controversies make clear that 
“for pinkwashers and pinkwatchers alike, queerness in Israel-Palestine has 
become a powerful symbol of something bigger than—and far removed 
from—the actual space of Israel-Palestine” (Ritchie 2014, 3). Indeed, 
even as he sympathizes with queer political formations militating against 
the Israeli occupation, and even as he praises the emergence of queer of 
color critiques of homonormativity and homonationalism that struggle to 
rearticulate sexual politics to a broader horizon of social and economic 
justice, Ritchie warns:
%HQHDWK>WKH@FROOHFWLRQRIVHHPLQJO\FRQWUDGLFWRU\LQWHUHVWV>LQYROYHG
LQWKHLQFLGHQWDW WKH&HQWHU@    OLHVDFRPPRQWKHPH7KHGHEDWH
over pinkwashing among New York City queers had less to do with 
the realities of queerness in Israel/Palestine—or even the ideological 
uses of it by the Israeli government—and more to do with the utility 
of pinkwashing for making all kinds of claims to queer space in the 
neoliberal city. (Ritchie 2014, 4)
Ritchie’s major concern, therefore, is what he perceives as a disarticulation 
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between, on the one hand, the struggles for hegemony conducted within 
LGBTQ formations in the global North and, on the other hand, the struggles 
in the global South that are often mobilized in the context of the former. 
0RUHRYHU GUDZLQJ D FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ WKH FRQÀLFW DW WKH&HQWHU DQG
Puar and Mikdashi’s critique of pinkwatching activism, he takes a step 
further and argues that the disconnection between queer struggles in the 
United States and Israel-Palestine coincides with a disconnection between 
the theory of homonationalism and the struggles of Palestinian queers. In 
his view, “homonationalism’s critics have removed the theory from the 
concrete socio-historical context it so lucidly described and released it 
LQWR WKH HWKHU RI HPSW\ VLJQL¿HUV WKDW FDQ WDNH RQ LGHRORJLFDO YDOXH IRU
DQ\SXUSRVH IURPD¿JKWRYHUZKRbelongs in New York City’s LGBT 
&RPPXQLW\ &HQWHU WR DQ HIIRUW E\ WZR$PHULFDQ DFDGHPLFV >3XDU DQG
0LNGDVKL@WRGLVPLVVDQWLKRPRQDWLRQDOLVPTXHHUDFWLYLVWVIRUHQJDJLQJLQ
homonationalism” (Ritchie 2014, 5). Hence, his proposal to rearticulate the 
WKHRU\WRDFRQFUHWH¿HOGRIIRUFHVYLDDQHWKQRJUDSKLFIRFXVRQWKHGDLO\
experiences of Palestinian queers under Israeli occupation: “I argue that 
queer inquiry—especially those lines of inquiry informed by ethnic and 
cultural studies paradigms—might learn something from ethnography’s 
stubborn insistence on the primacy of the quotidian” (7).74 In this spirit, the 
rest of his essay is devoted to tracking the operations of the “checkpoint” 
in Israel-Palestine as a central mechanism to control the mobility of 
Palestinians, including Palestinian queers.
Ritchie’s critique is pertinent and his deployment of ethnography serves 
indeed to mitigate some of the totalizing abstractions that are to be found 
in Puar’s and Massad’s respective analyses. However, this move is not 
followed by an alternative attempt of theoretical abstraction that—unlike 
the theories he criticizes—must preserve the concrete determinations of the 
struggles it appropriates. This does not mean that Ritchie does not theorize, 
or that he deploys ethnography as a mere reproducer of the empirically-
given against theory. On the contrary, his discussion of the checkpoint—
the core of his analysis—proceeds in three steps. First, he acknowledges 
its centrality to the exercise of Israeli sovereignty: “As part of a gradual 
process that began at the conclusion of the Six-Day War in 1967, the state 
developed a labyrinthine system of checkpoints that has given it almost 
complete control over the mobility of Palestinian bodies, including the 
ability to impose both external ‘closures’ on the West Bank and Gaza . . . and 
internal closures (and curfews) that further limit the mobility of Palestinians 
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WR VSHFL¿F FLWLHV YLOODJHV DQG RWKHU GH¿QHG DUHDV´ 5LWFKLH  
Second, even as he warns against abstracting the checkpoint from its 
“trenchant physicality,” he adopts it “as a metaphor for understanding how 
Israeli sovereignty penetrates even the most seemingly intimate spaces 
RIHYHU\GD\ OLIH´ 7KXV¿QDOO\KHDQDO\]HVKRZ WKLV FKHFNSRLQWDV
metaphor regulates the mobility of Palestinian queers through different 
spaces: cyberspace (dating websites), cruising spaces (that is, spaces of 
“public” intimacy), the intimate space of love relationships, and the public 
space of gay bars and clubs (9-14). As Hall would put it, Ritchie struggles 
to produce the checkpoint as a “concrete-in-thought” that shall enable him 
to theoretically appropriate the experiences of Palestinian queers without 
abstracting them from the material conditions of their emergence.
+RZHYHUWKLVDQDO\VLVDGGUHVVHVRQO\LQSDUWWKHSUREOHPDWLFSUR¿OHGE\
Ritchie’s own essay. While it mitigates the totalizing abstractions that often 
circulate within debates about homonationalism and sexual imperialism, 
and even as it recenters the discussion about pinkwashing in Israel-Palestine 
DURXQGWKHH[SHULHQFHVRI3DOHVWLQLDQTXHHUVDQGDZD\IURPWKHFRQÀLFWLQJ
interests of heterogeneous LGBTQ formations in the United States, it does 
not manage to suggest, in turn, how to read the transnational articulations 
between these different struggles. In order to do so, a further attempt of 
abstraction is required that connects homonationalism, sexual imperialism, 
the critiques of both and the ideological function that such critiques 
perform in the global North, and the struggles against heteropatriarchy 
and imperialism (including sexual imperialism) conducted by LGBTQ and 
feminist formations in the global South.
This problem is addressed by María do Mar Castro Varela and Nikita 
Dhawan in their essay, “Normative Dilemmas and the Hegemony of Counter-
Hegemony” (2011). Castro Varela and Dhawan acknowledge that “the 
SROLWLFVRIKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\H[HUFLVHVDQLQÀXHQFHEH\RQG(XUR$PHULFDQ
borders and despite its Eurocentrism, it claims transnational legitimacy” 
(110). But they warn: “However, . . . it is dangerous to primarily focus on 
queer imperialism while ignoring the heterosexist violence experienced by 
queers in the global South” (110). Thus, contrary to Massad, according to 
whom homophobia in the Arab world is a direct effect of Western imperialism 
and of the Gay International, Castro Varela and Dhawan posit as the starting 




the European context or the experiences of racism and discrimination that 
are part and parcel of the everyday life of queer migrants are urgent issues 
that need to be scandalized” (111 n27), and even as they register that “in most 
postcolonial contexts, the criminalization of homosexuality was introduced 
during colonialism” (110),75 they nonetheless insist, echoing Ritchie: “we 
WDNHVHULRXVO\WKHSROLWLFVRIORFDWLRQDQGWKHFRQÀLFWRILQWHUHVWVEHWZHHQ
the struggles in the global North and the global South” (111 n27). In light of 
this perspective, they offer a rather damning account of queer of color and 
queer diasporic theoretical formations:
The recent turn within Euro-American queer theory and politics 
increasingly focuses on diasporic queers of colour on the one hand 
as “targets” of homonationalism (Puar 2007) and on the other hand 
as agents of utopian futurity and queer world-making (Muñoz 2009). 
The representation of diasporic queers of colour as simply “victims” 
of queer imperialism masks their location on the privileged side of 
transnationality. . . . There is a certain impulse in Euro-American queer 
studies and politics to universalize their interests and critique, so that 
even as “U.S. sexual exceptionalism” . . . is challenged, “U.S. academic 
exceptionalism” is consolidated—an interesting “repetition-in-rupture.” 
0RUHRYHU >W@KHUHLVDFHUWDLQPRQRSROL]DWLRQRIDJHQF\E\WKRVH
who, with First World citizenships and hard currency, can afford to 
reject “pragmatic” politics in favour of more “radical” interventions in 
the face of queer imperialism. (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2011, 111)76 
Different aspects are being criticized in this passage that can be schematically 
summarized as follows: a) what Castro Varela and Dhawan seem to consider 
as a “fetishization” of the queer of color subject—as victim—in contemporary 
TXHHUGHEDWHVEDGLVDYRZDOLQWKHSURFHVVRIWKH³SULYLOHJHGORFDWLRQ´RI
the queer of color diasporic subject vis-à-vis the transnational divide, even 
as that subject is the target of multiple forms of oppression and exploitation 
LQ:HVWHUQVRFLDOIRUPDWLRQVFDPRUHJHQHUDOKHJHPRQL]DWLRQRI:HVWHUQ
social formations and forms of knowledge in contemporary queer debates, 
even when the latter set out to address precisely questions of Western 
KHJHPRQ\ G WRR TXLFN D UHMHFWLRQ RI ³SUDJPDWLF´ SROLWLFV LQ IDYRU RI
intellectual forms of radicalism. Their primary concern is, needless to 
say, LGBTQ struggles in the global South: “In most countries of the 
global South, queer activists and theorists are struggling for constitutional 
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recognition of sexual rights, including same-sex marriage, as an important 
aspect of sexual justice, even as these are rejected in the global North as a 
politics of appeasement” (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2011, 112).77
Castro Varela and Dhawan’s critique, like Ritchie’s, is provoking 
DQGSHUWLQHQW7KHSUREOHP WKH\ UDLVH²WKDW ³>D@QWLUDFLVW SROLWLFV LQ WKH
global North are related to but are not continuous with the processes of 
decolonization in the global South” (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2011, 
112)—is a necessary starting point to develop theories and theoretical 
practices able to account for the transnational articulations between 
homonationalism, sexual imperialism, and homophobia. However, both 
Ritchie and Castro Varela and Dhawan fail to read the struggle around 
the color line in contemporary queer debates in Europe and the United 
States as a source of recomposition—that is, as a key terrain of politico-
ideological struggle, not simply a mark of Western privilege. It is against 
the background of this partial misreading that Castro Varela and Dhawan 
end up emphasizing the discontinuities, rather than the relations, between 
queer struggles emerging on the two sides of the transnational divide. In so 
doing, their analysis remains just one step removed from actually offering 
an account of the transnational articulations between those struggles.78 
Such an account is to be found, instead, in Rahul Rao’s work. Rao 
intervenes in these debates primarily by focusing on a key contemporary site 
of articulation of sexual imperialism: the local and international struggles 
around the infamous Anti-Homosexuality Act passed by the Parliament 
of Uganda in December 2013, signed into law by President Yoweri 
Museveni on February 24, 2014, and later ruled invalid on procedural 
grounds by the Constitutional Court of Uganda. Not surprisingly, this 
piece of homophobic legislation—which originally prescribed death 
penalty for those engaging in same-sex practices, later replaced with 
life imprisonment—circulated among Western critics as an example of 
quintessentially “African” homophobia. In the remainder of this section, I 
recover Rao’s earlier critique of Massad’s work on the Gay International as 
well as his most recent analyses of the Ugandan case. By drawing the two 
together, I suggest that Rao offers an approach to homonationalism and 
sexual imperialism which does not obscure the transnational articulations 
between queer struggles in the global North and in the South. As I shall 
argue, Rao’s approach foregrounds such articulations by paying distinct 
attention to the balance of forces among the different subjects involved: 
WKHSRVWFRORQLDOVWDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQVWLWXWLRQVRIWKH
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civil society (such as churches) operating both locally and transnationally, 
and LGBTQ formations in the global North and the global South.
 In “Queer in the Time of Terror” (2011),79 Rao questions Massad’s 
analysis of the Gay International on different grounds. First, like Dhawan, 
KHVWDWHVWKDWTXHHUFULWLFDOWKHRU\PXVW³¿QGDODQJXDJHLQZKLFKWRFULWLFLVH
the supremacism that lurks within the global politics of LGBT solidarity 
without downplaying or ignoring the oppressiveness of homophobia” 
(44). In Rao’s view, Massad’s analysis is a quintessential example of a 
failure to do so. Second, Rao reiterates a critique of Massad’s denial of 
Arabs’ agency (45-46). But the third and most interesting way in which 
he addresses Massad’s analysis is by questioning the very abstraction of 
a monolithic Gay International: “Massad tars all Western activism with 
the same brush. . . . In contrast, this essay attempts to disaggregate the 
Gay International, bringing to light distinct manifestations of a gay rescue 
narrative on both the political right and left, produced by different actors 
with different sorts of motivations” (45).80 Thus, with a focus on Britain 
and the United States, Rao distinguishes between the ideological and 
political practices articulated by right-wing formations such as the Log 
Cabin Republicans (LCR) in the United States and by traditionally left-
wing activists such as Peter Tatchell and Outrage! in Britain. As I discussed 
in the previous chapter, LCR is a gay group close to the U.S. Republican 
Party. Tatchell, instead, had taken part in the British Gay Liberation Front 
in the 1970s, was a member of Labour in the 1980s, and joined the Green 
Party in 2004. His group Outrage! is in part an offspring of this political 
trajectory and advocates direct action and civil disobedience.81
About LCR, Rao argues that “it is the very incompleteness of their 
LQFOXVLRQZLWKLQWKH86QDWLRQDQGPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\WKH5HSXEOLFDQ3DUW\
which furnishes a powerful incentive for collusion between homosexuality 
and nationalism” (Rao 2011, 51). In other words, relying on Puar’s analysis 
of homonationalism, Rao suggests that the interests of such right-wing 
IRUPDWLRQVLQWKH³VDYLQJ´RITXHHUVLQWKHJOREDO6RXWKJHWDUWLFXODWHG¿UVW
and foremost in the course of a hegemonic struggle for legitimate space 
within the nation-state and the party.82 When looking at the traditionally 
left side of the political spectrum, instead, Rao suggests that LGBTQ 
IRUPDWLRQV¿QGLQWKHVH[XDOSROLWLFVRIWKHJOREDO6RXWKSULPDULO\DPHDQV
to rearticulate their very raison d’être. He points out that Tatchell “operates 
from a more gay-friendly jurisdiction in which LGBT citizens have won a 
QXPEHURIVLJQL¿FDQWYLFWRULHVSDUWLFXODUO\VLQFHWKHHOHFWLRQRID/DERXU
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government in 1997” (53). This context, coupled with Tatchell’s own 
SROLWLFDOYLVLRQDOORZVKLPWRDI¿UPWKDWKLVLQWHUQDWLRQDOFDPSDLJQLQJLV
GULYHQE\ WKH³YHU\VLPSOH´YLHZWKDW³>K@XPDQULJKWVDUHXQLYHUVDODQG
indivisible, whether in Iran, Britain or the United States” (Tatchell, quoted 
in Rao 2011, 52). However, Rao argues that this commitment to human 
rights in the global South is not as transparent as Tatchell suggests. Rather, 
it helps him articulate an oppositional standpoint on sexual politics which 
has partially lost its ground in the British context. According to this analysis, 
while LCR’s missionary attitude is actually motivated by their struggle 
for inclusion in the United States, the depoliticizing effect of inclusion in 
Britain is what informs Tatchell’s commitment to human rights struggles 
abroad. Thus, Rao highlights that heterogeneous LGBTQ formations in 
the global North similarly adopt a missionary position vis-à-vis the global 
South but are driven to do so by different interests.83
This disaggregation of the Gay International is not meant to downplay 
its participation in homonationalism and sexual imperialism. In “The 
Locations of Homophobia” (2014), a later essay in which Rao exposes the 
political and theoretical limitations of “locating” homophobia culturally 
DQG JHRJUDSKLFDOO\ KH VXJJHVWV WKDW 7DWFKHOO¶V ¿UP VWDQFH RQ KXPDQ
rights worldwide goes hand-in-hand with his willful indifference to the 
detrimental effects of his political practices on LGBTQ struggles in the 
global South:
In the run-up to the 2011 Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting (CHOGM) in Perth, Tatchell called on British Prime Minister 
David Cameron to apologise for Britain’s imposition of the sodomy 
law on its colonies. Under pressure from activists, Cameron responded 
with an ill-advised comment suggesting that British aid would be linked 
to respect for LGBT rights in recipient countries. (Rao 2014, 177)
Not only did Cameron’s suggestion—incited by Tatchell—provoke 
hostile reactions on the part of different African leaders, but perhaps 
more importantly, “a number of African activists publically dissociated 
themselves from this articulation of ‘gay conditionality,’ warning that the 
refusal of aid on sexual rights grounds would result in the scapegoating 
of queers in recipient countries potentially provoking a backlash against 
them, besides reinforcing perceptions of the ‘westerness’ of homosexuality 
and further entrenching imperial relationships between donor and recipient 
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countries” (Rao 2014, 178). While this statement by African activists did 
not explicitly mention Tatchell, an earlier statement did so and addressed 
him as follows: “Stay out of African LGBTI issues. You have proven 
that you have no respect for conveying the truth with regards to Africa 
or consulting African LGBTI leaders before carrying out campaigns that 
have severe consequences in our countries. . . . This is neo-colonialism and 
it has no place in our struggle or in Africa” (Aken’Ova et al. 2007).84 If 
WKHDQDO\VLVHQGHGKHUHLWZRXOGFRQ¿UP0DVVDG¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKH*D\
International is centrally responsible for the articulation of homophobia 
in the Arab world and the global South at large. Rao, instead, locates the 
maneuvers of particular segments of the Gay International within a broader 
¿HOG RI WUDQVQDWLRQDO VWUXJJOHV SD\LQJ DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH EDODQFH RI IRUFH
between the different subjects involved. 
Rao begins by observing that the attempts by Western governments, 
LGBT formations, and international organizations to “locate” homophobia 
in the global South matches the argument often formulated by Southern 
elites themselves according to which homosexuality, indeed, is a Western 
import (Rao 2014, 174). Both sides of this debate, in turn, use to be countered 
by progressive critics with the rejoinder that actually homophobia, rather 
than homosexuality, is a Western import. One variant of the rejoinder 
points out that “most postcolonial states with homophobic laws inherited 
them from their Western colonial predecessors. In this regard, the legacy 
of British colonialism has become a particular focus of attention” (175).85 
While this variant looks at the colonial past, another variant of the same 
argument focuses on the present circulations of homophobic ideology. This 
critique was mobilized, for instance, in the debates over the criminalization 
of homosexuality in Uganda: “The claim that homophobia is an import 
IURPWKH:HVWKDV   EHHQSURPLQHQW LQGLVFXVVLRQRI8JDQGD¶V >$QWL
+RPRVH[XDOLW\ $FW@ ZKLFK KDV ZLGHO\ EHHQ DWWULEXWHG WR WKH PDOLJQ
LQÀXHQFHRI86&KULVWLDQHYDQJHOLFDOPLVVLRQDULHVLQ$IULFD´,QGHHG
according to various accounts, the Anti-Homosexuality Bill was conceived 
in the wake of a ‘Seminar on Exposing the Homosexual Agenda,’ held in 
Kampala in March 2009 and attended by U.S. homophobic evangelicals 
Scott Lively, Don Schmierer, and Caleb Brundidge.86 By focusing either on 
homophobia as a colonial legacy or on the involvement of Western actors in 
its contemporary circulations, progressive critics aim to resist both Western 
attempts to “locate” homophobia in the global South and Southern attempts 
to construct homosexuality as a culturally inauthentic Western import.  
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However, according to Rao, while all of this is true and important to 
register—the British empire did export anti-sodomy laws to its colonies 
and U.S. evangelicals do participate in the contemporary enforcement of 
oppressive sexual politics in the global South—both rejoinders may be 
WULYLDORUDWOHDVWLQVXI¿FLHQWWRXQGHUVWDQGFRQWHPSRUDU\DUWLFXODWLRQVRI
homophobia in Uganda and elsewhere in the South. On the one hand, the 
emphasis on colonial anti-sodomy laws “fails to account for the embrace 
DQGUHVLJQL¿FDWLRQRIWKHVHODZVE\SRVWFRORQLDOHOLWHVDQGWKHSHUVLVWHQFH
or emergence of homophobia in many postcolonial societies decades after 
the end of colonialism” (Rao 2014, 177). On the other hand, the focus 
on the involvement of U.S. religious individuals and movements in the 
articulation of state homophobia in contemporary Uganda tends to by-pass 
a fundamental question: “what has prepared Ugandan audiences to be 
UHFHSWLYHWRWKHJRVSHORIKRPRSKRELDZKHWKHULPSRUWHGRULQGLJHQRXV"´
(181) In other words, the rejoinders of Western involvement past and 
present in the production of homophobia either in Uganda or elsewhere 
in the global South may be more or less successfully mobilized by critics 
in the global North in order to counter the imperialist tendencies of, 
among others, LGBTQ formations such as Tatchell’s Outrage! However, 
those rejoinders alone are of little help when it comes to understand how 
homophobia in fact materializes in the South.   
Rao suggests that one way of addressing this question, in the particular 
context of Uganda, is by offering a conjunctural analysis of the role played 
by local elites in the current articulation of homophobia. First, he suggests 
WKDW WKH8JDQGDQ$QJOLFDQFOHUJ\PD\KDYHKDUQHVVHGH[LVWLQJFRQÀLFWV
over homosexuality within the international Anglican Communion in order 
WRVL]HIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHDVLJQL¿FDQWVSDFHRIDXWKRULW\ZLWKLQLW$VKH
observes, it was not until the thirteen Lambeth Conference in 1998—the 
assembly of the Communion taking place every ten years—that the issue 
of homosexuality became a central concern for the Church of Uganda (Rao 
2014, 191). At the conference, where homosexuality was hotly debated, 
African clergies played a pivotal role in cementing a conservative bloc 
that managed to have a resolution against homosexuality passed. Thus, the 
8JDQGDQFOHUJ\KDGVSHFL¿FLQWHUHVWVLQDFWLYHO\FLUFXODWLQJKRPRSKRELF
ideologies at this moment of struggle within the Communion, for it allowed 
them to take space within a historically imperialist institution (192-193).87 
Second, shifting the attention from the religious to the political elite, Rao 
observes that “one . . . explanation for contemporary homophobia suggests 
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that it serves the political interests of the ruling elite by diverting the 
attention of local and international publics from an increasingly dismal 
record of governance” (194). Thus, while the Anglican clergy may have 
exploited homophobia to seize space within the international Communion, 
the Ugandan political elite may have deployed it to conceal or even to 
preserve a base of consent to its political maneuvers. 
However, even as these explanations begin to account for the local 
and transnational struggles for hegemony presiding over the concrete 
HPHUJHQFHRIVWDWHKRPRSKRELDDFFRUGLQJWR5DRWKH\DUHVWLOOLQVXI¿FLHQW
As he puts it in a later essay, titled “Global Homocapitalism” (2015), 
³HYHQ>WKHVH@DFFRXQWVWKDWZHLJKW$IULFDQDJHQF\PRUHKHDYLO\KDYH
neglected to explain subaltern receptiveness to these discourses” (45). 
Thus, in this essay, he follows the lead of Hall et al.’s analysis in Policing 
the Crisis (1978) and, reading the contemporary formation of homophobia 
in Uganda as a moral panic, he turns “from the production of homophobic 
discourse . . . to what we might think of as the ‘consumption’ side of this 
problem” (Rao 2015, 46). In order to do so, he emphasizes the role played 
by neoliberal structural adjustments—advocated by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund and implemented in Uganda through the 
1980s and 1990s—in preparing the terrain for the popular reception of 
homophobic ideology.
According to Rao, next to the Anglican church, a fundamental actor 
mediating the circulation of homophobia in contemporary Uganda is the 
constellation of Pentecostal-charismatic churches. The emergence and 
spread of the latter, in turn, should be understood within a context marked 
by the sequence of war and neoliberalization. On the one hand, the guerrilla 
war waged between 1981 and 1986 by the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni—the current President of Uganda, who 
signed the Anti-Homosexuality Act into law in 2014—managed to end a 
series of dictatorships and authoritarian governments. According to Rao, 
in the wake of the war, “Pentecostalism’s promise of temporal rupture and 
renewal through ‘born again’ Christianity provided the perfect spiritual 
complement to the victorious NRM’s mission of reconstruction from 1986 
onwards” (Rao 2015, 45). In this respect, Pentecostal churches were also 
aided by a lack of association with previous ruling blocs (contrary to the 
Anglican and Catholic churches). On the other hand, the NRM inherited a 
country highly indebted. Thus, abandoning its previous Marxist positions, 
it proceeded to implement the structural adjustment programs advocated 
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by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This politico-
economic context favored a further expansion of the Pentecostal churches:
As structural adjustments gathered pace, the new Pentecostal churches 
moved into the space vacated by the shrinking state, becoming major 
providers of social services such as education and health. By the 
early 2000s, the burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic offered the perfect 
pretext for their interventions in the public sphere with a conservative, 
moralizing and virulently homophobic discourse. (Rao 2015, 46) 
This war of position, conducted by the Pentecostal churches vis-à-vis a 
state receding from the provision of public services, was not just made 
possible by neoliberalization. As Rao remarks, the World Bank granted 
explicit support to faith-based organizations as key partners in the project 
of social and economic “development” (Rao 2015, 46). Materially, 
Pentecostal churches as well as heteropatriarchal family structures helped 
absorbing the precarizing effects of structural adjustments. Ideologically, 
such religious formations strengthen the links between family, morality, 
and material wellbeing, thus crucially mediating the rise of popular 
homophobia in times (and places) of economic insecurity (47).
In light of this analysis, Rao questions the World Bank’s recent 
stances against homophobia in the global South. In February 2014, for 
instance, the Bank decided to delay a loan of 90 million U.S. dollars to 
Uganda in response to Museveni’s signing of the Anti-Homosexuality 
Act.88 A debate ensued—within and outside LGBTQ formations—about 
WKH EHQH¿FLDO RU GHWULPHQWDO HIIHFWV RI WKH %DQN¶V GHFLVLRQ %XW 5DR
comments: “Missing in this curious debate about whether the Bank should 
concern itself with LGBT rights was a recognition of the degree to which 
it was already implicated in their disavowal” (Rao 2015, 47). In other 
words, the stance against homophobia taken both by the Bank and by 
SRZHUIXOGRQRUVLGHRORJLFDOO\³DOORZ>V@WKHPWRPDVTXHUDGHDVDJHQWVRI
benevolence and to shore up the hegemony of ‘development’ and neoliberal 
FDSLWDOLVPDVFLYLOL]LQJLQÀXHQFHV´7KXVEXLOGLQJRQWKHGHEDWHVRQ
homonormativity and homonationalism, Rao terms this articulation of 
LGBT rights to the transnational consolidation of neoliberal hegemony, 
“global homocapitalism.” The latter, as an ideological formation, relies “on 
a view of homophobia as ‘merely cultural’” (48),89 making it possible not 
RQO\WRORFDWHKRPRSKRELDDVDQHVVHQWLDOHOHPHQWRIVSHFL¿F³FXOWXUHV´
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but also to continue promoting a liberal politics of recognition even as 
those promoting it are centrally implicated in the material consolidation of 
KRPRSKRELDLQWKH¿UVWSODFH
Rao’s key conclusion, in “The Locations of Homophobia” (2014), 
is that rather than trying to “locate” homophobia we should focus on 
its “dispersion.” He writes: “The affects that travel under the sign of 
‘homophobia’ in Uganda may well feature locally particular idioms . . . but 
their structural relations with material precarity bear a striking resemblance 
to those visible in the West. In this crucial respect at least, homophobia in 
8JDQGDLVQRWVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURPKRPRSKRELDLQWKH:HVW´
However, this observation differs from Tatchell’s abstract invocation of 
indivisible and universal human rights, which in times of homonationalism 
and sexual imperialism regularly ends up locating homophobia in the 
global South. Rao’s observation proceeds, on the contrary, from his 
concrete and conjunctural analyses. Upon mentioning the accounts that 
read homophobia in Uganda as a moral panic, he remarks: 
Such accounts take us further in understanding the resonance that 
homophobic discourses have with Ugandan audiences today. But 
notice what has happened to the location of homophobia in such 
DUJXPHQWV>7@KHNLQGVRIH[SODQDWLRQVRIIHUHGIRUKRPRSKRELDLQ
Uganda work equally well for the West. (Rao 2014, 195)90    
As this passage suggests, it is theoretical practice itself that, according to 
Rao, points at a dispersion of homophobia. Because the same theoretical 
practices allow us to understand the concrete emergence of homophobia 
in the global North and in the global South, any attempt to “locate” 
KRPRSKRELD ORVHV WKHRUHWLFDO DQG SROLWLFDO VLJQL¿FDQFH 5DR PDNHV
this point with reference to the concept of moral panic, hence explicitly 
connecting his analysis to the work of Hall in the 1980s, among others. 
But we could make the same point by situating Rao’s analysis in relation 
to contemporary queer of color and queer diasporic critique. Similarly to 
Ferguson’s (2004) and Reddy’s (2011) accounts of the heteropatriarchy 
affecting queer of color and queer diasporic formations in the United States, 
Rao’s analysis suggests that homophobia in Uganda materializes through 
the contradictions between state and capital. I argued at the beginning of 
this chapter that, for Reddy, the U.S. state upholds an ideology of sexual 
freedom—to the point of making space for the gay Pakistani asylum seeker 
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within the legal archive—even as it reinforces diasporic heteropatriarchy 
through migration management, mediating the formation of a gendered 
DQGUDFLDOL]HGODERUIRUFH)RU5DRLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVXFK
as the World Bank take stances against homophobia even as they help 
producing the terrain on which both state and popular homophobias thrive. 
In Uganda as well as the United States, the emergence of homophobia 
can be tracked through materialist analyses that acknowledge the relative 
autonomy of politics and ideology. Such analyses, in turn, highlight the 
dispersion of homophobia across the transnational divide as an object of 
both theoretical inquiry and political practice.
Following Rao’s call to disperse homophobia, in the next section I 
shift the attention from the global South to the European South, and more 
VSHFL¿FDOO\WRWKH,WDOLDQFRQWH[W+HUH,IRFXVRQWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\ZDURQ
“gender ideology” unleashed in Italy by the Vatican, the local far-right, and 
Catholic conservative movements. Anti-gender mobilizations are taking 
place today all over Europe and their primary targets are feminist and queer 
theories, lobbying organizations, equality legislation, and sexual education 
initiatives. The anti-gender front claims to be resisting an ideological 
colonization proceeding from the United States and from European and 
international institutions. On the one hand, by turning to Europe, I aim 
to undo the divide between Western sexual freedom and Third World 
homophobia that structures the politics and ideologies of homonationalism 
and sexual imperialism. On the other hand, I pay particular attention to 
the antagonisms activated among queer critics about how to understand 
and to resist the conservative campaign. Through this focus, I expand and 
FRQFOXGHP\UHÀHFWLRQVRQWKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFH
Gender Panic: The War on “Gender Ideology” 
at the Periphery of Europe
On December 21, 2012, during his Christmas address to the Roman curia, 
former Pope Benedict XVI recalled Simone de Beauvoir’s famous assertion 
WKDW³RQHLVQRWERUQEXWUDWKHUEHFRPHVZRPDQ´%HDXYRLU>@
330). Hence he commented: “These words lay the foundation for what is 
put forward today under the term ‘gender’ as a new philosophy of sexuality. 
According to this philosophy, sex is no longer a given element of nature, 
that man has to accept and personally make sense of: it is a social role that 
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we choose for ourselves, while in the past it was chosen for us by society. 
The profound falsehood of this theory and of the anthropological revolution 
contained within it is obvious” (Pope Benedict XVI 2012). As I will argue, 
WKLVZDVQRWWKH¿UVWWLPHWKDWWKH9DWLFDQDQGWKH3RSHEHFDPHFRQFHUQHG
with feminist and queer critiques of the heteropatriarchal naturalization of 
gender. But this speech formally initiated a widespread counter-offensive 
against what has since been termed “gender theory” or “gender ideology” 
(Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). This conservative campaign draws together a 
number of heterogeneous elements—feminist and queer theories, equality 
legislation, and sexual education initiatives in schools, among others—and 
constructs them, in Pope Francis’ (2015) words, as a project of “ideological 
colonization.” The latter, in turn, is attributed to the penetration of feminist 
and “homosexualist” lobbies into European supranational institutions and 
international political bodies, such as the United Nations (Prearo and De 
*XHUUH7KHVSHHFKE\3RSH%HQHGLFW;9,IRUWKH¿UVWWLPH
brought this conspiracy theory out of the political and intellectual circles 
close to the Vatican and projected it into the public space. It did so at a 
particular moment, when a law bill was being discussed in France that 
would extend the institution of marriage to same-sex couples: the so-called 
marriage pour tous (marriage for all), passed by the French Parliament in 
April 2013. The Vatican’s attack on “gender” was central to the emergence 
of the French movement Manif pour Tous (Demonstration for All) opposing 
the law (Garbagnoli 2014, 258). From that moment on, the war on “gender 
ideology” has been branching out quickly, especially across Southern and 
Eastern Europe. 
The anti-gender front began to take shape in Italy in the Summer 2013, 
in order to contest a law bill on homophobic and transphobic violence (the 
so-called Scalfarotto Bill). Its emergence was mediated by the French 
experience, as illustrated, for instance, by the formation of the group Manif 
pour Tous – Italia (Garbagnoli 2014, 258). Since then, the movement 
has been mobilizing fervently. Unlike its French counterpart, which was 
ultimately unable to block the legalization of same-sex marriage, the Italian 
anti-gender front has already obtained major successes. The Scalfarotto 
Bill was approved by one of the two chambers of the Italian Parliament but 
never made it to the other. A program of sexual education in public schools 
GHVLJQHGE\81$5WKHQDWLRQDORI¿FHDJDLQVWUDFLDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQZDV
struck down by the Ministry of Education, University and Research of 
Matteo Renzi’s government in 2014. Finally, a law bill on LGBT civil 
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unions proposed by the same government (the so-called Cirinnà Bill) 
became law in 2016, but only after restrictive revisions introduced under 
the pressure of anti-gender mobilizations and Pope Francis himself (Bernini 
2016, 369).91 Yet, although these concrete differences between the French 
and the Italian case do matter, they should not be overstated. Whether 
VXFFHVVIXORUQRWLQLWVDWWHPSWVWRKDOWVSHFL¿FOHJLVODWLYHSURFHVVHVWKH
ZDURQ³JHQGHULGHRORJ\´KDVFRPHWRUHGH¿QHWKHYHU\WHUUDLQRIVH[XDO
politics in contemporary Europe. 
This shifting of the political terrain stands in a contradictory relation 
to the debates on homonationalism and sexual imperialism discussed in 
this chapter. On the one hand, the attack on “gender ideology” in Europe 
seems to controvert one of the unspoken premises informing such debates: 
that is, the assumption that a certain degree of sexual progress had been 
achieved once and for all across the global North, or at least that the path 
in that direction had been irreversibly taken. In the introduction to their 
forthcoming volume Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing 
Against Equality (2017), Roman Kuhar and David Paternotte write:
Scholars, observers and actors alike were generally convinced that 
Europe was on an unstoppable way toward “full” gender equality and 
VH[XDO FLWL]HQVKLS7KH\DVVXPHG WKDW VXFK IRUPVRIRSSRVLWLRQ >DV
WKHDQWLJHQGHUPRELOL]DWLRQV@ZHUH ODUJHO\ IRUHLJQ WR WKH(XURSHDQ
experience or could only subsist as remains of the past and primarily 
in Eastern Europe or in (Catholic) countries such as Italy or Ireland. 
Largely successful demonstrations . . . such as the French Manif pour 
Tous came therefore as a surprise and force them to amend such a 
grand narrative. (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017) 
This passage suggests that “progress” is a rather volatile object for both 
theory and political practice. Even as Kuhar and Paternotte make no 
reference to queer critiques of homonationalism and sexual imperialism, 
their analysis can be appropriated as a reminder that such critiques may 
unwittingly participate in contemporary efforts to “locate” progress in 
the global North and homophobia in the global South, to the extent that 
they unilaterally insist on the rearticulation of sexual progress to Western 
nationalism and imperialism.
Yet, on the other hand, it is undeniable that the war on “gender 
ideology” has been spreading unevenly across Europe. The language 
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of “ideological colonization” has found a particularly fertile terrain in 
Southern and Eastern European peripheries. To different degrees and in 
different ways, the latter maintain with “Europe” a relation of political and 
economic dependency both historically and in the context of the current 
politico-economic crisis, during which the peripheries of the continent have 
been the primary target of austerity measures designed at the supranational 
level.92 Thus, as Weronika Grzebalska observes in the context of Poland, 
an “anti-neocolonial, Eurosceptic rhetoric . . . played out loudly throughout 
the recent anti-gender mobilisation. In statements and discussions that 
DFFRPSDQLHGWKHFDPSDLJQWKHGLVFXUVLYH¿JXUHRIWKH(8DVDFXOWXUDO
coloniser, corrupting innocent Polish children and suppressing the Polish 
national culture, was used ubiquitously” (Grzebalska 2015, 92). Sara 
Garbagnoli projects this analysis on the Italian context. In her view, the 
success of the conservative campaign in Italy is also due to its capitalizing 
on the current politico-economic crisis, “creating a moral panic that 
responds to a number of anxieties produced during a period of austerity” 
(Garbagnoli 2017). As I have been arguing throughout this dissertation, in 
times of crisis moral panics thrive. According to this reading, the current 
war on “gender ideology” ideologically mediates the European politico-
economic crisis by rearticulating internal divides already existing between 
Europe and its own peripheries.
Therefore, bringing “gender ideology” into contemporary debates 
on homonationalism and sexual imperialism may both erode the divide 
between Western sexual freedom and Third World homophobia and 
reposition it, at the same time, within Europe itself. Shall we consider the 
current war on “gender ideology” in Europe to entirely undo the divide 
between global North and global South, which informs the politics and 
LGHRORJLHV RI KRPRQDWLRQDOLVP DQG VH[XDO LPSHULDOLVP" 2U VKDOO ZH
privilege the success achieved by the conservative campaign in the Southern 
and Eastern peripheries of the continent, hence rearticulating Europe itself 
as a terrain of struggle internallyFURVVHGE\IRUPVRIVH[XDOLPSHULDOLVP"
Rather than answering these questions and solving the contradiction—
that is, rather than “locating” homophobia in the European periphery and 
proceeding to position the latter, in turn, either in Europe or as its more 
ambiguous “internal other”—in the remainder of this section I focus on 
the antagonisms among queer critics themselves about how to read the 
conservative campaign. Paying attention to the problem of theoretical 
practice, I resist locating either homophobia or the European periphery. 
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A key approach to the war on “gender ideology” in Italy has been 
D UHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI LWVKLVWRU\*DUEDJQROLZDV WKH¿UVWRQH WR LQWURGXFH
this analysis in the Italian context, in an essay titled “‘L’ideologia 
del genere’: l’irresistibile ascesa di un’invenzione retorica vaticana 
contro la denaturalizzazione dell’ordine sessuale” (“Gender Ideology”: 
The Irresistible Rise of a Vatican Rhetorical Invention Against the 
Denaturalization of the Sexual Order) (2014).93 In this piece, Garbagnoli 
traces the emergence of the rhetorical device “gender ideology” (sometimes 
referred to as “gender theory”) back to the International Conference on 
Population and Development organized by the UN in Cairo in 1994, and 
the World Conference on Women organized in Beijing the next year. In 
the wake of the two conferences, the Vatican became concerned with 
the appearance of “gender” in the language of international politics. An 
intense work of elaboration began which led to the publication, in 2003, 
of Lexicon: Ambiguous and Debatable Terms Regarding Family Life and 
Ethical Questions3RQWL¿FDO&RXQFLOIRUWKH)DPLO\>@,QWKLV
text, and especially in the long introduction by French Catholic priest and 
psychoanalyst Tony Anatrella, “gender theory” is presented as an “opinion,” 
a “disembodied” theory informed by a radical individualism, an ideology 
following in the footsteps of Marxism but more dangerous than the latter 
because of its promise of liberation, a theory elaborated by “intransigent 
feminists” who put forward “childish” claims, and a “negationism of the 
sexes” that the people will have to raise up against. Garbagnoli comments:
Et la voilà the mysterious “theory”: a blob of slogans that make no 
theoretical sense and of sexist and homophobic prejudices that have 
QRWKLQJ WRGRZLWK WKHUHVHDUFKSURGXFHGZLWKLQ WKH¿HOGRIJHQGHU
studies. (Garbagnoli 2014, 255)       
By terming “gender theory” or “gender ideology” a blob, Garbagnoli does 
not simply remark the theoretical inconsistencies internal to the Vatican’s 
discourse. More importantly, she points at the way in which disparate 
elements converge in it and come to form an apparently seamless whole. 
On the one hand, she signals that the Vatican “draws together agents and 
groups that are neither homogeneous nor concordant” (Garbagnoli 2014, 
$PRQJWKHVHDUHWKHDFDGHPLF¿HOGRIJHQGHUVWXGLHVWKHSROLWLFVRI
gender mainstreaming, and different forms of equality legislation. On the 
RWKHUKDQGIRFXVLQJRQWKHVSHFL¿FDWWDFNRQWKH¿HOGRIJHQGHUVWXGLHV
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Garbagnoli emphasizes that not only does the Vatican tactically preserve 
the English word “gender” despite the existence of its Italian translation 
(genereKHQFHIUDPLQJWKH¿HOGDV³DQRIIVKRRWRI86LPSHULDOLVP´
but it also insists on referring to “gender theory” in the singular, obscuring 
the differences and antagonisms among heterogeneous feminist and queer 
analyses. Thus, in her view, the rhetorical device “gender ideology” 
SHUIRUPV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWDZRUNRIFRQGHQVDWLRQRIboth heterogeneous 
social forces and heterogeneous forms of critical knowledge. 
This articulation of “gender ideology” appeared in the Lexicon in 2003, 
but its circulation during the following years was restricted to political and 
intellectual milieus close to the Vatican. As I mentioned earlier, only in 
ZDVWKHIRUPXOD¿UVWGHSOR\HGWRDUWLFXODWHDFRQVHUYDWLYHSROLWLFDO
front in the public space, in the context of the French debate over same-
sex marriage. Hence in the Summer 2013, through the mediation of the 
French experience, “gender ideology” came to dominate the Italian debate 
on the Scalfarotto Bill on homophobic and transphobic violence. In her 
early essay, Garbagnoli registers some of these political materializations of 
the Vatican’s discourse on “gender,” yet her primary focus is on the history 
RIWKHGLVFRXUVHLWVHOI,QVWHDGDVLJQL¿FDQWZRUNRQWKH¿HOGRIVRFLDODQG
political forces composing the Italian anti-gender front has been carried 
out, among others, by Yàdad De Guerre and Massimo Prearo.94 In a recent 
piece co-written by the two, Prearo and De Guerre (2016) reconstruct the 
trajectory that produced the very architecture of the conservative bloc. On 
the one hand, they observe: “The emergence of this broad mobilization is 
due to the long and synergetic work carried out by fundamentalist Catholic 
groups, traditionalist groups, and fringes of the Italian far-right, with the 
support of Vatican elites and segments of the Catholic world.” Yet, on the 
other hand, they emphasize that the construction of such a bloc was crossed 
by internal struggles for power as well as by the metamorphosis of already 
existing formations through their participation in the anti-gender campaign. 
First and foremost, even though anti-gender protests in Italy, as in 
France, have been primarily focusing on the matter of LGBT civil rights, 
Prearo and De Guerre (2016) foreground the presence of strong anti-
abortion formations within the movement from its inception. As they point 
RXW WKH ,WDOLDQ SUROLIH PRYHPHQW RUJDQL]HG LWV ¿UVW0DUFLD 1D]LRQDOH
per la Vita (National March for Life) in 2011, importing the model of 
WKH0DUFK IRU /LIH RUJDQL]HG IRU WKH ¿UVW WLPH LQ:DVKLQJWRQ LQ 
While this experiment was by and large a failure, the second edition of the 
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march in 2012 was more successful, also due to the support of segments 
of the political class. Prearo and De Guerre stress that from the second 
march more radicalized pro-life formations emerged that were going to 
play a key role in the anti-gender front.95 The latter began to take shape 
in the Summer 2013. Parallel to the mobilizations against the Scalfarotto 
Bill and the Cirinnà Bill modeled on the French movement against same-
sex marriage, pro-life and traditionalist groups started to organize public 
FRQIHUHQFHVRQ³JHQGHU´7KH¿UVWWZRFRQIHUHQFHVWRRNSODFHLQ9HURQD
DQGLQSDUWLDOFRQÀLFWZLWKRQHDQRWKHU2QHZDVRUJDQL]HGE\WKHSUROLIH
formations connected to the National March for Life and was supported by 
mayor Flavio Tosi, a member of the far-right party Lega Nord (Northern 
League). The other, instead, was organized by the fundamentalist Catholic 
group Christus Rex and the neo-fascist party Forza Nuova (New Force), 
in polemic with mayor Tosi. The anti-gender mobilizations remained 
dispersed and even fractured until 2014, when yet another conference 
was organized in Verona—again with the support of the Municipality—
by a new pro-life association called Vita è (Life is). According to Prearo 
and De Guerre, it was at this conference that the constellation of pro-life 
movements, fundamentalist Catholic groups, and far-right formations 
cohered into an anti-gender front. The latter provided itself with clear 
strategies and coordination, inaugurating a season of public conferences 
and mobilizations during which the war on “gender ideology” reached 
its peaks of homophobia and transphobia. In this context, Prearo and De 
Guerre speak of “the becoming anti-gender of pro-life groups.” And it was 
indeed a processWUDYHUVHGE\FRQÀLFWVRYHUSRZHUDQGVSDFH
Prearo and De Guerre’s reconstruction is key to a substantial 
understanding of the formation of the anti-gender bloc in Italy. First, it 
makes visible segments of it that would otherwise tend to disappear from 
view, such as the pro-life movement opposing abortion rights. Second, it 
foregrounds its connections with the political class. Third, it highlights the 
system of alliances reactivated and cemented, in the context of a struggle 
over sexual politics, between conservative Catholic groups and far-right 
formations. Fourth, it does not circumvent the internal struggles that 
accompanied the construction of an effective bloc. In light of their analysis, 
Prearo and De Guerre (2016) conclude that “the ‘anti-gender’ movement 
. . . cannot be reduced to an emotional reaction to the panic spread by 
WKH µQRJHQGHU¶ FDPSDLJQ QRU WR WKH >&DWKROLF@&KXUFK¶V LQWUXVLRQ LQWR
Italian politics.” Indeed, even if it remains quite literally a reactionary 
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bloc—reacting to progressive sexual politics and to the autonomization 
RI IHPLQLVWDQGTXHHUNQRZOHGJHVDVDFDGHPLF¿HOGV *DUEDJQROL
257)—what the anti-gender bloc has been conducting since 2013 is also 
a struggle for hegemony, against the background of internal struggles for 
hegemony among its different segments. Taken together, Garbagnoli’s 
analysis of the emergence of “gender ideology” as a rhetorical device, and 
3UHDURDQG'H*XHUUH¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKH¿HOGRIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOIRUFHV
that cohered around it, allow us to track the different articulatory practices 
that presided over the formation of the Italian anti-gender bloc and its 
relative success.96 
Lorenzo Bernini entered into this debate by emphasizing yet another 
element that favored, in his view, the rise of the anti-gender bloc, or at least 
prevented the construction of an effective resistance to it: the fractures 
and antagonisms existing among the social forces that would have been 
expected to homogeneously oppose the conservative attack. Bernini 
IRUPXODWHVWKLVDUJXPHQWIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQDQHVVD\WLWOHG³8QRVSHWWUR
s’aggira per l’Europa…Sugli usi e gli abusi del concetto di ‘gender’” (A 
Specter is Haunting Europe…On the Uses and Abuses of the Concept of 
“Gender”) (2014).97 Here, he highlights that Luisa Muraro—a prominent 
¿JXUH RI WKH ,WDOLDQ ³WKRXJKW RI VH[XDO GLIIHUHQFH´98 which detains “an 
indisputable hegemony within Italian feminism” (84)—has explicitly 
aligned herself with Pope Francis’ opposition to the introduction of sexual 
education programs in public schools, allegedly informed by “gender 
WKHRU\´ 0RELOL]LQJ ZHOONQRZQ FRQÀLFWV within feminist theory yet 
projecting them into the context of the current conservative campaign, 
Muraro argues that “gender theory” is indeed guilty of negating sexual 
difference (Muraro and Sasso 2014). In a later essay, Bernini (2016) also 
QRWHV WKH VWDQFH DGRSWHG E\ VRPH ¿JXUHV RQ WKH /HIW DJDLQVW VWHSFKLOG
adoption, originally contained in the Cirinnà Bill on LGBT civil unions 
but later removed under anti-gender and Vatican pressures. The article on 
stepchild adoption would have allowed one member of a registered couple 
to legally adopt his or her partner’s children, thus further undermining, 
according to the Vatican, the heterosexual foundations of the family. 
Among those siding with the Vatican in this context were Giuseppe Vacca, 
the current president of the Gramsci Foundation, and Mario Tronti, one of 
the founding theorists of Italian workerism (operaismo) and now member 
of the centrist Democratic Party. Thus, while Prearo and De Guerre point 
at the ways in which the anti-gender ideology managed to compose a bloc 
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out of heterogeneous social and political forces, Bernini foregrounds the 
ODFNRIDVLPLODUSURFHVVRQWKHRWKHUIURQWRUWREHPRUHSUHFLVHKHWUDFNV
WKH UDPL¿FDWLRQV RI WKH DQWLJHQGHU EORFZKHUH RQHPD\ H[SHFW WR ¿QG
resistance to it.  
Additionally, Bernini notes the lack of reaction on the part of the Italian 
academy at large. In his view, this is not surprising, for the latter “has always 
been reluctant to recognize academic dignity to gender studies and queer 
theories” (Bernini 2014, 85). The only exception at the time of his earlier 
essay was a letter with which the feminist Società Italiana delle Storiche 
(Italian Society of Women Historians) addressed the Minister of Education, 
University and Research.99 The letter states: “A ‘theory of gender’ . . . does 
QRWH[LVW7KLVFDWHJRU\>JHQGHU@GHSOR\HGLQDIUXLWIXOZD\DFURVVGLIIHUHQW
GLVFLSOLQHV WKDW E\ QRZ FRQVWLWXWH WKH ¿HOG RI gender studies, does not 
introduce a theory, a vision of man and woman, but rather a conceptual tool 
that enables us to think and analyze the historical-social dimensions of the 
relations between the sexes in all their complexity and articulation” (Società 
Italiana delle Storiche, quoted in Bernini 2014, 85). Adopting this position, 
Bernini argues that indeed a gender theory does not exist, and offers instead 
DQDFFRXQWRIWKHKHWHURJHQHRXV¿HOGRIFRQWHPSRUDU\TXHHUWKHRULHVIURP
its prehistory in the analyses of Michel Foucault and Monique Wittig, to the 
pioneering works of Teresa de Lauretis, Judith Butler, and Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, to the queer of color critique of José E. Muñoz and the antisocial 
thesis of Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman (Bernini 2014, 85-87). Bernini’s 
move is double. On the one hand, he responds to the conservative campaign 
by negating the very existence of a homogeneous and prescriptive “gender 
theory.” He does so by highlighting the heterogeneity characterizing the 
FRQWHPSRUDU\ ¿HOGV RI JHQGHU VWXGLHV DQG TXHHU WKHRULHV 2Q WKH RWKHU
KDQG KH LGHQWL¿HV WKH LQYLVLELOL]DWLRQ RI WKLV KHWHURJHQHLW\²ZKLFK KH
attributes both to the hegemony of the “thought of sexual difference” in 
Italian feminism and to broader academic resistances against these forms 
of critical knowledge—among the conditions of possibility for the current 
conservative attack to thrive.    
A similar double move was at work, if more implicitly, in Garbagnoli’s 
(2014) earlier essay, yet from a different theoretical standpoint. Upon 
signaling, as Bernini does, that sexual difference thinker Luisa Muraro 
explicitly joined Pope Francis in his critique of anti-discrimination 
programs in schools allegedly informed by “gender theory,” Garbagnoli 
ironically comments: “in Italy we enjoy the privilege of having ‘gender 
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theory’ even before the analyses, the research, the theories>LQWKHSOXUDO@
GHYHORSHGZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRIJHQGHUVWXGLHVFDQEHVWXGLHGDQGGLVFXVVHG
with the proper intellectual and institutional means that this would require” 
(253). Such intellectual means are to be found, in Garbagnoli’s view, not 
so much in queer theories as in the work of French radical materialist 
feminists such as Christine Delphy, Colette Guillaumin, Nicole-Claude 
Mathieu, and Monique Wittig, whose reception, she argues, continues to 
encounter strong resistances in Italy.100 Hence, she concludes her analysis 
by quoting two of them:
of “gender theory” we can say, as Colette Guillaumin wrote about 
“race,” that: no, “gender theory” does not exist. Or actually yes: 
“gender theory” does exist, but it is not what it pretends to be. It is not 
the-theory, nor the “lesbian feminist” and “homosexualist” ideology 
that allegedly produce violence, sadness, and natural catastrophes. 
Rather, it is a reactionary rhetorical device whose goal is delegitimizing 
knowledges and struggles that denaturalize the sexual order. In so 
doing, it is meant to perpetuate the brutality and tyranny of a system of 
oppression that inferiorizes women and/or non-straight people (Wittig 
1992). (Garbagnoli 2014, 260)101    
The rejoinder that “gender ideology” (or “gender theory” in the singular) in 
fact does not exist—put forward by the Italian Society of Women Historians, 
picked up by Garbagnoli with a difference, and more explicitly embraced 
by Bernini—became one of the most common progressive responses to 
the war on “gender ideology” in Italy. However, as we shall see, it also 
contributed to produce yet another front of antagonism, this time among 
queer critics themselves. 
In response to the widespread circulations of the rejoinder, Federico 
=DSSLQRDQG'HERUDK$UGLOOLSXEOLVKHGDSROHPLFDOHVVD\WLWOHG³/DYRORQWj
di negare. La teoria del gender e il panico eterosessuale” (The Will to 
1HJDWH*HQGHU7KHRU\DQG6WUDLJKW3DQLF,QWKLVSLHFH=DSSLQR
and Ardilli develop three central arguments. First, they term those who argue 
that a “gender theory” as such does not exist, “negationists.” According 
WR =DSSLQR DQG $UGLOOL QHJDWLRQLVP KDV EHFRPH D OLEHUDOSURJUHVVLYH
common sense that must be contested and resisted because of its collusion 
with “straight panic.” In their view, negationists go on explaining that there 
is not a “gender theory,” but rather different “respectable” theories that do 
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not possess a prescriptive character and certainly are not meant to negate 
sexual difference. In so doing, negationists are accused of trying to comfort 
a straight audience that must feel threatened, instead, by the revolutionary 
potential of queer feminist theory. Indeed, their second argument is that a 
gender theory does exist, and its primary goal is precisely that of negating 
sexual difference by exposing the heterosexual matrix that presides over 
its production. They identify such a theory with Butler’s work on gender 
SHUIRUPDWLYLW\+HQFHLQDWKLUGPRYH=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOLUHFDOOWKHTXHHU
JHVWXUHRIUHFODLPLQJWKHLQVXOW²¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWWKHLQVXOW³TXHHU´²LQ
order to reclaim not only “gender theory,” but also “gender ideology.” In this 
respect, they write: “While it is clear to us that there are different historical 
DQGSKLORVRSKLFDO VWUDWL¿FDWLRQVRI WKHFRQFHSWRI µLGHRORJ\¶ZHZLVK WR
emphasize one of its many possible meanings: that of a theory that becomes 
SUDFWLFH´=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOL7KHLUUHIHUHQFHKHUHLV*UDPVFL102 
But is “gender ideology” open to a reclaiming similar to the 
UHFODLPLQJRI WKH LQVXOW³TXHHU´",QRUGHU WR UHFODLP³JHQGHU LGHRORJ\´
=DSSLQR DQG $UGLOOL PDNH LW HQWLUHO\ FRLQFLGH ZLWK %XWOHU¶V WKHRU\ RI
gender performativity, signaling the extent to which the conservative bloc 
LWVHOI LGHQWL¿HV %XWOHU DV DQ H[HPSODU\ JHQGHU LGHRORJXH103 However, 
according to the critical approach to the concept of ideology associated 
ZLWK *UDPVFL²ZKLFK =DSSLQR DQG$UGLOOL H[SOLFLWO\ LQYRNH²LGHRORJ\
SHUIRUPV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWDZRUNRIFRQGHQVDWLRQRULQ+DOO¶VWHUPVD
work of articulation. In the discourse of the anti-gender movement, Butler’s 
WKHRU\JHWVDUWLFXODWHGWRDEURDGHU¿HOGRIKHWHURJHQHRXVHOHPHQWVIURP
same-sex marriage to the use of LGBT rights as aid conditionality. For 
instance, Pope Francis has protested the fact that “international bodies . . . 
PDNH¿QDQFLDODLGWRSRRUFRXQWULHVGHSHQGHQWRQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIODZV
to establish ‘marriage’ between persons of the same sex” (Pope Francis 
2016, 191). While this statement is imprecise—for same-sex marriage has 
never been put forward as a condition for international aid—we saw in the 
case of Uganda that other legal battles concerning LGBT rights have been 
GHSOR\HGWRWKDWHQGERWKE\SRZHUIXOGRQRUVDQGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDO
institutions such as the World Bank. Thus, commenting on the Pope’s 
statement, David Paternotte and Sarah Bracke register the postcolonial 
dimension of the debate on “gender ideology” and situate the latter in 
relation to current debates on homonationalism and sexual imperialism: 
>7KH@IUDPLQJ>GHSOR\HGE\3RSH)UDQFLV@LQYRNHVWKHSRVWFRORQLDO
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in powerful ways, and notably the idea of national self-determination. 
It is also intricately connected to the ways in which gender relations 
DQG VH[XDOLW\ KDYH ¿JXUHG DQG FRQWLQXH WR ¿JXUH LQ FRORQLDO DQG
imperial discourses and practices. . . . The Vatican’s current insistence 
on “ideological colonization” mobilizes a powerful critique of global 
practices of development aid as well as postcolonial sentiments and 
identities at large. (Paternotte and Bracke 2016, 150) 
In light of this analysis, what exactly would we reclaim by reclaiming 
³JHQGHU LGHRORJ\´"&DQ WKH UHFODLPLQJ HQWLUHO\ E\SDVV WKH DUWLFXODWRU\
ZRUN SHUIRUPHGE\ WKH DQWLJHQGHU GLVFRXUVH"&DQ%XWOHU EH UHFODLPHG
DQG DLG FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ VLPSO\ EH OHIW RXW"104 Rather than to reclaim the 
insult, I suggest that a Gramscian notion of ideology must be deployed 
¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWWRFRQGXFWDFRQMXQFWXUDODQDO\VLVRIWKHSURGXFWLRQDQG
circulation of the conservative campaign, in order to reconstruct the terrain 
on which the ideology of the anti-gender bloc has been able to install itself. 
A number of such conjunctural analyses are proceeding, today, from 
Eastern Europe. These analyses read the contemporary war on “gender 
ideology” as a moral panic taking roots in the context of the current politico-
HFRQRPLFFULVLV)RU LQVWDQFH:HURQLND*U]HEDOVND(V]WHU.RYiWVDQG
$QGUHD3HWĘZULWH³7RSDUDSKUDVH*UDPVFLWKHJOREDOL]HGQHR
liberal democratic order is in crisis, and as a new paradigm is struggling 
to be born, various morbidities are allowed to rise to the surface.” Among 
such morbidities is, in their view, the attack on “gender.” Hence, they term 
gender a “symbolic glue” able to condense heterogeneous ideological 
elements, to construct a united front among heterogeneous conservative 
forces, and even struggling to produce a new common sense.105 Their 
conclusion is that taking critique seriously means understanding the space 
RFFXSLHGE\WKHDQWLJHQGHUEORFDQG¿QGLQJZD\VWRVHL]HWKHVDPHVSDFH
on different terms. Rather than reclaiming the insult of ideology, such a 
reading practices the reclaiming by unpacking the ideological struggle 
FRQGXFWHGE\WKHDQWLJHQGHUEORFLQWKH¿UVWSODFH7KLVUHDGLQJLQWXUQ
needs to be grounded on concrete analyses such as the ones offered by 
Garbagnoli, Prearo and De Guerre, and Bernini in the Italian context. These 
analyses—especially if taken together—allow us to track the different 
articulatory practices presiding over the construction of the anti-gender 
bloc. Even if none of them frame their intervention in terms of ideology 
or counter-ideology, I suggest that their concrete analyses are more useful 
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to reach a materialist understanding of the war on “gender ideology” than 
=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOL¶VTXHHUUHFODLPLQJRIWKHLQVXOW
$QG \HW LQ KLV UHVSRQVH WR =DSSLQR DQG $UGLOOL %HUQLQL 
explicitly rejects not only their reclaiming of “gender ideology,” but the 
very understanding of critical theory as ideology. He does so primarily by 
FRQWHVWLQJ=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOL¶V UHDGLQJRI%XWOHU ,QKLVYLHZ%XWOHU¶V
theory of gender performativity is not meant to negate sexual difference, 
but rather to question its self-evidence and to turn it into a problem for 
critical theory and political practice.1067KXVZKLOH=DSSLQR DUJXHV WKDW
³TXHHU >WKHRU\@ LVPRUH RU OHVV H[SOLFLWO\ LQIRUPHG E\ D QRUPDWLYH²RU
LGHRORJLFDO²FRPPLWPHQW WR D VXEYHUVLRQ RI >WKH KHWHURVH[XDOPDWUL[@´
=DSSLQR   %HUQLQL LQVLVWV WKDW WKH WKHRUHWLFDO SHUVSHFWLYH
adopted by Butler as well as Foucault is “critical, not normative” (Bernini 
  $JDLQVW =DSSLQR DQG $UGLOOL¶V FULWLTXH RI ³QHJDWLRQLVP´
%HUQLQL UHDI¿UPV D GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH ³JHQGHU WKHRU\´ RU ³JHQGHU
ideology” produced by the anti-gender bloc as the target of its conservative 
FDPSDLJQDQG WKHPXOWLSOLFLW\RIFULWLFDO WKHRULHVSRSXODWLQJ WKH¿HOGRI
gender and queer studies. Bernini’s rejoinder, in turn, led to a rupture with 
=DSSLQR107 The latter accused the former not only of homonormativity, but 
¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWRIVDIHJXDUGLQJDFDGHPLFLQWHUHVWVWKHUHVSHFWDELOLW\RI
gender studies) over the radical knowledges produced by queer political 
IRUPDWLRQVJHQGHULGHRORJ\UHFODLPHG$QDOO WRRIDPLOLDUFRQÀLFWZDV
WKXV UHDI¿UPHG EHWZHHQ DFDGHPLF NQRZOHGJH DQG DFWLYLVW NQRZOHGJH
at a time when both were under attack and in a place that in fact never 
witnessed a proper institutionalization of feminist and queer theories.
+RZHYHU YLUWXDOO\ DEVHQW IURP WKH GHEDWH EHWZHHQ =DSSLQR DQG
Bernini was an acknowledgment of the fact that Bernini’s own position 
ZDV HPEHGGHG LQ D VSHFL¿F SROLWLFDO SURMHFW /LYLQJ DQG ZRUNLQJ LQ
Verona—a bastion of the Italian far-right and one of the epicenters of the 
anti-gender movement from its inception—Bernini, like Prearo, has been 
participating in the setting up of a series of counter-conferences aimed 
DWH[SODLQLQJWKHQDWXUHRIJHQGHUVWXGLHVWRWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF¿UVWDQG
foremost teachers and parents.108 His insistence on the critical nature of 
gender studies and queer theories must be understood within the context 
of this attempt to practice counter-information, or even counter-hegemony. 
$VKHZULWHVLQKLVUHSO\WR=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOL³ZKHQ,KDSSHQ   WR
give public lectures in front of parents who are afraid that their children 
might be forced to change their gender or might be masturbated by their 
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teachers, I deploy the formula ‘gender theory does not exist’ to explain 
that the theories elaborated within contemporary gender studies and queer 
studies . . . are not normative but critical theories” (Bernini 2016, 378). 
This makes clear that, for Bernini, the fact that queer theory is a critical 




forthcoming introductory book to queer theories, “critical philosophers are 
PLOLWDQW LQWHOOHFWXDOV´ %HUQLQL+HUHKHVSHFL¿HVKLVYLHZRI WKH
relationship between (queer) theory and political practice:
queer theories can be described as critical political philosophies 
which assume the standpoint of sexual minorities and denounce the 
regime that minoritizes them as arbitrary, abusive, and intolerable. 
While doing so, they do not necessarily offer solutions or alternatives, 
but leave the task of elaborating and experimenting both of them to 
collective and individual practices of struggle. (Bernini 2017) 
Thus, drawing on Butler’s critique of normativity but especially on 
)RXFDXOW¶VSRVLWLRQLQJDVDFULWLFDODQGVSHFL¿FLQWHOOHFWXDO²DQGHFKRLQJ
)RXFDXOW¶VUHIXVDOWRWHOORWKHUVZKDWWRGR²%HUQLQLWDNHVLVVXH¿UVWDQG
foremost with the toneRI=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOL¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQ,QKLVYLHZ
their polemic against “negationism” invalidates not only the analyses of 
those who have been trying to understand the emergence of the war on 
³JHQGHULGHRORJ\´LQ,WDO\EXWDOVRVSHFL¿FSROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHVGHSOR\HGE\
LGBTQ formations to resist the conservative attack. Among these are the 
counter-conferences organized in Verona in the context of which Bernini 
has been elaborating his distinction between “gender theory” or “gender 
ideology” and the multiplicity of feminist and queer theories as critical 
forms of knowledge.  
Thus, despite Bernini’s insistence on the critical nature of queer theory, 
the explicit link between his analysis and his political practice in fact proves 
=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOL¶VSRLQWFULWLFDOWKHRU\is a form of counter-ideology. 
But to this we must add, following Hall, that every ideological practice 
performs its work within a regime of relative autonomy, that is, according to 
LWVRZQLQWHUQDOORJLFV+HQFHFULWLFDOWKHRU\QHHGQRWUHQRXQFHLWVVSHFL¿F
PRGHRIDQDO\VLVLQRUGHUWRHQWHUWKH¿HOGRIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOVWUXJJOHV
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Garbagnoli suggests something similar in her earlier essay: “I believe that 
the increasing vulgarization, the media success, and the political effects of 
WKHXVHVRIWKLVH[SUHVVLRQ>µJHQGHULGHRORJ\¶@GHPDQGWKDWZHUHVHDUFKHUV
ZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRIJHQGHUVWXGLHVVSHDNXSLQWKHVSLULWRIDNQRZOHGJHWKDW
is intrinsically conceived as engagé precisely by virtue of its autonomy” 
(Garbagnoli 2014, 251). According to Garbagnoli, it is the autonomy of 
critical theory that makes it a social and political force. The debate between 
%HUQLQLDQG=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOLPLJKWVXJJHVWWKDWFDUHIXODQDO\VLVPXVWEH
traded for political engagement or the other way around. On the contrary, 
I have argued that the concrete analyses offered in the Italian context by 
Garbagnoli, Prearo and De Guerre, and Bernini allow us to understand 
the politico-ideological struggles conducted by the anti-gender bloc in this 
particular European periphery. In other words, I suggest that the best way 
in which critical theory might contribute to progressive political change is 







In “The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees” (1986b), Hall 
does not suggest that Marxism abandons political economy as a terrain 
of critique and transformative political practice, but that it abandons 
WKH HFRQRPLF DV D ¿QDO JXDUDQWHH RI ERWK WKHRU\ DQG SUDFWLFH ,Q KLV
YLHZDV,KDYHDUJXHGDWOHQJWKLQWKH¿UVWFKDSWHUWKHSROLWLFDODQGWKH
ideological are not fully, but relatively autonomous from the economic. 
As he writes: “The relations between these different levels are, indeed, 
determinate LHPXWXDOO\GHWHUPLQLQJ´DQG\HW³>W@KHHFRQRPLFcannot 
HIIHFW D ¿QDO FORVXUH RQ WKH GRPDLQ RI LGHRORJ\ LQ WKH VWULFW VHQVH RI
DOZD\V JXDUDQWHHLQJ D UHVXOW´ 7KH HFRQRPLF FDQQRW VHFXUH D¿QDO
guarantee because, on the one hand, “ideological categories are developed, 
generated and transformed according to their own laws of development 
DQG HYROXWLRQ´  DQG RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG EHFDXVH RI WKH ³QHFHVVDU\
‘openness’ of historical development to practice and struggle” (43). Thus, 
politics and ideology do not form out of thin air, but the ways in which the 
material conditions of their emergence are worked through in practice is 
not determined and guaranteed in advance. 
Hall developed this argument in the 1980s, at a crossroads between 
a protracted crisis of orthodox Marxism and the emergence of new 
theoretical moments on the Left. But the latter, in his view, “seem . . . 
to continue to stand on the shoulders of the very theories they have just 
GH¿QLWHO\GHVWUR\HG´+DOOE+HIROORZV
Had marxism not existed, “post-marxism” would have had to 
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invent it, so that “deconstructing” it once more would give the 
“deconstructionists” something further to do. All this gives marxism 
a curious life-after-death quality. It is constantly being “transcended” 
and “preserved.” (Hall 1986b, 28)1
One of the targets of Hall’s critique, in this essay and elsewhere, is 
Foucault. As I have argued in the third chapter, Hall suggests that Foucault’s 
replacement of ideology with the notion of discourse risks collapsing the 
latter, in fact, with the dominant ideology, but in the absence of a proper 
conceptualization of how any given ideology becomes dominant—or 
hegemonic—and of the relations between competing ideologies and the 
social and political forces they manage to articulate. Whether one agrees or 
not with Hall’s critique of Foucault’s own work, I have suggested that we 
can identify something akin to this dynamic in Massad’s (2007) critique of 
VH[XDOLPSHULDOLVPDVZHOODVLQ3XDU¶VDE3XDUDQG0LNGDVKL
DEPRVWUHFHQWUHÀHFWLRQVRQKRPRQDWLRQDOLVP%RWK0DVVDG
and Puar, albeit in different ways, draw on Foucault’s conceptualization of 
power. However, both of them implicitly reproduce a totalizing notion of 
ideology whose very totalizing character can go unchecked because of the 
DEVHQFHRIDQ\VSHFL¿FFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRILGHRORJ\0DVVDGHYHQVHHPV
to resurrect some economistic assumptions when he needs to explain the 
core of his otherwise Foucauldian analysis, that is, why the deployment 
of sexuality would fail to take root and gain hegemony in Arab social 
formations. Looking at these contemporary appropriations of Foucault, we 
may further qualify Hall’s diagnosis thirty years later: not only is Marxism 
granted a “life-after-death quality,” but its posthumous iterations within 
the folds of other theoretical languages can end up amplifying some of 
the problems that had supposedly incited a departure from Marxism in 
WKH¿UVWSODFH,IRQHVWRSVQDPLQJDSUREOHP²LQWKLVFDVHLGHRORJ\DQG
its determinations—the problem may easily come back with a vengeance, 
especially if one does so without really shifting the problematic.    
$QG0DU[LVWSUREOHPDWLFVDUHFRPLQJEDFNLQWKH¿HOGRIFRQWHPSRUDU\
queer critique, which had been by and large hegemonized, from the late 
1980s onward, by post-Marxist conceptual apparatuses. Marxism is 
reappearing today not just as a disavowed ghost “still rattling around in 
the theoretical machine” (Hall 1986b, 32), but in the form of a conscious 
reencounter. On the one hand, this “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory 
is taking place within the context of a more general return to Marxism in 
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times of politico-economic (and ideological) crisis. On the other hand, 
central to the reencounter between queer theory and Marxism has been the 
appearance of homonormativity, homonationalism, and sexual imperialism: 
three intertwined conceptual abstractions, among others, that help us 
name the contemporary articulations of progressive sexual politics to the 
politico-economic project of neoliberalism, for the consolidation of its 
hegemony nationally and transnationally. I have been arguing throughout 
this dissertation that, in this context, queer theory must try to reconstruct for 
itself a Marxist terrain of critique without subsuming the analysis of sexual 
formations and sexual politics—explicitly or implicitly—under resurrected 
forms of economic reductionism or too abstract understandings of the laws of 
capitalist development. One way to do so, I propose, is to anchor the emerging 
queer Marxism in Hall’s critical interventions in the 1970s and 1980s.
My claim is also that such a queer Marxism would resist too quick a 
dismissal of identity politics. Drawing on Hall’s analysis of Thatcherism 
as well as on Duggan’s (2003) work on homonormativity, I have posited 
that the articulation of progressive sexual politics to the consolidation of 
neoliberal hegemony should not lead to an abandonment of identity politics 
E\TXHHUFULWLFV/HWPHEULHÀ\UHFDOOVRPHNH\DVSHFWVRIWKLVDUJXPHQW
First: as Hall argues, ideology is a terrain of struggle where two can play 
at the game. That terrain must be seized, not defected. Moreover, to call 
for an abandonment of identity because of its contemporary articulations 
rightward—in the form of homonormativity, homonationalism, and sexual 
imperialism—means presuming that there can be political languages 
and modes of organizing that will be forever resistant to contradictory 
articulations. I suggest that this presumption is rooted in a misreading 
RI WKH VRFLDO DQGSROLWLFDO¿HOGV6HFRQGDSROLWLFDOSURMHFW WKDW LV WUXO\
invested into making a difference does not elude the contradictory terrain 
of common sense, but immerses itself into it in order to disarticulate and 
rearticulate its constitutive elements. That identity has become common 
sense across virtually all social segments in Western societies—in no small 
measure an achievement of feminist, antiracist, and LGBTQ politico-
ideological struggles—is a good reason to continue working on and within 
its terms, not to declare them bankrupt. Third: identity political formations, 
as Duggan points out, provide the Left today with some of its most vibrant 
forces. Abandoning the terrain of identity politics means depriving a 
possible counter-hegemonic bloc of one of its key sites of articulation.
Throughout the second and third chapters, I have deepened the latter 
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claim by turning to the processes of recomposition taking place within 
contemporary LGBTQ formations. I have argued that the struggles 
FRQGXFWHGE\TXHHURIFRORUDQGTXHHUGLDVSRULFFULWLTXHZLWKLQWKH¿HOG
of queer theory (and politics) can be understood as a form of counter-
KHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV ,W LV ¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW E\ PHDQV RI VXFK
intersectional critiques that queer theory is being able to read the emergence 
of homonormativity, homonationalism, and sexual imperialism. This is the 
case when queer critics read the “culture wars” about race within LGBTQ 
formations—such as the gay attacks on the Esperanza Peace and Justice 
Center in the late 1990s, mentioned in the second chapter—not just as 
an instance of gay racism and conservatism, but as part and parcel of a 
EURDGHUVKLIW LQ WKHLGHRORJ\RI WKHQHROLEHUDOEORFRUZKHQWKH\FHQWHU
the experiences of queer migrants of color—as in Reddy’s (2011) reading 
of the “gay Pakistani asylum seeker” in the United States, discussed in 
the third chapter—not only as sites of intersection of multiple forms of 
oppression, but as a privileged vantage on the contradictions between state 
and capital in the context of the uneven globalization of neoliberalism. 
I have suggested that, through such readings, queer of color and queer 
diasporic critics are conducting a hegemonic struggle around the color line 
within queer theory, generating internal fronts of antagonism that force 
SURFHVVHVRI UHGH¿QLWLRQDQGUHFRPSRVLWLRQRQWR WKH¿HOG ,Q WKHVHFRQG
chapter, looking at the trajectory of black lesbian feminist critique in the 
Netherlands through the political life narrative of Gloria Wekker, I went 
as far as to suggest that overlapping intersectional struggles taking place 
across different identity formations—the struggle around race within 
feminist and LGBTQ formations as well as struggles around gender and 
sexuality within antiracist formations—may have produced contemporary 
antiracist organizing, rather than LGBTQ organizing, as a privileged site for 
the articulation of queer critique. Through this displacement, recomposition 
reaches its peak. My reading of that displacement is located in the Dutch 
context and need not be generalized too quickly, yet it maintains important 
parallels with transformations taking place elsewhere, such as the formation 
of Black Lives Matter (BLM) in the United States. Looking at these 
SURFHVVHV RI UHFRPSRVLWLRQ DQG GUDZLQJ RQ )HUJXVRQ¶V  VSHFL¿F
proposal of a queer of color theoretical practice, I have argued that queer of 
color critique mediates today both our understanding of homonormativity 
and the “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory. It does so, I have suggested, 
E\ FRQGXFWLQJ D VWUXJJOH WR KHJHPRQL]H WKH FRORU OLQH ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOG
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hence deploying a counter-hegemonic form of identity politics.
To be sure, many of the critics discussed in this dissertation, on whose 
analyses I have relied in order to offer my own, participate in a general 
call to move away or “beyond” identity politics. I have suggested that this 
is often due to a misreading of identity politics as the single-issue politics 
put forward by large lobbying organizations. In line with this misreading, 
many embrace intersectionality as a critique of identity politics, even as 
RQHRIWKH¿UVWH[SOLFLWIRUPXODWLRQVRILGHQWLW\SROLWLFVLVWREHIRXQGLQWKH
³&RPEDKHH5LYHU&ROOHFWLYH6WDWHPHQW´ >@ ²D IRXQGDWLRQDO
text for black lesbian feminism and intersectional critique. In light of its 
genealogy and because of its activation of key processes of recomposition 
LQ WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ WKHRUHWLFDO DQG SROLWLFDO ¿HOGV , KDYH SURSRVHG WR
FRQFHSWXDOL]HLGHQWLW\SROLWLFVDVDQH[SDQVLYHDQGLQWHUVHFWLRQDO¿HOGRI
DQWDJRQLVPVSXQFWXDWHGE\IRUPVRILGHQWL¿FDWLRQDQGGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQD
politics that acknowledges the salience of gendered, racialized, and sexual 
formations (among others), mobilizes social forces emerging from such 
formations and at their intersections, hence interrupts the exclusionary 
XQLYHUVDOLVPVWKDWKDYHKLVWRULFDOO\RUJDQL]HGWKHSROLWLFDO¿HOG
Even as I maintain that a reconceptualization of identity politics may 
SUHYHQWLWVGLVPLVVDOERWKE\TXHHUFULWLFVDQGRQWKH/HIWDWODUJHDVSHFL¿F
critique has been taking root in times of homonormativity, homonationalism, 
and sexual imperialism that cannot be reduced to a simple misreading of the 
problem. As I have pointed out in the second chapter, some Marxist critics 
warn about the UHL¿FDWLRQ of identity under capitalism, particularly in its 
current neoliberal phase. According to this view, what we perceive as “our” 
identity is actually a product and a function of a process of increasing social 
fragmentation that is meant to detach us, ideologically, from a totality of 
social relations. Identities are “extracted” from the social totality through 
mechanisms of isolation and particularization of certain aspects of social 
life (such as sexual desire), and quite literally sold back to us as the “truth” 
of ourselves and a source of value, most clearly through practices of market 
segmentation as well as through a segmentation of the labor force itself at 
the level of production. Puar (2012) similarly argues, from a non-Marxist 
perspective, that identity and interpellation are central technologies of power 
in disciplinary societies, but she makes this argument only to suggest that in 
contemporary societies of control the interpellation of identity has lost any 
VXFKFHQWUDOLW\+HQFHXQOLNHPRVWFULWLFVRIWKHUHL¿FDWLRQRILGHQWLW\3XDU¶V
critique of identity politics is primarily grounded not on the assumption 
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that the latter are integral to the current organization of exploitative social 
relations, but on the idea, drawn from Deleuze, that power today is by and 
large indifferent to the problem of identity. In other words, Puar insists—as 
I do, following Hall—that any given formation of power must be challenged 
on its own terrain. The disagreement is about how to conceptualize power 
DQGFRQVHTXHQWO\KRZWRGH¿QHWKHWHUUDLQRIVWUXJJOH
From a Marxist perspective, instead, Floyd (2009) develops perhaps 
WKH PRVW VRSKLVWLFDWHG FULWLTXH RI WKH UHL¿FDWLRQ RI LGHQWLW\ (QJDJLQJ
FORVHO\ZLWK/XNiFV¶WKHRUL]DWLRQRIWKHGLDOHFWLFEHWZHHQUHL¿FDWLRQDQG
totality, Floyd struggles to identify a space for queer theory and politics—
HYHQ LQ WKHLU PRVW ³UHL¿HG´ IRUPV VXFK DV %XWOHU¶V  WKHRU\ RI
gender performativity or the queer insistence on the use of the body as an 
LQVWUXPHQWRISOHDVXUH²ZLWKLQD0DU[LVWFULWLTXHRIUHL¿FDWLRQ+HGRHV
VRWKURXJKWZRVLJQL¿FDQWPRYHVRQWKHRQHKDQGKHUHUHDGV/XNiFVWR
VKLIW WKH IRFXV IURP WKH VXEMHFWLYH WR WKHREMHFWLYHHIIHFWVRI UHL¿FDWLRQ
WKDW LV IURPFRQVFLRXVQHVV WR WKHERG\RQ WKHRWKHUKDQGKH UHUHDGV
UHL¿FDWLRQLWVHOIDVDSURFHVVWKDWLVQRWRQO\QHJDWLYHDQGDOLHQDWLQJEXW
also productive of critical vantages on the social totality. The combination 
RI WKH WZRPRYHV DOORZV )OR\G WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH UDGLFDO UHL¿FDWLRQ RI
the body in queer theory and politics—the body taken as an instrument 
of pleasure and as an object of analysis in itself—not as a moment to be 
negated, but rather as a point of support for a critical aspiration to totality. 
:KLOH)OR\GUHFRYHUVWKHFRQFHSWXDODSSDUDWXV¿UVWGHYHORSHGE\/XNiFV,
have approached his analysis through the lens of Hall’s reading of Gramsci. 
$V,KDYHREVHUYHG)OR\G¶VUHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIUHL¿FDWLRQEH\RQGLWV
purely negative connotations comes very close to Hall’s reconceptualization 
RILGHRORJ\+RZHYHUKLVVKLIWDZD\IURPWKHUHL¿FDWLRQRIFRQVFLRXVQHVVLQ
fact allows him to by-pass the problem of counter-ideology altogether and to 
pose too immediate a relation between the laws of capitalist development—
WKH GLDOHFWLF EHWZHHQ UHL¿FDWLRQ DQG WRWDOLW\²DQG WKHPDWHULDOL]DWLRQ RI
the queer body as a site resistance. Hence his conclusion that, in times of 
KRPRQRUPDWLYLW\ DTXHHUSROLWLFL]DWLRQRI WKH UHL¿HG VH[XDOERG\ LQ WKH
SXEOLFVSDFHGLUHFWO\PLOLWDWHVDJDLQVWWKHSULYDWL]LQJUHL¿FDWLRQRILGHQWLW\
put forward by identity politics in their current neoliberal articulations. 
In this analysis, the political and ideological practices activated within 
LGBTQ formations in order to understand and contest the sexual politics of 
neoliberalism disappear from view. Most importantly, it is the antagonism 
around the color line activated by queer of color and queer diasporic 
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formations that cannot fully appear, if we read it—as I do—as a form of 
counter-hegemonic identity politics. I have insisted on this point not to 
disqualify Floyd’s analysis, but on the contrary, because the critique of 
UHL¿FDWLRQDQGWKHUHFRYHU\RIWKHGLDOHFWLFEHWZHHQUHL¿FDWLRQDQGWRWDOLW\
form one of the most promising terrains for a contemporary reencounter 
between queer theory and Marxism. Hence, I suggest that this body of 
WKRXJKW PXVW ¿QG ZD\V WR LQWHJUDWH LQWR LWV DQDO\VLV DQ DFFRXQW RI WKH
more conjunctural wars of position taking place within the theoretical and 
SROLWLFDO¿HOGV7KLVLVWKHPDLQFRQWULEXWLRQWKDW+DOO¶VUHDGLQJRI*UDPVFL
in the 1980s can offer to the current “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory. 
My reading of queer of color and queer diasporic formations as 
HQJDJHGLQRQHVXFKKHJHPRQLFVWUXJJOHZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\
need not imply that most authors appearing throughout my analysis frame 
or perceive their interventions as part of that struggle. In the context of my 
GLVFXVVLRQRI LGHQWLW\SROLWLFV WKLVSRLQWKDVVRPHVSHFL¿F LPSOLFDWLRQV
That is, to posit that queer of color and queer diasporic critique activate 
VSHFL¿FSURFHVVHVRIUHFRPSRVLWLRQZLWKLQWKH¿HOGGRHVQRWUHTXLUHDQG
should not prescribe that they articulate their interventions in such terms. 
And, shifting from the terrain of theory to the relation between theory and 
SUDFWLFHRIIHULQJD0DU[LVWUHDGLQJRID¿HOGRILQWHUVHFWLQJLGHQWLW\SROLWLFV
does not require and should not prescribe that the latter speak the language 
of Marxism (even if some of them do). In other words, a tension must 
be kept—in theory—between the autonomy of identity politics and their 
insertion into Marxist analysis. A queer Marxism without guarantees does 
not just resist a dismissal of identity politics, and it does not just resist a 
subsumption of identity under resurrected forms of economic reductionism 
or too abstract understandings of the laws of capitalist development, but 
¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW²LQ RUGHU WR DYRLG DOO RI WKH DERYH²LW UHJLVWHUV WKH
relative autonomy of identity politics.
$V,KDYHDUJXHGLQWKH¿UVWFKDSWHUWKHSULQFLSOHRIUHODWLYHDXWRQRP\
is key to Hall’s reading of Gramsci in the 1980s. In the last chapter of 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy >@  /DFODX DQG 0RXIIH
address a similar problem. Here they ask: “is there not an incompatibility 
between the proliferation of political spaces proper to a radical democracy 
and the construction of collective identities on the basis of the logic of 
HTXLYDOHQFH"´7KHORJLFRIHTXLYDOHQFHLVWKHQDPHWKDW/DFODXDQG
Mouffe give to the alliances to be forged among different political forces 
in order to build a counter-hegemonic historical bloc. However, the way 
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they solve the tension between equivalence and autonomy, at a theoretical 
level, is precisely by reducing them to internal logics of hegemony itself. 
According to them, while equivalence and autonomy appear to simply 
oppose each other, we should rather regard them as complementing and 
limiting each other: they are two “social logics, which intervene to different 
degrees in the constitution of every social identity, and which partially 
limit their mutual effects” (183). On the one hand, equivalence impedes 
D ¿QDO FORVXUH RI WKH VRFLDO IRU LW FRQVWDQWO\ SURGXFHV DQ DQWDJRQLVWLF
polarization of the social into two camps. On the other hand, since every 
element of a chain of equivalence is split and maintains a certain degree 
of particularity, autonomy limits the logic of equivalence and impedes that 
such a polarization is ever fully stabilized into a new closure. 
By reducing equivalence and autonomy to two logics internal to 
hegemony and limiting each other, Laclau and Mouffe aim to account 
in theory for the radical contingency that, in their view, keeps the social 
formation endlessly open to new articulations. However, in so doing, they 
neutralize the concrete political tensions existing between a politics of 
hegemony and the autonomy of each social and political force participating 
LQ LW$W WKH HQG RI WKH ¿UVW FKDSWHU , KDYH KLJKOLJKWHG VRPH RI WKHVH
tensions while recovering the experience of Lesbians and Gays Support the 
Miners (LGSM). Focusing on the different politico-ideological practices 
they deployed in order to articulate an alliance with the miners on strike 
against the second Thatcher government, I have argued that the practice of 
hegemony often involves a suspension of autonomy. Thus, it is not surprising 
that Laclau and Mouffe’s attempt to reconcile equivalence and autonomy in 
theory ends up subsuming autonomy under hegemony altogether. Consider 
the following political remark: “If the demands of a subordinated group 
are presented purely as negative demands subversive of a certain order, 
ZLWKRXWEHLQJOLQNHGWRDQ\YLDEOHSURMHFWIRUWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVSHFL¿F
areas of society, their capacity to act hegemonically will be excluded from 
the outset . . . and as a result the strategy is condemned to marginality” 
/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@,QVWHDG,VXJJHVWWKDWWKHSULQFLSOH
of relative autonomy developed by Hall is better equipped to appropriate 
heterogeneous political struggles theoretically without subsuming their 
concrete terrains of intervention.  
In this respect, it is useful to contrast the tone of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
indictment with Hall’s analysis of the gay and feminist critiques emerged 
ZLWKLQEODFNDQWLUDFLVWIRUPDWLRQVLQWKHVZKLFK,KDYHEULHÀ\UHFDOOHG
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in the second chapter. Hall does offer a Gramscian reading of this political 
moment, and his reading informs my own analysis of the contemporary 
struggle conducted by queer of color and queer diasporic critique within 
WKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\,Q³1HZ(WKQLFLWLHV´>@IRULQVWDQFH
he argues that the end of a monolithic black subject under the pressure of 
black feminist and gay critiques exposes the ways in which race always 
manifests itself, concretely, in articulation with other axes of identity and 
RSSUHVVLRQ $QG LQ ³:KDW LV WKLV µ%ODFN¶ LQ %ODFN 3RSXODU &XOWXUH"´
(1992b), he posits that these articulations explain the very convergence of 
certain politics of liberation with forms of oppression exercised in other 
domains. However, this attempt of theoretical recomposition does not 
abstract from the negation of a black political subject put forward by black 
feminist and gay critiques. Most importantly, such critiques are not made a 
target of contempt: “the plurality of antagonisms and differences that now 
seek to destroy the unity of black politics, given the complexities of the 
structures of subordination that have been formed by the way in which we 
were inserted into the black diaspora, is not at all surprising” (32). Thus, it 
is not surprising either that when Laclau suggested, during a late encounter 
with Hall on Argentinian television and while discussing diasporic politics, 
that all politics is hegemonic, Hall replied rather skeptically: “I suppose 
WKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWUHVHUYDWLRQ,KDYH>DERXWZKDW\RXVDLG@LVZKHWKHUDOO
politics is hegemonic. . . . I suppose my hesitation arises from the example 
you used, because . . . a diasporic politics is . . . not necessarily a hegemonic 
politics. It may seek to become one, but I’m not even sure that it does that. 
So, I think we need to make some distinctions within politics.”2
Especially the difference in tone between Hall and Laclau and Mouffe 
is blatant. I suggest that this difference is symptomatic of two divergent 
theoretical practices. While Laclau and Mouffe try to construct a closed 
DQGVHOIVXI¿FLHQWWKHRUHWLFDOHGL¿FH+DOOWDNHVDORQJGHWRXUWKURXJKWKH
theory of hegemony that however does not prevent him from apprehending 
heterogeneous political interventions while preserving their differences 
and determinations through the very process of theoretical appropriation. 
In “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies” (1992a), for instance, he 
recalls the unsettling encounters of cultural studies with feminism and race 
and presents both encounters as crucial moments of “interruption.” His 
account of the appearance of feminism in cultural studies in the 1970s is 
not dissimilar, in tone, from his analysis of the feminist and gay critiques 
articulated within black political formations in the 1980s. He describes 
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feminism as “the thief in the night” breaking in at the Birmingham CCCS: 
³, XVH WKHPHWDSKRU GHOLEHUDWHO\$V WKH WKLHI LQ WKH QLJKW LW EURNH LQ
interrupted, made an unseemly noise, seized the time, crapped on the table 
RIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHV´2QHRIWKH¿UVWRXWFRPHVRIWKLVDSSHDUDQFHZDV
the collective volume Women Take Issue (Women’s Studies Group, CCCS 
 +DOO REVHUYHV ³7KH WLWOH RI WKH YROXPH LQ ZKLFK >IHPLQLVP¶V@
GDZQUDLGZDV¿UVWDFFRPSOLVKHG²Women Take Issue—is instructive: for 
they ‘took issue’ in both senses—took over that year’s book and initiated 
a quarrel” (Hall 1992a, 282). This feminist intervention is not portrayed 
as an attempt of hegemonization. Indeed, as Charlotte Brunsdon recalls, 
from the Women’s Studies Group that came to be established at the CCCS 
a proposal emerged, in 1976, to set up a separatist group. The proposal, 
which encountered strong resistances, was informed by the practice of the 
women’s liberation movement (Brunsdon 1996, 281-282). 
But there is more in Hall’s account:
Because of the growing importance of feminist work and the early 
beginnings of the feminist movement outside in the very early 1970s, 
many of us in the Centre—mainly, of course, men—thought it was time 
there was good feminist work in cultural studies. . . . And yet, when it 
broke in through the window, every single unsuspected resistance rose 
to the surface—fully installed patriarchal power, which believed it had 
disavowed itself. (Hall 1992a, 282) 
,WLVQRWGLI¿FXOWWRUHDGEHWZHHQWKHOLQHVRIWKLVSDVVDJHKRZSUHFLVHO\WKH
radically anti-hegemonic nature of this feminist intervention is what Hall 
values the most. This does not prevent him from registering its hegemonizing 
effects. Elsewhere, he writes: “Feminism and the social movements around 
sexual politics have . . . had an unsettling effect on everything once thought 
of as ‘settled’ in the theoretical universe of the Left. . . . This is more than 
simply the question of the Left being ‘nice’ to women or lesbians or gay 
men or beginning to address their forms of oppression and exclusion. It 
has to do with . . . the recognition that all social practices and forms of 
domination—including the politics of the Left—are always inscribed in and 
to some extent secured by sexual identity and positioning” (Hall 1989, 132). 
However, it remains essential, for Hall, to recognize that certain politics, at 
certain moments, are not for all, and that they may derive their political force 
precisely from an active refusal to enter any hegemonic chain of equivalence. 
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It is also in this sense that I suggest we understand the relative autonomy 
of the political in general, and of identity politics in particular. The point 
is not just that sexual identities and practices should not be reduced to 
an unmediated effect of economic structures, as their articulations depend 
on ideological and political practices that are relatively autonomous from 
the economic level. This is a key theoretical point that must certainly be 
located at the core of the contemporary “Marxist renaissance” in queer 
theory. But the relative autonomy of politico-ideological struggle also has 
crucial implications at the level of theoretical practice. That is, the political 
maintains a relative autonomy not only from the economic, but also from 
theory itself. 
$UHÀHFWLRQRQ WKHRUHWLFDO SUDFWLFH UXQV WKURXJKRXW WKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQ
as a whole, but it is particularly central to the third chapter. Looking at 
the polemics initiated by Massad and Puar with Helem and AlQaws 
respectively, I have argued that both of them tend to impose theoretical 
DEVWUDFWLRQVRQWRD¿HOGRIFRQFUHWHSROLWLFDOVWUXJJOHV)ROORZLQJVRPHRI
the critics of Massad and Puar, who point at their diasporic location in the 
United States as the source of some of the limitations to be found in their 
respective analyses, I have suggested that the question of diaspora further 
emphasizes the already complex relation between theory and practice. Yet, 
rather than suggesting that the diasporic standpoint impedes an appropriation 
of Southern political struggles that preserves their concrete determinations, 
,KDYHUHFDOOHG5DR¶VPDWHULDOLVWDQDO\VHVRIWKHIRUPDWLRQRI
homophobia in contemporary Uganda, in order to illustrate an alternative 
approach to the problems of homonationalism and sexual imperialism. 
In fact, I have pointed out that the limitations to be found in Puar’s and 
0DVVDG¶VUHVSHFWLYHDQDO\VHVDUHGXH WRDVLJQL¿FDQWH[WHQWQRWWRWKHLU
diasporic standpoint as much as to their disconnection from the theories and 
WKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFHVWKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HWKHEURDGHU¿HOGRITXHHUGLDVSRULF
critique. Thus, this chapter ends on the question of theoretical practice. 
Looking at the contemporary war on “gender ideology” in Italy, and paying 
particular attention to the antagonisms activated among queer critics 
themselves about how to read the conservative attack, I have proposed that 
critical theory be understood as a form of counter-ideological practice only 
to the extent that one acknowledges the relative autonomy of politics and 
ideology. This means, on the one hand, that theory contributes to political 
struggle in its own way, without retreating from its intellectual protocols. 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLWPHDQVWKDWWKHRU\GRHVQRWUHGXFHWKHSROLWLFDO¿HOGWR
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the abstractions produced according to such intellectual protocols.             
In “The Problem of Ideology,” Hall insists that since history is open to 
practice and struggle, Marxist theory itself must be kept open to practice 
and struggle. This is what he terms Marxism without guarantees. In his 
view, the positing of the economic as a guaranteed determination of 
historical processes (whether in general or “in the last instance”) has helped 
cultivating the illusion of the capacity of prediction, of theoretical certainty. 
But such an illusion “represents the end of the process of theorizing, of 
WKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGUH¿QHPHQWRIQHZFRQFHSWVDQGH[SODQDWLRQVZKLFK
alone, is the sign of a living body of thought, capable still of engaging 
and grasping something of the truth about new historical realities” (Hall 
1986b, 43). In this sense, despite Foucault’s reluctance to understand 
his own theorizing as a form of counter-ideological practice, and despite 
the critiques that Hall formulated against Foucault’s theoretical practice, 
a contemporary queer Marxism has something to learn from Foucault’s 
stubborn refusal to tell others what to do. In fact, I suggest that Hall and 
Foucault to a certain extent converge in this respect. As I have recalled 
in the second chapter, Ferguson (2010) registers that, in the context of 
7KDWFKHULVP+DOODQGRWKHUVZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVVWUXJJOHG
to facilitate the emergence of organic intellectuals even as they questioned 
any assumption of transparency and correspondence between the theoretical 
¿HOG DQG WKH¿HOGRI VRFLDO DQGSROLWLFDO SUDFWLFHV7KXV WKHQRWLRQVRI




attempts to appropriate such practices in theory while acknowledging the 
VSHFL¿FVRFLDOORFDWLRQRIKHURUKLVRZQLQWHOOHFWXDOODERU
According to this view, and in light of my analyses throughout this 
dissertation, I suggest that a queer Marxist politics struggles to forge broad 
systems of alliances in order to sustain the emergence of a counter-hegemonic 
bloc in times of neoliberalism, homonormativity, homonationalism, and 
sexual imperialism. A queer Marxist theory, instead, participates in that 
struggle by acknowledging the relative autonomy of the political—and, 
PRUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ RI LGHQWLW\SROLWLFV7KDW LV DTXHHU0DU[LVPZLWKRXW
JXDUDQWHHV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWOHWVJRRIWKHSUHWHQVLRQWRIXOO\UHFRPSRVH






1. Throughout the dissertation, I employ the acronyms LGBTQ or 
/*%7GHSHQGLQJRQZKHWKHUWKHLQFOXVLRQRI³TXHHU´¿WVRUQRWWKH
KHWHURJHQHRXVSROLWLFDOVXEMHFWUHIHUHQFHGLQHDFKVSHFL¿FGLVFXVVLRQ
2. The video of the protest is available on the website of BLM Toronto: 
https://blacklivesmatter.ca/proud/ (accessed January 15, 2017).
3. The announcement of the invitation of BLM by the organization of 
the Toronto Pride is available at: http://www.pridetoronto.com/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2016-02-10_2016-Pride-Toronto-Honoured-
Group-Black-Lives-Matter-Toronto-Media-Release.pdf (accessed 
January 15, 2017). 
4. In the wake of the mass shooting at the LGBTQ nightclub Pulse, in 
Orlando, on June 12, 2016, the organization of the San Francisco 
Pride announced an increase in police presence and the introduction 
of security screening for the participants. The local chapter of 
BLM was among the groups that responded to the announcement 
by withdrawing from the Pride, which that year had been organized 
around the theme of “social and economic justice.” BLM’s statement 
is available at: http://blacklivesmatter.com/in-response-to-increased-
policing-of-civic-center-grand-marshals-awardees-withdraw-from-
participation-in-pride-parade/ (accessed January 15, 2017).   
5. See the section “About Us” of BLM’s website: http://blacklivesmatter.
com/about/ (accessed January 15, 2017). 
6. For an analysis of the increasing engagement of the LGBT movement 
with the market in the United States throughout the 1990s, see 
Alexandra Chasin, Selling Out: The Gay and Lesbian Movement 
Goes to Market7KHERRNLQFOXGHVDVSHFL¿FGLVFXVVLRQRI
the marketization of Pride marches. 
7. The notion of the “color line” originally refers to the racial segregation 
that persisted in the United States after the abolition of slavery in 
7KHQRWLRQZDV¿UVWIRUPXODWHGE\)UHGHULFN'RXJODVVLQKLV
250 Notes to Chapter One
essay “The Color Line” (1881). It was later picked up by W. E. B. Du 
Bois, who famously argued, in The Souls of Black Folk (1903), that 
the problem of the color line is the problem of the twentieth century.
8. For instance, BLM’s protest at the Toronto Pride is mentioned in the 
opening of the call for a panel on ‘Queer Pedagogies on Dissent in 
the Age of Empire, Homonationalism, and Social Protest,’ organized 
for the 2017 Annual Meeting of the American Studies Association 
(ASA). The call is available at: https://www.theasa.net/collaborate/
queer-pedagogies-dissent-age-empire-homonationalism-social-
protest (accessed January 15, 2017).  
Chapter One
1. Hall on different occasions took distance from the status of a “founding 
¿JXUH´LQWKH¿HOGRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHV,QRQHVXFKRFFDVLRQKHZURWH
³,KDYHDOZD\VEHHQVOLJKWO\ZDU\RIGH¿QLQJWRRSUHFLVHO\ZKDWLV
and what isn’t cultural studies, because of the danger of ‘policing’ its 
boundaries. I suppose that reluctance is particularly appropriate for 
me, in relation to early British cultural studies, because if anybody 
LVJRLQJWR¿QGWKHPVHOYHVLQDQµRULJLQDU\¶SRVLWLRQDVLWZHUHWR
pronounce what British cultural studies was and was not, I’m the 
person in that position. And the temptation is always to police it 
in the name of some ‘essence,’ which was always there. I am in a 
SDUWLFXODUO\ GLI¿FXOW SRVLWLRQ EHFDXVH LI WKHUHZDV D EHJLQQLQJ ,
was there” (Hall 1996, 396).
2. See David Forgacs’ essay “Gramsci and Marxism in Britain” (1989), 
which provides an excellent reconstruction of the reception and 
circulation of Gramsci in British Marxism from the 1960s to the 1980s.
3. It is important to remark that this chapter is neither about Gramsci 
nor, strictly speaking, about Hall’s work as a whole. My account 
of Hall’s thought is circumscribed to his reading of Gramsci in the 
1970s and 1980s, rooted in that conjunctural triangulation between 
the rise of Thatcherism, a crisis of the Left, and the emergence of 
new identity politics. 
4. Martin Jacques, who edited with Hall the volumes The Politics of 
Thatcherism (1983) and New Times: The Changing Face of Politics 
in the 1990s (1989), was the editor of Marxism Today from 1977 
until its closure in 1991.  
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 7KH¿HOGRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVLQLWVFRQWHPSRUDU\VKDSHKDVVLJQL¿FDQWO\
expanded and internally differentiated itself, contributing to a 
SUROLIHUDWLRQ RI DXWRQRPRXV ¿HOGV VXFK DV ZRPHQ¶V DQG JHQGHU
studies, sexuality and queer studies, ethnic studies, and so forth. 
,W LV ZLWKLQ WKHVH ¿HOGV DQG HVSHFLDOO\ DW WKHLU LQWHUVHFWLRQV WKDW
contemporary queer debates on the rearticulations rightward of 
sexual politics are taking place.
6. I discuss what I term the “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory in chapter 2.
7. Through the next two chapters, I question the dismissal of identity 
politics by contemporary queer critics. In chapter 2, I argue that 
recent critiques of the theoretical and political pitfalls of identity 
tend to reduce the broader terrain of identity politics to contemporary 
forms of single-issue political lobbying. By recovering the tradition 
of intersectional critique in feminist theory (see Combahee River 
&ROOHFWLYH >@  &UHQVKDZ   , VXJJHVW LQVWHDG
WKDW LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV LV EHWWHU XQGHUVWRRG DV DQ H[SDQVLYH ¿HOG RI
DQWDJRQLVWLFLGHQWL¿FDWLRQVDQGGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV,QWKLV¿UVWFKDSWHU
I prepare the terrain by focusing on Hall’s efforts to think through 
the tensions between identity politics and Marxism, activated by 
the appearance of new social movements such as feminism, gay 
liberation, and Black Power on the horizon of the Left. 
8. It is equally renown that, even as this moment of institutionalization 
LQPDUNHGWKHRI¿FLDOEHJLQQLQJRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVDVD¿HOG
it was also the result of a longer trajectory of cultural criticism that 
PDGH WKLV EHJLQQLQJ SRVVLEOH LQ WKH ¿UVW SODFH 'UDZLQJ DWWHQWLRQ
to the earlier work by Richard Hoggart in The Uses of Literacy 
(1957), Raymond Williams in Cultural and Society (1958), and E. P. 
Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class (1963), Hall 
observes: “The search for origins is tempting but illusory. . . . Cultural 
Studies, in its institutional manifestation, was the result of . . . a break 
LQWKHV%XWWKH¿HOGLQZKLFKWKLVLQWHUYHQWLRQZDVPDGHKDG
EHHQLQLWLDOO\FKDUWHGLQWKHV´+DOO>@D
9. For an account of the origins of cultural studies that takes into consideration 
its positioning vis-à-vis the established disciplines, its political context 
and ambitions, as well as the role played by key individuals such as 
Hoggart and Hall, see Norma Schulman, “Conditions of their Own 
Making: An Intellectual History of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies at the University of Birmingham” (1993). 
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10. This is by no means a way to respond once and for all to Nelson, 
7UHLFKOHUDQG*URVVEHUJ¶VFRQFHUQVDERXW%HQQHWW¶VEURDGGH¿QLWLRQ
RI WKH ¿HOG LI DQ\WKLQJ EHFDXVH%HQQHWW¶V RZQ HVVD\ZDVPHDQW
SUHFLVHO\ WRDI¿UP WKHQHFHVVLW\RIPRYLQJbeyond the Gramscian 
moment in cultural studies. This chapter, on the contrary, sets out to 
recover that moment. 
11. Hall himself always resisted the temptation of policing the boundaries 
of cultural studies. In the same essay in which he voices his concerns 
about the dynamics of institutionalization of cultural studies in the 
United States, he also states: “I don’t want to talk about British 
FXOWXUDOVWXGLHVZKLFKLVLQDQ\FDVHDSUHWW\DZNZDUGVLJQL¿HUIRU
me) in a patriarchal way, as the keeper of the conscience of cultural 
studies, hoping to police you back into line with what it really was if 
only you knew” (Hall 1992a, 277).  
 7KLVGLVVHUWDWLRQ LV ORFDWHGDW WKHFURVVURDGVRI WZRGLIIHUHQW¿HOGV
cultural studies and political philosophy. One of the consequences of 
ZULWLQJLQEHWZHHQWKHWZR¿HOGVKDVEHHQWKHFKRLFHWRHQJDJHFORVHO\
ZLWKVXFKDFHQWUDO¿JXUHLQFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVDV+DOO\HWSULYLOHJLQJ
his more politico-philosophical interventions and isolating them, to 
DFHUWDLQH[WHQWIURPKLVUHÀHFWLRQVRQPHGLDDQGFXOWXUDOSUDFWLFHV
The latter have been equally central to Hall’s work. For instance, key 
to his understanding of the relations between culture and power has 
been the conceptualization of media production and consumption that 
KH GHYHORSHG LQ ³(QFRGLQJ'HFRGLQJ´ +DOO >@ E ,Q WKLV
famous essay, Hall distinguishes between the four different “moments” 
of media production, circulation, consumption, and reproduction, 
arguing that each moment maintains a degree of “relative autonomy” 
from the others. This means that every moment entails different 
possibilities (for instance, the audience of a media product are not 
just passive receivers of its ideological message). Yet this autonomy 
is relative because the articulation of every moment to the others 
GHOLPLWV WKHYHU\¿HOGRISRVVLELOLWLHV WKDWHDFKPRPHQWHQWDLOV2Q
the one hand, by privileging Hall’s philosophical interventions over 
his analyses of cultural practices, I partly betray the very nature of his 
work. On the other hand, I do emphasize the capacity of his theoretical 
SUDFWLFH WR HQJDJH ZLWK WKH FRQFUHWH²PRUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ ZLWK WKH
concrete conjuncture of Thatcherism—and I insist on Hall’s stubborn 
UHIXVDOWRWUDGHDQHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHFRQFUHWHIRUWKHRUHWLFDOÀXHQF\
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13. It is interesting to note that, besides Hall’s own reception of Gramsci, 
the very appearance of Gramsci’s writings in Britain was strictly 
related to the events of 1956. As David Forgacs highlights, the 
¿UVW UHPDUNDEOH (QJOLVK WUDQVODWLRQ RI *UDPVFL E\ /RXLV 0DUNV
The Modern Prince and Other Writings *UDPVFL >@
1957), was initially rejected by its publisher on the grounds of its 
heterodoxy and published only after the political turmoil which 
led to the emergence of the New Left: “Marks had submitted the 
typescript in early 1956 to the publishers Lawrence and Wishart, 
whose managerial board was at that time directly accountable to 
the higher committees of the Communist Party of Great Britain. It 
was passed to the Political Committee for vetting but blocked on the 
grounds of its heterodoxy by a number of members, including Emile 
Burns. However, the events of 1956—Khrushchev’s secret speech, 
the Polish and Hungarian crises, the consequent resignations from 
the CPGB—supervened to produce by the end of the year a changed 
political and theoretical climate. Maurice Cornforth, then managing 
editor of Lawrence and Wishart, pressed again for publication and the 
HGLWLRQ¿QDOO\DSSHDUHGLQ*UDPVFLZDVWKXVFRQYH\HGLQWRWKH




the institutions of the union and the party formed part and parcel of 
the picture he had in mind. Today, the shifts rightward of some key 
segments of LGBTQ movements in Europe and the United States go 
hand-in-hand with the more general shift rightward of the traditional 
institutions of the Western Left.
15. By insisting on the relative autonomy of theoretical practice and 
RQ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH FRQFUHWHLQWKRXJKWPXVW SDVV WKH YHUL¿FDWLRQ
of the concrete-real, Hall takes some distance from Althusser’s 
otherwise similar remarks on Marx’s epistemology. He writes: 
“Any theory of ‘theoretical practice,’ such as Althusser’s, which 
seeks to establish an ‘impassable threshold’ between thought and its 
object, has to come to terms with the concrete reference (it is not, 
in our view, an empiricist reduction) embodied in Marx’s clear and 
unambiguous notion . . . that thought proceeds from the ‘working-up 
of observation and conception¶´+DOO>@6HHDOVR
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+DOO ³6LJQL¿FDWLRQ 5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ ,GHRORJ\ $OWKXVVHU DQG WKH
Post-Structuralist Debates” (1985a). For Althusser’s own account 
of theoretical practice, see For Marx $OWKXVVHU >@DQG
Reading Capital$OWKXVVHUDQG%DOLEDU>@
16. Since the primary goal of this chapter is not to verify Hall’s reading 
of Gramsci, but rather to explore how that reading informed Hall’s 
understating of his “New Times,” I make use of the 1971 selected 
edition of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks by Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith, to which Hall himself had access at his time.
17. The “economism” that came to prevail within the Second International 
derived from a reading of Marx that transformed the latter’s analysis 
of the historical tendency toward a crisis of capital, as well as his 
SUH¿JXUDWLRQ RI FODVV VWUXJJOH DQG LWV SRVVLEOH RXWFRPHV LQWR
necessary laws of historical progress. Such a perspective in fact writes 
off—at least implicitly—the very importance of struggle, for history 
itself becomes the driving force that will bring capitalism to its end.
18. Gramsci’s attack on economism and his focus on “the superstructures 
of civil society” can be understood at least in part contextually, as a 
supplement to Marxism. Hall points out that it was the reluctance of 
large segments of Marxism to explore the levels of the ideological 
DQG WKH SROLWLFDOZKLFK OHG*UDPVFL LQ WKH ¿UVW SODFH WRPDNH D
particular effort in that direction: “Not that he ever forgot or neglected 
the critical element of the economic foundations of society and 
its relations. But he contributed relatively little by way of original 
formulations to that level of analysis. However, in the much-neglected 
areas of conjunctural analysis, politics, ideology and the state, the 
character of different types of political regimes, the importance of 
cultural and national-popular questions, and the role of civil society 
in the shifting balance of relations between different social forces—
on these issues, Gramsci has an enormous amount to contribute” 
(Hall 1986a, 8). However, to locate Gramsci as a mere supplement 
ZLWKLQWKHEURDGHU¿HOGRI0DU[LVWWKHRU\ZRXOGEHPLVOHDGLQJDQG
certainly Hall himself does not commit such a mistake. Gramsci’s 
thorough conceptualization of the political and the ideological levels 
was not simply meant to “balance” Marxist economism. It was 
central, instead, to an attempt at better apprehending the economic 
itself in its historical concreteness. We should not just register that 
Gramsci never forgot the structuring force of economic relations in 
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any given society. We should insist, rather, that it was precisely his 
commitment to a fuller understanding of such relations, and of the 
mechanisms of their possible transformation, which led him to place 
particular emphasis on the political and the ideological levels of the 
social formation. 
19. Recently, Peter D. Thomas has subjected Anderson’s essay to 
a meticulous critique in The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, 
Hegemony and Marxism (2009).
20. In an earlier essay, Chantal Mouffe recognizes that already in “Some 
Aspects of the Southern Question” Gramsci had posed the question 
of an alliance between the Northern proletariat and the Southern 
peasantry with a focus on “the political, moral, and intellectual 
conditions which were necessary to bring this about” (Mouffe 1977, 
178). Yet, already then, at least in part contradicting this previous 
observation, she concludes as follows: “However, we are still at the 
stage of the leninist conception of hegemony seen as the leadership 
of the proletariat over the peasantry, that is to say that it was political 
leadership which constituted the essential element of this conception 
in view of the fact that hegemony was thought of in terms of a class 
alliance” (179). She thus moves on to analyze the Prison Notebooks, 
where, in her view, “hegemony in its typically gramscian sense is to 
be found” (179).     
 *UDPVFL¶VSDVVDJHLVTXRWHGLQ/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@
22. Gramsci’s explicit reference, in this analysis, is to Italian intellectual 
Benedetto Croce (1866-1952).
23. Commenting on Gramsci’s use of hegemony in the earlier essay, 
Hall observes: “In fact, this is already a theoretically complex and 
rich formulation. It implies that the actual social or political force 
which becomes decisive in a moment of organic crisis will not be 
composed of a single homogenous class but will have a complex social 
composition. Secondly, it is implicit that its basis of unity will have to 
be, not an automatic one, given its position in the mode of economic 
production, but rather a ‘system of alliances.’ Thirdly, . . . the actual 
forms of the political struggle will have a wider social character—
dividing society not simply along ‘class versus class’ lines, but rather 
polarizing it along the broadest front of antagonism (‘the majority of 
the working population’). . . . In fact, in national and ethnic struggles 
LQ WKH PRGHUQ ZRUOG WKH DFWXDO ¿HOG RI VWUXJJOH LV RIWHQ DFWXDOO\
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polarized precisely in this more complex and differentiated way” (Hall 
1986a, 16). What Hall has in mind at the end of this passage is, clearly, 
forms of struggle that emerge in postcolonial social formations. And 
he is right in highlighting the relevance of “Some Aspects of the 
6RXWKHUQ4XHVWLRQ´WRFULWLFDODQDO\VHVRISRVWFRORQLDOFRQWH[WVQRW
only because it was Gramsci himself, in that essay, who understood the 
relation between the Italian North and the South in colonial terms—
“The Northern bourgeoisie has subjugated the South of Italy and the 
,VODQGVDQGUHGXFHGWKHPWRH[SORLWDEOHFRORQLHV´*UDPVFL>@
1978, 441)—but also because it was primarily this text which effected 
the transmission of Gramscian concepts to analyses of postcolonial 
social formations, most famously to the South Asian Subaltern Studies 
Group. The latter was formed in the early 1980s out of the initiative of 
a group of historians of India and South Asia. Their inaugural goal was 
that of carrying out an analysis of colonial and postcolonial societies 
from the perspective of subaltern classes—a “history from below” in 
contrast with both colonialist and bourgeois-nationalist elitism. This is 
how Ranajit Guha, one of the founders of the group, framed the whole 
project in his manifesto “On Some Aspects of the Historiography 
RI&RORQLDO ,QGLD´ 7KHPDQLIHVWRZDVSXEOLVKHG LQ WKH¿UVW
volume of the group and its very title, needless to say, is meant to 
reference Gramsci’s essay on the Southern question. Edward W. 
Said points out, in Culture and Imperialism (1993), that Gramsci’s 
“spatial consciousness” (51) is what makes his conceptual apparatus 
particularly helpful for an analysis of colonialism. He thus argues that, 
in “Some Aspects of the Southern Question,” “Gramsci’s brilliant 
analysis goes . . . beyond its tactical relevance to Italian politics in 
1926, for it provides . . . a prelude to The Prison Notebooks, in which 
he gave . . . paramount focus to the territorial, spatial, geographical 
foundations of social life” (49). 
24. The term “post-Marxism” has circulated widely and has acquired 
GLIIHUHQW LQÀHFWLRQV GHSOR\HGDW WLPHV DV DQ DFFXVDWLRQ DQGRWKHU
times as a mark of theoretical and political novelty). It was used 
derogatively, with reference to Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, by 
1RUPDQ*HUDV LQ ³3RVW0DU[LVP"´  DQ HVVD\SXEOLVKHGRQ
New Left Review. Laclau and Mouffe responded to Geras’ critique 
on the same journal (Laclau and Mouffe 1987). In the preface to the 
second edition of their work, they address the label more generally 
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and make two key points. First: “we can say that we do not oppose it 
insofar as it is properly understood: as the process of reappropriation 
of an intellectual tradition, as well as the process of going beyond 
LW´ /DFODXDQG0RXIIH >@ L[+DOO VXEVWDQWLDOO\DJUHHV
with them in this respect: “‘post’ means, for me, going on thinking 
on the ground of a set of established problems, a problematic. . . . 
So I am, only in that sense, a post-marxist and a post-structuralist, 
because those are the two discourses I feel most constantly engaged 
with” (Hall 1986c, 58-59). The second point made by Laclau and 
Mouffe in the preface is, instead, more substantial, for it sheds 
light on the precise political conditions for this reappropriation of 
Marxism beyond itself. According to them, the process by which 
such a reappropriation takes place “cannot be conceived just as an 
internalKLVWRU\RI0DU[LVP´/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@L[
As they observe, “many social antagonisms, many issues which are 
crucial to the understanding of contemporary societies, belong to 
¿HOGVRIGLVFXUVLYLW\ZKLFKDUHexternal to Marxism, and cannot be 
reconceptualized in terms of Marxist categories—given, especially, 
that their very presence is what puts Marxism as a closed theoretical 
system into question” (ix-x). Think of queer theory and politics: 
WKLVLVRQHVXFK¿HOGexternal to Marxism, which exercises a certain 
pressure on its theoretical and political categories. For Laclau and 
Mouffe, it is Gramsci’s broadening of Marxist analysis that produced 
an unprecedented permeability of Marxism to political demands and 
modes of struggle that are, in principle, external to it. In this sense, 
ERWK0DU[LVPLQJHQHUDODQG*UDPVFLPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\PXVWEHUHDG
beyond themselves, yet Gramsci is assigned a privileged position in 
the process, for he already laid the ground, within Marxism, for such 
an eccentric reappropriation to take place. 
25. Hall makes this point while discussing the concept of “money”: 
“Take money. It exists before banks, before capital. If we use the 
term, ‘money,’ to refer to this relatively simple relation, we use a 
concept which . . . is still abstract and simple: less concrete than 
the concept of ‘money’ under commodity production. As ‘money’ 
becomes more developed so our concept of it will tend to become 
PRUHµFRQFUHWH¶´+DOO>@
26. This and other passages suggest that Gramsci to some extent 
anticipated Michel Foucault’s conceptualizations of disciplinary 
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power and biopolitics in relation to traditional sovereign power 
)RXFDXOW >@  >@  >@  , UHWXUQ WR
Foucault later in this chapter and more extensively in chapter 3. 
27. Anderson’s primary preoccupation in this passage is to oppose 
reformist readings of Gramsci. He writes: “historically, and this is 
the most essential point of all, the development of any revolutionary 
crisis necessarily displaces the dominance within the bourgeois 
power structure from ideology to violence. Coercion becomes both 
determinant and dominant in the supreme crisis, and the army 
inevitably occupies the front of the stage in any class struggle against 
the prospect of a real inauguration of socialism” (Anderson 1977, 44).
28. In the same essay, Hall also observes that while the concept emerged 
in relation to Poulantzas’ work, the idea of authoritarian populism 
¿UVWVXUIDFHGLQWKHDQDO\VLVFDUULHGRXWE\KLPVHOIDQGKLVFROOHDJXHV
in Policing the Crisis (1978), which I discuss later in this chapter. 
29. See Marx’s use of ideology in The German Ideology (Marx and 
(QJHOV>@
30. Marx’s passage is quoted in Hall (1986b, 35).
31. To be precise, while Larraín states that the same “neutral” understanding 
of ideology is shared by Laclau and Hall, he nonetheless registers that 
the latter, unlike the former, did delve into Marx’s use of the concept. 
Yet Larraín criticizes precisely the fact that this exploration of Marx’s 
use of ideology did not prevent Hall from embracing what he terms a 
“neutral” version of the concept. Importantly, his concern is not only 
theoretical but also political: “it is not enough to be able to account 
for the successful way in which Thatcherite ideology has been able 
to articulate the interests of a wide variety of groups and sections of 
British society, it is necessary to show, critically, its shortcomings 
and inadequacies” (Larraín 1991, 21). That is, a “neutral” version 
of ideology must be at least complemented with the “negative” 
approach. Otherwise, “the analysis could easily become a political 
celebration of the achievements of Thatcherism” (21). On this point, 
Larraín echoes the concerns already articulated by Jessop et al. 
32. What interests me is neither to comment on Laclau’s reading of 
Peronism nor to discuss Laclau’s theory of populism as a whole. 
The key element, here, is his claim that ideological elements do not 
possess a necessary class belonging, for this is what Hall found most 
relevant in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. 
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33. In this chapter, I refer to gay and lesbian politics rather than LGBT 
RU/*%74SROLWLFV WR UHÀHFW WKHFRQFUHWHSROLWLFDOVXEMHFW WKDW WKH
authors discussed had in mind in the 1980s.
34. A satisfactory discussion of Laclau and Mouffe’s embracing of the 
discursive turn, hence of their poststructuralist reading of Gramsci, 
LV EH\RQG WKH VFRSH RI WKLV FKDSWHU +RZHYHU VRPH FODUL¿FDWLRQV
are due. Their notion of “discourse” draws on Michel Foucault’s 
The Archaeology of Knowledge >@  DQG -DFTXHV
Derrida’s Writing and Difference >@ )URP WKH IRUPHU
Laclau and Mouffe borrow the intuition that a discourse acquires 
its consistency not by reference to a principle external to it, but 
through a principle immanent to the discursive formation itself: a 
“regularity in dispersion.” Laclau and Mouffe appropriate this idea 
in order to argue that each element entering a hegemonic relation 
derives its identity not by an external principle, but exclusively by 
its relational position vis-à-vis the other elements to which it gets 
DUWLFXODWHG /DFODX DQG0RXIIH >@   +RZHYHU
they lament that Foucault maintained a distinction, which they deem 
“inconsistent,” between discursive and non-discursive practices 
(107). It is Derrida’s deconstruction of structuralism that allows 
Laclau and Mouffe to leave behind that distinction. According to 
6DXVVXUH¶VVWUXFWXUDOOLQJXLVWLFV WKHVWUXFWXUHRIODQJXDJHLV¿UPO\
organized by the immanent relations among its elements (see 
6DXVVXUH >@ 7KLV DOUHDG\ FRQVWLWXWHV DQ DSSUR[LPDWLRQ
to Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of discourse, for the center of 
the structure (its principle of organization) is located, by Saussure, 
within the structure itself. However, Derrida observes that, while 
“the center of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the 
total form,” it also “closes off the play which it opens up and makes 
possible. As center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, 
HOHPHQWVRUWHUPVLVQRORQJHUSRVVLEOH´'HUULGD>@
Therefore, thinking in terms of a structure provided with its own 
organizing center would lead one to consider discursive formations 
as fully constituted wholes. But, in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, 
for articulatory practices to be continuously operative in a social 
formation (that is, for hegemonic struggle to take place), a discursive 
formation must always necessarily fail to establish itself as a fully 
closed totality. Thus, they follow Derrida both in dispensing with any 
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QRWLRQRIDVWUXFWXULQJFHQWHUDQGLQDI¿UPLQJWKDWeverything becomes 





and Mouffe, the social formation must be understood as a discursive 
totality that always necessarily fails to establish itself as a closed 
whole, because its attempts at fully constituting itself are constantly 
interrupted not by extra-discursive elements, but by other discourses, 
RWKHUDWWHPSWVWR¿[PHDQLQJZKHUHPHDQLQJLVLPSRVVLEOHWR¿[
35. This friction over the status of the discursive and the non-discursive 
can be traced, in fact, to Hall’s broader skepticism toward Laclau 
and Mouffe’s theoretical practice. This is well illustrated by Hall’s 
following comment: “Theoretically, perhaps, they are much more 
consistent than I am. Logically, once you’ve opened the gate, it’s 
reasonable to go through it and see what the world looks like on 
the other side. But I think that that often becomes its own kind of 
reductionism. I would say that the fully discursive position is a 
reductionism upward, rather than a reductionism downward, as 
economism was” (Hall 1986c, 57). 
36. In this passage, Hall quotes from the Prison Notebooks (Gramsci 
>@
37. Hall describes the compromise as follows: “The Right—marginalizing 
their more reactionary and free-market elements—settled for the 
welfare state, comprehensive education, the Keynesian management of 
economic policy, and the commitment to full employment as the terms 
of peaceful compromise between capital and labor. In return, the Left 
DFFHSWHGWRZRUNEURDGO\ZLWKLQWKHWHUPVRIDPRGL¿HGFDSLWDOLVPDQG
ZLWKLQWKH:HVWHUQEORFVSKHUHRIVWUDWHJLFLQÀXHQFH'HVSLWHWKHPDQ\
real differences of emphasis . . . the situation was characterized by a 
profound, underlying consensus or compromise on the fundamental 
VRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFIUDPHZRUNZLWKLQZKLFKFRQÀLFWVZHUHIRUWKH
moment, ‘settled’ or contained” (Hall 1988c, 36).
38. The phrase “authoritarian populism” appears at least once already in 
Policing the Crisis, even if this earlier text does not explicitly theorize 
WKH QHZ FRQMXQFWXUH LQ WKRVH WHUPV ³>$@ SRLQW QRW VXI¿FLHQWO\
acknowledged, is the mobilising power of the recruitment of ‘the 
261Notes to Chapter One
ODZ¶LQZLQQLQJRYHUWKHVLOHQWPDMRULW\WRDGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHFULVLV
which regularly and routinely underpins a more authoritarian form 
of the state. The interposition of the law directly into class relations 
may have destroyed something of its effective neutral ‘cover.’ But it 
also had the opposite effect: of making it more legitimate for ‘public 
opinion’ to be actively recruited in an open and explicit fashion in 
favour of ‘the strong state.’ Anyone who doubts that may tune in to 
any ‘grass-roots’ phone-in radio programme at random, and catch 
WKH HEE DQG ÀRZ RI DXWKRULWDULDQ SRSXOLVP LQ GHIHQFH RI social 
discipline” (Hall et al. 1978, 304-305).  
39. Indeed, Policing the Crisis already makes scattered references to 
Thatcher herself. Commenting on the general rise of authoritarianism 
in the early 1970s from the vantage point of the end of the decade, 
for instance, Hall et al. observe: “What lends this steady drift into 
an active authoritarian ‘social gospel’ its political muscle is the 
HPHUJHQFH IRU WKH ¿UVW WLPH VLQFH WKH ZDU RI DQ RUJDQLVHG DQG
articulate fraction of the radical right within the leadership of the 
Conservative Party itself. With the election of Mrs Thatcher and her 
entourage, this fraction no longer belongs to the Tory fringes and 
back-benches. It has been installed at its intellectual and political 
centre” (Hall et al. 1978, 315). 
40. In fact, according to Hall et al., none of the apparatuses centrally 
involved in the moral panic (the media, the police, and the judiciary) 
simply reacted to mugging. To different degrees and in different ways, 
all of them contributed to amplify and structure the panic, hence to 
produce mugging as a social phenomenon. However, by taking action 
against mugging and producing a discourse about it even before the 
moral panic emerged as such, the police are more clearly implicated 
in the production of mugging than the media or the courts.   
41. As Hall et al. point out, it is precisely the formal independence of the 
media that turns them into a terrain of ideological struggle. Indeed, 
similarly to how the relative autonomy of the state allows the dominant 
class to negotiate different class interests in order to consolidate and 
exercise hegemony, the formal independence of the media makes 
VSDFH IRU WKH DUWLFXODWLRQ RI FRQÀLFWLQJ SRLQWV RI YLHZ GHVSLWH
VLJQL¿FDQWFRQVWUDLQV7KH UHVXOW LV³WRPDNH WKH µUHSURGXFWLRQRI
the dominant ideologies’ a problematic and contradictory process, 
DQGWKXVWRUHFUHDWHWKHDUHQDRIVLJQL¿FDWLRQDVD¿HOGRILGHRORJLFDO
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struggle” (Hall et al. 1978, 220).
 ,W LVZRUWKPHQWLRQLQJ DV D IXUWKHU TXDOL¿FDWLRQ RI WKLV DUJXPHQW
that according to Hall et al. the articulation between mugging and 
race was never made fully explicit during the moral panic of 1972-73. 
According to their analysis, the link fully becomes a matter of popular 
and political common sense only later, when the problem of mugging 
resurfaces in 1974 after a period of silence (Hall et al. 1978, 327-328). 
This does not mean, however, that race does not play a central role in 
the structuring of the mugging phenomenon from the very beginning. 
43. For one of Hall’s most sophisticated analysis of the articulation 
between race and class, which resists both economism and culturalism, 
see “Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance” 
(1980). The concrete reference of this essay is the postcolonial South 
African social formation.
44. In fact, Hall et al. remark, in the same sentence, that “for those 
sectors still at work the tempo of militancy has also considerably 




in some of the major industrial disputes” (342). However, the core of 
their analysis in this last chapter of Policing the Crisis focuses on the 
processes of political and ideological formation taking root among 
the wageless in black communities, in particular unemployed youth.
45. Smith does not discuss the mugging panic. Her analysis of racism 
in New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality primarily focuses 
on the earlier phenomenon of Powellism. Moreover, she makes 
only scattered references to the notion of “panic” itself (A. Smith 
1994, 22, 59, 123, 149-150, 159, 168, 216). However, her analysis 
RI6HFWLRQKHDYLO\LQÀXHQFHGE\+DOO¶VZRUNFDQEHXQGHUVWRRG
in line with the reconceptualization of the concept of “moral panic” 
offered in Policing the Crisis.    
46. That the moral panic about homosexuality in 1987-88 resembles 
panics about black immigration and racialized crime in the 1960s and 
1970s does not mean that racism is a matter of the past, neither at the 
time of Smith’s writing nor today. Smith herself makes the opposite 
point: “British political scientists readily admit that Enoch Powell’s 
racist campaign against black immigration played an important role 
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in British politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But it is generally 
assumed that as the last major crisis around a new ‘wave’ of black 
immigration wound down in 1972—the crisis about the entry of 
8JDQGDQ$VLDQV>ZKLFKIROORZHGWKHHDUOLHUFULVLVLQYROYLQJ.HQ\DQ
$VLDQV@²EODFNLPPLJUDWLRQDQGUDFHPRUHRUOHVVGLVDSSHDUHGIURP
the political agenda. . . . I want to offer a radically different story” 
(A. Smith 1994, 5). Indeed, according to Smith, the fact that race did 
not resurface between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s in the form 
of moral panics does not mean that it did not play a pivotal role in 
the project of Thatcherism: “While it is true that black immigration 
legislation never regained a prominent position on the British political 
agenda after the mid-1970s, and while it is true that Powell himself 
ZDV FRQ¿QHG WR WKH SDUOLDPHQWDU\ EDFN EHQFKHV DIWHU FRPPLWWLQJ
various strategic blunders in 1974, the Powellian legacy of guilt-
free British nationalism—constructed through the exclusion of black 
otherness—became a powerful resource for Thatcherism” (7).  
47. As Smith argues, on the one hand, the movement of the middle class 
to the suburbs in post-war times produced a concentration of Labour 
voters in the urban centers. On the other hand, the expansion of the 
welfare state assigned to local authorities the function of distributing 
the new services available (A. Smith 1994, 15).
48. Smith argues that, in order to manufacture the idea that a campaign 
for the promotion of homosexuality by local governments did exist 
LQWKH¿UVWSODFHWKHVXSSRUWHUVRI6HFWLRQHQJDJHGLQDFDUHIXO
production of “evidence” (A. Smith 1994, 191-194). While they could 
certainly rely on the real backing granted by some local governments, 
such as the GLC, to lesbian and gay political formations, they 
grounded their attack on a mixing of texts and policies that in fact had 
OLWWOHWRGRZLWKRQHDQRWKHU$QLQVWDQFHRIWKLVLVWKHRI¿FLDOUHSRUW
presented at the House of Commons on March 8, 1987 by Jill Knight, 
one of the Conservative Members of Parliament who presided over 
the passing of Section 28: “At one point, Knight quotes a passage 
from a sex-education text which she incorrectly claims to have been 
µSURPXOJDWHGE\DORFDOFRXQFLO¶VKHWKHQGLUHFWO\SURFHHGVWRVLWXDWH
her ‘evidence’ by quoting passages from a radical critique of the 
family by the Gay Liberation Front written in 1971” (192). On the 
one hand, as Smith observes, this construction of a seamless whole 
out of disparate texts and policies focuses on local government “as 
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LI WKHORFDOFRXQFLOV LQYHQWHGWKHVH>OHVELDQDQGJD\@RUJDQL]DWLRQV
to brainwash teenagers, when such organizing actually originated 
in the lesbian and gay community” (193). On the other hand, what 
she terms the “evidence game” came to organize both camps of the 
debate. Indeed, most of those opposing Section 28—particularly 
within Labour—made more efforts to distance the party from its 
associations with an alleged campaign to promote homosexuality 
than defending the progressive politics characterizing local councils 
such as the GLC (194-195). Hall’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s critique 
of the Left in “New Times”—a critique of its reluctance to articulate 
WKH LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV RI WKHQHZ VRFLDOPRYHPHQWV²LVTXDOL¿HGE\
Smith, in the particular context of this moral panic, with reference to 
the way in which Thatcherism was able to structure the very terms of 
the debate: as a struggle over truth and evidence.             
49. Smith draws, instead, on Gilroy’s analysis of the Conservative 
3DUW\¶VPRELOL]DWLRQ RI WKH ¿JXUH RI WKH ³EODFN HQWUHSUHQHXU´ $
6PLWK*LOUR\
50. Foucault makes several incursions throughout this dissertation, 
especially in chapter 3. Indeed, his work constitutes a necessary 
reference point for any attempt to bring a theory of hegemony into 
contemporary queer debates. However, this dissertation does not offer 
a sustained account of the relation between Gramsci and Foucault, 
between the theory of hegemony and the theory of biopolitics. In 
fact, a thorough discussion of this relation has yet to fully take place 
DOVRRXWVLGHWKH¿HOGRITXHHUWKHRU\HYHQDVPDQ\FULWLFVGUDZRQ
both Gramsci and Foucault without thematizing the possible frictions 
between them. For a good critical overview of some explicit efforts 
to identify convergences between the two authors, see Mark Olssen, 
³)RXFDXOWDQG*UDPVFL,V7KHUHD%DVLVIRU&RQYHUJHQFH"´
A recent collective attempt to bring Gramsci and Foucault into closer 
dialogue with each other is the volume edited by David Kreps, titled 
Gramsci and Foucault: A Reassessment (2016).
51. Bertsch correctly remarks: “Foucault shouldn’t take all the blame for 
the way his work was received. But it should make us more dubious 
RIKLVWKHVLV(YHQLIWKHLGHDRIWKHVSHFL¿FLQWHOOHFWXDOKDVSURYHQ
XVHIXOLQORFDOVWUXJJOHVZHVWLOOPXVWFRQIURQWWKHIDFWWKDWVSHFL¿F
intellectuals who meet with success in their work have a way of 
metamorphosing into universal intellectuals” (Bertsch 2000).
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52. In chapter 3, I make this argument about Jasbir K. Puar’s (2007) 
work on homonationalism and Joseph A. Massad’s (2007) critique of 
sexual imperialism.
53. I got to know myself the story of LGSM through the recent movie. 
To be more precise, after its release a discussion on the experience 
of the group was organized in Bologna, Italy, by the queer collective 
Laboratorio Smaschieramenti. I wish to thank Serena Bassi, who was 
invited that night to organize a discussion and who pointed me at 
some of the relevant literature to understand the story of LGSM.       
54. Bill Schwarz and Alan Fountain (1985) highlight an interesting 
ambiguity in the NUM’s own relation to the problem of media 
reporting. Indeed, they observe that Scargill both attacked the media 
and, at the same time, tried to occupy the media space whenever 
possible to the advantage of the union and the strike. In their view, this 
ambiguity, that his detractors never missed, signals a real question: 
“Without doubt the NUM has been absolutely correct in seeing the 
media as central, on occasions decisively so, in determining the 
balance of forces between the strikers and those ranged against 
them. . . . However to over-emphasize it is to risk losing a wider 
battle. Whilst people in the heat of struggle can see the media as 
grotesque and interfering, this is far from so for those who have 
never directly experienced the vindictiveness of its attacks. For them 
the argument that the media is simply a lie machine, producing a 
distortion after another, often appears unconvincing and biased in its 
own turn. In addition, such a line does little to assist in the battle for 
determining how the strike is represented day-by-day—it obstructs 
attempts to utilise whatever openings for sympathetic coverage are 
available” (124). Hence, they push this argument further, echoing 
in fact Hall’s critical understanding of ideology: “The press may be 
DVLJQL¿FDQWRUJDQL]HURISRSXODUEHOLHIV LQ VHOHFWLQJFDWHJRUL]LQJ
and contextualising information so as to make sense of the world 
for its readers, but it does not create these ideas from the abstract” 
(125). For them, at stake is not simply a media conspiracy, but an 
articulation of ideologies and media practices that produces an 
apparatus structurally incapable of “neutral” reporting: “What is ‘the 
QHZV¶"    (YHU\ DFW LQ FRQVWLWXWLQJ D QHZV LWHP LQ GHFLGLQJ LQ
which order the items should be placed and in what accent the items 
are read, involves the adoption of a position. The fact that the vast 
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majority of television makers do not accept this is a critical aspect of 
maintaining the system’s conservatism” (132). 
55. As a partial corrective to this polarization, I shall note that the 
analogies between the two groups and the modes of their oppression 
under Thatcherism played a role also within the lesbian and gay 
community itself. As LGSM member Rosie Leach commented during 
an interview, “I think in some ways it’s the press and the police that 
have made the link for a lot of gay people, because they see what 
happens to them all the time, getting hassled and getting called 
old names in the newspapers and all that” (Flynn, Goldsmith, and 
Sutcliffe 1985, 42). However, the contrary is less true. A working-
FODVVSRVLWLRQLQJZDVQRW VLJQL¿FDQWO\PRELOL]HGE\/*60 LQ WKH
encounter with the miners.
 ,W LVZRUWKQRWLFLQJ WKDWVXFKDSROLWLFVRIFODVVFRQÀLFWZLWKLQ WKH
lesbian and gay community in London—particularly within the 
context of organizing support for the miners—also entailed, at least 
potentially, a questioning of the center-periphery divide within 
Britain and its impact on the spatial organization of gay and lesbian 
life. As Mike Jackson explained during an interview: “we’re a 
London-based group, and yet actually there’s no mining community 
near London. The nearest one is 80 miles away, in Kent. But an awful 
lot of people in our support group are actually from outside London, 
originally. And, tell me if I’ve got this wrong, but, certainly myself, 
and I suspect an awful lot of the others, the reason we ended up in 
London was because life was easier to be gay in London than it was 
outside. . . . I think that’s really sad, that we have to come and live in 
this little ghetto. And if there’s one thing I’d like to see the strike do, 
for example in Dulais, if nowhere else, is for young gay kids to be 
able to grow up there…” (Flynn, Goldsmith, and Sutcliffe 1985, 45). 
57. This point is developed further in chapter 2, where I discuss at length 
the key intervention of queer of color critique in contemporary queer 
theory and politics.
58. Partly, this is also the case. For instance, Kelliher comments that, 
despite LGSM’s commitment to also¿JKWKRPRSKRELDE\RUJDQL]LQJ
explicitly as lesbians and gays, the group’s reliance on the rhetoric of 
supporting “the miners and their families” in fact “risked repeating 
the same exclusions that they hoped to ultimately undermine” 
(Kelliher 2014, 251).
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Chapter Two
1. Following Hall’s analysis of Thatcherism, neoliberalism is 
understood here not just as a set of economic policies, but as a 
complex of economic, political, and ideological practices. Thus, I 
make reference to a “neoliberal bloc” in order to signal that economic 
neoliberalization is always accompanied by a struggle for hegemony 
conducted on the political and ideological terrains. This reading draws 
on Hall’s analysis of Thatcherism as much as on Duggan’s work. 
For instance, she writes: “If neoliberalism has been the continuing 
foundation for pro-business activism in the U.S. since the 1970s, that 
activism has also engaged a shifting array of political/cultural issues 
and constituencies in order to gain power and legitimacy. . . . In order 
WRIDFLOLWDWHWKHÀRZRIPRQH\XSWKHHFRQRPLFKLHUDUFK\QHROLEHUDO
politicians have constructed complex and shifting alliances, issue by 
issue and location by location—always in contexts shaped by the 
meanings and effects of race, gender, sexuality, and other markers 
of difference. These alliances are not simply opportunistic, and the 
issues not merely epiphenomenal or secondary to the underlying 
reality of the more solid and real economic goals, but rather, the 
economic goals have been (must be) formulated in terms of the range 
of political and cultural meanings that shape the social body in a 
particular time and place” (Duggan 2003, xvi).
2. The concept of homonormativity recalls that of heteronormativity, 
introduced by Michael Warner in Fear of a Queer Planet (1993). 
Yet, as Duggan herself makes clear, the two concepts are not meant 
to be parallel: “there is no structure for gay life, no matter how 
conservative or normalizing, that might compare with the institutions 
promoting and sustaining heterosexual coupling” (Duggan 2003, 
50, n15). Thus, homonormativity is conceptualized as a gay 
politics that supplements the institutions of heteronormativity, 
rather than equal or even replace them. It does so by privatizing 
sexuality and supporting the increasing shrinking of the public (both 
public democratic spaces and the public sector as such). Duggan’s 
DQDO\VLVRIKRPRQRUPDWLYLW\¿UVWDSSHDUHGLQKHUHVVD\³7KH1HZ
Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism” (2002), 
but the subsequent incorporation of that analysis in The Twilight of 
Equality? helps better situate homonormativity within the broader 
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context of the construction of neoliberal hegemony in the United 
States. For a critical approach to Duggan’s work that however 
does not engage with this broader framework, and interprets 
homonormativity primarily as the name for a regime of normalized 
homosexuality, see Mary Bernstein and Verta Taylor’s introduction 
to their edited volume The Marrying Kind? Debating Same-Sex 
Marriage within the Lesbian and Gay Movement (2013). 
3. Epistemologically, this gesture is typical of Butler’s work: focusing 
on theoretical and political positions that are not directly exemplary of 
a problem, but rather reproduce it through the very structure of their 
arguments. Yet in this essay, her choice to criticize Fraser’s work, rather 
than addressing any of the orthodox Marxist authors who are the real 
target of her critique, is also strategic. It is meant to avoid, in Butler’s 
own words, “the pettier politics of who said what, and who said what 
back” (Butler 1997b, 265). Instead of engaging in such polemics, 
Butler tries to establish a conversation among closer theoretical and 
political allies—a move that Fraser seems not to entirely understand 
and that she deems “unfortunate” (Fraser 1997b, 279).
 7R EHPRUH SUHFLVH )UDVHU GLVWLQJXLVKHV EHWZHHQ D ³GH¿QLWLRQDO´
and a “functionalist” aspect of Butler’s argument. In her view, Butler 
IRUPXODWHVDGH¿QLWLRQDODUJXPHQWZKHQVKHFDOOVIRUDQH[SDQVLRQ
of the economic base so as to include in it the heteronormative 
regulation of sexuality that anchors the latter to the family as the site 
for the social reproduction of persons (Fraser 1997b, 283-285). It is 
WKLVGH¿QLWLRQDODUJXPHQWWKDW)UDVHUFRQVLGHUVWREHDKLVWRULFDOIRU
Butler suggests that the anchoring of sexuality to the heteronormative 
IDPLO\GH¿QHVFDSLWDOLVPDVVXFKUDWKHUWKDQFRQVWLWXWLQJRQHPRGH
RI UHJXODWLRQ DUWLFXODWHG WR VSHFL¿F FDSLWDOLVW VRFLDO IRUPDWLRQV
7KHQ )UDVHU REVHUYHV LW LV IURP WKLV GH¿QLWLRQDO DUJXPHQW WKDW
Butler’s functionalist argument follows: “Here the claim is that 
the heteronormative regulation of sexuality is economic—not by 
GH¿QLWLRQ EXW EHFDXVH LW LV IXQFWLRQDO WR WKH H[SDQVLRQRI VXUSOXV
value” (285). The difference between these two aspects of the same 
argument, which indeed strictly depend on one another, is not to be 
found in Butler’s own essay.
5. Smith partly acknowledges this: “Butler also cites, with approval, 
highly problematic functionalist arguments in which the social 
is constructed as a closed organic system. . . . Like functionalism, 
269Notes to Chapter Two
poststructuralism undermines the possibility of an autonomous, 
fully self-conscious, and instrumentalist subject that is prior to a 
given formation. A deconstructive approach cannot, however, be 
reconciled with functionalism’s organicist and totalistic dimensions. 
Butler’s text is fundamentally at odds with itself in this respect” (A. 
Smith 2001a, 108). This passage has the virtue of highlighting the 
common ground between functionalism and deconstruction, which 
makes their encounter in Butler’s essay possible, if problematic, in 
WKH¿UVWSODFH+RZHYHUDUHÀHFWLRQRQVXFKDFRPPRQJURXQGLV
not to be found in Butler’s essay itself, which shifts seamlessly from 
functionalism to deconstruction with no apparent awareness of the 
contradictions between the two.
 )RU VSHFL¿F DWWHPSWV WR GUDZTXHHU WKHRU\ DQG0DU[LVP WRJHWKHU
see Rosemarie Hennessy, 3UR¿WDQG3OHDVXUH6H[XDO ,GHQWLWLHV LQ
Late Capitalism 0LUDQGD -RVHSKAgainst the Romance of 
Community.HYLQ)OR\G7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH7RZDUG
a Queer Marxism3HWHU'UXFNHUWarped: Gay Normality and 
Queer AnticapitalismDQG3HWUXV/LXQueer Marxism in Two 
Chinas (2015). For two good overviews of this theoretical moment, 
ZKLFK DOVR SURYLGH DPDSSLQJ RI WKH ¿HOG VHH1DW5DKD ³4XHHU
Marxism and the Task of Contemporary Queer Social Critique” 
(2014) and Gianfranco Rebucini, “Marxisme queer: approches 
matérialistes des identités sexuelles” (2016).
7. For two key texts of the Freudo-Marxist tradition, see Wilhelm 
Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism>@DQG+HUEHUW
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into 
Freud >@  )RU D FRQWHPSRUDU\ TXHHU LQWHUYHQWLRQ WKDW
VLJQL¿FDQWO\UHHQJDJHVZLWK)UHXGR0DU[LVPDQGZLWKWKHZRUNRI
Italian gay militant and philosopher Mario Mieli, see James Penney, 
After Queer Theory: The Limits of Sexual Politics (2014).
8. Interestingly, Butler almost seems to acknowledge this possibility at 
WKHEHJLQQLQJRIKHUHVVD\³%XWZKDWLIP\UHKHDUVDO>RIRUWKRGR[
0DU[LVWDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWFXOWXUDODQGLGHQWLW\SROLWLFV@LQYROYHVD
WHPSRUDU\ LGHQWL¿FDWLRQZLWK WKHPHYHQDV,P\VHOISDUWLFLSDWH LQ
WKHFXOWXUDOSROLWLFVXQGHUDWWDFN",VWKDWWHPSRUDU\LGHQWL¿FDWLRQWKDW
I perform, the one that raises the question of whether I am involved 
in a parody of these positions, not precisely a moment in which, 
IRUEHWWHURUZRUVHWKH\EHFRPHP\SRVLWLRQ",WLV,ZRXOGDUJXH
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impossible to perform a convincing parody of an intellectual position 
ZLWKRXW KDYLQJ D SULRU DI¿OLDWLRQZLWKZKDW RQH SDURGLHVZLWKRXW
having and wanting an intimacy with the position one takes in or on 
as the object of parody” (Butler 1997b, 266).
9. Butler herself mentions processes of antagonism and cross-
IHUWLOL]DWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH WKHRUHWLFDO ¿HOG DPRQJ IRUPV RI FULWLFDO
knowledge production that, like identity politics, she considers to 




within feminism—to name but a few. This may seem to be precisely 
the tedium of identitarian struggles that a new, more inclusive Left 
hopes to transcend. And yet, for a politics of ‘inclusion’ to mean 
something other than the redomestication and resubordination of 
such differences, it will have to develop a sense of alliance in the 
FRXUVHRIDQHZIRUPRIFRQÀLFWXDOHQFRXQWHU´%XWOHUE
10. For another engagement with the debate between Butler and 
Fraser that insists on the lack of a theory of hegemony, see Jacinda 
Swanson, “Recognition and Redistribution: Rethinking Culture and 
the Economic” (2005).
11. Butler herself does mention Hall and the project of cultural studies at 
WKHYHU\EHJLQQLQJRIKHUHVVD\+HUHVKHDI¿UPVWKDWWKHDWWDFNRQ
identity politics from an orthodox Marxist standpoint is accompanied 
by a similar criticism of the forms of critical knowledge populating, 
IRUQHDUO\¿IW\\HDUVQRZWKHLQWHOOHFWXDOVFHQHRIWKH/HIW7KXVVKH
mentions “an explicitly Marxist objection to the reduction of Marxist 
scholarship and activism to the study of culture, sometimes understood 
as the reduction of Marxism to cultural studies” (Butler 1997b, 265). 
And later, even more explicitly, she remarks that any reference “to an 
apparently stable distinction between material and cultural life marks 
the resurgence of a theoretical anachronism, one that discounts the 
contributions to Marxist theory since Althusser’s displacement of 
the base-superstructure model as well as various forms of cultural 
materialism (e.g., Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, Gayatri Chakravorty 
6SLYDN´+RZHYHUWKH¿HOGRIFXOWXUDOVWXGLHVDQGLWVHDUO\
reconceptualizations of hegemony, ideology, and the relation between 
base and superstructures are not subject to real theoretical engagement 
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in “Merely Cultural.” In her response, Fraser does not notice Butler’s 
cursory reference to this intellectual trajectory. 
12. I say “virtually” because Duggan does not reference Hall’s work 
on Thatcherism in her analysis of neoliberalism and its cultural and 
identity politics.
 6HH+DOO¶VDFFRXQWRIKLVRZQSRVLWLRQLQJZLWKLQWKH³¿UVW´1HZ/HIW
in his essay, titled “Life and Times of the First New Left” (2010).
14. Rosemarie Hennessy suggests that even the Marxist and socialist gay 
formations that emerged within the gay liberation movement managed 
only loosely to situate an analysis of homosexual oppression within a 
Marxist framework. While acknowledging the value of those critical 
efforts, she writes: “Comprised of a loose network of collectives, 
journals, newsletters, study groups, conferences, and actions whose 
most intensive activity lasted only until the mid-seventies, the Gay 
Left represented a short-lived but vital willingness to make use of 
marxism as a critical framework to link sexual oppression to global 
capitalism. In fact, however, there were more gestures in this direction 
than there were developed theoretical explanations from which to 
forge a fundamentally anticapitalist activist politics” (Hennessy 
2000, 45-46).
15. For Duggan’s own analysis of the sex wars, see her earlier work 
with Nan D. Hunter, Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture 
(1995). See also Miranda Joseph’s account of the attack on the 
National Endowment of the Arts in the 1990s, in Against the Romance 
of Community (2002). 
16. The radicalization of the movement caused by the AIDS crisis 
constitutes, at least in part, a temporary suspension of this historical 
trajectory. Or, to put it differently, the political formations emerged 
in the context of the AIDS crisis helped maintaining during the 
1980s a broader horizon of redistribution downward that was going 
to recede dramatically in the next decade. Duggan makes this point: 
“Occasionally, it all came together as it had in earlier times—the 
PRYHPHQWERUQWR¿JKW$,'6DQG+,9LQIHFWLRQOLQNHGLGHQWLW\DQG
civil rights politics with an encompassing vision of material and 
cultural equality, and drew upon the resources of activists, theorists, 
artists, and scientists to construct an imaginative range of political 
interventions during the 1980s” (Duggan 2003, xix).
17. Additionally, Anna Marie Smith argues that the Responsibility and 
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Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) passed under 
Clinton’s government, not only famously managed to “end the 
welfare as we know it,” in Clinton’s own words, but also turned it into 
“a series of severely disciplinary controls” (A. Smith 2001b, 310). 
In particular, the PRWORA targeted single mothers on welfare, the 
disproportionate majority of them women of color: depicting them 
DVWKHRQHVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHLURZQSRYHUW\SUHVFULELQJWKDW WKH\
must cooperate in tracking their children’s biological father, whose 
FKLOG VXSSRUW SD\PHQWVZRXOG VDYH SXEOLFPRQH\ DQG FKDQQHOLQJ
funds for abstinence education programs (312-313). In this way, 
Smith argues, the PRWORA worked hand in hand with the DOMA in 
UHDI¿UPLQJKHWHURSDWULDUFKDOPDUULDJHDVDQRUP\HWLQWKHVSHFL¿F
FRQWH[W RI QHROLEHUDOL]DWLRQ ³:LWK WKH >35:25$@ D SRRU VLQJOH
mother is explicitly expected to marry her way out of poverty. . . . 
In this manner, patriarchal heterosexual marriage is more than a 
PRUDO FDWHJRU\ LW LV DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ WKDW LV VXSSRVHG WR UHSODFH WKH
state’s obligations towards the poor. The promotion of patriarchal 
heterosexual marriage—especially among the poor—is therefore 
integral to the post-welfare state regime” (315).   
18. Additionally, the centrality of personal relationships to fundraising 
militates to preserve a white male leadership for the movement. 
Indeed, the funding practices that became key to U.S. large national 
organizations in the 1990s increasingly required a leadership capable 
RIVKDULQJUDFLDODQGFODVVDI¿OLDWLRQVZLWKPDMRUGRQRUV)RUD¿UVW
hand account of these dynamics, see Urvashi Vaid, Virtual Equality: 
The Mainstreaming of Gay Liberation (1995), particularly chapter 
8. Vaid, former Executive Director of the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force (NGLTF), provides in that text an insider and self-critical 
perspective on the transformations of the movement discussed by 
Chasin. See also her Irresistible Revolution: Confronting Race, 
Class and the Assumptions of LGBT Politics (2012), for a more 
retrospective assessment of those transformations.
19. Since homonormativity is the name that Duggan gives to the sexual 
SROLWLFV RI QHROLEHUDOLVP LQ WKH WZHQW\¿UVW FHQWXU\²WKH ³JD\
wing” of a nonredistributive multicultural politics of equality—it is 
DOVR LPSRUWDQWQRW WR IHWLVKL]H WKHVSHFL¿FUROHSOD\HGE\SROLWLFR
ideological formations such as LCR and IGF. The emergence of 
homonormativity in the late 1990s and early 2000s is the result of 
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two articulated trajectories: on the one hand, the incorporation of a 
UKHWRULFDOFRPPLWPHQWWRIRUPDOHTXDOLW\ZLWKLQWKHQHROLEHUDOEORF
on the other hand, the increasing ascendancy of neoliberal logics 
and forms of organizing within the LGBTQ movement. These are 
processes that affect wider segments of the movement and are not 
reducible to the operations of the explicitly neoliberal gay formations 
discussed so far. Although Duggan’s privileged focus on IGF focuses 
the attention on the political and ideological work performed by the 
group, she acknowledges the broader reach of the problem—both in 
The Twilight of Equality? and in more recent interventions, where she 
questions the unilateral investment of most segments of the LGBTQ 
movement in the campaign for marriage equality (Kim and Duggan 
'XJJDQ'XJJDQ7KHVHSLHFHVDOVRFRQWDLQ
tactical suggestions that do not necessarily exclude gay marriage 
activism from the construction of a broad counter-hegemonic bloc in 
times of neoliberalism. In “Beyond Gay Marriage,” for example, Kim 
and Duggan begin by acknowledging both the increasing household 
diversity characterizing the United States today and the erosion 
of the welfare state carried out by neoliberal reforms. Hence, they 
comment: “For gay activists, and indeed for all progressive activists, 
it would be far more productive to stress support for household 
diversity—both cultural and economic support, recognition and 
resources for a changing population as it actually lives—than 
to focus solely on gay marriage. By treating gay marriage as one 
form of household recognition among others, progressives can 
generate a broad vision of social justice that resonates on many 
fronts” (Kim and Duggan 2005). In “(Re)Producing Social Justice 
After Neoliberalism,” Duggan takes a step further and proposes 
a recovery of the concept of “social reproduction” in order to 
ground the expansive alliance politics required to challenge both 
homonormativity and neoliberalism. However, it is worth noticing 
that in the same piece she suggests to replace “intersectionality” with 
“social reproduction”: “Perhaps a term like social reproduction can 
become expansive enough to illuminate the web of connections that 
LVWRRÀH[LEOHVKLIWLQJFRPSOH[DQGJOREDOO\YDULDEOHIRUWKHWHUP
intersectionality to capture” (Duggan 2009). Later in this chapter, I 
argue that intersectionality is key to the contemporary transformations 
of queer theory and LGBTQ politics in the face of homonormativity. 
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20. Duggan makes these points by discussing Wendy Brown’s States of 
Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (1995).
21. I discuss Floyd’s and Ferguson’s analyses later in this chapter, and 
Puar’s in chapter 3.
22. See Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and 
Society (1976).
23. Moreover, although queer critiques of identity politics in times of 
homonormativity are primarily directed against sexual identity 
politics, the same critique is most commonly deployed today—in 
both critical theory and society at large—to dismiss the theory and 
politics of antiracism. Talking about the refusal to think critically 
about race within what he terms “establishmentarian queer theory,” 
+LUDP 3HUH] REVHUYHV WKDW VXFK D UHIXVDO ³KDELWXDOO\ FODVVL¿HV
almost any form of race studies as a retreat into identity politics” 
(Perez 2005, 171). Given the racial operations of homonormativity, 
any queer critique of identity politics explicitly designed to militate 
against the sexual politics of neoliberalism must at least attend to 
these convergences.
24. See also Peter Drucker, Warped: Gay Normality and Queer 
Anticapitalism (2015). I do not discuss Drucker’s work because his 
HQJDJHPHQWZLWK/XNiFV¶FRQFHSWVRIUHL¿FDWLRQDQGWRWDOLW\KHDYLO\
depends on, and reproduces, Hennessy’s and Floyd’s respective 
readings. Yet his intervention proves original in many other respects.
 , IRFXV RQ +HQQHVV\¶V DQG )OR\G¶V UHVSHFWLYH UHDGLQJV RI /XNiFV
because they well illustrate, especially through a comparison between 
the two, the challenges and gains of the contemporary “Marxist 
UHQDLVVDQFH´ LQ TXHHU WKHRU\<HW WKLV GRHV QRW PHDQ WKDW /XNiFV
represents the only point of reference for either of the two. Hennessy 
deploys a very diverse conceptual apparatus in 3UR¿WDQG3OHDVXUH, 
ranging from Marx and Engels to Gramsci, from materialist feminism 
to Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse, from Louis Althusser to 
Raymond Williams, from John D’Emilio to Wendy Brown. Her 
primary goal is not to build a comprehensive theoretical framework, 
but rather to draw insights from the vast Marxist tradition in order to 
question some of the assumptions that inform contemporary queer 
WKHRU\7KHFRQFHSWRIUHL¿FDWLRQKRZHYHULVSDUWLFXODUO\FHQWUDOWR
her project. Floyd, instead, offers a more consistent engagement with 
WKH0DU[LVWWUDGLWLRQWKDWJRHVIURP/XNiFVWR0DUFXVHDQG)UHGULF
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Jameson—a tradition that he supplements with insights drawn from 
regulation theory and David Harvey. Marcuse and Jameson are key to 
)OR\G¶VUHDGLQJRIUHL¿FDWLRQDQGWRWDOLW\QRWRQO\EXWDOVRIRUKDYLQJ
RSHQHG/XNiFV¶FRQFHSWXDODSSDUDWXV WR WKHHPHUJHQFHRI WKHQHZ
VRFLDOPRYHPHQWV<HW/XNiFVUHPDLQVWKHPDLQSRLQWRIUHIHUHQFH
for Floyd as well as the author with whom he entertains the more 
sustained critical dialogue throughout 7KH5HL¿FDWLRQRI'HVLUH.            
 /XNiFV¶DUJXPHQW LVQRW MXVW LQIRUPHGE\ WKH0DU[LVW WKHVLVRI WKH
revolutionary historical task of the proletariat. He also observes, 
more concretely, that the different way LQZKLFK UHL¿FDWLRQ DIIHFWV
the capitalist’s and the worker’s respective consciousness compels 
the latter, as opposed to the former, to negate the very process of 
UHL¿FDWLRQDQGDVSLUHWRWRWDOLW\³,WLVWUXHIRUWKHFDSLWDOLVWDOVRWKHUH
LVWKHVDPHGRXEOLQJRISHUVRQDOLW\WKHVDPHVSOLWWLQJXSRIPDQ>sic@
into an element of the movement of commodities and an (objective 
and impotent) observer of that movement. But for his consciousness it 
necessarily appears as an activity (albeit this activity is objectively an 
illusion), in which effects emanate from himself. This illusion blinds 
him to the true state of affairs, whereas the worker, who is denied the 
scope for such illusory activity, . . . is therefore forced into becoming 
the object of the process by which he is turned into a commodity and 
reduced to a mere quantity. But this very fact forces him to surpass the 
LPPHGLDF\RIKLVFRQGLWLRQ´/XNiFV>@
27. See chapter 7 of Bodies that Matter (Butler 1993a).
28. Against this reduction, Hennessy asserts: “If identities and their 
referents are secured through overdetermined processes of class as 
well as gender, the constitutive inability of any identity to secure its 
referent or to capture what it names—whether that identity be woman, 
homosexual, heterosexual, or queer—is not the result of an instability 
LQKHUHQW WR VLJQL¿FDWLRQ EXW RI DQ DUUD\ RI VRFLDO FRQWUDGLFWLRQV
including relations of labor” (Hennessy 1994, 103). Or, as she puts it 
in 3UR¿WDQG3OHDVXUH³>D@JDLQVWQHRLGHDOLVWVZKRFODLPDPELYDOHQFH
is the trace of an unrepresentable Real and neoculturalists who claim 
that ambivalence is the mark of the indeterminacy of ideology, 
VLJQL¿FDWLRQRUGLVFRXUVH,DUJXHWKDWWKHDPELYDOHQFHRIQHZPRUH
ÀH[LEOHPRGHVRILGHQWLW\²DQGVH[XDOLGHQWLW\VSHFL¿FDOO\²QHHGVWR
be read in terms of its historical relation to the contradictory structures 
of capitalism” (Hennessy 2000, 34).
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29. Hennessy explicitly mentions Sparks’ analysis while offering her 
own critique of Hall.
30. I address the relationship between universalism and totality thinking 
later in this chapter, in the context of a discussion of intersectionality 
and queer of color critique.
31. Floyd’s reference in this passage, next to Butler’s theory of gender 
performativity, is the work of Leo Bersani, for instance in Homos (1995). 
32. For Butler’s appropriation of Althusser in the service of her theory of 
gender performativity, see her Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive 
Limits of “Sex” (1993a), in particular chapter 4.
33. Floyd focuses exclusively on performative masculinity, not 
femininity. Indeed, one of his arguments is that historicizing Butler’s 
theory also reveals the lack of a perfect parallel between masculinity 
and femininity (Floyd 2009, 82).
34. Floyd leaves relatively open the question of whether Butler’s theory 
is then able to describe exclusively the norms and experiences of 
gender emerging in this particular historical conjuncture—what his 
historicizing gesture suggests—or whether her theory can in fact 
aspire to a higher degree of generalization. This question becomes 
particularly crucial as Floyd conceptualizes masculinity as a citation 
of the previous norm of manhood eroded by Taylorism. Was manhood 
OHVVSHUIRUPDWLYHWKDQPDVFXOLQLW\XQGHU7D\ORULVP")OR\GKLPVHOI
discusses this problem (Floyd 2009, 90-94).
35. In his foundational essay “Capitalism and Gay Identity,” D’Emilio 
offers a historical materialist analysis of the emergence of gay 
identity in the United States in relation to industrialization and to 
the spread of wage labor outside the family. Hence, he poses a key 
question: “How is it that capitalism, whose structure made possible 
the emergence of a gay identity and the creation of urban gay 
communities, appears unable to accept gay men and lesbians in its 
PLGVW"´'¶(PLOLR,QKLVYLHZWKHDQVZHULVWREHIRXQG
in the “contradictory relationship of capitalism to the family,” for the 
link between family and production weakened by industrialization 
was sutured at the ideological level by positing the family as a source 
of emotional security (108).
36. Hennessy makes this point by turning to Wendy Brown’s States 
of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (1995), which 
Duggan instead criticizes for reproducing a dismissal of identity 
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explanation . . . is inseparable from its radically dehistoricizing 
FDSDFLW\    7KH FRQFHSW RI UHL¿FDWLRQ W\SLFDOO\ JUDVSV FDSLWDOLVW
GHYHORSPHQWDVDQDUUDWLYHRIGHFOLQHIRUH[DPSOH/XNiFV¶IRUPDWLYH
use of it has been appropriately been accused of presuming some prior, 
harmonious integration of subject with object, some earlier moment 
RIXQSUREOHPDWLFRUJDQLFVRFLDOXQL¿FDWLRQ´)OR\G
38. Hall makes this point about ideology, which I discuss in chapter 1.
39. I have been privileging Floyd’s rereading of Butler at the expense 
of his engagement with Foucault because it best illustrates Floyd’s 
theoretical practice and also, importantly, because it helps me 
underline the differences between Floyd’s and Hennessy’s respective 
FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQVRIUHL¿FDWLRQ
40. See the foundational text of regulation theory by Michel Aglietta, A 
Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The U.S. Experience>@
41. For example, the decoupling of body and knowledge effected 
E\ GHVNLOOLQJ DQG VFLHQWL¿F PDQDJHPHQW DQG WKH FRQFRPLWDQW
emergence of a niche market targeting men cannot explain, alone, 
the heterosexualized UHL¿FDWLRQ RI PDVFXOLQLW\ XQGHU 7D\ORULVP
Moreover, I mentioned earlier that Floyd reads the emergence of 
a gay subculture in the 1950s and 1960s, especially through the 
circulation of gay physique pictorials, as a working of the “weakness” 
of the new performative masculinity. This dialectical movement 
must be understood as mediated by ideological formations and 
state practices. Floyd draws the entire picture while discussing the 
social and political conditions in which that gay subculture took 
shape: “the vigorous state tactics in trying to preempt any genuine 
socialization of homosexuals—efforts to mitigate the circulation 
of these images, efforts like the routine police raids on gay bars—
suggest that we might understand this marginal circuit, this collective 
labor of homosexualizing masculinity, to be not merely heterosexual 
masculinity’s constitutive outside but a constitutive outside of a 
uniformity . . . of production and consumption, a provocation for the 
ongoing enforcement not only of a Cold War-era ‘national security’ 
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but of a Fordist mode of regulation” (Floyd 2009, 165).
42. It is worth quoting Ruskola at length on this matter: “I am not at all 
sanguine about the analytic distinction between acts and identities. 
Notoriously, the Hardwick RSLQLRQ LWVHOI >WKURXJK ZKLFK WKH
Supreme Court had sanctioned the constitutionality of anti-sodomy 
ODZVLQ@H[SORLWHGWKHXQVWDEOHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHWZRDV
LWRSSRUWXQLVWLFDOO\DWYDULRXVWLPHVERWKFRQÀDWHGDQGGLVDJJUHJDWHG
‘sodomy’ and ‘sodomites.’ Acts are always performed by actors who 
have identities, and identities are always consolidated in and through 
acts” (Ruskola 2005, 239-240). 
43. Queer of color critique is not the only form of counter-hegemonic 
identity politics mobilized within LGBTQ formations in order to 
resist homonormativity. In “Transgender History, Homonormativity, 
and Disciplinarity” (2008), for example, Susan Stryker argues that, 
before its current circulation in queer theory debates, homonormativity 
was a term deployed by transgender activists since the early 1990s in 
order to contest the hegemony of sexual orientation (homosexuality) 
in LGBTQ politics in the United States. Hence, taking this historical 
insight as her starting point, and registering the marginalization of 
trans bodies and knowledges in LGBTQ formations, she writes 
at the end of the essay: “Homonormativity . . . is more than an 
accommodation to neoliberalism in its macropolitical manifestations. 
>(@YHQZHOOLQWHQWLRQHGDQWLKRPRQRUPDWLYHFULWLFDOSUDFWLFHVWKDW
take aim at neoliberalism can fall short of their goal when they fail 
to adequately account for the destabilizing, cross-cutting differences 
within sexual categories that transgender issues represent. Such 
critical practices can function in unintentionally homonormative 
ways that circumvent and circumscribe, rather than amplify, the 
radical potential of transgender phenomena to profoundly disturb 
the normative” (155). In this passage, Stryker draws attention to the 
exclusions reproduced by queer critical discourses that are articulated 
to resist homonormativity but nonetheless continue to privilege an 
emphasis on cisgender gays and lesbians at the expense of trans 
people, hence rearticulating themselves to what transgender activists 
in the 1990s already termed homonormativity. Yet Stryker does 
not merely call for inclusion. Rather, she posits that “transgender 
phenomena” as suchKDYHDVSHFL¿FSRWHQWLDOWRLQWHUUXSWWKHUHJLPHV
of normativity through which homonormativity itself takes shape, 
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therefore suggesting that trans bodies and knowledges must be at the 
forefront of queer critiques of homonormativity. Hence, we could 
say that her text constitutes an attempt to hegemonize trans issues 
within queer theories and politics in times of homonormativity—a 
struggle similar to the one conducted by queer of color critique 
around the color line. However, Stryker herself has recently pointed 
at the emergence of forms of “transnormativity.” During a 2014 
interview about the contemporary challenges for transgender studies, 
for instance, she observes: “What is truly amazing to me, after 
having been out as trans for nearly a quarter century, is the extent to 
which it is now becoming possible for some trans people to access 
what I call ‘transnormative citizenship,’ while at the same time truly 
KRUUL¿FOLIHFLUFXPVWDQFHVSHUVLVWIRURWKHUWUDQVSHRSOH5DFHUHDOO\
does seem to be the dividing line that allows some trans people to 
be cultivated for life, invested in, recognized, and enfolded into the 
biopolitical state, while allowing others to be consigned to malignant 
neglect or lethal violence” (Stryker and Dierkes-Thrun 2014). Even 
as homonormativity remains an articulation far more consolidated 
and operative than transnormativity, Stryker suggests here that race, 
rather than gender and its nonconformities, constitutes the main 
terrain of antagonism at the time of such new normativities.
 6HHIRUH[DPSOH-XOLHQ¶V¿OPLooking for Langston (1989). 
45. For Julien’s and Mercer’s own reading of the dynamics discussed by 
+DOOVHHWKHLUHVVD\WLWOHG³'H0DUJLQDQG'H&HQWUH´>@
46. This difference between the time of Hall’s writing and our times does 
not make Hall’s reading less relevant. On the contrary, as I argue in the 
¿UVWFKDSWHUWKHIDFWWKDW+DOOWKRXJKWWKURXJKWKHtensions between 
Marxism and identity politics makes his work worth recovering 
today, in the context of a “Marxist renaissance” in queer theory.
47. I must note the ambiguity between an endorsement of intersectionality 
and a critique of identity politics by many of the authors I discuss in this 
chapter, Floyd and Ferguson among them. This ambiguity proceeds 
from the fact that intersectionality is often regarded as a critique of 
identity politics. As I have argued, instead, intersectionality can be 
understood (and was understood, in many of its earlier formulations) 
as a form of identity politics. 
48. For two recent queer interventions that establish a dialogue with 
Marxism by explicitly reengaging the question of universalism, see 
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James Penney, After Queer Theory: The Limits of Sexual Politics 
(2014) and Madhavi Menon, Indifference to Difference: On Queer 
Universalism6LQFH3HQQH\UHFRYHUVPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\WKH
conceptual apparatus of Freudo-Marxism, his work gestures toward 
universalism yet also reestablishes a rather anachronistic privileging 
of sexual difference over other differences, in line with the traditional 
focus of psychoanalysis.  
49. Consider, as another example, Eng’s instructive analysis of Lawrence 
v. Texas in The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the 
Racialization of Intimacy (2010). Here, Eng proposes to understand the 
emergence of homonormativity—what he terms “queer liberalism”—
through the lens of a queer diasporic epistemology focused on the 
intersections between sexuality and race. In his analysis of the case, 
he points out that what led to the arrest of John Lawrence and Tyron 
Garner was not just an instance of gay conjugal intimacy arbitrarily 
interrupted by the police forces. In fact, that night Lawrence was 
hosting at his place a friend, Robert Eubanks, together with his date, 
*DUQHU<HWDOOHJHGO\LUULWDWHGE\WKHÀLUWJRLQJRQEHWZHHQ/DZUHQFH
and Garner, Eubanks called the police and reported “a nigger going 
crazy with a gun,” referring to African American Garner. This is what 
led the police to intervene and subsequently to charge Lawrence 
and Garner with consensual sodomy. As Eng comments, not only 
this one-night triangle (no matter the actual relationships existing 
between the three men) “renders queer liberalism’s idealization of 
FRQMXJDOGRPHVWLFLW\HVSHFLDOO\LURQLF´PRVWLPSRUWDQWO\LWLV
the forgotten racial element that troubles any celebratory account 
of Lawrence v. Texas: “It is this enduring and unresolved history of 
whiteness, private property, and black racial trespass that provides 
the material and ideological background through which the queer 
liberalism of Lawrence emerges” (36). Therefore, Eng writes: “While 
race is not the doctrinal issue in Lawrence, I contend that it should 
be central to our thinking about the case politically and socially” 
(25). In his view, race must be placed, more broadly, at the center of 
contemporary queer analyses—it must be hegemonized, in my own 
terms—not just because a focus on race can provide us with a more 
comprehensive picture of the operations of homonormativity and 
neoliberalism, but because the very emergence of homonormativity 
“depends upon a constitutive forgetting of race” (36).
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50. I read Muñoz’s concept by emphasizing its theoretical and political 
aspects, yet this does not do entire justice to his primary focus on art 
and performance practices. This elusion tends to downplay, among 
other things, the disciplinary aspect of his intervention. For, as he 
VWDWHV KLV WKHRUL]DWLRQ RI GLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ WKURXJK TXHHU RI FRORU
performances is meant to be “a contribution to the formation of a 
queer performance-studies lens” (Muñoz 1999, xiv).




for revamping them for collective struggle, from capitalism’s inside 
to its outside—the space of unmet needs” (Hennessy 2000, 207). 
So, while for Hennessy a queer collective subject must negate the 
UHL¿FDWLRQRILGHQWLW\DQGDUWLFXODWHDQDVSLUDWLRQWRWRWDOLW\WKDWWDNHV
as its starting point a broad understanding of human desires and 
needs, Muñoz reads a plethora of queer of color practices that work 
through identities, throw them into question, but never abandon them 
as sites of both subjective and political articulation. The difference 
between the two may be, perhaps, a matter of emphasis. Yet for the 
project of this dissertation, which investigates among other things the 
relationship between identity politics and the politics of hegemony, 
that difference is key.
52. Muñoz makes reference to Duggan’s work in progress (Muñoz 1999, 
xii), for her analysis of homonormativity was not published yet at the 
time of the publication of 'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV.
53. In 'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV, Muñoz makes reference to diverse traditions 
of Marxist thought, from Hall’s reading of Gramsci in the 1980s to 
the workerism of C. L. R. James in The Future in the Present (1977). 
James makes his appearance at the end of Muñoz’s text. Here, Muñoz 
draws on James’ call to identify the instances of socialist society 
already at work in the present in order to conceptualize queer of color 
performances as mapping possible futures. This allows him to free 
such performances from what he terms the “burden of liveness” and 
to insist “on the minoritarian subject’s status as a world-historical 
entity” (Muñoz 1999, 198). Yet 'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV is not a Marxist 
or historical materialist text. For a more consistent engagement 
with Marxism, see Muñoz’s work on Ernst Bloch in his more recent 
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Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (2009). 
54. As I discussed, Floyd does engage with regulation theory in order 
WR FRQFHSWXDOL]H WKH KLVWRULFDOO\ VSHFL¿F PHGLDWLRQV RI SROLWLFR
ideological practices. Yet these are conceptualized, indeed, as 
mediations RI WKH PRUH IXQGDPHQWDO SURFHVV RI UHL¿FDWLRQ +LV
engagement with regulation theory remains mostly supplementary. 
 7KH¿JXUHRI WKHSURVWLWXWH LQ0DU[DQG WKDWRI WKH WUDQVJHQGHUHG
mulatta in Bentzen are brought even closer by the fact that, as 
Ferguson notices, the sexual pathologization of the working class 
FRLQFLGHG ZLWK LWV UDFLDOL]DWLRQ ³&RQÀDWLQJ WKH SURVWLWXWH ZLWK
the British working class inspired racial mythologies about the 
supposedly abnormal reproductive capacities and outcomes of that 
class. One tale suggested that the bodies of British working-class 
women could produce races heretofore unforeseen” (Ferguson 2004, 
9). For the concomitant racialization and sexualization of the working 
class in nineteenth-century Britain, see the pioneering work of Anne 
McClintock in Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the 
Colonial Contest (1995).   
56. Ferguson discusses the role of both the female head and the queer in 
Wright’s black nationalist ideology especially through a reading of 
his novel Native Son>@%XWWKHSUREOHPRIWKHIHPDOH
headed household also emerges from Wright’s own memories: 
“Wright understood social disorganization as a feminizing process 
that disrupted African American gender and sexual integrity. One of 
the signal disorganizing moments came when Wright’s father deserted 
the family, leaving his mother as the head. It was in the midst of the 
IDWKHU¶VDEVHQFHWKDW:ULJKWKDGKLV¿UVWLQWHQVHERXWZLWKKXQJHU´
(Ferguson 2004, 46). Ferguson recovers this memory from Wright’s 
autobiography Black Boy: A Record of Childhood and Youth (1945). 
57. See Combahee River Collective, “Combahee River Collective 
6WDWHPHQW´ >@ $XGUH /RUGH Sister Outsider: Essays 
and SpeechesDQG%DUEDUD6PLWK³7RZDUGD%ODFN)HPLQLVW
Criticism” (1994). Smith’s work is particularly central to Ferguson’s 
analysis because of her “lesbian reading” of Toni Morrison’s Sula 
(1973). Ferguson discusses such a reading of Morrison precisely as 
the articulation of a lesbian standpoint that however participates in 
the expansion of the nonheteronormative through intersectionality. 
For instance, Smith writes: “Despite the apparent heterosexuality of 
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the female characters, I discovered in re-reading Sula that it works 
as a lesbian novel not only because of the passionate friendship 
between Sula and Nel, but because of Morrison’s consistently 
critical stance toward the heterosexual institution of male/female 
relationships, marriage and the family. Consciously or not, 
Morrison’s work poses both lesbian and feminist questions about 
black women’s autonomy and their impact upon each other’s lives” 
(Smith, quoted in Ferguson 2004, 127).
58. Ferguson is as unforgiving is his critique as to point out elements 
of heteropatriarchy in the work of BPP leader Huey P. Newton, yet 
without mentioning the speech Newton delivered in New York on 
August 15, 1970, titled “A Letter to the Revolutionary Brothers 
and Sisters About The Women’s Liberation and Gay Liberation 
Movements.” The speech opened as follows: “During the past 
few years strong movements have developed among women and 
among homosexuals seeking their liberation. There has been some 
uncertainty about how to relate to these movements. Whatever your 
personal opinions and your insecurities about homosexuality and 
the various liberation movements among homosexuals and women 
(and I speak of the homosexuals and women as oppressed groups), 
we should try to unite with them in a revolutionary fashion. I say 
‘whatever your insecurities are’ because as we very well know, 
VRPHWLPHV RXU ¿UVW LQVWLQFW LV WRZDQW WR KLW D KRPRVH[XDO LQ WKH
mouth, and want a woman to be quiet. We want to hit a homosexual 
LQ WKHPRXWKEHFDXVHZHDUHDIUDLG WKDWZHPLJKWEHKRPRVH[XDO
and we want to hit the women or shut her up because we are afraid 
that she might castrate us, or take the nuts that we might not have to 
start with” (Newton 1970).
59. Ferguson does not theorize about the present in Aberrations 
in Black, yet he offers precious insights. As he mentions, the 
pathologization of the female-headed household and of other African 
American nonheteronormative formations in state, sociological, and 
revolutionary discourses alike has also sustained the ideological 
articulation of neoliberalism from the 1970s onward. Indeed, the 
¿JXUH RI WKH ³ZHOIDUH TXHHU´ KDV EHHQ FHQWUDO WR WKDW DUWLFXODWLRQ
in the United States (Ferguson 2004, 124-125). Hence, building on 
his reading of African American gender and sexual heterogeneity 
throughout the twentieth century, on his recovery of the struggle 
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conducted by women of color and black lesbian feminists in the 
1970s and 1980s, and on a brief discussion of the role played by 
heteropatriarchal sexual regulation among populations of color in 
times of neoliberalism, Ferguson concludes his analysis with a brief 
note on the contemporary conjuncture: “In this historic moment, 
probably more than any other, oppositional coalitions have to be 
grounded in nonnormative racial difference. We must look to the 
differentiated histories of women of color and queer of color critical 
formations to aid us in this enterprise” (137). As this passage makes 
clear, his insistence on women of color and black lesbian feminists’ 
GLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ ZLWK EODFN UHYROXWLRQDU\ LGHRORJLHV LV QRW PHDQW
to deemphasize the question of the color line. On the contrary, it 
suggests that nonheteronormative racial difference must be located at 
the center of any counter-hegemonic bloc that is to emerge from the 
intersection of multiple identity political formations.
60. Ferguson himself offers a queer of color critique of homonormativity 
in an essay titled “Race-ing Homonormativity: Citizenship, 
Sociology, and Gay Identity” (2005). Here, not only but also through 
DUHDGLQJRI0DU[¶VHVVD\³2QWKH-HZLVK4XHVWLRQ´>@
he reads the homonormative subject’s access to citizenship and racial 
privilege as conditioned on the privatization of the sexual.
61. A similar convergence between homonormativity, neoliberal spatial 
politics, and the disciplining of queer of color formations emerges from 
Manalansan’s analysis, in the same essay, of the transformations of 
Christopher Street (Manalansan 2005, 49-52). Here, the Christopher 
Street piers—once a space of cruising and socializing, especially for 
queers of color—have now disappeared in favor of manicured parks 
and new residential buildings. While Manalansan’s queer of color 
informants feel that the space is no longer their own, as they are in 
fact prevented from getting together in the street and nearby the new 
buildings by an increased police activity, real estate agencies advertise 
WKHDUHDWRWKHPRUHDIÀXHQWVHJPHQWVRIWKHJD\SRSXODWLRQ3XEOLVKHG
in gay mainstream newspaper Gay City News, the following ad promotes 
a new building, The Pier: “The Pier stands as the newest landmark to 
living on the water. Reserved for the few . . . the resident’s view is 
majestic. . . . A statement of status and choice, The Pier offers a variety 
of luxuries and homes melded in contemporary architecture the essence 
of function” (Gay City News, quoted in Manalansan 2005, 51). 
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62. This both points at the hegemonization of the color line in times of 
homonormativity and suggests a danger of this process: to restrict the 
relevance of race for queer theory exclusively to the contemporary 
conjuncture. Indeed, Ferguson’s queer of color analysis of urban 
industrialization in the early twentieth century in the United States 
has no impact on Floyd’s reading of the same time and place.
63. I focus on the context of the “war on terror” in chapter 3, while 
discussing Jasbir K. Puar’s (2007) critique of “homonationalism.” 
64. Floyd’s quote is from David Harvey, The New Imperialism (2005, 201).
65. Ferguson makes reference to Hall’s essay “Assembling the 1980s: 
The Deluge and After” (2005). Although in Aberrations in Black 
Ferguson does not engage with Hall’s work, Amy Villarejo notices 
the proximity between their respective intellectual practices: 
“Ferguson’s project, forging queer of color analysis that bridges 
the social sciences and the humanities (sociology and literature), 
displays the kind of thinking that some of the early work of British 
cultural studies did, particularly in its sense of unrelenting urgency 
and in the transformations it puts into play of academic categories 
(cultural studies, queer studies, critical race studies, queer of color 
critique). Like some critiques of that initial Birmingham Centre work, 
Ferguson also seeks to unmask the normative assumptions of Marxist 
traditions while disavowing the ideology of transparency of which 
such unmasking would seem to be an example” (Villarejo 2005, 71). 
66. Information about Rhodes Must Fall is available on the Facebook 
page of the movement: https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/ 
(accessed January 15, 2017).
67. Among other initiatives, UoC organized a Decolonial School that was, 
in fact, a school of intersectional critique. The collective describes the 
school as follows: “The program is meant for those who are interested 
in being part of social movements, activism and want to participate 
in the ongoing global struggle that aims to decolonize not just the 
University, but also the imperialist white-supremacist capitalist ableist 
hetero-patriarchy.” The program of the school is available at: http://
universityofcolour.com/post/138621008963/edit-open-registration-
IRUWKH¿UVWVHPHVWHURIDFFHVVHG-DQXDU\
68. The Diversity Commission is part of a broader Democratization 
and Decentralization Commission established at the University of 
Amsterdam in the wake of the 2015 occupation. See the webpage of 
286 Notes to Chapter Two
the broader Commission (in Dutch): http://commissiedd.nl/ (accessed 
-DQXDU\  7KH ¿QDO UHSRUW RI WKH'LYHUVLW\&RPPLVVLRQ
submitted on October 12, 2016, is available at: http://commissiedd.
nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/1.-Diversity-Commission-Report.
pdf (accessed January 15, 2017).  
69. Wekker was a professor in the Graduate Gender Programme at 
Utrecht University, the Netherlands, when I enrolled in the master 
program of Gender and Ethnicity. Although she was never my teacher, 
I got to know her outside the university. I conducted an interview 
with her on April 30, 2015 at her house in Amsterdam. Information 
about her life and quotes by her that are not referenced in the text 
proceed from the material of that interview. Traces of Wekker’s 
life narrative and of her involvements in different intellectual and 
political projects can be found, in English, throughout the pages of 
her most recent book, White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism 
and Race (2016). See also the entry on her in the online encyclopedia 
of Afro-European studies, written by Betta Pesole: http://www.
encyclopediaofafroeuropeanstudies.eu/encyclopedia/gloria-wekker/ 
(accessed January 15, 2017).
70. During her interview with me, Wekker remembers the incident as 
WDNLQJSODFHLQUDWKHUWKDQDQGIRFXVHVRQWKH¿JXUHRI
black feminist Julia de Lima. According to Wekker’s memory, it was 
de Lima who stepped forward and read a statement criticizing the 
program of the school and accusing the white feminist movement 
of racism. Although de Lima was indeed present at the Winter 
School in 1983, it was actually Troetje Loewenthal who read that 
famous speech. The latter was subsequently published in the Dutch 
Tijdschrift voor Vrouwenstudies (Journal of Women’s Studies) under 
the title “De witte toren van vrouwenstudies” (The White Tower of 
Women’s Studies) (1984). For an account of these events and the 
debates that followed, within the framework of a broader discussion 
of Dutch feminist theorizing on race and racism, see Katrine Smiet, 
“‘Transatlantic Cross-Pollination’: 30 Years of Dutch Feminist 
Theorizing on Race and Racism” (2014).
71. During her interview with me, Wekker says: “the government . . . had 
a subsidy policy to support all kinds of minority organizations, so men 
were very active on that front . . . to get subsidy for their organizations, 
but it was mostly in the social/cultural sphere, to organize get-together’s, 
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in the Turkish and Moroccan community very much around mosques, 
to build mosques. . . . But it wasn’t, you know, a broadPRYHPHQW
they were organizing according to ethnic backgrounds.”
72. My account is necessarily very brief and limited. For the full 
trajectory of the black, migrant, and refugee women’s movement in 
the Netherlands, see the edited volume by Maayke Botman, Nancy 
Jouwe, and Gloria Wekker, Caleidoscopische visies. De zwarte-, 
migranten-, en vluchtelingenvrouwenbeweging in Nederland 
(Kaleidoscopic Visions: The Black, Migrant, and Refugee Women’s 
Movement in the Netherlands) (2001). The book also discusses the 
particular choice of the Dutch movement to name itself as black, 
migrant, and refugee women’s movement. For an account in English, 
see Smiet, “‘Transatlantic Cross-Pollination’: 30 Years of Dutch 
Feminist Theorizing on Race and Racism” (2014). 
 7KH¿JXUHRI)RUWX\QLVFHQWUDO WRWKHVH[XDOL]DWLRQRIWKH³ZDURQ
terror,” which is one of my central concerns in chapter 3. For an analysis 
RIWKLVSKHQRPHQRQLQWKH1HWKHUODQGVZKLFKFHQWHUV WKH¿JXUHRI
Fortuyn, see Stefan Dudink, “A Queer Nodal Point: Homosexuality 
in Dutch Debates on Islam and Multiculturalism” (2017). 
74. Besides the question of who managed to seize the positions of power, 
or perhaps in relation to that question, a history still needs to be written 
of how the epidemic affected white and black gay men differently in 
the Netherlands. Wekker recalls that some of her informants speak 
about a lively Surinamese gay male community in Amsterdam 
that was decimated by the epidemic. See also the documentary by 
Surinamese director Andre Reeder, Aan Niets Overleden (Cause of 
Death: Nothing) (1996). Reeder was also a member of the queer of 
color collective Strange Fruit, active in Amsterdam in the 1990s.
75. As Wekker recalls during her interview with me, Tineke Sumter, 
one of the founding members of Sister Outsider, was previously a 
member of Suho.
76. The COC, the major LGBT organization in the Netherlands, publicly 
supported the presence of the PVV as extra-coalitional partner in 
the government that had to be formed after the elections in 2010. 
COC chairperson Vera Bergkamp stated: “We will not be hijacked 
by the left or the right, but we look where our interests are best 
met. PVV indeed touches a chord with gays. We cannot afford to 
look the other way when people are under duress. Violence against 
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gays has increased according to the police in the past years. Among 
the perpetrators Moroccan boys are overrepresented” (Bergkamp, 
quoted in Wekker 2016, 115).  
77. Duyvendak does mention Strange Fruit, a queer of color collective 
active in Amsterdam from 1989 to 2002 that organized within the 
framework of the national organization COC, although in a critical 
relation with it. Yet, interestingly, in the brief portrait of the group that 
he provides, he avoids mentioning that one of the central concerns of 
the group was precisely how AIDS differently affected queer people 
of color, some of them sex workers. For a comprehensive account of 
the trajectory of Strange Fruit, its work and vision, its relations with 
Sister Outsider, and its tensions with the COC’s structure, see Fatima 
El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational 
Europe (2011, 121-137). El-Tayeb herself has been part of the group 
from 1996 to 2000.
78. For different accounts of the time that Lorde spent in Berlin and of her 
impact on Afro-German women and the Afro-German movement, see 
Dagmar Shultz’s documentary Audre Lorde—The Berlin Years 1984 
to 1992 (2012) and the collective volume edited by Stella Bolaki and 
Sabine Broeck, Audre Lorde’s Transnational Legacies (2015).
79. The reference is to Audre Lorde, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (1982).
 :HNNHUUHFDOOVWKHVDPHLQVWDQFHVRILGHQWL¿FDWLRQLQDGLDORJXHZLWK
Cassandra Ellerbe-Dueck about the impact of Lorde on the Afro-
German and the Afro-Dutch women’s movements: “There were so 
many points of recognition: for instance, the episode when she describes 
little fat Audre with bad eyesight, wriggling between her mother’s legs 
as the mother tries to comb the daughter’s unruly hair. The smells of 
the hair oil and the pain of that episode is so vividly evoked that I 
felt myself back in my own mother’s lap. But I was also breathlessly 
reading Audre’s analyses of the inevitable division of roles between 
black and white lesbians in intimate relationships, where, based on a 
racist-sexist worldview, black women were assigned the butch role 
EHFDXVHWKH\GLGQRWVWDQGDFKDQFHRIEHLQJLGHQWL¿HGZLWKIHPLQLQH
beauty. I had never read anything that was so insightful, poetic, and 
meaningful at the same time” (Ellerbe-Dueck and Wekker 2015, 58).
81. Not only did Lorde labor to get Afro-German women together, 
creating an encounter from which Showing Our Colors HPHUJHG
EXWPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\VKHLQVLVWHGWKDWWKH2UODQGDSXEOLVKLQJKRXVH
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which had translated some of her writings prior to her arrival in 
Berlin, stop translating her own texts and support, instead, a project 
by Afro-German women themselves (El-Tayeb 2011, 66).
82. For an account of the resistances and attacks that the book elicited 
LQ'XWFKPHGLDDQGDFDGHPLDDW WKHWLPHRI LWV¿UVWSXEOLFDWLRQLQ
Dutch in 1984, see Baukje Prins, De onschuld voorbij. Het debat 
over de multiculturele samenleving (Beyond Innocence: The Debate 
DERXW WKH0XOWLFXOWXUDO 6RFLHW\  (VVHG¶V ¿UVW ERRNZKLFK
had been attacked both politically and methodologically, was 
followed by a more theoretically-driven study of everyday racism, 
titled Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory 
and Analysis of the Experiences of Black Women (1991). For a more 
comprehensive account of Essed’s work, see the entry on her in the 
online encyclopedia of Afro-European studies, written by Sabrina 
Marchetti: http://www.encyclopediaofafroeuropeanstudies.eu/
encyclopedia/philomena-essed/ (accessed January 15, 2017). 
83. See Wekker’s own account of her involvement in policy making and of 
WKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVRIWKH¿HOGRI'XWFKDQWLUDFLVWDQGJHQGHUHTXDOLW\
policy from the 1980s to the present, in White Innocence (2016, 52-64).
84. In Wekker’s memory, Lorde was central not only to the development 
of black lesbian feminist organizing in Europe, but to some of her 
own personal choices as well. In her dialogue with Cassandra Ellerbe-
'XHFNVKHUHPHPEHUV³$ERYHDOO>$XGUH@JDYHPHWKHFRXUDJHWR
do what I had dreamed of doing but had not previously had the courage 
to undertake: in 1987 I entered a Ph.D. program at the University of 
California, Los Angeles, where I focused on Afro-Surinamese women’s 
constructions of sexuality” (Ellerbe-Dueck and Wekker 2015, 60). 
85. Wekker’s PhD dissertation was titled ‘I Am Gold Money (I Pass 
Through All Hands, But I Do Not Lose My Value)’: The Construction 
of Selves, Gender, and Sexualities in a Female, Working-Class, Afro-
Surinamese Setting (1992).
86. Wekker’s research on mati participated at a very early stage in 
the transnational turn in gay, lesbian, and queer studies, for she 
conceptualizes the practice and institutions of matiDV¿QGLQJWKHLU
conditions of possibility within the African diaspora. Moreover, The 
Politics of Passion also suggests some of the ways in which mati 
morphed by travelling to the Netherlands from the 1970s onward, 
where it encountered, resisted, or merged with gay and lesbian 
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identity formations. In the context of a discussion of the black lesbian 
feminist genealogy of queer of color critique, it is worth noticing 
that Wekker’s research on mati explored black women’s sexuality 
and sexual formations by placing an unprecedented emphasis on 
sex itself. During a 2009 interview, Wekker answers as follows to 
the interviewer, who asks her to explain the lack of a conversation 
about sex among Caribbean feminists: “I think it’s broader than 
just Caribbean feminists, because I think it’s also true for African-
American feminists. Hortense Spillers’ observation in the early 
1980s that black women are like ‘the beached whales of the sexual 
universe,’ that they’re not speaking, but awaiting their verb, still 
holds true. . . . I think Darlene Clark’s insights are correct when she 
talks about how . . . it became so important for black women to don 
a cloak of asexuality because of the history of black women being 
UDSHG EODFNZRPHQEHLQJ GH¿QHG DV XQUDSHDEOH DOZD\V DOUHDG\
ready to have sex. So black women decided they had to be asexual, 
to perform asexuality. I think that has played a huge role for a long 
time” (Wekker and Gosine 2009, 2). Wekker is not indifferent to the 
hegemonic representations of black women’s sexuality mentioned 
in this passage. At the beginning of the chapter of The Politics of 
Passion devoted to the life narrative of her central informant, Miss 
Juliette, Wekker asks: “how do I tell Miss Juliette’s life history, and 
the sexual stories of other Creole working-class women, in light of 
a dominant Euro-American history of representing black women’s 
sexuality as excessive, insatiable, the epitome of animal lust, and 
DOZD\V DOUHDG\ SDWKRORJLFDO"´ :HNNHU   +RZHYHU WKHVH
questions do not impede her to undertake the task of narrating sex. As 
such, her intervention bears disciplinary implications. As she notes 
in the interview mentioned above, “Gay Studies has engaged with 
sexuality, but Lesbian Studies has engaged more with gender. And so 
whatever it is that lesbians do sexually, we don’t get a very clear view 
of it. I’m pretty much doing away with all these binaries, which keep 
repeating a particular way of looking at the world and I think that’s 
ZKDWXSVHWV >VRPH@VWXGHQWV´ :HNNHUDQG*RVLQH:KDW
are the implications of such observations for the project of queer of 
FRORU FULWLTXHZKLFK ¿QGV LWV JHQHDORJLFDO DQFKRULQJ SRLQW LQ WKH
ZRPHQRIFRORUDQGEODFNOHVELDQIHPLQLVPRIWKHVDQGV"
Both Muñoz and Ferguson insist on how queer of color critique must 
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disidentify with Marxism, black liberation, and queer theory. Yet, if 
we pay particular attention to the domain of the sexual, as Wekker does, 
should not queer of color critique disidentify, at least in part, with black 
OHVELDQIHPLQLVPDVZHOO",WLVLQWHUHVWLQJLQWKLVUHVSHFWWRORRNDW
Muñoz’s reading of Vaginal Creme Davis’ “terrorist drag.” As Muñoz 
points out in 'LVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQV³9DJLQDO'DYLVGLVLGHQWL¿HGZLWK
%ODFN3RZHUE\VHOHFWLQJ$QJHOD>'DYLV@DQGnot the Panthers as a site 
of self-fashioning and political formation. . . . Vintage Black Power 
discourse contained many homophobic and masculinist elements that 
were toxic to queer and feminist subjects” (Muñoz 1999, 99). In this 
passage, the immediate alignment of queers and feminists of color 
WKURXJK WKHLUGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQZLWK%ODFN3RZHU LGHRORJ\ WHQGV WR
obliterate the fact that, by explicitly sexualizing Angela Davis’ name, 
9DJLQDO 'DYLV SDUWO\ GLVLGHQWL¿HG ZLWK EODFN IHPLQLVP 9DJLQDO
Davis herself, quoted by Muñoz, registers the ironic nature of the 
DSSURSULDWLRQ³,ZDVWKH¿UVWRQHLQP\IDPLO\WRJRWRFROOHJH²,
got militant. That’s when I started reading about Angela and the 
3DQWKHUVDQGWKDW¶VZKHQ9DJLQDOHPHUJHGDVD¿OWHULQJRI$QJHOD
through humor” (Davis, quoted in Muñoz 1999, 98). By focusing 
RQWKHVH³OLJKWHU´IRUPVRIGLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQDQGIROORZLQJ:HNNHU¶V
lead in questioning the disciplinary status of the sexual across the 
RYHUODSSLQJ ¿HOGV RI JD\ OHVELDQ DQG TXHHU VWXGLHV PRUH ZRUN
should be done on the relationships between black lesbian feminism 
and queer of color critique.    
87. 7KH WZR IROORZLQJ WH[WV DUH NH\ LQ WKLV UHVSHFW ¿UVW :HNNHU¶V
inaugural address as the chair of Gender and Ethnicity at Utrecht 
University, which discussed the intersectional articulations of power 
LQWKH¿HOGRINQRZOHGJHSURGXFWLRQDQGZDVWLWOHG³1HVWHQERXZHQ
op een winderige plek. Denken over gender en etniciteit in Nederland” 
(Building Nest in a Windy Place: Thinking about Gender and Ethnicity 
LQWKH1HWKHUODQGVVHFRQGDQHVVD\VKHZURWHZLWK+HOPD/XW]
that introduced the concept of intersectionality in the Dutch context as 
the offspring of the black, migrant, and refugee women’s movement, 
titled “Een hoogvlakte met koude winden. De geschiedenis van het 
gender- en etniciteitdenken in Nederland” (A Wind-Swept Plain: The 
History of Gender and Ethnicity-Thought in the Netherlands) (2001). 
88. Wekker devotes an entire chapter of White Innocence to the 
FRQWHPSRUDU\DQWL=ZDUWH3LHWPRYHPHQW:HNNHU
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89. In White Innocence, Wekker borrows the notion of “cultural 
archive” from Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (1993). 
)RUDFROOHFWLYHDFFRXQWRIWKHVSHFL¿FLWLHVRI'XWFKUDFLVPZKLFK
includes a contribution by Wekker herself, see the volume edited by 
Philomena Essed and Isabel Hoving, Dutch Racism (2014). 
90. The Diversity Commission was conceived of, from its inception, as a 
temporary institution within the institution, which must work for one 
year and then disappear after having made a difference.
Chapter Three
1. In the passage from which this quote is extracted, Rao is concerned 
ZLWKDVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWSUREOHPWKDWLVWKHGLI¿FXOW\RIDQDO\]LQJ
the global South from other locations in the global South.  
2. That queer diasporic critique is genealogically rooted in the earlier 
work of lesbian feminists of color, and more broadly in transnational 
feminist analyses, is worth remarking. In the introduction to his 
Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men in the Diaspora (2003), Martin F. 
Manalansan IV explicitly recalls this genealogy. His gesture parallels 
that of Ferguson’s in Aberrations in Black, even as Manalansan shifts 
the emphasis from the work of 1980s feminists of color addressing the 
articulations of gender, sexuality, race, and class in the United States 
toward those feminist analyses that most explicitly engaged, already 
at that time, with the transnational dimension of those articulations: 
“This book and the works of the ‘new queer studies’ owe a clear 
intellectual debt to feminist scholars of the ‘politics of location.’ In 
the mid to late 1980s, several feminist thinkers, among them lesbians, 
Third World women, and women of color, began a critique of the 
prevailing feminist construction of woman as a universal category 
and called for the recognition and analysis of the particularities and 
divergences in experiences of women in various parts of the world” 
(7-8). Manalansan’s explicit reference is to the work of Adrienne Rich, 
Chandra T. Mohanty, and Gloria Anzaldúa, among others (see Moraga 
DQG$Q]DOG~D 5LFK >@ 0RKDQW\ *RSLQDWK
goes one step further. Rather than just acknowledging the feminist 
genealogy of queer diasporic critique, she mobilizes a feminist 
vantage point in her own analysis of queer diasporic formations, thus 
DGGLQJ\HWDQRWKHUOD\HURIFULWLTXHWRKHULQWHUYHQWLRQ³>Impossible 
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Desires@SD\>V@VSHFLDODWWHQWLRQWRqueer female subjectivity in the 
diaspora, as it is this particular positionality that forms a constitutive 
absence in both dominant nationalist and diasporic discourses. More 
surprisingly perhaps, and therefore worth interrogating closely, is the 
elision of queer female subjectivity within seemingly radical cultural 
and political diasporic projects that center a gay male or heterosexual 
feminist diasporic subject. Impossible Desires refuses to accede to 
the splitting of queerness from feminism that marks such projects” 
(Gopinath 2005a, 6).
3. To be more precise, Ferguson posits feminist and queer of color 
critique as a necessary mediation and point of support for the 
emergence of a truly postnationalist turn in American studies. A 
postnationalist American studies, he argues, cannot simply articulate 
a critique of U.S. nationalism through the historical subjects 
foregrounded by cultural and revolutionary nationalist projects, for 
these obliterate “the gender and sexual heterogeneity that composes 
social formations” and thus collude with both U.S. nationalism and 
liberal ideology on the terrain of heteropatriarchy (Ferguson 2004, 
139). Registering this discussion, Gopinath notes that “queer of color 
critique, as Ferguson articulates it, explicitly rejects the parochialism 
of American studies as well as the underlying heteronormativity 
of even its postnationalist versions” (Gopinath 2005b, 159). Thus, 
despite its primary focus on the context of the United States, 
³)HUJXVRQ¶VDQDO\VLVSRLQW>V@WRWKHLQDGHTXDF\RIQDWLRQEDVHG
conventional area-studies approaches to theorizing the production of 
modern racial and sexual formations” (159).
 , PXVW QRWH WKDW , ORFDWH 5HGG\¶V ZRUN ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOG RI TXHHU
GLDVSRULF FULWLTXH HYHQ DV KH H[SOLFLWO\ LGHQWL¿HV KLV RZQDQDO\VLV
as an instance of queer of color critique and does not posit any 
difference between the two. Indeed, as I have been arguing so far, a 
distinction between the two theoretical formations can be established 
only provisionally and precariously.
5. Reddy reports the following long passage from the testimony that 
Rahman delivered at a symposium on ‘Shifting Grounds for Asylum: 
Genital Surgery and Sexual Orientation,’ which took place at the 
New York University School of Law on October 16, 1997: “I came 
to the United States from Pakistan in 1991 as a student. I had come 
to the United States because I had a thought that coming out as a gay 
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man would be safer for me in this country. After graduating in 1995, 
I moved to New York City and became a member of the South Asian 
Lesbian and Gay Association, SALGA. I had realized that going back 
to Pakistan was not an option for me anymore. I would not be able 
to do the kinds of work that I wanted to do with safety in Pakistan. 
There is no infrastructure in place in Pakistan where I could obtain 
legal recourse if threatened for being queer. As queer immigrants in 
this country are usually placed outside immigration law, applying 
for asylum seemed to be the only strategy where I did not feel that 
I was compromising myself as a gay man. Heterosexual marriage 
and working a job I did not like for years to get a green card did not 
seem like attractive choices. Choosing to apply for asylum instead 
of availing myself of other options also became a political choice. 
Furthermore, I strongly believed in my claim and felt that under U.S. 
LPPLJUDWLRQODZ,¿WWKHFDWHJRULHVRIDV\OXP,GLGKDYHDJHQXLQH
fear that if I led life as an openly gay man in Pakistan, my life would 
EH LQ GDQJHU´ 5DKPDQ TXRWHG LQ 5HGG\   5HGG\ ¿UVW
offered his analysis of the “gay Pakistani immigrant” in an essay titled 
“Asian Diaspora, Neoliberalism, and Family: Reviewing the Case for 
Homosexual Asylum in the Context of Family Rights” (2005). The 
same essay appears as the third chapter of Freedom with Violence. 
6. The Audre Lorde Project is a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Two Spirit, 
Trans, and Gender Non Conforming People of Color center for 
community organizing, based in New York City and working for 
social and economic justice. The report to which Reddy makes 
reference in this passage, realized by himself and Natalie Bennett, 
is titled Communities at a Crossroads: U.S. Right Wing Policies and 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Two Spirit and Transgender Immigrants of 
Color in New York City (2004).  
7. To make that argument, one need not assume, as Reddy seems to do, 
that heteropatriarchy within diasporic formations is simply an effect 
of state migration management. Earlier in his analysis, Reddy himself 
points out that “Rahman’s discourse marks a certain liminality within 
both normative diasporic formations and the nation-state, each 
of which is dependent upon the racialized institutions of kinship 
and family” (Reddy 2011, 151). Hence, he seems to suggest, like 
Gopinath and Ferguson respectively do, that among the targets of 
queer diasporic critique is also the heteropatriarchy articulated within 
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diasporic formations in a relation of relative autonomy (or even 
antagonism) to the state. In other words, diasporic heteropatriarchy 
works in articulation with state racism and heteropatriarchy, not 
just as its by-product. Similarly, one need not work through a purely 
instrumental and negative notion of ideology, as Reddy seems 
to do when he posits that the liberal ideology of universal sexual 
freedom serves only to “mask” the state’s incitement of diasporic 
heteropatriarchy in the service of capital accumulation, that is, 
for the production of a racialized and gendered labor force. A less 
reductionist notion of ideology, such as the one proposed by Hall in 
WKHVLVHQWLUHO\VXI¿FLHQWWRXQHDUWKWKHVRFLDOFRQWUDGLFWLRQV
of concern to Reddy’s analysis. Avoiding the deployment of a purely 
negative notion of ideology does make a difference especially in this 
context, for it helps the critic not to disqualify, if only implicitly, 
both the experience of those queers who do claim asylum in Europe 
or the United States, like Saeed Rahman, as well as the experience 
of those who labor and mobilize to make such claims possible in the 
¿UVWSODFH,QWKLVFRQWH[WLWLVDOVRZRUWKPHQWLRQLQJWKDW5KDPDQ
himself is to a large extent aware of the complexities of his social 
location as a gay Pakistani asylum seeker in the United States. Alisa 
Solomon, who conducted an interview with him on this matter, 
writes: “The legal scholar—and gay Pakistani immigrant—Saeed 
Rahman has explained how he found that winning his asylum claim 
in 1997 meant demonizing Pakistan in ways that were painful to him, 
as though showing how impossible it is for a gay man to live openly 
there required a thorough, even colonialist, indictment of the entire 
culture. At the same time, Rahman found he was expected to ‘buy 
into a simple discourse of how wonderful America is.’ Dreaming of 
coming here, he had ‘felt that in America I could live freely. Even if 
one is harassed or attacked for being gay, there’s recourse to the law. 
But that narrative didn’t factor in that I was non-white and going 
to be an immigrant’” (Solomon 2005, 20). This passage shows that 
Rahman made use of the asylum system available to him even as he 
refuses, from a queer of color diasporic vantage point, to articulate 
the United States as a site of freedom and safety.      
8. For a good overview of diasporic critique within cultural studies, 
ranging from the foundational essays by Hall and Gilroy to more 
recent interventions, including Gopinath’s and Manalansan’s, see the 
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volume Theorizing Diaspora (2003), edited by Jana Evans Braziel 
and Anita Mannur. For other collective volumes on queer diaspora, 
see Q & A: Queer in Asian America (Eng and Hom 1998) and Queer 
Diasporas3DWWRQDQG6iQFKH](SSOHU
9. Puar and Rai refer to the summary of the lectures that Foucault gave 
DW WKH &ROOqJH GH )UDQFH LQ  ¿UVW SXEOLVKHG LQ )UHQFK LQ
1999 and later in English under the title Abnormal)RXFDXOW>@
2003). The version of the summary to which Puar and Rai refer was 
published earlier, in a volume of Foucault’s writings edited by Paul 




generally, in his writings on the different technologies of power that 
he terms sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics, Foucault counters 
his own tendency to posit the relation between them as a temporal 
sequence by emphasizing that they rather penetrate one another. In 
Security, Territory, Population, for instance, he writes: “There is not 
WKH OHJDODJH WKHGLVFLSOLQDU\DJHDQG WKHQ WKHDJHRI VHFXULW\ >RU
ELRSROLWLFV@    ,QUHDOLW\\RXKDYHDVHULHVRIFRPSOH[HGL¿FHV LQ
which, of course, the techniques themselves change and are perfected, 
or anyway become more complicated, but in which what above all 
changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system 
of correlations between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary 
PHFKDQLVPVDQGPHFKDQLVPVRIVHFXULW\´)RXFDXOW>@
11. Of course, 9/11 should not be understood as the absolute starting 
point of such a disarticulation. However, Puar and Rai are correct 
LQ LGHQWLI\LQJ WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK WKH VSHFL¿F SROLWLFRLGHRORJLFDO
FRQWH[WRIWKH³ZDURQWHUURU´DFFHOHUDWHGDQGLQWHQVL¿HGWKHSURFHVV
12. In this essay, Puar and Rai make only a passing remark on queer 
diasporic formations, emphasizing their silence: “While the revival 
of Sikh middle-class ‘good citizenship’ nationalist pride threatens 
to hinder possible coalitions across class, race, and sexuality, South 
Asian queer organizations have been relatively quiet about the racist 
backlash. Turbans have never been viewed as very queer-friendly, 
at least not in the diaspora. Community-based antibacklash/war 
organizing efforts—for example, a recent vigil in Jackson Heights, 
New York, organized by International South Asia Forum—have been 
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conspicuously ‘straight’” (Puar and Rai 2002, 139). 
13. On the activation of anti-intellectual censorship of public critique in 
the aftermath of 9/11, see Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers 
of Mourning and Violence (2004a), especially chapter 1.
14. On the one hand, Puar contests on concrete grounds the very claim 
of exceptionality. This is indeed how she opens her essay: “The 
torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib is neither exceptional nor 
singular, as many people, including Donald Rumsfeld, the Bush 
administration, the U.S. military establishment, and some good 
liberals would have us believe. The opposite is shown by the prison 
guard backgrounds of several soldiers facing prosecution for the 
Iraqi prisoner situation and by the incarceration practices within the 
U.S. prison industrial complex or even by the brutal sodomizing of 
Abner Louima by New York police” (Puar 2004, 522). On the other 
hand, pointing at the “disgust” articulated by both state and popular 
reactions to the pictures, she rightfully asks: “What is ‘disgusting,’ 
D FRPPRQO\ XVHG ZRUG RI GHVFULSWLRQ DERXW WKHVH SKRWRV" 86
soldiers grinning, stupidly waving their thumbs in the air, the depicted 
sex acts themselves, simulated oral and anal sex between men, or the 
IDFWWKDWWKHSKRWRVZHUHWDNHQDWDOO"$QGZK\DUHWKHVHSKRWRVDQ\
more revolting than pictures of body parts blown apart by missiles 
DQG H[SORVLYHV"$PLGVW%XVK¶V FODLPV WR WKH FRQWUDU\ WKH DFWLRQV
of the U.S. military in Saddam’s former torture chambers certainly 
narrows the gap between us and them—between the patriot and the 
terrorist” (523). Thus, she does not only question the exceptionality 
RIWKHWRUWXUHSUDFWLFHVGHSOR\HGE\86PLOLWDU\RI¿FHUVEXWDOVR
the articulations of U.S. exceptionalism informing such reactions. 
15. The reference is to liberal New York Times journalist Thomas 
Friedman (Puar 2004, 523).
16. The reference is to socialist feminist Barbara Ehrenreich (Puar 2004, 528).
17. In her own reading of the Abu Ghraib scandal, Judith Butler makes 
clear that the tortures perpetrated on Iraqi prisoners did not just exploit 
the presumed misogyny and homophobia of the victims, but actively 
engaged in the work of producing those victims as misogynist and 
homophobic, according to the Orientalist script: “The point is not 
simply to break down the codes, but to construct a subject that would 
break down when coercively forced to break such codes—and I 
suppose we have to ask—which subject would not break down under 
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WKRVHFRQGLWLRQV"´%XWOHU
18. The Al-Fatiha Foundation, once based in the United States and now 
dissolved, was founded by Alam (a Pakistani American) in 1997. I 
return on Puar’s and Massad’s respective critiques of Alam and Al-
Fatiha later in this chapter.
19. For a reading of homonationalism through the Gramscian concept 
of integral state, see Gianfranco Rebucini, “Integral State, Historical 
Bloc and Homonationalism in France. A Gramscian Analysis of 
Neoliberal ‘Equality Politics’” (2013b).
20. See chapter 1, note 12.
21. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault outlines his method 
as follows: “instead of reconstituting chains of inference (as one 
often does in the history of the sciences or of philosophy), instead 
of drawing up tables of differences (as the linguists do), it would 
GHVFULEHV\VWHPVRIGLVSHUVLRQ´)RXFDXOW>@$QGKH
follows: “Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, 
such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of 
VWDWHPHQWFRQFHSWVRUWKHPDWLFFKRLFHVRQHFDQGH¿QHDUHJXODULW\
(an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), 
we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with 
a discursive formation” (38). The phrase itself “regularity in 
dispersion,” instead, is the way in which Laclau and Mouffe describe 
this early epistemic project of Foucault’s while appropriating it 
in the service of their own discursive rereading of Gramsci: “The 
type of coherence we attribute to a discursive formation is . . . close 
to that which characterizes the concept of ‘discursive formation’ 
formulated by Foucault: regularity in dispersion. In the Archaeology 
of Knowledge, Foucault rejects four hypotheses concerning the 
unifying principle of a discursive formation—reference to the same 
object, a common style in the production of statements, constancy of 
the concepts, and reference to a common theme. Instead, he makes 
dispersion itself the principle of unity, insofar as it is governed by 
rules of formation, by the complex conditions of existence of the 
GLVSHUVHGVWDWHPHQWV´/DFODXDQG0RXIIH>@
22. For instance, in her 2006 essay Puar suggests that the main contradiction 
characterizing homonationalism—that is, the absorption of elements of 
feminist and LGBTQ discourse within heteropatriarchal nationalism—
is stabilized by an Orientalist geographic imaginary that locates proper 
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identity (hetero or homo) in the West and sexual perversity in the 
Middle East (Puar 2006, 68). Drawing on Derek Gregory’s rereading 
of Said’s notion of “imaginative geographies,” she argues that this 
Orientalist imaginary is performative, for its “desired truths become 
lived as truths . . . thus producing all sorts of material traces and 
evidences of these truths, despite what counter-evidence may exist” 
(68). As we saw in her discussion of the different reactions to the Abu 
Ghraib pictures, the United States manages to cohere as a space rid 
of misogyny and homophobia precisely through a scandal involving 
the misogyny and homophobia of the U.S. military, yet displaced on 
the Iraqi population. Hence, Puar argues: “It is through imaginative 
geographies produced by homo-nationalism . . . that the contradictions 
inherent in the idealization of the US as a properly multicultural 
heteronormative but nevertheless gay-friendly, tolerant, and sexually-
liberated society can remain in tension” (68). This ingenious reading, 
however, reduces a fundamentally social contradiction to the internal 
logic of homonationalism as a discursive formation, rather than 
FRQFHSWXDOL]LQJ KRPRQDWLRQDOLVP LWVHOI DV D ÀH[LEOH LGHRORJLFDO
formation able to articulate heterogeneous interests into a hegemonic 
bloc and thus win over the consent of heterogeneous social segments. 
On the concept of “imaginative geographies” to which Puar refers, 
see Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978a) and Derek Gregory, The 
Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq (2004).
23. In his different writings and lectures on the matter, Foucault tends 
to analyze the emergence of disciplinary power and biopolitics (as 
well as the whole series sovereignty-discipline-biopolitics) as an 
historical sequence. Yet at the same time, he repeatedly makes clear 
that these different technologies of power must not be regarded as 
progressively replacing one another. See note 10.
24. Foucault also argues that sexuality constitutes a major site for the 
articulation of discipline and biopolitics: “On the one hand, sexuality, 
being an eminently corporeal mode of behavior, is a matter for 
individualizing disciplinary controls. . . . But because it also has 
procreative effects, sexuality is also inscribed, takes effect, in broad 
biological processes that concern not the bodies of individuals but . . . 
the multiple unity of the population. Sexuality exists at the point where 
ERG\DQGSRSXODWLRQPHHW´)RXFDXOW>@
25. Neither Puar nor Mbembe propose that necropolitics simply contradicts 
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or displaces Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary and biopolitical 
technologies of power. Mbembe coins the concept of necropolitics by 
looking at the space of the colony and at the Apartheid regime, hence 
implicitly signaling the limited applicability of Foucault’s analysis 
DFURVV WKH LPSHULDOGLYLGH+RZHYHUZLWK VSHFL¿F UHIHUHQFH WR WKH
current occupation of Palestine, he writes: “Late-modern colonial 
occupation differs in many ways from early-modern occupation, 
particularly in its combining of the disciplinary, the biopolitical, 
and the necropolitical” (Mbembe 2003, 27). Puar, in turn, observes: 
“Many accounts of contemporary biopolitics . . . foreground either 
UDFHDQGVWDWH UDFLVPRUDV -XGLWK%XWOHUGRHV WKH UDPL¿FDWLRQRI
the emergence of the category of ‘sex,’ but rarely the two together. 
In this endeavor I examine the process of disaggregating exceptional 
queer subjects from queer racialized populations in contemporary 
U.S. politics rather than proffer an overarching paradigm of 
biopolitical sexuality that resolves these dilemmas. By centering 
race and sexuality simultaneously in the reproduction of relations of 
living and dying, I want to keep taut the tension between biopolitics 
and necropolitics. . . . This bio-necro collaboration conceptually 
acknowledges biopower’s direct activity in death, while remaining 
bound to the optimization of life, and necropolitics’ nonchalance 
toward death even as it seeks out killing as a primary aim” (Puar 
2007, 35). The reference at the beginning of this passage is to Judith 
Butler’s essay “Sexual Inversions” (1993b).
26. Although I emphasize the formation of “queer necropolitics” as a 
key theoretical axis of Puar’s analysis and as a new terrain of queer 
critique, in the introduction to the book Puar proposes three other 
conceptual constructs that build on the notion of biopolitics and 
guide her analysis throughout Terrorist Assemblages. First, “U.S. 
sexual exceptionalism,” which brings together the representation 
RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DV H[FHSWLRQDOO\ WROHUDQW RI VH[XDO GLYHUVLW\
the exceptional and precarious incorporation—necessary to that 
representation—of elements of feminist and LGBTQ discourses 
LQWR 86 KHWHURSDWULDUFKDO QDWLRQDOLVP DQG ¿QDOO\ SHUKDSV PRVW
importantly, the exceptional suspension of the limits of state power 
that the United States—not only, but also through the articulation of 
this sexual exceptionalism—legitimize for themselves in times of war 
(Puar 2007, 3-11). Second, “queer as regulatory,” which indicates the 
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shift of queerness from a predominantly disciplinary apparatus to a 
biopolitical technology of population management (11-24). Third, “the 
ascendancy of whiteness,” by which Puar means the incorporation of 
“proper” ethnic difference (middle-class and straight) into a neoliberal 
politics of multicultural equality. According to Puar, as much as 
homonormativity supplements rather than replacing or displacing 
heteropatriarchy, the incorporation of the “proper” ethnic—versus the 
racialized other—supplements the hegemony of whiteness. Moreover, 
in her view, it is this incorporation of the middle-class straight ethnic, 
hand-in-hand with the emergence of homonormativity, that produces 
the basic norm of homonationalism: the homosexual other is white, 
the racial other is straight (24-32). In the introduction to Terrorist 
Assemblages, Puar also highlights the role played by the religion/
secularism divide in the formation of homonationalism: “Queer 
secularity demands a particular transgression of norms, religious 
norms that are understood to otherwise bind that subject to an 
especially egregious interdictory religious frame. The queer agential 
subject can only ever be fathomed outside the norming constrictions 
RI UHOLJLRQ FRQÀDWLQJ DJHQF\ DQG UHVLVWDQFH´  7KLV SDVVDJH
RSHQVRQWR D FRQWHPSRUDU\¿HOGRI IHPLQLVW DQGTXHHU DQDO\VHVRI
the relation between sexual politics and the religion/secularism 
divide, in what have sometimes been termed “postsecular” times. 
For the postsecular, see Judith Butler, Jürgen Habermas, Charles 
Taylor, and Cornel West, The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere 
:LOOLDP ( &RQQROO\Why I Am Not a Secularist 
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age  0LFKDHO :DUQHU -RQDWKDQ
VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun, Varieties of Secularism in a 
Secular AgeDQG5RVL%UDLGRWWL%ROHWWH%ODDJDDUG7RELMQGH
Graauw, and Eva Midden, Transformations of Religion and the Public 
Sphere: Postsecular Publics  IRU D IRXQGDWLRQDO IHPLQLVW
reconceptualization of agency and resistance from the vantage point 
of religious formations, see Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The 
Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject IRUDQDQDO\VLVRI
the relation between sexual politics and secularism in the context of 
the “war on terror,” see Judith Butler, “Sexual Politics, Torture, and 
6HFXODU7LPH´IRUDFROOHFWLRQRISRVWVHFXODUDQGWKHRORJLFDO
engagements with Puar’s work, see the special issue of Culture and 
Religion edited by Melissa M. Wilcox, titled “Terrorist Assemblages 
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0HHWVWKH6WXG\RI5HOLJLRQ5HWKLQNLQJ4XHHU6WXGLHV´IRU
a critique of the debate on homonationalism and the postsecular turn 
in queer postcolonial theory, because of its failure to properly address 
the violence exercised by religious formations on sexual minorities, 
see Nikita Dhawan, “The Empire Prays Back: Religion, Secularity, 
and Queer Critique” (2013).              
27. See also the special issue edited by Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and 
Posocco, “Murderous Inclusions” (2013).
28. Interestingly, in Queer Lovers and Hateful Others: Regenerating 
Violent Times and Places (2015), Haritaworn shifts back and forth 
between a focus on the biopolitical/necropolitical management of 
bodies and populations and an analysis of the ideological construction 
of consent. Through explicit reference to Policing the Crisis, 
Haritaworn suggests that the emergence of “Muslim homophobia” 
in contemporary Germany be understood within a historical chain of 
moral panics and within the longer history of European racism and 
colonialism (6-8). Conversely, the “queer lover” is conceptualized 
as “a transitional object that eases the shift from a welfare to a 
neoliberal regime, and ushers us into consent with techniques and 
horizons that would not otherwise be palatable” (35). Thus, the 
“queer lover” and the “hateful other” form, in fact, an ideological 
pair. However, the privileging of such a reading is at least in part 
contradicted in other passages: “Foregrounding a transnational race, 
gender and disability studies lens and placing it in critical dialogue 
with affect studies and scholarship on biopolitics and necropolitics, 
I argue that the hate/crime paradigm travels within a context where 
capital, identity moulds and carceral and biomedical methods cross 
borders instantly, while critiques and alternatives often do not” (126). 
Queer Lovers and Hateful Others seems to suggest an interesting 
encounter between queer necropolitics and the analysis of hegemonic 
formations, yet Haritaworn tends to by-pass the tensions between 
the two approaches, shifting seamlessly from one to the other. For 
other analyses of homonationalism in the context of European social 
formations, see Jin Haritaworn, Tamsila Tauqir, and Esra Erdem, 
“Gay Imperialism: Gender and Sexuality Discourse in the ‘War on 
7HUURU¶´RQ%ULWDLQ3DXO0HSVFKHQ-DQ:'X\YHQGDNDQG
Evelien H. Tonkens, “Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural 
&LWL]HQVKLS LQ WKH1HWKHUODQGV´RQ WKH1HWKHUODQGV-XGLWK
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Butler, “Sexual Politics, Torture, and Secular Time” (2008), on the 
1HWKHUODQGV DQG)UDQFH DQGeULF )DVVLQ ³1DWLRQDO ,GHQWLWLHV DQG
Transnational Intimacies: Sexual Democracy and the Politics of 
Immigration in Europe” (2010), on some of the differences between 
Europe and the United States. Puar herself refers to the Dutch and 
the British contexts as key sites of emergence of homonationalism 
(Puar 2007, 11-21). In European Others: Queering Ethnicity in 
Postnational Europe (2011), with a particular focus on the Dutch and 
German social formations yet looking at the European postnational 
space as a whole, Fatima El-Tayeb discusses homonationalism 
within the broader problematic of the intersections between gender, 
sexuality, race, and citizenship in contemporary Europe. She does so 
from a queer of color and queer diasporic vantage. 
29. Gianfranco Rebucini correctly points out that Puar deploys assemblage 
not only as concept, but also as method: “Jasbir Puar uses an original 
method to detect the sites of emergence of homonationalism in the 
United States. She is interested in both cultural phenomena that may 
seem trivial, such as the cartoon South Park (very popular and also 
intended for an adult audience), and in certain cultural phenomena 
and events related to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, she 
constructs what she calls assemblages,QIDFWWKHVH>DVVHPEODJHV@
a concept that she borrows from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
refer to . . . the composition of elements of discourse that are 
apparently disarticulated, but that drawn together reveal a very 
convincing critical coherence” (Rebucini 2013a, 78. My translation). 
Assemblage as concept and assemblage as method overlap. Indeed, 
as I already mentioned, Puar herself points out that this assembling of 
different sites of articulation is the best way to expose the contingency 
of homonationalism as a political formation.
30. For a number of discussions of the relation between assemblage 
and articulation, see Arturo Escobar, Territories of Difference: 
Place, Movements, Life, Redes  -HQQLIHU 'DU\O 6ODFN DQG
-0DFJUHJRU:LVH ³$UWLFXODWLRQ DQG$VVHPEODJH´ 'DYLG
)HDWKHUVWRQH ³2Q $VVHPEODJH DQG $UWLFXODWLRQ´  DQG
Alexander G. Weheliye, “Assemblages: Articulation” (2014). 
31. I borrow the phrase from Clare Hemmings’s critique of the “affective 
turn,” in “Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological 
Turn” (2005).
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32. Yet, unlike other participants in the “ontological turn,” Puar does not 
dismiss representation as a necessary terrain for critical theory. Upon 
registering what she terms a “somewhat circuitous debate about the 
relationship of affect to representation”—a debate which tends to 
posit a split between those who focus on pre-social and pre-subjective 
affect (ontology) versus those who work on emotion, that is, the form 
taken by affect through its cultural representations and circulations, 
which the critic must decode (epistemology)—Puar, whose work 
unmistakably privileges the notion of affect foregrounded by the 
“ontological turn,” nonetheless remarks: “The collective project, 
since all we can really enact is a representational schema of affect, 
is what we are now developing: an epistemology of ontology and 
affect” (Puar 2007, 207). For a feminist analysis of emotion, instead, 
see Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004). For an 
excellent Marxist critique of the “ontological turn” in anthropology, 
see David Graeber, “Radical Alterity is Just Another Way of Saying 
‘Reality’: A Reply to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro” (2015). 
33. Perhaps more concretely, Puar suggests that identity politics colludes 
with diversity management and liberal multiculturalism, hence “with 
the disciplinary apparatus of the state—census, demography, racial 
SUR¿OLQJ VXUYHLOODQFH²LQ WKDW µGLIIHUHQFH¶ LV HQFDVHG ZLWKLQ D
structural container that simply wishes the messiness of identity into 
a formulaic grid” (Puar 2007, 212). To a certain extent, she is right. 
But, that such state practices occupy the politico-ideological terrain 
of identity is no reason for a counter-hegemonic project to abandon it 
altogether. On the contrary, as I argued in the previous two chapters 
following both Hall and Duggan, that terrain must be sized if a 
counter-hegemonic project is to effectively articulate and transform 
WKH¿HOGRIFRPPRQVHQVHDWLWVGLVSRVDO0RUHRYHULWLVWKHODERURI
feminist, queer, and antiracist political formations that has historically 
produced identity as a key terrain of struggle. To abandon it because 
of its opening to exploitative or oppressive practices (by the state 
or any other political subject) means cultivating the fantasy that 
we may produce political practices and languages that are radically 
resistant to contradictory articulations. Laclau and Mouffe’s warning 
is worth recalling here: “There is . . . no subject—nor, further, any 
‘necessity’—which is absolutely radical and irrecuperable by the 
dominant order, and which constitutes an absolutely guaranteed 
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point of departure for a total transformation” (Laclau and Mouffe 
>@  $V DQ DOWHUQDWLYH WR LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV 3XDU
proposes to move toward “affective politics.” The latter, however, 
necessarily lacks precise contours: “There is no entity, no identity, 
no queer subject or subject to queer, rather queerness coming forth 
DWXVIURPDOOGLUHFWLRQVVFUHDPLQJLWVGH¿DQFHVXJJHVWLQJDPRYH
from intersectionality to assemblage, an affective conglomeration 
that recognizes other contingencies of belonging (melding, fusing, 
viscosity, bouncing) that might not fall so easily into what is 
sometimes denoted as reactive community formations—identity 
politics—by control theorists” (Puar 2007, 211). As this passage 
shows, this affective politics would be quite literally, in Puar’s view, 
a politics without a subject.
34. In fact, Puar explicitly criticizes queer of color and queer diasporic 
theoretical formations, both because of their deployment of 
intersectionality as well as on more concrete political grounds. 
For instance, she writes: “Queer intersectional analyses challenge 
>TXHHUQHVV¶ SRVVLEOH FRPSOLFLWLHV ZLWK UDFLDO FODVV JHQGHU DQG
FLWL]HQVKLS SULYLOHJHV@ EXW LQ GRLQJ VR PD\ IDLO WR VXEMHFW WKHLU
RZQ IUDPHV WR WKHYHU\FULWLTXH WKH\GHSOR\    >4@XHHURIFRORU
and queer immigrant communities (not to mention queer of color 
critique) are always beyond reproach, an untenable position given 
the (class, religious, gender-queer, national, regional, linguistic, 
generational) tensions within, among, and between queer diasporic, 
immigrant, and of color communities, thus obfuscating any of 
their own conservative proclivities. Conversely, it also holds queer 
of color organizing and theorizing to impossible standards and 
expectations, always beholden to spaces and actions of resistance, 
transgression, subversion” (Puar 2007, 23). In this passage, Puar 
VHHPVWREHFULWLFL]LQJWKHKHJHPRQL]DWLRQRIUDFHZLWKLQ WKH¿HOG
of queer theory, a struggle to which her own work nonetheless 
contributes. I suggest that the type of discontent articulated by Puar 
(and many others today) derives, in part, from a misreading of the 
practice of intersectionality within contemporary queer theory. As I 
argued in the second chapter, the latter should not be understood just 
as a pluralist call for inclusion—hence Puar’s critique of its failure to 
equally thematize the differences within queer of color and diasporic 
formations themselves—but rather as an hegemonic struggle around 
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race: a process of recomposition.
35. Puar follows: “But to render intersectionality as an archaic relic of 
identity politics bypasses entirely the possibility that for some bodies 
. . . discipline and punish may well still be a primary apparatus of 
power” (Puar 2012, 63). In this passage, rather than entirely dismissing 
intersectionality and identity politics (and with them, discipline), 
Puar seems to suggest that discipline be understood as a residual 
technology of power operating within social formations otherwise 
primarily characterized by biopolitical technologies of control. 
Thus, her reading resembles Foucault’s own understanding of the 
function of murder as a residue of sovereign power operating within 
disciplinary and biopolitical regimes. This partially contrasts with 
Puar’s own insistence, in Terrorist Assemblages, that discipline and 
biopolitics work together and through one another, as Foucault himself 
maintained. There, she even argues that both discipline and biopolitics 
challenge identity politics and intersectionality: “Foucault’s own 
provocations include the claim that sexuality is an intersection, rather 
than an interpellative identity, of the body and the population. . . . While 
Foucault’s formation hails the feminist heuristic of ‘intersectionality,’ 
unlike intersectional theorizing which foregrounds separate analytics 
of identity that perform the holistic subjects’ inseparableness, the 
entities that intersect are the body (not the subject, let us remember) 
and population” (Puar 2007, 206). In the later essay, instead, she 
seems to locate identity politics within the purview of disciplinary 
power, hence positing the shift toward biopolitical technologies of 
control (diagnosed by Deleuze) as the ground for a necessary turn 
toward a post-identity politics, or what she terms “affective politics” 
(see note 33). Within the economy of this argument, she proceeds to 
offer a residual reading of discipline in order not to entirely dismiss 
intersectional theoretical and political practices.
36. I use the phrase “gay, lesbian, and homosexual,” rather than 
LGBTQ, because this is the phrase that Massad himself most often 
uses in his work.
37. This difference can be partly mapped onto a disciplinary difference 
between Puar and Massad. While Puar’s work is an instance of 
transnational feminist and queer critique that deploys the language 
of contemporary cultural studies, Massad is a professor of modern 
Arab politics and intellectual history. 
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38. The passage in question is the following: “The Gay International 
and this small minority of Arab same-sex practitioners who adopt its 
epistemology have embarked on a project that can best be described 
as incitement to discourse” (Massad 2002, 374). 
39. Later, situating the incitement to discourse more explicitly in relation 
to the formation of the Gay International, Massad writes: “It is in 
the realm of the emergent agenda of sexual rights that made its 
appearance in the United States and other Western countries in the 
late 1960s and began to be institutionalized in the 1980s and 1990s 
that talk of sexual practices in the rest of the world, including the Arab 
world, would be introduced to the international human rights agenda 
and would be coupled with notions of ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ 
behavior. This incitement to discourse on sexual rights outside the 
United States and Western Europe necessitated that human rights 
organizations and advocates incorporate existing anthropological 
knowledge of the non-Western world” (Massad 2007, 37). 
40. Merabet is a queer cultural anthropologist specialized on Syria and 
Lebanon. See his Queer Beirut (2014).
41. For example, Merabet opens his essay as follows: “Beirut can be 
perceived as a social body, with all the complexities of such an 
organism. Lebanon’s capital provides, in fact, the stage for a panoply 
of moods and dispositions which are a dynamic result of particular 
histories and larger socio-historical circumstances” (Merabet 2004, 
30). Morever, the primary scope of his essay is to analyze the 
contradictory articulations of gay or homosexual identity in relation 
to the patterns of post-civil war consumerism in Lebanon. While 
such a reading is not entirely irreconcilable, of course, with insights 
borrowed from psychoanalysis, the merge takes place, in Merabet’s 
argument, without any conceptualization of the frictions between the 
two perspectives. 
42. Interestingly, Merabet himself makes a similar point, even if his 
goal is not to dismiss such sexual formations because of their class 
belonging. Upon noticing that, strictly speaking, it is hard to identify 
D ³JD\ FRPPXQLW\´ LQ%HLUXW KH VSHFL¿HV ³7KHUH DUH RI FRXUVH
some local gay interest groups that have formed since the beginning 
of the decade. For instance, in a Beirut demonstration against the war 
on Iraq in March 2003, the press covered a half dozen individuals 
PDUFKLQJXQGHUQHDWKUDLQERZÀDJV1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKLVDUJXDEO\
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cautious ‘coming out,’ the visibility of local gay advocates within a 
larger public who would actually recognize the symbolic meaning 
RIWKHUDLQERZÀDJUHPDLQVOLPLWHG7KLVOLPLWDWLRQLVSDUWO\GXHWR
WKHSHFXOLDULWLHVRI WKH/HEDQHVH ODZ WKDW FODVVL¿HVKRPRVH[XDOLW\
as a ‘sexual activity that is contrary to nature’ and therefore must 
be suppressed. Moreover, the various demure attempts by some 
PHPEHUVRI WKHVH LQWHUHVWJURXSV WR UHDFKRXW WHQG WREHFRQ¿QHG
ZLWKLQ WKH ERXQGDULHV RI WKHLU RZQ²JHQHUDOO\ DIÀXHQW²VRFLDO
backgrounds” (Merabet 2004, 32). 
43. The reference is to Michael Warner, Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer 
Politics and Social Theory (1993).
44. On the sexual politics of European colonialism, see Robert Aldrich, 
Colonialism and Homosexuality (2003) and Federico Garza Carvajal, 
%XWWHUÀLHV:LOO%XUQ3URVHFXWLQJ6RGRPLWHVLQ(DUO\0RGHUQ6SDLQ
and MexicoRQWKHKRPRHURWLFVRI2ULHQWDOLVPVHH-RVHSK
A. Boone, The Homoerotics of Orientalism RQ WKH OHJDF\
of the colonial export of homophobia, see the report by Human 
Rights Watch, This Alien Legacy: The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws 
in British ColonialismIRUDUHUHDGLQJRI)RXFDXOWWKURXJK
the history of European colonialism, see Ann Laura Stoler, Race 
and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things (1995). 
45. 2Q 0D\   WKH (J\SWLDQ SROLFH²PRUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ WKH
&DLUR 9LFH 6TXDG DQG RI¿FHUV IURP 6WDWH 6HFXULW\ ,QYHVWLJDWLRQV
(Mabahbith Amn al-Dawla)—raided a discotheque located on a boat 
moored in the Nile, in Cairo. Of the 55 men involved, the majority 
were present that night on the boat while the rest were arrested in 
their home or on the street. For an account of the arrests, the trials, 
as well as the tortures to which the men were subjected (including 
anal examinations), see the report by Human Rights Watch, In a 
Time of Torture: The Assault on Justice In Egypt’s Crackdown on 
Homosexual Conduct (2004). 
46. Makarem’s letter, in turn, provoked a new response by Massad, titled 
“I Criticize Gay Internationalists, not Gays” (2009b).
47. In a later essay, titled “The Story of HELEM” (2011), Makarem 
offers a more detailed account of the formation of the group. For 
Helem’s approach to the articulations between sexual politics and anti-
imperialism, see also Jedidiah Anderson, “LGBTIQ NGOs in Lebanon 
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in the Wake of Postcolonialism and Joseph Massad’s Critique” (2014).
48. This point is reiterated in Islam in Liberalism: “Nowhere do I . . . 
HYHUFODLPWKDWWKRVHZKRDGRSW:HVWHUQLGHQWL¿FDWLRQVRIJD\QHVV
(or straightness, for that matter) among Palestinians (or Arabs or 
Muslims) are necessarily not anti-Occupation or that they are not 
part of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli colonialism. Those 
ideologically informed charges betray the inability of those who level 
them to make distinctions between adopting imperial epistemologies 
and ontologies on the one hand and remaining anti-imperialist 
politically on the other, a point I discuss in Desiring Arabs with 
regards to Islamist and secular nationalist Arabs, some of whom are 
complicit with gay and straight internationalism epistemologically 
but are anti-imperialist in their political stances” (Massad 2015, 256).
49. I by-pass Massad’s reference to a complicity “at the level of ontology,” 
or his assertion that those who identify as gays, lesbians, or homosexuals 
in the Arab world “adopt an imperial ontology,” for these are rather 
awkward formulations. I assume that what Massad means is that they 
adopt an imperial understanding of ontology: that is, an epistemology.
50. This does not mean that Terrorist Assemblages and the concept of 
homonationalism have not been the targets of critique. I address 
some of these critiques later in this chapter. For now, let me just 
mention that some critics have found Puar’s analysis unnecessarily 
paralyzing. Consider, as an example among others, Éric Fassin’s 
following statement: “I/we do not want, or so I argue, the dominant 
GLVFRXUVH RI VH[XDO QDWLRQDOLVPV WR GH¿QH P\RXU RZQ GLVFRXUVH
I (at least) do not want this priority to determine all my positions. 
I do not want to abandon my commitment to sexual democracy, 
simply because this rhetoric has been appropriated for purposes that 
go against all my beliefs. I cannot be reduced to the mirror image 
of my enemies. I want to talk about sexual democracy, not just its 
instrumentalization. This is what critical thought is about. It is not 
merely about the denunciation of our opponents’ positions, which 
would only amount to criticism. Critique also entails questioning the 
imposition of the very terms of debate” (Fassin 2011, 267). Fassin 
goes on lamenting that the debate about homonationalism often 
translates into a tendency to “absolve” heteropatrarchy in “Arab 
FXOWXUH´ D SRVLWLRQ KH WHUPV ³FXOWXUDOLVW´ DQG ¿UPO\ UHMHFWV 
272). He made these remarks during the opening plenary of the now 
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infamous ‘Sexual Nationalisms’ conference, held in Amsterdam 
on January 27-28, 2011. In his remarks during the closing plenary, 
Didier Eribon expressed a position similar to Fassin’s, yet adopting 
a far more polemical tone. On the one hand, he suggested that the 
critique of homonationalism has been producing “academic slogans 
that do not have much to do with politics.” On the other hand, in his 
view, this academic mannerism is “always on the verge of becoming 
a queer-stalinism” (Eribon 2011). Unlike the polemics emerged 
around Massad’s work on the Gay International, these critiques do 
not concern the agency of LGBTQ formations in the Arab world or 
elsewhere in the global South (for this is not, indeed, a question raised 
by Puar’s analysis of homonationalism). If any agency is at stake in 
Fassin’s and Eribon’s critiques, it is the agency of Western LGBTQ 
formations. Their main concern seems to be the possibility of keep 
thinking and organizing around sexual politics in the wake of Puar’s 
critique.  
51. Massad dismisses the delegation as part of “the recent trend of 
solidarity tourism to the West Bank that has become fashionable in 
liberal circles in Europe and the United States in the last decade” 
(Massad 2015, 271, n158). For a chronicle of the very emergence of 
the idea of a LGBTQ delegation to Palestine, see Sarah Schulman, 
Israel/Palestine and the Queer International (2012). 
52. For the trajectory of the “Brand Israel” campaign, from its inception 
in 2005 to its progressive expansion to gays and lesbians in 2010-11, 
see Sarah Schulman, “A Documentary Guide to ‘Brand Israel’ and 
the Art of Pinkwashing” (2011). Schulman’s account also registers 
the explicit participation of LGBTQ formations in this expansion of 
the state campaign.
53. I do not question Puar’s (or anyone else’s) deployment of the concept 
in the context of Israel-Palestine. This charge was leveled at her by 
the organizers of a conference on ‘Fundamentalism and Gender’ held 
at the Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany, in 2010 (where she 
was invited as keynote speaker). These critics went as far as to argue 
that the context of Israel-Palestine has no relation with the “war on 
terror” launched by the United States in the aftermath of 9/11. For 
Puar’s own account of this incident, see her “Citation and Censorship: 
The Politics of Talking About the Sexual Politics of Israel” (2011). 
This is not the kind of expansion I mean to signal and criticize. 
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Rather, I question the conceptual expansion of homonationalism in 
Puar’s interventions after Terrorist Assemblages. 
54. Puar made this point at a workshop that took place during the 
conference ‘Affect, Embodiment and Politics,’ organized at the 
Universitat Autònoma of Barcelona, Spain, on February 12-14, 2015. 
55. In registering this expansion of the concept of homonationalism, 
I rely in part on the analysis offered by C. Heike Schotten in 
“Homonationalism: From Critique to Diagnosis, or, We Are All 
+RPRQDWLRQDO 1RZ´  6FKRWWHQ LGHQWL¿HV WKUHH SKDVHV RI
what she regards as a transition from homonationalism as a “critique 
of politics” to homonationalism as a “diagnostic of international 
political relations.” She names the three phases as follows: 
“homonationalism1,” corresponding with the analysis developed 
by Puar in Terrorist Assemblages ³KRPRQDWLRQDOLVP´PDUNHG
E\ D ¿UVW LQWHUYHQWLRQ E\ 0LNGDVKL  RQ Jadaliyya DQG
“homonationalism2,” that is, the deployment of homonationalism as 
co-extensive with imperialism and as a “structure of modernity”—
or, I suggest, as another name for biopolitics—to be found in Puar 
and Mikdashi’s interventions on Jadaliyya as well as in Puar’s 
subsequent writings. Schotten argues that, “in broadening its global 
reach, homonationalism becomes less important politically as either 
DGLVWLQFWSKHQRPHQRQRUDVSHFL¿F WDUJHWRI UHVLVWDQFH´6FKRWWHQ
2016, 362). Her primary concern is that this expansion makes the 
concept less useful for “a critical evaluation of activist movements” 
(366). Indeed, as the title of her essay suggests, the expansion of the 
concept implies that we are all homonationalist now. My concern, 
instead, has less to do with an “evaluation” of political organizing 
than with the problem of theoretical practice: how the concrete 
(including political organizing) can be appropriated in theory while 
preserving its differences and determinations.        
56. In Terrorist Assemblages, Puar makes only brief and scattered 
references to Massad (Puar 2007, 27, 111, 140 n79). In a later 
essay, she cautiously takes some distance from Massad’s analysis 
while suggesting, at the same time, that the emergence of any anti-
imperialist alternative to the Gay International may be halted as long 
DVVH[XDOLW\FRQWLQXHVWREHSULYLOHJHGDVDWHUUDLQRILGHQWL¿FDWLRQ
and political struggle: “while one may disagree with Joseph 
Massad’s damning critique of the ‘Gay International,’ we would do 
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well to ask exactly how the ‘Queer International’ proposed by Sarah 
Schulman is an alternative or antidote to the Gay International. Is it 
the case that simply by virtue of being articulated through ‘queer’ 
rather than ‘gay,’ and through a global solidarity movement, that the 
SLWIDOOV RI WKH JD\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUH UHDOO\ DYRLGHG"´ 3XDU E
37) Sara Schulman formulates the idea of a “Queer International” in 
Israel/Palestine and the Queer International: “The Bolsheviks led 
the Third International—the global coalition of world communist 
organizations, but Leon Trotsky’s concept of permanent revolution 
led to the idealism of ‘the Fourth International,’ in response to 
Stalin’s corruption of revolutionary principle. In his book Desiring 
Arabs, Joseph Massad, a professor at Columbia University and a 
Palestinian, describes the ‘Gay International’ as a Western apparatus 
imposing concepts of homosexuality on Palestinian sex between men. 
All of these factors converged on my use of the ‘queer international,’ a 
worldwide movement that brings queer liberation and feminism to the 
principles of international autonomy from occupation, colonialism, 
and globalized capital” (S. Schulman 2012, 66). By suggesting that 
Schulman’s project reproduces the same pitfalls of the Gay International, 
Puar seems to align herself with Massad’s critique of epistemic, rather 
than political imperialism—indeed, with the argument (which Massad 
IRUPXODWHVDJDLQVW3XDU LQ WKH¿UVWSODFH WKDWQRJOREDOFLUFXODWLRQ
of sexuality can ever take place through non-imperialist channels. 
Mikdashi makes this point against Schulman in an earlier article that 
anticipated some of the arguments put forward by Puar and herself on 
Jadaliyya: “critics of pinkwashing who assume an international queer 
camaraderie repeat a central tenet of homonationalism: homosexuals 
should be in solidarity with and empathize with each other because 
they are homosexual” (Mikdashi 2011).
57. Importantly, Said observes that not only imperialism and anti-
imperialist resistance, but the different resistances emerging across 
the imperial divide—by anticolonial intellectuals and movements in 
the Third World and by anticolonial Europeans in the metropolis—
shared culture as a key terrain of struggle. As he puts it, “we should 
acknowledge that, at both ends of the redrawn map, opposition 
and resistance to imperialism are articulated together on a largely 
common although disputed terrain provided by culture” (Said 
1993, 200). Thus, while Massad is concerned with exposing the 
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“epistemological complicity” with imperialism on the part of LGBTQ 
formations in the Arab world that are in fact politically embattled 
against imperial domination, the Said of Culture and Imperialism 
registers that “complicity” as his very starting point for an analysis 
of anti-imperialist resistance.
58. It is worth repeating that this statement is partly incorrect, for culture 
and ideology do not entirely overlap in Said’s analysis. In the passage 
I just quoted, for instance, he refers to culture as a theater where 
political and ideological struggles are articulated, thus making it 
clear that the terrain of culture is more circumscribed and differs from 
that of ideology in general. According to Said, as I read him, literary 
production is relatively autonomous not only from the political and the 
economic, but also from the terrain of ideology itself, for it possesses 
LWVRZQLQQHUORJLFVDQGJRDOV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWDHVWKHWLFSOHDVXUH
Yet this is fully compatible with Hall’s analysis of the articulations 
between the economic, the political, and the ideological. As I argued 
LQWKH¿UVWFKDSWHUZKLOHGLVFXVVLQJPolicing the Crisis, not only each 
of these levels is relatively autonomous from the others, but also each 
apparatus operating at one level (for instance, the police as a state 
apparatus) functions in part according to its irreducible logics. In this 
view, approaching literature as an ideological formation does not 
PHDQDEDQGRQLQJDIRFXVRQLWVVSHFL¿FORJLFVDQGUXOHVERWKWKRVH
VKDSLQJ WKH ¿HOG DVZHOO DV WKRVH JRYHUQLQJ HDFK OLWHUDU\ REMHFW
From a methodological and disciplinary perspective, this means that 
aesthetic questions concerning the literary object must be kept in 
tension with questions about the politico-economic (and ideological) 
context of its production and consumption. In Orientalism, Said 
suggests that this tension does not equal a trading of aesthetic analysis 
for politico-ideological critique. On the contrary, the tension supports 
a better understanding of literature itself, its production as a complex 
DHVWKHWLF¿HOG ³WREHOLHYH WKDWSROLWLFV LQ WKH IRUPRI LPSHULDOLVP
bears upon the production of literature, scholarship, social theory, 
and history writing is by no means equivalent to saying that culture 
is therefore a demeaned or denigrated thing. Quite the contrary: my 
whole point is to say that we can better understand the persistence 
and the durability of saturating hegemonic systems like culture when 
we realize that their internal constraints upon writers and thinkers 
were productive, not unilaterally inhibiting” (Said 1978a, 14).   
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59. In order to criticize Massad’s overestimation of the power of the 
Gay International—that is, his indifference to concrete relations 
of force—Drucker deploys a similar logic: “In fact, the spread of 
lesbian/gay identities in the dependent world probably owes less to 
RXWVLGHFXOWXUDOLQÀXHQFHVWKDQWRVRFLDOFDXVHVOLNHPDVVPLJUDWLRQWR
FLWLHVPRUHZDJHGODERUE\ZRPHQKLJKHUZDJHVFRPPRGL¿FDWLRQ
of everyday life, assumption of some traditional family functions by 
the state, and the spread of modern medicine with its penchant for 
FODVVL¿FDWLRQ7KHUHODWLYHVFDUFLW\RIOHVELDQJD\LGHQWLWLHVLQ$UDE
countries would then be due less to weaker European and North 
$PHULFDQLQÀXHQFHZKLFKVHHPVGRXEWIXOWKDQWRIDFWRUVOLNHWKH
region’s relatively low rate of female-paid employment” (Drucker 
2008). Thus, ironically, even as Drucker seems to accuse Massad 
of “ideologicisim” (or at least culturalism), both authors implicitly 
share a rather economistic approach to sexual formations.   
60. That this quasi economistic reading makes its appearance in the 
context of an interview, and that Massad’s books and essays in general 
contradict it, does not undermine my argument. For, what I mean to 
identify is not a consistent (but untenable) combination of Foucault 
and economism, but precisely the contradictions between the two 
DSSURDFKHV0RUHRYHU WKLVVSHFL¿FSDVVDJHZDV ODWHU LQFRUSRUDWHG
by Massad in his Islam in Liberalism (2015, 221). Finally, in the 
context of her famous critique of Foucault and Deleuze, which 
primarily focused on a dialogue between the two rather than any 
of their major theoretical works, Gayatri C. Spivak wrote: “I have 
chosen this friendly exchange between two activist philosophers 
of history because it undoes the opposition between authoritative 
theoretical production and the unguarded practice of conversation, 
enabling one to glimpse the track of ideology” (Spivak 1988, 272). 
For the conversation in question, see Michel Foucault and Gilles 
Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power” (1977).
61. Said makes reference, in this passage, to Foucault’s The Archaeology 
of Knowledge>@DQGDiscipline and Punish: The Birth of 
the Prison>@
62. While in the previous passage from Orientalism Said claims to be 
drawing on Foucault’s notion of discourse in general, mentioning 
both The Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish, 
in this later essay he posits a distinction within Foucault’s own 
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theoretical trajectory: “The historical tendency that seems to me 
to have held Foucault in its grip intellectually and politically in his 
last years was one he perceived—incompletely, I think—as growing 
ever more coherent and unidirectional, and it is this tendency that 
carried him over from the differentiations and subtleties within 
power in L’Ordre du discours and L’Archéologie du savoir to the 
hypertrophied vision of power in later works like Surveiller et punir 
and volume 1 of L’Histoire de la sexualité” (Said 1986, 150-151).
63. After a discussion of Foucault, Said’s essay ends as follows: “It 
may seem an abrupt conclusion to reach, but the kinds of theory 
I have been discussing can quite easily become cultural dogma. 
Appropriated to schools or institutions, they quickly acquire the status 
RI DXWKRULW\ ZLWKLQ WKH FXOWXUDO JURXS JXLOG RU DI¿OLDWLYH IDPLO\
Though of course they are to be distinguished from grosser forms 
of cultural dogma like racism and nationalism, they are insidious 
in that their original provenance—their history of adversarial, 
oppositional derivation—dulls the critical consciousness, convincing 
it that a once insurgent theory is still insurgent, lively, responsive 
to history” (Said 1983, 247). For Said’s partial rethinking of his 
pessimistic position regarding the traveling of theory, see “Traveling 
Theory Reconsidered” (1994). Note that this later essay, unlike the 
earlier one, does not mention Foucault but focuses exclusively on 
WKH FLUFXODWLRQV DQG DSSURSULDWLRQV RI /XNiFV¶History and Class 
Consciousness>@
64. For an excellent analysis of both Said’s and Hall’s critiques of 
Foucault, which raises many of the questions I am raising here, see 
Enakshi Dua, “Not Quite a Case of the Disappearing Marx: Tracing 
the Place of Material Relations in Postcolonial Theory” (2014).
65. Foucault does offer some suggestions concerning the articulation of 
resistance. In his view, each point of application of power is also 
a point of support for resistance, and vice versa. Or, to be more 
precise, power is the relationship between power and resistance. In 
WKH¿UVWYROXPHRIThe History of Sexuality, he writes: “Where there 
is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. . . . 
>7KH@H[LVWHQFH>RISRZHUUHODWLRQVKLSV@GHSHQGVRQDPXOWLSOLFLW\RI
points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, 
or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present 
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everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus 
of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure 
law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, 
HDFK RI WKHP D VSHFLDO FDVH´ )RXFDXOW >@  7KLV
understanding of the relations between power and resistance has paved 
the way for a long trajectory of feminist and queer theorizing trying 
to conceptualize resistance and transformation from a Foucauldian 
perspective. Perhaps the most consistent and well-known attempts 
in this direction are to be found in the works of Judith Butler, from 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990) and 
Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (1993a), to 
The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (1997a). 
66. I discuss Foucault’s critique of ideology in some more detail in chapter 1.
67. At the same time, Bernini notes Foucault’s exceptional reference, in 
the passage I just quoted, to the universal: “It seems as if Foucault, 
FRUQHUHGE\KLVREYLRXVPLVUHDGLQJ>RIWKH,UDQLDQ5HYROXWLRQ@LQD
SXEOLFUDWKHUWKDQDFDGHPLFLQWHUYHQWLRQIHHOVREOLJHGEXWDOVR¿QDOO\
authorized to speak up once and for all: respect for each individual’s 
freedom is, for him, a non-negotiable standard of judgment. A 
universal, if you wish, but not an epistemic one: a principle that 
orients praxisHYHQDVLWFDQQRWEHMXVWL¿HGE\theorìa” (Bernini 2013, 
201-202). All translations from Bernini’s essay are mine.
 ,GLVFXVVWKHQRWLRQRIWKHVSHFL¿FLQWHOOHFWXDOLQVRPHPRUHGHWDLOLQ
FKDSWHU,QFKDSWHU,EULHÀ\PHQWLRQWKDWDOVR)HUJXVRQLV
critical of the notion of the organic intellectual. However, he registers 
that the notion was profoundly reconceptualized by Hall and others 
at the CCCS in the context of Thatcherism. In that context, the need 
IRURUJDQLFLQWHOOHFWXDOVZDVDVXUJHQWDVWKHQHHGWRXQGRWKH¿FWLRQ
of transparency between intellectual labor and the social and political 
¿HOG,QRWKHUZRUGVIROORZLQJ)HUJXVRQLWLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRQRWHWKDW
Hall shares some of Foucault’s critiques of the organic intellectual. 
Yet, as is the case with the concept of ideology, the same critiques 
lead Foucault to entirely abandon these Marxist concepts while Hall 
struggles to keep thinking on that terrain. 
69. 7KLV GRHV QRWPHDQ WKDW WKH VSHFL¿F LQWHOOHFWXDO ZLOOIXOO\ LJQRUHV
the context in which resistance to power emerges. In fact, Foucault 
does offer a brief conjunctural reading of the Iranian revolution and 
its aftermath. Upon registering the religious element present in the 
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revolution from the start, he writes: “But should one have expected 
the religious element to quickly move aside in favor of forces that 
ZHUHPRUHUHDODQGLGHRORJLHVWKDWZHUHOHVVµDUFKDLF¶"8QGRXEWHGO\
not, and for several reasons. First there was the rapid success of 
WKHPRYHPHQW UHFRQ¿UPLQJLW LQ WKHIRUPLWKDGMXVW WDNHQ7KHUH
was the institutional solidity of a clergy whose sway over the 
population was strong, and whose political ambitions were vigorous. 
There was the whole context of the Islamic movement: with the 
strategic positions it occupies, the economic keys which Muslim 
countries hold, and its own expansionary force over two continents, 
it constitutes an intense and complex reality all around Iran. With 
the result that the imaginary contents of the revolt did not dissipate 
in the broad daylight of the revolution. They were immediately 
transposed to a political scene that seemed fully prepared to receive 
them but was actually of a completely different nature” (Foucault 
>@<HW WKLVSDVVDJHZKLFKSD\VVRPHDWWHQWLRQ WR
the articulations between politico-economic forces and ideological 
formations, makes its appearance halfway through the article only to 




brought into history, breathing life into it” (452).
70. The reference in this passage is to Foucault, “The Concern for Truth” 
>@
71. The reference in this passage is to Foucault, “The Confession of the 
Flesh” (1980, 199).
 7KH FRQÀLFW GLVFXVVHG E\ 5LWFKLH LQ WKLV HVVD\ LQ VRPH ZD\V
resembles the “culture war” waged by conservative gay men against 
the Esperanza Peace and Justice Center in the late 1990s, mentioned 
in chapter 2.
73. Ritchie notes that among the “good queers” were also Urvashi Vaid, 
Lisa Duggan, and Jasbir Puar (Ritchie 2014, 2). 
74. Importantly, in this essay Ritchie also deploys intersectionality 
against assemblage: “in opposition to Puar’s dismissal of it . . . I 
RIIHU KHUH >LQWHUVHFWLRQDOLW\@ DV D PRUH SURGXFWLYH IUDPHZRUN IRU
understanding the actual operations of power in diverse socio-
historical contexts” (Ritchie 2014, 6). And again: “I employ an 
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intersectional approach that is less concerned with deconstructing 
LGHQWLW\FDWHJRULHV WKDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJKRZµSDUWLFXODUYDOXHV >DUH@
attached to them and the way those values foster and create social 
hierarchies’ (Crenshaw 1991, 1297). . . . There are, after all, still 
some queers who cannot afford to ‘de-privilege the human body as 
a discrete organic thing’ (Puar 2012, 57), and they are constrained 
in their movements by overlapping structures and practices of 
power, which are best understood—and critiqued—not with 
recourse to totalizing theoretical catchwords but by understanding 
the circumstances of their emergence” (7). The references in this 
passage are to Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color” (1991) 
and Puar, “‘I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess’: Becoming-
Intersectional in Assemblage Theory” (2012). When Ritchie states 
that there are still some queers who cannot afford assemblage, he 
ironically reiterates the “residual” reading of intersectionality that 
Puar offers in the very same essay from which he quotes (see note 
35). But his tone is obviously ironic and his comment is meant to 
signal the privileged position from which intersectionality can be 
dismissed as a theoretico-political devise.   
75. Castro Varela and Dhawan offer the example of Section 377 of the 
Indian Penal Code, introduced under British colonial rule in 1860. 
See also note 44.
76. There are certain obvious imprecisions in this passage. These have to 
do with Castro Varela and Dhawan’s attempt, as I read it, to provide an 
DFFRXQWQRWVRPXFKRI3XDU¶VRUDQ\RQHHOVH¶VVSHFL¿FDQDO\VLVEXW
of the circulation of such analyses and their hegemonic effects within 
FRQWHPSRUDU\TXHHU WKHRU\DQG/*%74SROLWLFV)LUVW WKH\DI¿UP
that the queer of color diasporic subject is positioned as “victim” by 
queer of color and queer diasporic analyses in Europe and the United 
States, even as Puar (not to mention Massad) is actually interested in 
that subject’s complicity with the articulations of homonationalism 
and sexual imperialism. Second, Castro Varela and Dhawan tend to 
FRQÀDWH3XDU¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQZLWKWKHEURDGHU¿HOGRITXHHURIFRORU
and queer diasporic critique. But Puar’s analysis, as I have argued, to 
DVLJQL¿FDQWH[WHQWGHSDUWVIURPWKHWKHRUHWLFDOSUDFWLFHVRIWKDW¿HOG
especially through her theoretical undermining of intersectionality. 
Instead, queer of color critique—from Muñoz to Ferguson—is marked 
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by an intersectional attention to the articulations of racism within 
LGBTQ formations and the articulations of heteropatriarchy within 
communities of color (including antiracist political formations). The 
lack of this sort of multidirectional critique is precisely the target 
of Castro Varela and Dhawan’s argument. Thus, their reference to 
WKH¿HOGRITXHHURIFRORUDQGTXHHUGLDVSRULFFULWLTXHDVDZKROH
and their mention, in this passage, of Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia: The 
Then and There of Queer Futurity (2009), does not serve particularly 
well their critique of Puar. 
77. The politics of same-sex marriage is the central topic of Castro 
Varela and Dhawan’s essay. It is in the context of a discussion of 
same-sex marriage that they formulate their critique of queer of color 
and queer diasporic analyses. 
78. In “Homonationalism and State-Phobia: The Postcolonial Predicament 
of Queering Modernities” (2016), Dhawan takes a step further. This 
essay reiterates a critique of both Puar and Massad, yet does not 
position them as representative of queer diasporic theoretico-political 
formations. This would establish a partition between such formations 
and LGBTQ formations in the global South, as her essay with Castro 
Varela tends to do. Here, instead, Dhawan highlights precisely the 
complex position of queer of color and queer diasporic formations in 
Europe and the United States, which Puar’s and Massad’s analyses, in 
her view, cannot account for: “Given the efforts by queer diasporas to 
¿JKWUDFLVPLQPDLQVWUHDPVRFLHW\DQGKHWHURQRUPDWLYLW\LQDQWLUDFLVW
politics, it is irresponsible to neglect the entanglements of racism 
and heterosexism by reducing one to being the cause of the other” 
(58). Moreover, looking at the other side of the transnational divide, 
'KDZDQODPHQWVWKDW³>Z@LWKWKHSULPDU\IRFXVRQµ*D\,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶
and Western ‘homonationalism,’ there is the risk of overlooking 
the well-funded campaigns in postcolonial countries by Western 
‘profamily’ religious organizations to hinder progressive legislation 
or even to introduce coercive ones” (60-61). Thus, Dhawan points 
out that the complex terrain of sexual imperialism cannot be reduced 
to the operations of Massad’s Gay International, but must include 
an account of the involvement of other formations, such as Western 
religious-based movements, in the reproduction of heteropatriarchy 
in the global South. Through the combination of these observations, 
Dhawan moves further in the direction of theorizing the articulations 
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between queer struggles in the global North and the global South. As 
the rest of this section illustrates, this direction is fully developed by 
Rahul Rao’s work. 
 7KHHVVD\ LVDPRGL¿HGYHUVLRQRI WKH ODVWFKDSWHURI5DR¶VERRN
titled Third World Protest: Between Home and the World (2010). 
The book itself, which I cannot discuss here, makes a number of 
arguments that are relevant to my discussion of homonationalism 
DQG VH[XDO LPSHULDOLVP :ULWWHQ ZLWKLQ WKH ¿HOG RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO
relations, its central goal is to explore “the mindsets, orientations, 
and background assumptions of political protest in the Third World” 
(5): what Rao terms “protest sensibilities.” Its core argument is 
that communitarianism (or identity politics) and cosmopolitanism 
(or universalism) are both LQVXI¿FLHQW WRDFFRXQW IRU WKH WHUUDLQRI
Third World political protest and often appear in articulation in the 
counter-ideologies articulated by Third World political movements. 
Thus, Rao analyzes a number of movements that are critical of both 
communitarianism and cosmopolitanism taken in isolation, for they 
“assume that threats to vital interests emanate from both outside and 
LQVLGH WKHQDWLRQVWDWHVZLWKZKLFK WKH\>LGHQWLI\@7KLVDZDUHQHVV
induces a dual movement—a communitarian impulse to construct 
XQL¿HG QDWLRQDO SROLWLFDO DJHQF\ ZLWK D YLHZ WR FRQIURQWLQJ DQ
external threat, and a cosmopolitan inclination to deconstruct that 
community in an effort to civilize its exercise of disciplinary power 
vis-à-vis its own members” (8). 
80. Speaking about motivations, Rao seems to suggest in this earlier 
essay that the subjects of his analysis can be regarded as fully rational 
actors. This allows Katerina Dalacoura (2014) to argue that Rao 
offers a humanist and materialist reading of the Gay International 
as an alternative to Massad’s poststructuralist approach. Dalacoura’s 
analysis of the differences between Rao and Massad—which she 
situates within a broader split between humanism/materialism and 
poststructuralism in postcolonial studies, traceable to Said’s complex 
relationship with Foucault—is valuable in many respects. Yet by 
entirely collapsing materialism and humanism, she goes as far as 
WRVXJJHVWWKDW5DRXQOLNH0DVVDGSRVLWV³>W@KHVHOIGHVFULSWLRQRI
PHQDQGZRPHQLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDVKRPRVH[XDO>DV@WKHUHVXOW
of choice by morally responsible individuals” (1301). However, 
Rao’s work as a whole and especially his most recent analyses of 
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the Ugandan case—discussed later in this section—seem to question 
the assumption of such rational agents, and they do so precisely by 
deploying a materialist approach to hegemonic formations. Thus, 
not only but also in light of Rao’s later interventions, I read this 
HDUOLHU SLHFH DV HPSKDVL]LQJ FRQÀLFWLQJ interests, rather than just 
motivations, across different segments of the Gay International.
81. Tatchell has been at the center of the debate on homonationalism 
and sexual imperialism from its inception. Puar discusses the politics 
of Tatchell and Outrage! in Britain as a key site of articulation of 
homonationalism (Puar 2007, 17-19). See also Jin Haritaworn, 
Tamsila Tauqir, and Esra Erdem, “Gay Imperialism: Gender and 
Sexuality Discourse in the ‘War on Terror’” (2008). For an account 
of Tatchell’s politics within Labour in the 1980s, see Lucy Robinson, 
Gay Men and the Left in Post-War Britain (2007), chapter 6.  
82. Puar seems to suggest as much when she points out, in Terrorist 
Assemblages, that “homosexual subjects who have limited legal 
ULJKWVZLWKLQWKH86FLYLOFRQWH[WJDLQVLJQL¿FDQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO
currency when situated within the global scene of the war on terror” 
(Puar 2007, 4). However, Puar does not distinguish between right-
wing and left-wing formations. 
83. Rao makes a similar argument about international organizations such 
as Amnesty or Human Rights Watch, which equally “‘need’ human 
rights violations abroad as a reason for being, and have an interest 
in framing power struggles in different parts of the world as ‘rights 
violations’ with a view to sustaining particular programmes and 
campaigns” (Rao 2011, 55). 
84. Interviewed by Rao, Tatchell dismisses such critiques as “animated 
by petty local turf rivalries,” arguing that the signing of the statement 
by members of Ugandan groups, for instance, “was precipitated by 
UHVHQWPHQW WKDW >2XWUDJH@ ZRUNHG ZLWK RWKHU JURXSV LQ 8JDQGD´
(Rao 2011, 55). When David Kato, who was among the Ugandan 
signatories, was murdered in 2011, Tatchell did not hesitate to publicly 
state his admiration for Kato’s activism at the same time as he called 
on the Ugandan government to withdraw the Anti-Homosexuality 
Bill, hence ignoring Kato’s own critique of Tatchell’s campaigning 
on LGBT rights in Africa (Tatchell 2011). Rao is correct in pointing 
RXWWKDW³:HVWHUQDFWLYLVWVGHULYHVLJQL¿FDQWQRQPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHV
from their Third World interlocutors: a raison d’etre, legitimation for 
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LQWHUQDWLRQDO DFWLYLVP SURRI WKDW WKHLU DJHQGD UHPDLQV XQIXO¿OOHG
symbols for broader campaigns, prestige with their support base, 
etc.” (Rao 2011, 53). Yet, especially in the case of Tatchell, we may 
specify this argument to note that the extraction of such non-material 
resources can easily occur in the form of unilateral exploitation, 
rather than exchange.
85. See note 44.
86. See, for instance, Kapya Kaoma, Globalizing the Culture Wars: 
U.S. Conservatives, African Churches, & Homophobia (2009) 
and Colonizing African Values: How the U.S. Christian Right is 
Transforming Sexual Politics in Africa .DRPDD=DPELDQ
SDVWRUDQGVFKRODUEDVHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVWKH¿UVWWRH[SRVH
the links between the U.S. religious right and the contemporary rise 
of homophobia across African countries. 
87. As Rao comments, African clergies may have even experienced 
their central role in the struggle over homosexuality within the 
Communion as “a belated moment of decolonisation” (Rao 2014, 
193). For instance, he reports an account of the Conference provided 
by now-retired Archbishop of the Church of Uganda Livingstone 
Mpalanyi Nkoyoyo, in his authorized biography by Hamlet K. 
0EDED]L³>6@RPHELVKRSVIURPZHVWHUQFRXQWULHVKDGDSDWURQLVLQJ
attitude towards the African Church. On the one hand, they believed 
WKDW$IULFDQVZHUHLQFRPSHWHQWLQWKHRORJLFDOUHÀHFWLRQDQGWKHUHIRUH
QRWTXDOL¿HGWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI$QJOLFDQWKHRORJ\
An impression was being made that in the same way the African 
church received the faith from western churches, they were obliged to 
endorse the compromises that the western church had, in many places, 
WDNHQ RQ ERDUG DJDLQVW WKH WHDFKLQJ RI WKH+RO\%LEOH >1NR\R\R@
recalls that there was also a general feeling that the African church 
was severely impoverished, and largely dependent upon western aid 
for her development activities. It was believed that this dependency 
did not give her the authority to take a strong stand in defence of the 
scriptures. . . . The main question that he, and other Ugandan bishops 
anticipated was whether the belief and practice of the Anglican 
Communion would be based upon the teaching of the scriptures or 
whether it would be determined by the practices that had come to be 
accepted in western culture” (Mbabazi, quoted in Rao 2014, 192-193). 
88. In his essay, Rao discusses other instances of stances against 
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KRPRSKRELD UHFHQWO\ DUWLFXODWHG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ¿QDQFLDO
institutions, most importantly the World Bank’s attempts to build 
HFRQRPLFFDVHVIRU/*%7ULJKWV)RULQVWDQFH³>7KH%DQN¶V@
report estimating the cost of homophobia to the Indian economy . . . 
is revealing of the Bank’s emerging interest in queer sexuality. The 
basic argument is simple enough. Homophobia imposes avoidable 
costs on economies by lowering productivity and output as a result of 
employment discrimination, reducing investment in human capital 
as a result of discrimination in education, and widening health 
disparities between heterosexual and queer people thanks to the 
disproportionate risk of HIV/AIDS, violence, depression and suicide 
borne by the latter. . . . There is something profoundly troubling 
about a strategy that makes respect for personhood contingent on 
the promise of that person’s productivity were their personhood to 
be fully recognized” (Rao 2015, 41).   
89. Rao’s explicit reference, in this passage, is to the debate between 
Butler and Fraser on redistribution and recognition, discussed at the 
beginning of the second chapter. Rao questions both Butler’s and 
Fraser’s positions in that debate, as I do, through Duggan’s analysis 
of homonormativity. The latter shows that neither do queer struggles 
necessarily undermine the structures of capitalism, nor can recognition 
and redistribution be considered as disarticulated terrains of struggle 
indifferent to one another: “As Duggan explains it, neoliberals 
blunted the sharp edge of progressive critique by recognizing claims 
to equality while minimizing potential redistributive consequences: 
in essence, they embraced a non-redistributive identity politics. 
The distinction between recognition and redistribution, far from 
marking a real separation between different kinds of injustices as 
suggested by Fraser, is essentially the ruse through which neoliberal 
capitalism pretends to become more inclusive” (Rao 2015, 44). 
However, Rao departs not only from Butler and Fraser, but also 
from Duggan. In his view, Duggan’s analysis is limited by a certain 
voluntarism, in that “the argument proceeds as if things might have 
WXUQHGRXWGLIIHUHQWO\LIRQO\WKHVHDJHQWV>TXHHUVDQGWKHLUSXWDWLYH
HQHPLHVERWKQHROLEHUDOVDQGUHOLJLRXVFRQVHUYDWLYHV@KDGWKRXJKW
or acted in ways other than those in which they actually did” (44). 
Most importantly, according to Rao, “we are tempted to fantasize 
that if LGBT movements had refused the recognition/redistribution 
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distinction, they might not have succumbed to homonormativity in 
the way they did” (44). It is in order to challenge these presumptions 
that he focuses on the material conditions for the production and 
circulation of homophobic ideology, turning to the role played by 
structural adjustments in reshaping the Ugandan social formation. 
However, this critique of Duggan seems to by-pass the problem 
of ideology altogether. If homonormativity is read not as a “thing” 
to which LGBTQ movements “succumbed,” but as a concept (an 
abstraction) by which we can name an ideological formation in 
whose emergence those movements are implicated—where ideology 
is understood not as a smokescreen that simply “tricks” people, but 
as a process productive of common sense—then the analysis of 
homonormativity need not be grounded on the voluntarism of which 
Rao is rightfully suspicious. 
90. Rao’s reference is to the analysis proposed by Joanna Sadgrove, 
Robert M. Vanderbeck, Johan Andersson, Gill Valentine, and Kevin 
Ward in “Morality Plays and Money Matters: Towards a Situated 
Understanding of the Politics of Homosexuality in Uganda” (2012). 
As I mentioned, in “Global Homocapitalism” he also makes explicit 
reference to the analysis of the mugging panic developed by Hall et 
al. in Policing the Crisis (1978). 
 /*%7 FRXSOHV DUH QRZ GH¿QHG E\ WKH ODZ DV ³VSHFL¿F VRFLDO
formations” rather than families, and the article on stepchild adoption 
was scrapped which would have allowed one member of a registered 
couple to legally adopt his or her partner’s children. This article was 
subject to particularly intense debates during the process that led to 
the passing of the law.
92. For different histories of the European construction against its 
own South and East, see Roberto M. Dainotto, Europe (In Theory) 
 )UDQFR &DVVDQR Southern Thought and Other Essays on 
the Mediterranean >@ 0DULD7RGRURYD Imagining the 
Balkans DQG0LOLFD%DNLü+D\GHQ³1HVWLQJ2ULHQWDOLVPV
The Case of Former Yugoslavia” (1995).  
 $OOWUDQVODWLRQVIURP,WDOLDQWH[WVLQWKLVVHFWLRQZKHQQRWVSHFL¿HG
otherwise, are mine.
94. See the massive investigative report (in Italian), titled “Di chi 
parliamo quando parliamo di gender” (Who Are We Talking About 
When We Talk About Gender), published by De Guerre on his 
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blog: https://playingthegendercard.wordpress.com/di-chi-parliamo-
quando-parlano-di-gender/ (accessed January 15, 2017). 
95. These are the magazine Notizie ProVita (ProLife News) and the association 
Giuristi per la Vita (Jurists for Life) (Prearo and De Guerre 2016).
96. The two analyses indeed come together in a forthcoming French publication 
by Garbagnoli and Prearo, titled La croisade “anti-genre” (2017). 
97. The subtitle of Bernini’s article recalls Joan W. Scott’s essay “The 
Uses and Abuses of Gender” (2013), in which Scott addresses the 
anti-gender campaign in France.
98. The Italian “thought of sexual difference” is an approach developed 
especially by the philosophical community Diotima, based in 
Verona. It is the Italian equivalent of the school of thought developed 
in France by Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, and Julia Kristeva.  
99. The text of the letter (in Italian) is available at: http://www.
immaginiamicheravenna.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/LetteraSIS_
genere.pdf (accessed January 15, 2017).
 7KH¿UVWWUDQVODWLRQRIDFROOHFWLRQRI)UHQFKPDWHULDOLVWIHPLQLVWHVVD\V
took place only recently, edited by Garbagnoli and Vincenza Perilli 
and titled Non si nasce donna. Percorsi, testi e contesti del femminismo 
materialista in Francia (One is not Born a Woman: Trajectories, Texts, 
and Contexts of Materialist Feminism in France) (2013).
101. The references in this passage are to Colette Guillaumin, Racism, 
Sexism, Power and Ideology (1995) and Monique Wittig, The 
Straight Mind and Other Essays (1992).
 7KHUHIHUHQFHWR*UDPVFLLVPDGHH[SOLFLWLQDODWHUHVVD\E\=DSSLQR
alone, titled “Sovversione dell’eterosessualità” (The Subversion of 
Heterosexuality) (2015).
103. Butler herself engages with the anti-gender campaign in chapter 9 of 
her Undoing Gender (2004b).
104. 7KLV SRLQW LV SDUWLFXODUO\ UHOHYDQW IRU =DSSLQR DQG $UGLOOL¶V
intervention is also informed by contemporary critiques of 
homonormativity, homonationalism, and sexual imperialism. This 
DVSHFWEHFRPHVPRUHHYLGHQW LQD ODWHUYROXPHHGLWHGE\=DSSLQR
alone, titled Il genere tra neoliberismo e neofondamentalismo (Gender 
Between Neoliberalism and Neofundamentalism) (2016). The idea of 
DFROOHFWLYHYROXPHWRRNVKDSHLQWKHZDNHRI=DSSLQRDQG$UGLOOL¶V
LQWHUYHQWLRQDQGLQWKHPRUHVSHFL¿FFRQWH[WRIDQDFWLYLVWPHHWLQJ
called Gender Panic!, organized in Bologna in December 2015. The 
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goal of the meeting was to elaborate a radical queer response to the 
conservative anti-gender campaign. In the same spirit of the meeting, 
WKHVFRSHRIWKHYROXPHLVWRUHDI¿UPIHPLQLVWDQGTXHHUFULWLTXHV
of liberal sexual politics rather than retreat on a centrist terrain in 
the face of the attack on “gender.” In other words, the problematic 
informing the book is how to respond to the neofundamentalist attack 
ZLWKRXWFROOXGLQJZLWKQHROLEHUDOSURPLVHVRIHTXDOLW\$V=DSSLQR
puts it in the introduction, “the paradox of this crusade is that it forces 
us to resist, yet without desisting” (16). However, the formulation 
of this problematic tends to sever the concrete links between 
QHROLEHUDOLVPDQGQHRIXQGDPHQWDOLVP7REH VXUH=DSSLQR LQVLVWV
that the two seemingly opposite formations in fact converge. In his 
view, they do so to the extent that neofundamentalism struggles to 
re-hierarchize differences while neoliberalism proceeds to naturalize 
WKHP,QHLWKHUFDVHVRFLDOGLIIHUHQFHVDUHVXEWUDFWHGIURPWKH¿HOG
of political struggle. Yet this analysis locates neofundamentalism 
and neoliberalism as the Scylla and Charybdis of contemporary 
TXHHU SROLWLFV UDWKHU WKDQ GH¿QLQJ WKH FRQFUHWH WHUUDLQV RQZKLFK
they might diverge and converge. In other words, the imperative of 
UHVLVWLQJFROOXVLRQDQGUHDI¿UPLQJDTXHHUFULWLTXHRIQHROLEHUDOLVP
in the face of the conservative war on “gender ideology” takes over, 
VLGHOLQLQJDFRQMXQFWXUDODQDO\VLVRIWKHVSHFL¿FORFDWLRQRIVH[XDO
politics in the contemporary European periphery.   
 6HH DOVR WKH YROXPH HGLWHG E\ (V]WHU .RYiWV DQG 0DDUL 3}LP
Gender as Symbolic Glue: The Position and Role of Conservative 
and Far Right Parties in the Anti-Gender Mobilizations in Europe 
(2015) and Weronika Grzebalska, “Anti-Genderism and the Crisis 
of Neoliberal Democracy” (2016).
106. Bernini recalls Butler’s own stance on this matter: “By insisting that 
this will be a persistent and open question, I mean to suggest that we 
make no decision on what sexual difference is but leave that question 
open, troubling, unresolved, propitious” (Butler 2004b, 191-192).
107. The rupture took place on social media. 
108. The series of counter-conferences was organized by the LGBTQIAEF 
&RPPLWWHH *LRUGDQD %UXQD ZKLFK ZDV IRUPHG VSHFL¿FDOO\ WR
counter the advancement of the anti-gender movement in Verona. 
See the website of the Committee: http://comitatagiordanabruna.
blogspot.nl/ (accessed January 15, 2017). 
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Conclusion
1. Hall’s argument bears some obvious resemblances with Jacques 
Derrida’s analysis of the transformations taking place in the 
LQWHOOHFWXDO DQG SROLWLFDO ¿HOGV DIWHU WKH IDOO RI WKH ,URQ &XUWDLQ
in 1989, in Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of 
Mourning and the New International>@
2. The conversation between Laclau and Hall took place during an 
HSLVRGHRIWKH79SURJUDP³'LiORJRVFRQ/DFODX´%URDGFDVWHGRQ
Argentinian television in 2011, the program consisted of ten episodes, 
each of them staging a conversation between Laclau and another 
contemporary critical thinker. The other guests, besides Hall, were 
7RQL 1HJUL eWLHQQH %DOLEDU &KDQWDO 0RXIIH +RUDFLR *RQ]iOH]
*LDQQL9DWWLPR 'RUHHQ0DVVH\ -RUJH$OHPiQ -XGLWK 5HYHO DQG
Jacques Rancière. Thanks to German Eduardo Primera Villamizar for 
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